FOURTH EDITION

THE Crusades

A HISTORY

JONATHAN RILEY-SMITH & SUSANNA A. THROOP

BLOOMSBURY

THE CRUSADES

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A HISTORY

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Jonathan Riley-Smith and Susanna A. Throop

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In Memoriam

Jonathan Riley-Smith

1938–2016

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NOTE ON NAMES AND TERMINOLOGY

One of the most profound and subtle interventions made by modern scholars when writing about the past is their treatment of time, dates, places, and names. These interventions are pervasive and yet may be unacknowledged and unrecognized. They are virtually always made with the best of intentions—namely, writing prose that is accessible to those who new to the material—but inevitably there is a distortion of the past in the service of the present. Systems of time and dating, names of places and polities, and the rendering of personal names all change over time. Indeed, they vary within the present moment, and the homogenization that serves to make a textbook accessible to new students also serves to contribute to (or undercut) cultural hegemonies.

This book is indeed designed to be accessible to English-reading students and instructors, and it reflects that priority in a range of ways. All dates provided within the book are Common Era (CE) unless otherwise noted. Place names are given in modern English. Personal names have been simplified, standardized, and transliterated. I have minimized the use of non-Latin symbols and have only used words in their original language when to translate them would obscure meaning.

I have furthermore maintained the current practice of presenting personal names from some medieval languages in their modern English equivalents. This practice rapidly appears ludicrous when one considers the incredibly diverse languages and dialects in medieval Europe, all of which changed over time. It also appears deeply misleading, since the rendering of medieval European names into modern English equivalents suggests a cultural and linguistic homogeneity that emphatically did not exist. At the same time, the work involved in overturning this practice would be immense and well beyond the scope of this edition, not least because identifying individuals' "true" names is complicated by the range of languages and dialects, a lack of standardized spelling in the medieval vernaculars, and the fact that Latin was so often used for written records and yet presumably was not used for verbal communication. To give just one simple example, an individual who was called "Petrus" in a written medieval source may have been actually addressed as Peter, Pedro, Piotr, Pere, and any number of further variants.

It is nonetheless important that students recognize that these all represent decisions made in the interests of comprehension and that there are costs that should be understood and discussed. Above all, the richly textured diversity of medieval Afro-Eurasia, its peoples, and their languages and cultures is severely curtailed. The past was as complicated, complex, and variable as the present, but the past as it is presented in textbooks, including this one, can readily seem orderly, standardized, and homogenous; this is the result of authorial choices. Furthermore, if students were to pick up a textbook

on the crusades written in a different modern language, they would see different spellings, names, and, in some cases, systems of time and dating.

I have tried to be as precise and consistent as possible in describing peoples, regions, polities, and religions. Yet this, too, inevitably leads to distortion, since our modern categories for identity and geography do not map smoothly onto the past. Furthermore, medieval cultural, religious, and political identities did not necessarily agree neatly with each other. One person's "true Christian" was another's "heretic," to give only the most basic example. Neither did people in medieval Afro-Eurasia necessarily understand who or what they were talking about—or indeed care if they possessed clear understanding—any more than people today.

I have aimed to describe political powers as specifically as possible, and when discussing broader regional trends, whenever feasible to use basic, though modern, geographical terms—that is, North Europe, North Africa, West Asia, eastern Mediterranean, and so on. Thus "Europe" always means the continent and "Latin Christian" always means the religion, and neither term should be read as shorthand for the other, nor for race or other identity categories. Similarly "Iberia" refers to the geographical area of the Iberian Peninsula and "Anatolia" to the geographical area of the Anatolian Peninsula; neither implies a specific religious, ethnic, or political unit.

When it comes to religious identity, I have also aimed for precision and specificity without—apart perhaps from one paragraph in Chapter 4, which serves an important purpose—overwhelming student readers. For example, "Latin Christians" are distinguished from other Christian sects. I also acknowledge changes in religious self-identity over time. The most obvious example is that "Latin Christians" re-identified themselves as "Catholics" in the context of the changes known as the Protestant Reformation, and "Byzantine Christians" similarly transformed, in this text, into "Greek Christians." The term "heretic" should always be understood to represent the perspective of opposing views; the accuracy of the term depends heavily on perspective. "Islam," "Muslim," and "Islamic" refer to the religion, while "Islamicate" refers to regions, groups, or polities in which Muslims (of whatever ethnicity or culture) were politically dominant.

PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION

Susanna A. Throop

Every edition of this book has demonstrated Jonathan Riley-Smith's intellectual curiosity, interest in the fruits of the most recent research, and willingness to develop and change his own ideas. I sincerely hope that this edition demonstrates the same. But this edition is co-authored and thus represents additional change. I aim here to give readers a sense of how those changes have come to be and how I have managed the process of producing this edition.

Approximately a month before he passed away, Jonathan and his editor at Bloomsbury, Rhodri Mogford, asked me to co-author the fourth edition. I had previously submitted comments on the desirability of a fourth edition and what changes I would recommend to Bloomsbury, and I must assume those comments played a role in this request. Jonathan and I then worked together on a plan for changes to the fourth edition. He was clear that he hoped his work would thus continue to play a role within the field of crusade studies. Once we had agreed upon a plan and it had been vetted by Bloomsbury, a contract was issued. Jonathan passed at virtually the same moment that the contract was issued, and so it was signed by myself and his estate.

The biggest change that Jonathan and I agreed upon was the restructuring of the book. It was my responsibility to evaluate the original metaphor guiding the narrative—that of the human life cycle—and to alter it if it were no longer feasible. I did determine that the original metaphor of birth to death was no longer feasible given the most current research, but I have tried to keep a sense of both change and continuity over time at the heart of the book's structure, which I believe underlay Jonathan's original choice of the life cycle metaphor. It was also my task to reorganize the book into chapters that were more balanced in terms of length and scope and to provide additional context and chronological range. There were a number of smaller changes agreed upon as well, such as updates in terminology, which are evident in the book.

The plan that Jonathan and I agreed upon has been immensely helpful, yet it was a plan, not a finely detailed blueprint. The best of plans must be adjusted in the process of work, and that was certainly true as I have worked on this edition. I was not Jonathan's closest friend, most distinguished scholarly peer, or longest-standing interlocutor, but I trust that he understood and desired what I *have* brought to the work, namely, intense curiosity and a willingness to make changes. And I have tried to build upon his own major contributions to the field. For example, I have expanded portions of the book that bring his pluralistic approach to, I hope, even greater fruition, both geographically and chronologically.

I have also sought to respect the issues on which I do not believe he would have welcomed change. Although we only had a few weeks to discuss this fourth edition, I did come away with a clear sense of certain matters that Jonathan did not want changed, and

of course I have honored them. The book remains a chronological narrative designed to meet the needs of students first and foremost. His fundamental focus on penitential warfare and the role of religious motivation remains intact. I have only lightly edited his own prose to update terminology, ease transitions, and increase student understanding. In that vein, while I have lightly edited his prose, I have also attempted to adapt my own writing style to prevent an overly jarring experience for readers. Of course only others will be able to tell if I have succeeded. While close readers of prior editions will find some chapters largely unchanged, they will find others to be quite different. In some cases they will be able to distinguish our prose most readily by the number of endnotes. Recognizing the value of authorial transparency for students learning to be historians, I have given many more references to the works that have informed my own perspective than Jonathan did in prior editions.

This is a co-authored book, but the contributions of each author have not been synchronous. It is not the fourth edition that Jonathan would have produced on his own. It is also not a book on the crusades that I would have written as sole author. I am sure that Jonathan would not have agreed with all of the changes and additions I have made and I have grieved the inability to have those debates with him. But I hope that he would endorse my instinct for change in the interest of growth and would not have cause to regret entrusting me with this work. I have done this work for him and his family, and for all the brilliant scholars and teachers in the field of study that filled his life and that he so enriched.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Susanna A. Throop

My most profound thanks go to three senior scholars who made my own academic career possible and supported me at the most pivotal early stages of my work: Jonathan Riley-Smith; Paul Hyams; and Miri Rubin. I suspect like many of Jonathan's former students, I find it hard to put into words the role he played in my life and scholarship. He inspired, encouraged, and deeply challenged me. He also advocated for me, demonstrating a belief in my abilities that I have kept with me ever since. I would never have completed a PhD with Jonathan Riley-Smith in the first place were it not for Paul Hyams. Indeed, I would never have completed an undergraduate history degree, let alone gone on to doctoral work in medieval history, without Paul's teaching, mentorship, and support over more than two decades. He, too, has inspired, encouraged, and challenged me, helping me exceed my own expectations and see myself as someone capable of scholarly achievement, and setting a model for me of intellectual curiosity and creativity as well as of professional kindness and generosity. He furthermore introduced me to Miri Rubin. I will always be profoundly grateful for Miri Rubin's kindness in mentoring me while I was at Cambridge. In 2022 this may seem nearly unbelievable—at least I hope that it is so—but in Miri I was first able to talk and work closely with a brilliant, world-renowned historian who is a woman. I cannot overestimate the effects of witnessing her achievements and impact and knowing that she was interested in my work and well-being. Our conversations in the University Library's Tea Room will always be with me.

No one writes or even co-writes a book by themselves, and I am grateful to a number of colleagues who generously shared their time and expertise with me. Niall Christie reviewed nearly every chapter and corrected an embarrassingly large number of errors in Islamic historiography and Arabic. Paul Cobb provided additional assistance with transliteration within a very tight time frame. Jochen Schenk helped me navigate questions related to the Templars and Jonathan Riley-Smith's views on their guilt. Alexandra Garnhart-Bushakra heroically fact-checked the majority of my additions to the book, and Andrew Buck provided substantial assistance in updating the section on further reading. So many scholars—Jonathan Phillips, Mike Horswell, Kristin Skottki, Matt Gabriele, Jay Rubenstein, and others—have been unfailingly encouraging. The list of scholars whose work has informed this book is staggeringly long, and I have attempted to acknowledge them in new material written for the fourth edition. Because their names do not appear with anything like the frequency with which they have informed my own ideas, I want to especially credit here Robert Bartlett, Jonathan Phillips, and Christopher Tyerman. Any and all errors and/or scholarly misunderstandings are entirely my own.

I am grateful to funding from Ursinus College that enabled me to hire Alexandra Garnhart-Bushakra. The Student Research Assistants in the Humanities program at Ursinus College also enabled me to work with Logan Mazullo and, especially, Matthew

Furgele on this project. Matt worked with me on the book for the full four years he was at Ursinus, and was a true partner and collaborator. I am grateful for his hard work and thoughtful insights as well as his constant enthusiasm and encouragement. In 2020–1, as he worked on an honors project under my supervision and I worked on this book, both of us of course in the midst of the pandemic, our weekly check-ins—in which he would always ask, "how is the book coming?"—were a source of energy and hope.

Work on this book has coincided with a challenging period leading my department at Ursinus College after a series of bereavements in 2015–18, and I have appreciated the warm collegiality, teamwork, and support of my departmental colleagues Glenda Chao, Margie Connor, Lori Daggar, Johanna Mellis, and Edward Onaci. My thanks, too, to Associate Deans and Professors Kelly Sorensen and Meredith Goldsmith for their support. I always knew that completing this work while employed at an institution without a research library and other research resources would be a challenge, yet the pandemic further intensified the difficulties of accessing current scholarship. Many, many thanks to all the librarians at Ursinus College, in particular Dominique de Saint Etienne and Kerry Gibson, who worked tirelessly and creatively to help me reach as much secondary literature as possible.

More than thanks are owed to editor extraordinaire Rhodri Mogford. Rhodri has been an absolute model of editorial support and good counsel, unceasingly supportive, creative, and fully engaged. I cannot recommend him highly enough to my fellow scholars. Laura Reeves at Bloomsbury deserves especial thanks for her help with image permissions and cover design. Everyone at Bloomsbury has been patient as the pandemic delayed work on the edition, which I also deeply appreciate.

Personal thanks always come last, and yet they are the most fundamental. My spouse, Matt Abbott, has kept me going through this work in countless ways, affirming its importance and cheering me on without cease, and understanding and supporting the time and energy needed to do the work. He is the absolute best part of my life. My mothers-in-law Pamala Abbott and Deborah Brown have never stopped expressing their confidence in me. My dearest friends and brilliant scholars all, Kirstie Hettinga, Elizabeth Macaulay, and Kara McShane, have offered so much enthusiasm and so many moments of commiseration, triage, and sheer good humor, that they each deserve a medal. My therapist has been indispensable. Last but certainly not least—as they would be the first to tell you!—our three cats, Gemma, Rowan, and Sydney, deserve recognition. Whether sleeping all over my workspace or insisting in various ways that I set work aside to pay them attention, they too have helped immensely.

INTRODUCTION

This book attempts to provide as comprehensive a history of the crusades as is possible in a single volume. Its intended audiences are upper-level undergraduates, graduate/postgraduate students, and scholars who have need of a general historical survey. In a landscape positively crammed with single-volume histories of the crusades, it is distinguished by: a deepened engagement with the approach of pluralism and, as a result, the length and breadth of the narrative; avoidance of a grand or centralizing narrative structure; careful structure and organization; and attention to questions of language and terminology. Both authors are confident in students' and instructors' ability to handle complicated and ambiguous histories, and points where more research is particularly needed have been called out, not least in the hope that some students may rise to the challenge.

This book also stands out as one that has endured and yet changed significantly over time. Each edition has differed significantly from the one prior and historiographical change can be traced through the editions. The book in all its editions thus forms a coherent and transparent case study of historiographical change in the field of crusade studies. At the same time, the central idea at the heart of the first edition of the book has remained intact. This central premise is that while it is possible to outline a general definition of crusading that would have been recognizable to medieval contemporaries and that would extend well beyond military expeditions to Jerusalem, such a definition

> would not cover many other engagements which have to be considered in this book.. . . And yet all these were so closely associated with crusading that it would be absurd to treat them separately. It is best, I believe, to consider crusades as expressions of a crusading movement which outlasted the crusades.[1]

This ongoing premise at the core of the book remains its central argument.

The idea that crusades could be identified through various procedural criteria—not all of which were always present—is now known as pluralism. Pluralism asserts that crusades were a subcategory of Christian holy war, which stands in relation to, but is not identical with, Christian just war. Pluralism's emphasis on a range of procedural criteria, rather than a single target or unvarying definition, has led scholars to the important conclusion that contemporaries distinguished crusades from other wars not primarily by geography, target, or chronology but, rather, by a number of key procedural elements, such as papal authorization. Thus, while acknowledging that a large number of crusades did indeed target Muslims in particular, from a pluralist perspective, the crusades were not simply about Christians fighting Muslims for control of Jerusalem. Instead, as this book emphasizes, crusades were launched against Muslims, polytheists, purported

"schismatics" and "heretics," and political adversaries of the papacy, and crusade violence affected many others in addition, in particular Jews. Crusades were fought around the Mediterranean, in Europe, Africa, and the Atlantic world. In addition, while Jerusalem clearly served as both a literal and a symbolic goal for many crusaders, it was not a sine qua non for crusading.

Pluralism is not now unusual—indeed, it is the standard approach to scholarly discussions of the crusades—but this book still stands out for its insistence on following the themes of pluralism to their logical ends in a text suitable for teaching. The scholarly consensus has moved well away from the traditional understanding of the crusades as wars against Muslims for Jerusalem in the eleventh through thirteenth centuries, but this older understanding remains prominent in teaching materials. This book makes the current scholarly understanding accessible to both students and instructors who are not themselves scholars of the crusades. In the case of this edition, this has meant incorporating even more recent scholarship on the crusades beyond the traditionally and inaccurately numbered crusades and well beyond the region surrounding Jerusalem. New work on the crusades in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and beyond has also been incorporated, constructively overturning the common assumption that as a medieval phenomenon, the crusades stopped in a timely fashion at the cusp of early modernity.

With the needs of instructors and students at the forefront, the book features chapters of relatively equal length with comparable numbers of sub-sections and loosely comparable scope. Maps placed throughout assist with understanding the ever-changing political landscape. Textboxes provide more explanation in places where a lengthy digression would be distracting. While still not comprehensive, an updated guide to further reading, along with endnotes, should assist with student research.

Furthermore, an effort has been made to better contextualize the history of the crusades within the history of Afro-Eurasia. To study the crusades has traditionally meant to study crusaders, but that is not the only viable or meaningful approach. While this book does retain a primary focus on the crusaders and those Latin Christians—and then, later, Catholic Europeans—who formed crusaders' immediate social context, Eurocentrism is rejected. In other words, it is not assumed that the history of Europe stands at the center of the history of the world. Students should understand that the histories in this book would and did look different depending on perspective, and that the history of the crusades in the twenty-first century is also understood differently around the globe. Similarly, context, complexity, and ambiguity are all considered constructive in this book. Thus, while it is hoped that students will find the book accessible enough, it is also hoped that they will find plenty here to challenge and intrigue them, and to lead them to ask their own questions about the past.

Despite the continuity at the core of this book, the single largest change to have affected the study of crusading since the third edition was published is the field's general attention to the study of collective memory in both medieval and modern contexts, and an effort has been made to bring this attention into the book. But other recent trends can rapidly be identified: consideration of gender and the history of emotions; additional

work on crusading in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries; the willingness of many scholars to use critical theoretical approaches to grapple with the most complex problems; and more. It has proven impossible to integrate all the new work into this edition in equal measure, and thus, unavoidably, some scholars will conclude that matters will have been left out that should have been put in and others included that should have been left out. Furthermore, although any sort of meta-narrative has been rejected, the book has remained an essentially chronological narrative rather than a sequence of thematic discussions, and this structure, too, is an argument of sorts, since it implies coherence and linearity. The narrative structure of the book corresponds to its emphasis on both continuity and change over time, but this is only one way to organize a history of the crusades. Hopefully instructors will see this book as a solid foundation for learning that can be easily used in tandem with primary sources and additional instructional and scholarly literature of their own choosing.

CHAPTER 1
STUDYING THE HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES

Fundamental to the historical study of the crusades is the fact that they defy easy definition. There was and is no one definition of "crusade" that can be neatly applied. As a result, historians have continually debated the general nature of crusading as well as innumerable specific details of the crusading movement. These debates have taken place in different cultures and languages, from the Middle Ages forward. Often these debates have coincided with crusading. In other words, at the very same time as some were crusading, others were striving to present crusading one way or another in historical writing.

As a result, any attempt to study the crusades is unavoidably based on historical arguments about what "the crusades" were. In other words, studying the history of the crusades requires us to recognize the historiography of the crusades; that is, the way that writers have described the crusades and how those descriptions have changed over time. In order to bring this point to life, this chapter concisely outlines the trajectories of four broad historical positions on how to study "the crusades"—traditionalism, materialism, generalism, and pluralism—from the eighteenth century forward. It must be noted, however, that the four schools of thought just referenced have been identified in hindsight and for the purposes of analysis; eighteenth-century scholars did not label themselves "traditionalists" and neither did Carl Erdmann call himself a "generalist."

This overview is intended to be accessible and digestible to those approaching the subject for the first time. This chapter should make immediately clear that scholarly approaches to the crusades have changed significantly over time, often featured significant disagreement, and always been influenced by the historical contexts in which scholars have worked. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the overview provided by this chapter is incomplete. First, as will be noted in many chapters to come, the historiography of the crusades both extends far back into Middle Ages and is entangled with innumerable national historiographies and languages. Histories of crusades and crusading were written from the twelfth century onward, and debates about not only what happened but the causes, effects, and meanings of events were part of that historiographical tradition before the early modern period. Second, in the general study of the historiography of the crusades, an overreliance on English, French, and German historiographies sorely needs to be balanced by work on the historiography of the crusades in other languages and historical traditions. While the works of Norman Housley, Christopher Tyerman, and Alexander Mallett have been extremely helpful, there is now need for historiographical syntheses beyond those yet published.

Traditionalism and Materialism

The approach to the crusades now referred to as traditionalism was established in force by the leaders of the eighteenth-century movement known as the Enlightenment. Denis Diderot (*Encyclopédie*, 1751–72), François de Voltaire (*Essai sur les moeurs*, 1756), David Hume (*History of England*, 1754–62), William Robertson (*The Progress of Society in Europe*, 1769), and Edward Gibbon (*The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, 1776–88) primarily confined crusading geographically to the eastern Mediterranean and chronologically to the period stretching from the late eleventh to the late thirteenth centuries. Although there were contrary views from propagandists for the Hospitallers on Malta such as René de Vertot (*Histoire des chevaliers hospitaliers*, 1726), the consensus in eighteenth-century intellectual circles was that the crusading movement was past history. In other words, not only the crusades themselves, but the factors that had motivated the crusades, could be confined to two centuries in the deep past. This trend reflected a general emphasis on historical distance in eighteenth-century European historiography rather than an actual "end" to crusading, as Chapter 13 will demonstrate. It also reflected the fact that, although some writers asserted that the crusades had brought benefits to Europe, for most they appeared a prime example of medieval superstition and folly.

It cannot be stressed enough that these thinkers were employing an arbitrary definition that enabled them to condemn the movement as an example of medieval foolishness while throwing a blanket over its most recent manifestations. Diderot, for example, could not avoid referring in his *Encyclopédie* to the island of Malta as a "centre of war against the enemies of the Christian name," but in a long article on the Knights Hospitaller he hardly referred to warfare after 1291, although a great deal of space was given to the Hospitallers' structure and constitution. For Diderot and others, the crusades served to emphasize the backwardness of the Middle Ages and the presupposed superiority of their present moment; they functioned as the handy shadow behind the brightly blazing Enlightenment.

It was possible to see the crusades in the terms of traditionalists without condemning them. Under the influence of romanticism, nationalism, and imperialism, European scholars and novelists alike championed traditionalism in the early nineteenth century. Friedrich Wilken, a scholar who knew Arabic and Persian, championed the Enlightenment's definition of crusading. Wilken's *Geschichte der Kreuzzüge* appeared in seven volumes between 1807 and 1832 and was regarded in academic circles as a model of text-based and objective scholarship. Wilken was an early member of a new constellation of brilliant and prolific historians in France, Germany, and Switzerland who focused on crusades in the eastern Mediterranean and are still recognized for their efforts in uncovering and editing sources. No one today can ignore the works of Louis and René de Mas Latrie, Emmanuel Rey, Paul Riant, Melchior de Vogüé, Henri Delaborde, Charles Kohler, Joseph Delaville le Roulx, Reinhold Röhricht, Hans Prutz, and Heinrich Hagenmeyer or the publications patronized by the *Société de l'Orient Latin*. The great period of scholarship to which these men contributed lasted from the middle of the nineteenth century to the First World War.

While traditionalism served to define crusading geographically and chronologically, it did not address the question of motivation. Materialism, the assumption that crusaders were motivated primarily by profit, emerged in the nineteenth century. In contrast, the idea of crusade profiteering had not appealed particularly to eighteenth-century thinkers. One of their arguments had been that the movement had in fact pauperized Europe and prevented economic development. For Diderot, the consequences for Europe of "these horrible wars" had been "the depopulation of its nations, the enrichment of monasteries, the impoverishment of the nobility, the ruin of ecclesiastical discipline, contempt for agriculture, scarcity of cash and an infinity of vexations." Edward Gibbon's judgment had been that the crusades

> have checked rather than forwarded the maturity of Europe. The lives and labours of millions which were buried in the East would have been more profitably employed in the improvement of their native country: the accumulated stock of industry and wealth would have overflowed in navigation and trade; and the Latins would have been enriched and enlightened by a pure and friendly correspondence with the climates of the East.

In terms of material wealth and economic development, the crusades were a decidedly negative force for Diderot and Gibbon.

Views on crusade motivations shifted in the nineteenth century. Sir Walter Scott's crusaders were devoted to the pursuit of wealth, yet an even more influential, although unintentional, contributor to the development of materialism was a man whose personal beliefs could not have been more opposed to it. Imbued with a passionate desire to revive the glories of France's religious and monarchical past, Joseph François Michaud wrote his epic *Histoire des croisades*, which appeared in six volumes between 1812 and 1822, to counter the iniquities of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. Like Enlightenment thinkers Michaud confined his attention to crusades to the eastern Mediterranean, although he does not seem to have denied the existence of other theaters of war; he dismissed the Albigensian Crusade simply because it was not part of the narrative he wished to emphasize. On the other hand, he recognized that the crusading movement had flourished long after 1291, although he believed that by the seventeenth century it survived more in the minds of writers than in reality.

Michaud was convinced that crusading had enriched all the European nations engaged in it and that of all European countries France had benefited the most. The crusades were for him expressions of a superior Catholic civilization on a mission to resist Islam and "civilize" the world. His *Histoire* went through nineteen French editions by the end of the century, as well as being translated into English, German, Italian, and Russian. The patriotic elements in it appealed especially to European empire-builders, the rhetoric of which will be discussed in greater depth later. As a result, Michaud's ideas were applied to all kinds of European imperial and colonial ventures.

Even when scholarship on the crusades dwindled in the first half of the twentieth century, Michaud's ideas remained dominant. Thus by the 1920s and 1930s, liberal and

Marxist economic historians alike interpreted the crusades in social and economic terms. These historians assumed that something so powerful could only have been generated by economic forces, and that the crusading movement thus constituted a turning point in the history of the European economy. As the twentieth century continued, the crusades remained conceptually linked with imperialism and colonialism even while imperialism and colonialism were increasingly reviled. Thus even searing critics of Michaud's approach like Norman Daniel (*Islam and the West: The Making of an Image*, 1960) considered that Western colonialist assumptions of Islamic inferiority were based on perverse ideas generated in the period of the crusades.

This neo-imperialistic vision of crusading as proto-colonialist and driven overwhelmingly by economic forces became popular orthodoxy, in spite of the fact that the economic effects of the crusades have never been conclusively researched and no full economic history of the movement has ever been written. Norman Housley has pointed out that a convincing and complete study even of the role of the Italian merchant cities has yet to be published. That said, materialism seems to have gained renewed currency among crusade historians in the twentieth century only after the Second World War, when in the vanguard were the Israelis, particularly Joshua Prawer, for whom the portrayal of the crusaders as proto-colonialists was in accord with Zionism's interpretation of the history of the Promised Land since the Diaspora. It is worth emphasizing that materialism opened the door to the possibility that the crusades were not simply confined to the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, since a "universal" motivating force was believed ultimately responsible.

Generalism, Popularism, and Pluralism

As just alluded to, the number of scholars interested in investigating the history of the crusades was relatively low through the first half of the twentieth century. There were some notable exceptions to this trend. In the 1930s Carl Erdmann (*Die Entstehung des Kreuzzugsgedankens*, 1935) argued compellingly against traditionalism, asserting instead that the term "crusade" should be applied to any penitential Christian war undertaken on God's behalf. However, his ideas were not widely disseminated until his book was translated into English in the 1970s (*The Origin of the Idea of the Crusade*, 1977). He is now regarded as the first generalist; that is, a scholar who insisted on the crusades as one facet of the broader category of Christian holy war. Like materialism, generalism pushed back on traditionalism's confinement of the crusades to one region and two centuries.

Decades of near inertia provided, of course, the right conditions for the appearance of the multivolume general histories of René Grousset (*Histoire des croisades et du royaume franc de Jérusalem*, 1934–6) and Steven Runciman, and the planning of "The Wisconsin History of the Crusades" (*A History of the Crusades*, ed.-in-chief Kenneth Setton, 1969–89) by American scholars, who, influenced by German scholarship, disapproved of both Grousset's Michaudist tone and Runciman's novelistic approach. "The Wisconsin History" took so many decades to complete, however, that many of the

original contributors had died before their chapters were written and at least one pupil of Grousset had to be enlisted.

The period of scholarly stagnation ended in the 1950s. The European empires were being wound up. There was a revival of interest in "just-war" theory in response to the reports of the Nuremberg Trials and the debates about nuclear deterrence. In the explosion of research that followed scholars reassessed the nature of Latin Christian settlements in the eastern Mediterranean. The first evidence that change was in the air came in 1940 when the French historian and Arabist Claude Cahen had published the first detailed analysis of the principality of Antioch (*La Syrie du nord à l'époque des croisades et la principauté franque d'Antioche*, 1940). A few years later Jean Richard in France and Joshua Prawer in Israel began to rewrite the history of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, providing it with a coherent model of constitutional development, although their approach is now giving way to a more fractured view, introduced by the grassroots studies of Hans Mayer and Steven Tibble. It is impossible now to convey the excitement the researches of Richard and Prawer on the laws, constitution, economy, and society of the crusader settlements aroused. At the same time, however, differences between them on the nature of society in the Latin East reflected the last century and a half of imperialism. Joshua Prawer has recently been portrayed as a leader of the reaction against colonialism, but much of the evidence used in support of this can be interpreted differently. He had settled when relatively young in British Palestine, where he had absorbed British imperialist ideas at the same time as he had reacted against them. Jean Richard, on the other hand, had been a pupil of René Grousset and stands at the end of the line of French historians descending from Michaud.

Prawer and Richard differed in their perceptions of the relationship between conquerors and conquered in the Latin settlements in West Asia. Prawer, together with the English historian R. C. (Otto) Smail, assumed that the settlers had lived out their lives segregated from the indigenous inhabitants. Prawer and Smail ferociously attacked the opinion, proposed a century before by Emmanuel Rey and still held by Richard, that there had developed in the settlements a "Franco-Syrian society," in which settlers mingled with indigenous peoples to produce something culturally unique. To Smail, the settlers were a ruling class, separated from their subjects by language and religion, with force as "the ultimate sanction of Frankish dominion." Prawer went further, using the word "apartheid" to describe the way the colonists, gathered for the most part in urban communities, were segregated from the population in the countryside.

The debate between Prawer and Richard related to fundamentally different views of imperialism, and thus it also reflected the continued belief that the crusades were connected to modern imperialism and colonialism. Richard's approach reflected, as Smail recognized, the goal of cultural integration (on French terms) that featured in French empire-building, while the segregation posited by Prawer and Smail echoed the distance that British administrators tended to keep between themselves and their indigenous subjects. Recent scholarship has favored Richard's interpretation. Furthermore the issue of proto-colonialism has mutated in Israel to an acceptance of the settlement established in the wake of the crusades as a positive element in that country's past. Ronnie Ellenblum has traced a progression:

> from the "Jewish" reading of (crusader) history, focusing on the slaughter of the Rhineland Jewish communities in 1096, to a Zionist reading of the crusades, focusing on seeing them as an inverse prefiguration of the future Zionist movement, and finally to the reading of the crusades as part of my own country and, to a certain degree, as part of my own history.

Later twentieth-century scholars also reassessed the question of motivation, and as a result, generalism was not the only challenge to traditionalism and materialism that emerged in the twentieth century. Another challenge to traditionalism, today known as popularism, was proposed by Paul Alphandéry and Alphonse Dupront (*La Chrétienté et l'idée de croisade*, 1954–9). They suggested that the essence of crusading lay in prophetic, eschatological movements among the peasantry and urban proletariat. In other words, popular socioreligious movements were the driving force behind the crusades. Given the incredibly long history of such movements, popularism, like materialism and generalism, challenged traditionalism's definition of the crusades.

Yet materialism remained prominent, and none of the new approaches significantly dented the appeal of traditionalism among those who studied the crusades. For many historians writing in the early 1950s the only authentic crusades remained those launched from Western Europe to recover or defend Jerusalem. Campaigns in other theaters of war or against internal enemies of the church such as heretics could be loosely termed crusades, but being considered of a different order they were hardly given a second thought. Crusading was considered to have largely ended with the fall of Latin rule in the city of Acre in 1291. Little attention was paid to religious motivation. Historians allowed that it may have been a factor, but they found it morally repugnant. It was thought that popes had purely political reasons for proclaiming crusades, ordinary people were ignorant and thus vulnerable to coercion and persuasion, and crusaders of all classes masked their desire for material advancement under a veneer of piety. At the same time, it was assumed, crusading had been a demographic safety valve, releasing spare human capacity from a seriously overcrowded Western Europe. Meanwhile, the military orders were thought of not as authentic religious orders but as great financial institutions managing huge estates in Europe to resource their operations. This historical vision was relatively coherent and self-contained, it had weathered the challenges of generalism and popularism, and it is still shared by many members of the general public.

Among scholars, however, this old historical vision would not survive the challenge of a new approach to the study of the crusades, known as pluralism. This approach was already in the air in the early 1950s and was openly expressed in print by Jonathan Riley-Smith (*What Were the Crusades?*, 1977). Pluralists maintain that authentic crusades were fought not only in the eastern Mediterranean but in many different locations as well. They are less concerned with the place and people targeted by a crusading expedition; instead, as Giles Constable has remarked, they ask "how a crusade was initiated and organized" and how it was recognized as a crusade by contemporaries. Pluralism provides a model for identifying a crusade by concentrating on the legal criteria that defined its status: proclamation by the pope on Christ's behalf, including an explicit association with the

liberation of sacred land; and vows of a special kind made by the fighters, who enjoyed in consequence particular temporal (i.e., worldly) and spiritual privileges.

Pluralism was born in the closing years of an era in which models were fashionable. Like all models, it breaks down when one turns from the general to the particular. Some leading historians have been reconsidering the other approaches to definition and younger researchers have anyway lost interest in a debate that reached its height about twenty years ago and has now run out of steam. Thanks to very recent research we can, furthermore, now see that one of the basic premises of pluralism—that crusades took place outside the parameters of the Holy Land and the period from 1095 to 1291—was accepted centuries earlier by historians like Erich Pontopiddan (*Gesta et vestigia Danorum extra Daniam*, 1740–1).

Nevertheless, the twentieth-century pluralists have extended the field of vision in both time and space, and pluralism, albeit usually with adjustments or caveats, has become the dominant approach among scholars who study the crusades. Most authors of general histories had tended to give very little space to crusades after 1291 and none at all to those after 1464, which marked Pope Pius II's death and thus the end of his attempts to generate a crusade. Historians now recognize that many of the maritime and land campaigns against the Ottomans in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries were perceived and represented by contemporaries as crusades and are increasingly studying the relationship between crusading and the formation of transcontinental empires in the early modern and modern periods. In the pluralist perspective, moreover, crusading warfare in the eastern Mediterranean now sits alongside crusading warfare in the Iberian Peninsula, the interior of Western Europe, the Baltic region, the Balkans, and North Africa. An impetus has been given to studies of crusading in those regions, and historians can now make comparisons between Iberia and the eastern Mediterranean or between the order-states of Prussia and Rhodes within an intellectually coherent framework. As a result, as Anti Selart has noted, the pluralist concept of "crusade" may yet afford scholars a tool for the "contextualization" and reframing of both national and regional histories.[1]

Another and significant consequence of pluralism is that crusading is no longer viewed by historians as wars against Muslims, since from a pluralist perspective, crusading targeted not only Muslims but also purported heretics, papal enemies, non-monotheists, and Jews. Ironically, then, among themselves crusade scholars have largely dismantled the binary model of "Christian v. Muslim" at precisely the moment when members of the general public, bombarded by both white supremacist and jihadist propaganda, have had their views of crusading as something specifically anti-Islamic reinforced.

Rethinking Motivations

As the debate on definitions of crusading wound down in the late twentieth century, another issue came to the fore. As already noted, there has been a lack of evidence for the materialist conviction that crusaders were in general motivated by economic profit. It was natural, therefore, for some historians to focus on the other forces that might have

motivated crusaders, considering, as Norman Housley has put it, the "spectrum of goals, hopes, beliefs and fears that first impelled people to take the cross and later sustained them while they were on crusade." The approach of these historians has similarities to a form of sociocultural anthropology called cultural relativity, in which scholars suspend their own ethnocentric or political predispositions and study a subject with reference to its culture rather than to their own. This means taking what people communicated about themselves and about others seriously in relation to the world in which they lived. It also means recognizing the factors that would galvanize those people into action, including the many intangible ones that made up the "the mental spaces that people . . . themselves inhabited," in the words of Marcus Bull. Such factors connect to memory and memorialization, as well as the collective consciousness of closely knit groups such as families and what Bull has called "the underlying assumptions and instincts which up to then may not have found any dedicated outlet but could now assume a central importance."

This approach to motivation, to which Jonathan Riley-Smith gave the admittedly clumsy title of "sentient empathy," echoes developments in other fields of history, in which religious faith is now taken more seriously than it was, and in other disciplines, such as literature, social anthropology, and psychology. It also relates to critical developments in the study of history in general in the later twentieth century. For example, it was foreshadowed by the concern for *mentalités* that was championed by the *Annales* school in the twentieth century, and it connects to the emergence of cultural history and the many distinct subfields associated with it, such as the history of gender, the history of emotion, the history of memory, and the history of violence. To this list of topics now studied by crusade scholars should be added the history of race, which to date has been most fully explored in its relation to the crusades by Geraldine Heng.[2]

However, sentient empathy is open to the criticism that researchers are moving on to ground far more perilous than that occupied by anthropologists, who are generally concerned with existing cultures. Another potential weakness is the danger of uncritically adopting the models employed by writers in other fields. A scrupulous adherence to what has proved to be a vast range of evidential material can lead, without careful planning, to projects that are overambitious and uncritical. Lastly, and importantly, extensive empathetic engagement with crusaders rather than with those affected by crusading violence potentially silences those whose very silence—in some cases, complete elimination—was sought by crusaders. One wonders what histories might unfold if scholars simply turned their attention to other actors in the past.

Despite its limitations, sentient empathy and the unfolding cultural turn in crusade studies have helped provide balance to the study of crusaders' motivations. Although it is slightly unfair to say so, since they make only fleeting appearances in Georges Duby's famous study of the Maconnais, a telling comparison can be made between Duby's materialistic treatment of crusaders, in which evidence is sacrificed to theory and educated guesses, and Marcus Bull's examination of the background to the responses to the preaching of the First Crusade in what is now in which a more evidence-based and nuanced interrelationship between land, family interests, customary attachments, and religion is described. Decades

after its publication, Jonathan Riley-Smith's careful delineation of how the idea of crusading drew upon the concept of Christian love continues to challenge scholars to reevaluate the relationship between love and violence in the Christian tradition. In turn, Susanna Throop's analysis of the early idea of crusading as an act of vengeance asked scholars to recognize the connections contemporaries saw between Christian love, justice, and violent punishment and to abandon the assumption that ideas of crusade can be categorized as either "religious" or "secular." When undertaken critically and rigorously, with willingness to see a past that differs from what we imagine, sentient empathy can help reveal the multidimensional and at times contradictory factors that in the eyes of crusaders gave meaning to their actions. When applied equally to those with whom crusaders interacted, violently or otherwise, sentient empathy can also help reveal the multiple effects of and meanings ascribed to crusading. These are valuable insights not only for scholars of the crusades but for anyone concerned with religious violence as a much broader phenomenon.

At the same time, a gulf has opened up between research historians and a general public whose attachment to a romanticized vision of crusading as the epitome of a conflict between Christianity and Islam has been reinforced. Among the varied factors reinforcing this popular understanding are the emergence of the theory of perpetual "civilizational" conflict, as championed by Samuel Huntingdon, the ongoing use of the crusades in political rhetoric worldwide, and the pervasiveness of the Middle Ages in popular entertainment and social media. The prominence of medievalisms—references to "the medieval" to express views or motivate action in the present—has led to the formation of its own field of study, and scholars engaged in this work readily note that crusader medievalisms are especially dominant and widespread in the twenty-first century.

On the one hand, as historians reject the long-held belief that crusading can be contained within the eastern Mediterranean and within the central Middle Ages, and instead face up to the ideas of those who lived through the events in question, they find that their conceptions of historical reality conflict with those of nearly everyone else. On the other hand, historians' own work remains entangled with the popular representations of the crusades surrounding all of us. Furthermore, it is reasonable to conclude that historians' concept of crusading will continue to evolve and change over time, as is true of any topic of historical study and especially true of a field that keeps expanding. In the last seventy years an extraordinary growth in the number of individuals engaged in researching the crusades has driven intense activity in almost every aspect of crusade history. Taking one topic as an example, there were probably no more than 20 scholars seriously at work on the military orders in 1960, whereas 238 contributed to the 2009 *Dictionnaire européen des ordres militaires au Moyen Âge*.

None of these points makes scholars' current understanding less valid in this present moment, and one purpose of this book is to introduce readers to it. The picture of crusading presented in this book is more complex than the one that is recognized by the public, and it is not accepted in every particular by all crusade scholars without exception, but it reflects the scholarly consensus of our time. Furthermore, we believe that it is closer to the historical reality.

The Current Understanding

Crusading adapted itself repeatedly over time to circumstances, cultural changes, theological developments, and the ever-shifting political and economic dynamics of Europe, the Mediterranean, and Afro-Eurasia. Nonetheless, certain elements were constant in the eyes of participants and supporters. To crusade meant to engage in a war which was both holy, because it was believed to be waged on God's behalf, and penitential, because those taking part received a grant of remission of sins and penance from the papacy, and in many cases seem to have considered themselves to be performing an act of penance that was spiritually beneficial. War was—or at least was represented as and believed to be—authorized by the pope as vicar of Christ and targeted those deemed "enemies of Christ" and his church, which was understood to be rightly the Latin Church of Rome. Most crusaders were lay men and women who committed themselves to join the war by each making a vow. They were rewarded with indulgences: guarantees that the penitential act in which they were engaged would rank in God's eyes as a satisfactory remission of the sins they had committed up to that date. When their commitments were fulfilled, or when a campaign was considered to have ended, they resumed their normal lives. There were also crusaders of another type, the brothers and sisters of the military orders—such as, most notably, the Knights Templar, Knights Hospitaller, and Teutonic Knights—who made vows of profession and were therefore permanently engaged in the wars of Christians and Christendom. All these vows, whether specific and temporary or permanent, were symbolized by the wearing of crosses, either on everyday clothes or on religious habits.

As thus delineated, crusades were fought not only throughout the eastern Mediterranean and West Asia but also in the Iberian Peninsula, Africa, the central Mediterranean, and virtually all of Europe. They were proclaimed not only against Muslims but also against pagan Wends, Balts and Lithuanians, shamanist Mongols, Orthodox Russians, Byzantines, purported "heretics" such as the Cathars and Hussites, and those Latin Christians whom the papacy considered to be its enemies. Once launched, crusades also affected those who were not identified as targets by the papacy, such as Jewish communities within Europe and various communities, including Jews and Christians of many different sects, living around the Mediterranean under non-Christian rule. The crusading movement generated holy leagues of nations in the late Middle Ages and early modern period—alliances of powers, bolstered by crusade privileges—and a vast array of military orders; over several centuries, some military orders came to operate out of their own order-states and yet more eventually became nationalized and under the direction of state monarchs. From the fifteenth century onward, crusading and military orders such as the Order of Christ played roles in the European conquests and empire-formation in the Caribbean, Indian Ocean, Americas, and Africa. Clearly, then, the chronology of the crusades is as wide-ranging as its geography. While the First Crusade can be firmly dated to the late eleventh century, it nonetheless emerged from a variety of preexisting factors that are discussed in the next chapter. Furthermore, as discussed later in this book, assigning a precise end date to the crusading movement is extraordinarily difficult.

An extensive and not always coherent framework of ideas and practices underpinned crusading, providing continuity and points of recognition across time and space. Yet at the heart of this web was the idea that from the perspective of those who endorsed or participated in the crusading movement, crusades were penitential war-pilgrimages that enacted the will of God but also conferred substantial spiritual benefits on individual Latin Christians and Latin Christendom as a whole. (Other perspectives on crusading are considered in full in the chapters that follow.) In order to make sense of this, we need to understand certain key Latin Christian ideas and devotional practices prior to the First Crusade (1096–9).

Penance, Pilgrimage, and Eschatology

Medieval Latin Christians believed that when humans sin they owe debts to God which must be repaid by suffering in this world or punishment in the next. It had been believed that this debt could be reduced if a person in the right frame of mind took on a penance, an act of self-punishment that could take the form of fasting, making a pilgrimage, or engaging in self-flagellation. Penance could be assumed voluntarily or could be imposed by the priest to whom a sinner had confessed his or her sins. However, by the late eleventh century, Latin Christians were becoming convinced that no penitential act could ever repay God, since they could not possibly make "satisfactory" repayments to their creator. By the eleventh century, Latin Christians were thus acutely conscious that a feature of their society was a predisposition to sin and that repaying God for their sins before death was virtually impossible. This understandably generated anxiety and led many to seek ways to demonstrate religious feeling and sorrow for sin in a society in which piety tended to express itself publicly.

Participation in pilgrimages was for most people a natural way to do this. There was a constant traffic between local cult-centers, and this was stimulated by, and reinforced, the relations of the laity with their local religious communities, which were often the guardians of shrines and to which they were anyway growing increasingly close. Many pilgrims, however, traveled further afield. What drew them were not only the devotional and penitential aspects of a temporary and often demanding exile on the road but also the relics held at cult-centers and the miracles performed by the saints they represented, such as Faith at Conques, Benedict at Fleury and Cuthbert at Durham. These ranged from medical cures to idiosyncratic and sometimes capricious or vengeful acts of protection. Yet while miracles sometimes occurred at or near the greatest long-distance shrines—Compostela, Rome, and Jerusalem—Latin Christians usually went to Rome or Jerusalem out of devotion and for forgiveness of sins, rather than for miraculous assistance.

Pilgrims to Jerusalem were, broadly speaking, of three types. The first, and perhaps the most numerous, were those performing penances imposed on them by their confessors. The second, often hard to distinguish from the first because there was a penitential element in their journeys as well, were those engaged in what was called a *peregrinatio religiosa*, an act of devotion undertaken voluntarily and perhaps vowed, but not enjoined by a confessor. The third were those who were going to Jerusalem to live there until they

died. The special location of the city in the geography of Christendom meant that it was a place in which devout Latin Christians wanted to be buried.

Pilgrims had been visiting Jerusalem for centuries, and centers of its cult had already been established in Western Europe, but in the eleventh century, contemporary piety encouraged an almost feverish obsession with the holy places. Enthusiasm was fueled by the arrival of relics from Jerusalem, which were housed in many churches. There were especially famous collections in the Lateran Palace in Rome and in the abbey of Moissac in Languedoc. In the course of the eleventh century, churches were dedicated to the Holy Sepulchre or the True Cross, or constructed along the lines of the shrine which housed the Tomb. Some were even given directly to the Sepulchre.

In particular, there was a surge in pilgrimages to Jerusalem as the year 1000 approached. This likely reflected apocalyptic expectations, for it was to be in Jerusalem that the final acts in this dimension—the appearance of Anti-Christ, the return of the Savior, the earliest splitting of tombs, and reassembling of bones and dust in the General Resurrection—would take place. Then, in 1009, the Fatimid caliph al-Hakim (more on the Fatimids in the next chapter) ordered the Holy Sepulchre damaged. In Europe, news of this destruction generated a wave of persecution on the relatively new Jewish communities in parts of what is now France and briefly interrupted a flow of pilgrims to Jerusalem which had been on the way to becoming a flood.

Yet after the low point in eleventh-century pilgrimaging after 1009, the stream swelled again. There is evidence for many Latin pilgrims on the move in the mid-1020s, with enthusiasm reaching fever pitch at times. The year 1033 was considered to be the anniversary of the Resurrection and throughout the 1030s, at a time when the shrines in Jerusalem were being partially restored by the Byzantine emperor, pilgrims from many parts of Europe converged on the city. The next major wave of Latin pilgrims appears to have surged toward Jerusalem in the 1050s. Then in 1064 there was an especially large Latin pilgrimage, recruited in what is now France and Germany and triggered by the conviction that Easter Day 1065 was going to fall on exactly the same date as it had in CE 33. Even when passage across West Asia become much more difficult for Latin Christians in the 1070s, traffic to Jerusalem does not seem to have lessened. It was certainly on the increase in the 1080s and early 1090s.

As the waves of pilgrims just described suggest, Latin Christians understood their acts of devotion within a larger eschatological context. They did not only want to promote the health of their own souls but to do so within the framework of sacred time and Christian history, which was understood to conclude with Christ's victory over the Devil in the End of Days as described in the Book of Revelation. Previously these strands of thought were not considered essential to understanding the history of the crusades, but more recent work, led by Jay Rubenstein, has laid bare the apocalyptic language, references, and imagery threaded through crusading materials from the First Crusade onward. Not only the Bible but also preexisting eschatological traditions informed this language and imagery, such as the idea of a Last World Emperor—a final world emperor who would usher in the End of Days—described in the seventh-century Syriac text *Apocalypse of Pseudo-Methodius*, which was translated into multiple Mediterranean languages in the

eighth century. This preexisting orientation toward a cosmic conflict between Christ and the Devil, and the assumption of the inevitable arrival of the End of Days, are also part of the ideological backdrop of the crusades, and will remain an important component of crusading ideology for many centuries to come.

Christian Violence and Holy War

The institutionalization of spiritual rewards for meritorious warfare was another response to lay concerns about piety, salvation and sin, and another reflection of the essential eschatological war at the heart of contemporary understandings of Christian history. Such spiritual rewards first emerged in papal letters urging the Carolingian Franks to fight a range of enemies of the church and papacy in the eighth century and were mentioned more prominently in the eleventh century, especially the pontificate of Gregory VII. They were institutionalized in later centuries and are conventionally referred to now as "the crusade indulgence." At first described with various words and phrases, eventually the formalized crusade indulgence would be consistently referred to in papal bulls with the phrase *remissio peccatorum*, "remission of sins." A plenary (i.e., "full" or "complete") indulgence was the promise of the remission of all penance for all sins committed up to the date it was issued.

The concept of the crusade indulgence and the practice of granting it were amorphous from the early eleventh through the end of the twelfth centuries, and only definitively formulated around 1200. In short, as Ane Bysted has summarized in her masterful study of the early crusade indulgence and its historiography, later theologians had been "left with the task of explaining the foundations of an institution that was already well established."[3] While Bysted has identified changes over time in the crusade indulgence and ultimately its formal institutionalization, as later chapters discuss, she has argued persuasively that the idea of remission of sins and the penalties associated with them was present and played a pivotal role in recruitment for the crusades from the late eleventh century onward. As she notes, the remission of penance made the crusade indulgence more immediately appealing than a simple promise of spiritual rewards after death.

But the ideological foundations of crusading predated the eleventh century. The crusading movement emerged and then flourished against a background of ideas about Christian violence and holy war that most educated individuals considered to be convincing. This intellectual history has been explored most recently and over the true longue durée by Philippe Buc (*Holy War, Martyrdom and Terror: Christianity, Violence, and the West*, 2015). The critical point for us now is that without denying the particularity and impact of the First Crusade, these ideas and the practice of Christian violence and holy warfare predated it.

As so many scholars have noted but is not always recognized by the public, the body of writings considered by Christians to be divine revelation is ambivalent when it comes to physical actions that threaten, whether intentionally or as side-effects, homicide, or injury to the human body. On Mount Sinai Moses received from God the commandment "You shall not kill," but what struck fourth-century Christian theologians was how that

commandment was immediately modified in the narrative of events on and around Sinai. In the Book of the Covenant that follows and is a gloss upon the Ten Commandments, God was reported demanding the death penalty for an inventory of crimes and promising to exterminate those peoples who barred the entry of the Israelites into the Promised Land. When Moses came down from Sinai with the Tablets of the Law and found his followers worshipping a golden calf, he was described authorizing their slaughter.

It is a mistake to assume that the New Testament unequivocally condemns the use of force. Christ did indeed demand of his followers love of enemies as well as friends, meekness, gentleness and non-resistance. On the other hand, he, like John the Baptist, seemed to accept the need for soldiers, as when he praised the faith of the centurion but did not question his profession, and at the end of the Last Supper, according to St. Luke, he told the apostles:

> "Let him who has no sword sell his mantle and buy one. For I tell you that this scripture must be fulfilled in me, *And he was reckoned with transgressors. . .*" And they said, "Look, Lord, here are two swords." And he said to them, "It is enough."[4]

Christ's followers were carrying swords, presumably those from the room, later in the evening and it must have been with one of these that St. Peter cut off the ear of the High Priest's servant. Peter was rebuked by Christ, but if Christ had been opposed to the use of force on principle, the war-theorists asked, what was his leading disciple doing wielding a sword at his side, even if the purpose was the fulfillment of scripture? Jesus' cleansing of the Temple (John 2:13-6 and Matthew 21:12-13) was of course forcible, a powerful example of direct divine action against wrongdoers.

Other New Testament texts, particularly those relating to the career of St Paul, recognized the use of force by those in positions of rightful authority. The ruler in authority "does not bear the sword in vain [wrote Paul]; he is the minister of God and the avenger [*vindex*] of [God's] anger on those who do wrong" (Romans 13:4). Furthermore, of course, Paul's use of military metaphors to describe the Christian community—"fellow soldiers" (Phil. 2:25 and 2 Tim. 2:3-6) who wear the "breastplate of faith and love" (1 Thess. 5:8 and Eph. 6:10-18)—were pervasive and would eventually exert a powerful formative influence on the development of Western monasticism, as Katherine Allen Smith has conclusively shown (*War and the Making of Medieval Monastic Culture*, 2013).

Partly in an attempt to resolve apparent contradictions in scripture and partly in pragmatic response to changing political circumstances, Christian theology of violence evolved from its first century onward. Pacifism had played some part in the early church, although its extent has now been questioned; the role of both popular and state violence in combating "heresies" and other perceived threats within the Christian Roman Empire is undeniable. Pacificism survived as a minority opinion throughout the centuries that followed, and even crusade preachers still felt the need to answer its root-and-branch objections. But by the fourth-century Christian thinkers in the Roman Empire recognized that even if they did not support the use of violence to define the Christian community—what Thomas Sizgorich has called "boundary maintenance"[5]—their co-

religionists were numerous and occupied ranks in the army, posts in the judiciary that involved the imposition of penal violence, and the imperial throne itself. Roman thinkers found no comfort in distinguishing the old dispensation, recorded in the Old Testament, from the new. Not only was the New Testament itself ambivalent but furthermore, if the state of humankind and of humanity's perception of God had led him to authorize violence in one era, the fact that he frowned on much of it in another could not in any way prevent him from changing his policy again if conditions on Earth merited it.

The conviction, rooted in the law of the Roman Republic, that violence, whether expressed in warfare, armed rebellion, or an internal state sanction, required criteria to be considered legitimate was developed in a Christian context by Augustine of Hippo (354–430), the greatest of the early theoreticians. Augustine maintained that force could not be employed lightly or for aggrandizement, but only for a legally sound reason, which had to be a reactive one. It had to be formally sanctioned by an authority that was recognized as having the power to make such a declaration. And it had to be used justly. Augustine defined the offence which provided violence with a just cause as intolerable injury, usually taking the form of aggression or oppression. He recognized two expressions of legitimate authority. He followed St Paul in treating all rulers, even non-Christian ones, as divine ministers, although he saw the Christian Roman emperors especially as representatives of God, who had put them and the temporal power of the empire at the church's disposal. But he also believed that God could personally order violence, which would be "without doubt just." After all, on divine authority, Abraham had been prepared to sacrifice Isaac and Moses had waged war. God, in mandating the use of force, acted not out of cruelty but in righteous retribution. Augustine was prepared for direct commands from God to be transmitted to men under the new dispensation and he referred to the possibility of them coming in his own time in two of his later works.

Augustine was at his most positive when writing about the right intention required of those who authorized and took part in violence. They had to be motivated by love, and this should mean that only such force as was necessary would be employed. It followed that those responsible for the management of violence should circumscribe it in such a way that the innocent suffered as little as possible and that no more force was brought to bear than could reasonably be supposed to achieve the ends for which it had to be used. Augustine's treatment of right intention provided the foundations for the later doctrine of proportionality.

Although this may seem clear-cut, Augustine's ideas were scattered throughout a vast body of work produced over several decades, and were sometimes contradictory. Between the fourth and eleventh centuries there were popes who granted spiritual benefits to warriors, rulers, and armsbearers who clearly believed they were engaged in warfare on behalf of God and the church, and narratives of holy war that emerged in various regions, only most notably the Iberian Peninsula. But it was not until the eleventh century, when the popes were turning to scholars to justify the use of force on the Latin Church's behalf, that citations from Augustine's writings were anthologized in a convenient form with the contradictions ironed out. These eleventh-century theorists brought into focus two premises that underpinned Augustine's treatment of violence. The first was an insistence

on the ultimate authority of a God or Christ who was intimately involved in the affairs of this dimension. The second was the conviction that violence was ethically neutral. It was the intention of the perpetrators that provided violence with a moral dimension—bad in many cases but good in some—and this had led Augustine to develop a theory of just persecution that was to haunt Christian history down to the present.

The Augustinian tradition may seem alien today because it was displaced by another set of ideas, which reached maturity much more recently than we like to think. Modern just war theory presumes that violence is an evil but that disorder can be a greater one. The use of force may therefore become a necessity as the lesser of evils when a state or community is faced by a situation in which order can only be restored by means of it. In these special circumstances it will be condoned by God and participation in it will not incur guilt. The origins of this later body of thought are to be found in the Middle Ages, as theologians and canon lawyers struggled with demands for advice coming from those engaged in conflicts that were not covered by any traditional model, but the theory could not make headway until a large enough consensus was prepared to abandon the Augustinian premises.

Catalysts for the jettisoning of the belief that force could be employed on Christ's behalf were reports in the 1530s of atrocities committed by the Spaniards against the indigenous in the Americas and the critical reaction to them of the Spanish Dominican Francisco de Vitoria. For Vitoria and his followers, particularly Francisco Suarez and Felipe Ayala, the chief justification of violence could not be any divine plan but had to be "the common good," an Aristotelian concept expressed in an embryonic form in the work of the thirteenth-century theologian Thomas Aquinas. To Vitoria, Suarez, and Ayala it was the defense of the common good—the prerogative of every community—that provided authority and justification. Just-war arguments moved quickly from the spiritual to the temporal, from the field of moral theology to that of international law, a step developed within decades by the Protestant jurists Alberico Gentili and Hugo Grotius. God was removed from the equation and just war lost the luster of divine approval, but no one seems to have taken the second step necessary for the full emergence of modern just-war theory, the borrowing from pacifism of the belief that violence is intrinsically evil with the qualification that it could nevertheless be condoned as the lesser of evils. The topic still needs research, but it may be that this very important shift in thought was an achievement of a widespread peace movement that swept Europe and America after the Napoleonic Wars and split into pacifist and moderate wings in the 1830s. At the same time as a belief in violence as at best a necessary evil has become prominent, hopefully it will be equally obvious the more positive evaluations of Christian violence in particular contexts have also survived—now, primarily in war or against criminals—as the work of scholars like Philippe Buc, Timothy Gorringe, and others has demonstrated.

At any rate, the crusading movement tapped into two related sets of ideas about Christian violence. First, crusading invoked the concept of Christian holy war. A great many examples of Christian holy wars can be found in history, and they may be defined as a form of warfare authorized directly or indirectly by God (or Christ) and fought to further what were believed to be his intentions. Crusades were particular manifestations

of this tradition, but they were not, as sometimes imagined, the first or only Christian holy wars and they still were supposed to conform to the standard conditions of just cause, legitimate authority, and right intention. In other words, like all Christian wars, crusades were supposed to be reactive. They were not supposed to be wars of conversion, which were forbidden in canon law, although wars of conversion—or, at least, wars that were accompanied by coerced conversion—had been fought for centuries by the time of the First Crusade. Popes and preachers sometimes appear to flout this principle in order to gain recruits for particular campaigns and mass, coerced conversion followed on the heels of crusading violence, as later chapters discuss.

Second, crusading employed the concept of Christian punishment, the imposition of retributive justice on wrongdoers. This, too, emphasized the reactive nature of Christian violence: wrong had been done and justice was owed in order to correct wrongdoers—a category that elided modern ideas of sinfulness and criminality—and maintain the order of Christian society. For these reasons, for example, violence against heretics or others who challenged ecclesiastical authority was considered almost necessarily justified, since it was understood that heretics had chosen to rebel against Christ's establishment of the church as the custodian of the truths they had once recognized.

The cause for a crusade was particularly important because at least at first, these wars were fought primarily by volunteers. The first crusaders were such by virtue of the vows they had made; in canon law a vow had to be a voluntary act. When a pope proclaimed a crusade this could be no more than an appeal to men and women to join an expedition of their own free will. He might threaten them with hell-fire, but he could not force them to make vows, or punish them if they did not, and there were occasions when efforts at recruitment failed.

A convincing case was therefore essential, even if it had to be made post hoc. Expeditions to the eastern Mediterranean, North Africa, or the Iberian Peninsula could be justified as responses to present Muslim aggression or as attempts to recover "Christian" territory that had been injuriously seized in the past. The need to recover and hold Jerusalem, containing the two most sacred locations in Christendom, the Holy Sepulchre and Calvary, was a powerful incentive and the goal of Jerusalem was also used to reinforce the case for crusades in the Iberian Peninsula, because some convinced themselves that the best route to the Holy Land was by way of Spain and North Africa. Where no such argument could be easily made, land was sacralized and Christians represented under threat as a matter of course. Campaigns along the Baltic were portrayed, often spuriously, as reactions to the threat to Christian settlements posed by indigenous peoples and as defense of the lands of the Virgin Mary. Wars against heretics and political opponents of the papacy were said to counter an internal and active menace to the unity of Christendom or the security of the church. Indeed, Peter the Venerable, the influential twelfth-century abbot of Cluny, argued that violence against fellow Christians was even more justifiable than the use of force against non-Christians.

A defining feature of crusades made them very nearly unique. They were penitential. The idea of fighting for spiritual rewards was not new and in fact dates to the eighth century; nor was it in some way reserved for warfare against Muslims. By the early 1080s

it had come to feature heavily in the worldview of Pope Gregory VII and his supporters, though it was not at that time particularly successful, as we shall see. From the First Crusade on it became a defining characteristic of crusading and the one that was arguably most attractive to recruits. For crusade supporters, a crusade was a superlative kind of pilgrimage precisely because of the severity of the penance involved. The tribulations and torments of crusading were described over and over again, and the journey into a perilous and alien environment was portrayed as evidence of the love that burned in crusaders, who had emptied their hearts through true penitence.

That fighting and killing others was represented as the endurance of suffering can be jarring for modern minds. Nonetheless, it was this belief—that crusades were collective acts of penance—that most distinguished them from other holy wars in theoretical terms. Whereas most Christian holy war demanded service to God in arms by a devout soldier responding to a divine command, crusading further depended on a recruit's decision to undertake the penance of fighting on a campaign in which his obligations, at any rate if completed, would constitute for him an act of appropriate self-punishment. It is no exaggeration to say that a crusade was for a participant as an individual only secondarily about service in arms to God or the benefiting of the church or Christianity; it was primarily about benefiting oneself, since one was engaged in an act of self-sanctification.

The power of this conception rested in the long term on the way it answered to the concerns of Latin Christians. The remission of sins was offered to members of a society in which it was almost impossible for a layperson to avoid serious sin. For hundreds of years Latin Christendom remained marked by anxieties about sinfulness and a consequence was the appeal to many of crusading, which provided the opportunity to make a fresh start. The Latin Christian view of crusading remained primarily positive for at least 600 years, probably longer. From the twelfth century to the seventeenth the consensus of the teaching of Catholic bishops was that qualified men had a moral obligation to take the cross. This was reinforced by the support of a succession of men and women generally recognized as saints: Bernard of Clairvaux, Dominic, Louis of France, Thomas Aquinas, Bridget of Sweden, Catherine of Siena, John of Capistrano, even probably Francis of Assisi. From Urban II in 1095 to Innocent XI in 1684 pope after pope wrote or authorized letters in which the faithful were summoned to crusade, offered spiritual privileges if they responded, and threatened with divine judgment if they did not. Additionally, through crusading the papacy came to recognize a new type of religious institution: the military orders. At least six general councils of the church legislated for crusades and two of them, the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) and the Second Council of Lyons (1274), published the constitutions *Ad liberandam* and *Pro zelo fidei*, which were among the movement's defining documents.

Some readers were shocked by the use in the first edition of this book of a quotation from a report in the early 1270s by the thirteenth-century preacher Humbert of Romans, who was trying to answer the point that harm was done to Christendom by the deaths on crusade of so many Christians.

> The aim of Christianity is not to fill the earth, but to fill heaven. Why should one worry if the number of Christians is lessened in the world by deaths endured for God? By this kind of death people make their way to heaven who perhaps would never reach it by another road.

Humbert was stating what nearly all his contemporaries claimed to believe. We have to accept that whatever their hopes for temporal advantage, many men and women were prepared to sacrifice wealth, health, life itself—and prepared to commit repeated acts of violence and to kill—in a cause they believed to be just and even salvational. Their actions were expressions of a piety that may appear alien to us but was very real to them.

CHAPTER 2
THE EMERGENCE OF THE FIRST CRUSADE

What caused the First Crusade? This is a perennial question, but historians recognize that it is impossible to neatly identify a discrete cause for the First Crusade because of historical contingency. The First Crusade, like any historical event, resulted from numerous prior conditions and contributing factors. Historical contingency allows that the past was just as complicated as our present. As a result, the question, "what caused the First Crusade?" is overly simplistic and almost impossible to answer accurately.

Instead, this chapter asks: What factors influenced the emergence of the First Crusade? In particular, to what extent was the First Crusade an expansion of preexisting phenomena, and to what extent did it represent new ideas, actions, or individuals? To address these questions, we need to understand three different contexts for the First Crusade: connections and conflicts in Afro-Eurasia and especially the Mediterranean region in the eleventh century; tension between the theoretical unification and actual fragmentation of Christendom; and trends related to power, piety, and violence in Latin Christian society. At the end of the chapter, we will consider how the events of the late 1080s and early 1090s set the stage for Pope Urban II's successful appeal for holy war in 1095—the appeal that led to what we now call the First Crusade.

Connections and Conflicts in the Eastern Hemisphere

Although undoubtedly part of the history of Europe, the history of the crusading movement belongs first within the broader history of the eastern hemisphere. This context allows us to see the dynamic world in which the crusading movement emerged. At their most simplistic, stereotypical views of the crusades, imagine a world of static populations in which civilizations locked in conflict battled each other for supreme dominance. The actual history of Afro-Eurasia in the eleventh century shows us an intensely dynamic and fluid world with cultural, religious, and economic lines of connection as well as conflict. This history also reveals that while control of the eastern Mediterranean did relate to ideas of sacred lands, it also correlated with changing hemispheric trade routes.

East Asia in the eleventh century was booming, in flux, and connected through not only trade but also ideas to the Mediterranean. China under the Song dynasty was experiencing massive economic growth, fueled both by industrial development (e.g., in steel manufacturing) and by technological development (e.g., in maritime design). This boom, coupled with the rise of a consumer society, led to an increase in exports and

Map 1 Eastern Hemisphere, *c.* 1000.

imports. To the south, by the eleventh century the Gupta Empire in what is now India had dissolved. In its place in the south were a number of ambitious coastal states. Trade between East and South Asian states was intense, and, as Tansen Sen has shown, had replaced Buddhism as the main cultural point of connection between these societies.[1]

Southeast Asia and Song China had connections with the Mediterranean in the eleventh century in terms of religion, culture, and economics. By the year 1000, Muslims, Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians were all present living in South Asia. Diplomats and intellectuals visited each other's courts, with cultural exchange and the translation of works on topics such as mathematics and medicine. Power changes within regions under Islamic rule also affected South Asian merchants, in part because the rise of the increasingly dominant Fatimid dynasty, centered on Cairo, shifted economic focus from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea. For example, we see South Asian merchants' access to Mediterranean and Middle Eastern goods in the tribute offered to the Song imperial court.[2] But maritime trade routes were not the only well-trodden commercial paths in the eleventh century.

Intersecting overland trade routes functionally connected West and Central Asia, and so, from an economic perspective, there was a massive Afro-Eurasian economic system in the eleventh century. It would be wrong to suggest that the degree of interconnection and interdependence in this world system compares with modern globalization. Nonetheless, people, ideas, religions, cultures, and goods *were* connected, with an intensification evident in the eleventh century. The geographical center of that eleventh-century world system was West Asia, that is, the eastern end of the Mediterranean.

The Mediterranean Sea functioned as both a natural boundary and a natural point of connection. As a result, the long history of the Mediterranean is one of simultaneous competition, armed conflict, and economic and cultural exchange. In the eleventh century, a variety of different political units surrounded the Mediterranean—and those units fluctuated and changed over the course of the century, sometimes dramatically. Muslims, Jews, and Christians—all with various identities of family, ethnicity, and locality—lived around the Mediterranean. Political power was wielded by Muslims and Christians, in both cases from a variety of sects. Their subject populations were religiously plural, to greater or lesser degrees. And of course, due to its location, the Mediterranean and its peoples served as a point of connection with other regions in the eastern hemisphere.

In particular, the eastern Mediterranean (West Asia) linked to the Black Sea, the Red Sea, east African kingdoms and city-states, South Asia, North Africa—and from there to West Africa, including the empire of Ghana—and any number of overland Asiatic trade routes. In the eleventh century, following the effective, if not theoretical, disintegration of the power of the 'Abbasid caliphs of Baghdad, political control of West Asia was fragmented and contested by regional leaders from a range of ethnic and religious backgrounds. In religious terms, these leaders governed populations of Muslims, Jews, and Christians of a variety of different sects and with varying degrees of internal tolerance. All three of the aforementioned religions revered cities in West Asia,

Map 2 The Mediterranean Sea and Environs, *c*. 1000.

meaning that the region served as shared holy space at the same time as it was a pivotal economic crossroads.

People living in the region we now call Europe had access to the eleventh-century "world" system primarily through the Mediterranean Sea. The medieval Mediterranean was an arena for trade and travel as well as warfare. Political leadership around the Mediterranean adhered to different sects of both Christianity and Islam. Political boundaries, which were rarely fixed or agreed upon, were fluid, as were ideas of who or what constituted legitimate political power. As a result, any map with fixed political borders on it is at least moderately misleading, and there were many leaders who did not claim to rule a state but rather to rule a family or a "people." There were communities of Jews, Muslims, and Christians living under both Christian and Islamic rule around the Mediterranean, and many of those communities had other layers of identity as well: ethnicity, community, region, and family.

In the first three-quarters of the eleventh century, three interrelated developments affected life around the Mediterranean: both growth and disturbance of trade; a significant climate shift; and political fragmentation and reformation. From the eleventh century, Mediterranean trade focused on the nodes of the Italic Peninsula and Sicily, the Iberian Peninsula, North Africa, the Nile Delta and Valley, and West Asia. Political control of these nodes shifted through the century, as did, in some cases, the religious affiliation of rulers. It is important to recognize Jessica Goldberg's point that "the boundary lines between "states" . . . did not correspond neatly to the geography of trade."[3] Instead, as Goldberg explains further in her groundbreaking study based on documents from the Cairo Geniza, personal relationships and individual agency were central to trade; long-distance trade was centered on agricultural production rather than luxury goods; and production, manufacturing, and transit were thoroughly entangled. Thus, while political disruptions in the central Mediterranean, particularly the contest for Sicily, did affect trade, traders adapted and found work-arounds. Individuals and networks of trade might identify as Christian, Jewish, or Muslim, and they might work primarily with co-religionists, or with trade partners of different faiths. On their southern and eastern limits, Mediterranean trade routes tapped into hemispheric trade routes fanning across Afro-Eurasia—and in the eleventh century, these hemispheric trade routes were booming.

This overall intensification of hemispheric trade, including in the Mediterranean, took place amid anomalous climatic conditions. Global climatic change—known as the "Medieval Climate Anomaly" (MCA)—was apparent from the tenth century and intensified in the eleventh. The effects of the MCA varied greatly around the world; some regions were warmer and others cooler, some suffered droughts and others flooding. The MCA had generally beneficial effects in Western Europe, helping stimulate agriculture, population growth, and economic development, although it must have been responsible for the severe drought that just preceded the First Crusade. But the MCA caused havoc in West Asia, disrupting existing patterns of nomadism and promoting economic and political instability. The following paragraphs discuss this political instability in the Byzantine Empire and the ʿAbbasid and Fatimid Caliphates.

The central authority of the ʿAbbasid Caliphate (750–1258) had begun a gradual and uneven process of decline in the ninth century. The ʿAbbasid Caliphate was the second Islamic dynastic caliphate, the successor to the Ummayyad Caliphate (661–750). The ʿAbbasids were members of Muhammad's clan (the Banu Hashim), and they directly contested Ummayyad right to rule and, along with various other factions agitating for their own respective goals, directly sought the overthrow of the Ummayyads. In a moment of political opportunity during the reign of the Ummayyad Caliph Marwan II, the ʿAbbasids successfully achieved their revolution. However, the ʿAbbasid caliphs faced the same problems as their predecessors, especially the problems of how to rule a diverse and variously integrated society, and how to ensure a dynastic succession. By the ninth century, as noted, the central power of the ʿAbbasid caliphs was already in decline. This did not lead to the dissolution of the caliphate, but rather to greater power being wielded by local and provincial leaders, some of whom still claimed nominal allegiance to the caliph in Baghdad. While theoretically the caliphate remained intact, separate but interconnected polities replaced the unified state in practice.

By the eleventh century, this political situation in West Asia was further altered by the expansion of nomadic Turkic peoples from Central Asia. These Turks were not true outsiders. They had in many cases been integrated into ʿAbbasid society as unfree soldiers, bought as children, converted to Islam, militarily trained, and recognized for their abilities. As a result, many Turkic groups were well positioned to either help others seize power in a post-ʿAbbasid landscape, or seize power themselves. Indeed, sometimes they were explicitly invited into the region, as when ʿAtiyya, emir of Aleppo, called for Turkic military assistance in 1064. Other Turkic groups were not so well integrated into ʿAbbasid or post-ʿAbbasid societies, but were familiar nonetheless with the trade routes and the central Asian religions of Islam, Christianity, and Buddhism, and built coalitions with those Turkic peoples who were integrated. Groups like the Seljuk Turks and the Oghuz Turks converted to Islam, becoming part of the *umma* and breaking down the idea of a frontier between Muslims and Turks. A militarized push westward—a series of conquests accompanied by the movement of people—followed.

Starting in the eleventh century, the Seljuk Turks would pull together much of the former ʿAbbasid Empire and pursue the dream of Islamic empire. Brothers Tughril and Chagri—who claimed to be the grandsons of Seljuk, under whom the family converted to Islam—moved from Central Asia westward. The Seljuks controlled Khorasan by 1037 and pushed farther into what are now Iran and Armenia. In 1055 Tughril entered Baghdad and by 1059 he was master of Iraq as far as the Byzantine and Syrian marches. He established a state commonly known as the Seljuk Empire, which ruled what are now Iran and Iraq and part of Greater Syria in the name of the ʿAbbasid caliph. These Seljuks justified their progress westward as a campaign against the corruption in Islam which, they believed, had manifested itself in the scandal of the orthodox Sunni caliphate being for over a century under the dominance of Shi'ite princes. Their concern thereafter was to proceed against the "heretical" Fatimid caliph.

Box 2.1 Sunni and Shi'ite Islam

Islam, like other religions, features different branches or sects. One of the most significant and longest lasting branching points is between Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims, who disagree on the succession to the Prophet Muhammad and hold different theological and juridical views. Sunni Muslims believe that religious authority lies in the consensus of the community regarding the *Shari'a* (holy law), which originates in the Qur'an and is then elaborated in the *sunna*, the collective term for the teachings stemming from the words, deeds, and customs of the Prophet Muhammad as recorded in the *hadith*. The enforcement of this law, as distinct from its interpretation, fell to the caliphs who succeeded Muhammad. Thus, Sunni Muslims recognize the succession of caliphs following the death of Muhammad—from the Rashidun Caliphate to the Ummayyad Caliphate and then to the 'Abbasid Caliphate—as legitimate. In contrast, while Shi'ite Muslims also follow the Qur'an and their own understanding of the *sunna*, they additionally believe that supreme religious authority passed from the Prophet to 'Ali, his cousin, son-in-law, and fourth caliph, and thence to his lineal descendants, known as *imams* (spiritual leaders), who could also be sources of wisdom and guidance for the Muslim community. Today most Shi'ite Muslims maintain that this line of *imams* ended in 874 in the supernatural occlusion (the hiding) of the Twelfth Imam, whose authority has since been exercised in his name by jurists, and who will return in a messianic role at the end of time; this group are known in the modern day as Twelver Shi'ites. However, by then the Shi'ites themselves had split into a number of groups, each with their own teachings, and further splits followed. Thus in the Middle Ages the Fatimid caliphs in Cairo had developed a different form of Shi'ite Islam, and themselves claimed descent from 'Ali and the position of the rightful *imams*. As 'Ali's successors they appropriated supreme authority, not only over the *Shari'a* but also in respect of the hidden meaning of the revelation to Muhammad. The Fatimids were survived by three primary sects: the Druze, who recognize the Fatimid caliph al-Hakim, d. 1021, as the *imam* in supernatural occlusion; the Nizaris, referred to in Western medieval sources as the Assassins, who follow a line of *imams* stemming from the murdered Fatimid prince Nizar, d. 1096; and the Tayyibis, who follow the line of the infant son of the murdered Fatimid caliph al-Amir, d. 1130, deemed to be on Earth, but in whereabouts unknown.

Notwithstanding the actions of Tughril, Chagri, and their heirs, other Seljuks rejected the claimed imperial authority of the Seljuk Empire. From the later 1050s, parties of nomadic Seljuks were raiding deep into Byzantine Armenia and by the late 1060s they were to be found in Cilicia and in Anatolia proper. They were not under the control of Tughril's nephew and successor Alp Arslan, who was forced to intervene. This in turn provoked a Byzantine military reaction. In 1071 Alp Arslan conducted a campaign which,

although it involved capturing several Christian-ruled places in order to consolidate his frontier, was concerned primarily with bringing Muslim Aleppo to heel. Aleppo fell to him, but he then heard that the Byzantines were preparing an offensive. Rounding on the Byzantines, Alp Arslan defeated them (with the help of the apparent betrayal of the commander of the Byzantine rearguard) at the Battle of Manzikert.

However, Alp Arslan's control of West Asia was not uncontested nor was it necessarily his top priority, so long as his imperial rule was unchallenged. As a result, neither the Byzantine Empire nor the Seljuk Empire truly controlled West Asia in the mid-late eleventh century. Instead, the region was contested by local Seljuk rulers, who claimed distant relation to the imperial Seljuks but functioned largely independently of their nominal overlords. Some Christian rulers of various sects also continued to lead in Anatolia, and both Muslim and Christian rulers continued to rule religiously plural populations, including Muslims, Christians, and Jews.

The Byzantine Empire was undergoing its own changes in the eleventh century. From 867 to 1056, the capable rulers of the Macedonian dynasty—sometimes known as Byzantium's "Golden Age"—had revived the empire. They reconquered previously lost territory on all sides, expanded relations with emerging Rus' leaders (notably converting the Bulgars, Serbs, and Rus' to Byzantine Christianity), established an effective imperial bureaucracy, promoted trade, and deliberately cultivated artistic expression of all kinds, often in service of imperial grandeur. However, the mid-eleventh century saw a series of ineffective emperors and the rise of contenders who thought they would do better on the throne. Furthermore, Byzantium faced new military threats, including the Normans in Europe (who conquered formerly Byzantine territory in southern Europe) and the Seljuks in West Asia (who, as seen, took Anatolia). These various factors—new external threats and internal contentions—had interconnected effects. For example, Byzantine emperor Romanos IV's defeat at the hands of Alp Arslan at Manzikert in 1071, described earlier, led to a coup in Constantinople. In this tumultuous context, Byzantium increasingly employed Norman mercenaries in the Varingian Guard and sometimes as almost-independent generals, and increasingly overlooked differences between various European peoples in favor of the general, overarching identity of "Latins" (*Latinoi*).

Similar to the Macedonian dynasty in Byzantium, the Fatimid Caliphate, based in Cairo, experienced growth through the first quarter of the eleventh century, followed by decline and uncertainty in the mid-eleventh century. The Fatimid dynasty had established themselves in Egypt during the decline of ʿAbbasid control, starting in 969. Like the ʿAbbasids, they claimed to be the legitimate, godly Islamic rulers of their time, but unlike the ʿAbbasids, they were Shi'ite. Before the arrival of the Seljuk Turks, the Fatimids had claimed southern portions of Greater Syria, while the Byzantine Empire had claimed northern portions. In the 1060s and 1070s the Fatimids had to give way to Seljuks who, taking advantage of seventeen years of internal disorder in the Nile Delta and Valley, drove them out of most of their possessions in Greater Syria and left them with only a shaky hold on what remained to them. At roughly the same time, in the mid-eleventh century, the Fatimids lost control of Sicily and North Africa.

Political change was clearly a significant feature of the eastern Mediterranean in the eleventh century. Similarly, in the western and central Mediterranean, significant political changes were also occurring. Shortly after the beginning of the ʿAbbasid Caliphate, a remaining Ummayyad prince had retreated to the Iberian Peninsula, reunified it, and established the Ummayyad Caliphate of Córdoba. This caliphate disintegrated in 1031, replaced by a patchwork of smaller Muslim-ruled independent states, known as *ta'ifa* kingdoms. These kingdoms alternately allied and competed with each other as well as with small Christian-ruled polities in the north of the peninsula, all while a mixed population of Muslims, Christians, and Jews continued to thrive under Islamic rule in the larger, southern part of the peninsula.

Meanwhile, in the Italic Peninsula and the central Mediterranean, claims were also shifting, due to both political consolidation and new political players. The kingdoms of Germany, Italy, and Lombardy were technically joined in the person of Otto I of Germany, a strategically ambitious leader who was crowned emperor by the papacy in 962. In 1032, Burgundy was added to his heir's realms. Otto I and his successors, Otto II and Otto III—a dynasty known as the Ottonians—orchestrated sustained political power, increased wealth, and cultural flowering.

However, the Ottonians lived at distance from the Italic Peninsula. As a result, the papacy, some bishops, a relatively small number of magnates, and various city-states wielded more de facto power in the region. Imperial (i.e., German) rule in the peninsula was and would remain contested. The Byzantine Empire also held provinces in the southern Italic Peninsula, and in 1038, briefly invaded the Emirate of Sicily before beating a retreat in 1043.

Ultimately, those making or defending claims to Sicily and the Italic Peninsula—including Muslim rulers, Byzantines, Latin Christian rulers, and the papacy—faced challenges from and in many cases were defeated by the Normans, new arrivals on the scene. In 911, the Frankish king had granted one group of invading Vikings the duchy of Normandy. Thereafter, while some "Normans" focused on affairs in Frankish territory and across the English Channel, others went to the Mediterranean and the Byzantine Empire in search of power and territory, or, alternatively, simply looking for attractive positions as mercenaries. One particular extended Norman family, the Hautevilles, engaged in politics and warfare in the Mediterranean, alternately allying with and opposing the papacy, the Byzantine Empire, and various Muslim powers.

Popular visions of the Middle Ages often imagine a static and clearly subdivided world, in which peoples and powers, and the similarities and differences between them, were well defined. This is most readily seen in so many maps, which confidently draw clear lines across the land, literally delineating the human inhabitants, and suggesting that characteristics such as political allegiance, cultural identity, and religious affiliation could be tidily demarcated. Eleventh-century Afro-Eurasia was interconnected, prosperous, and in many ways, in a period of growth and experimentation. While its global system was not a fully integrated as our own, it was nonetheless a fully complex world, with polities, religions, cultures, economies, and worldviews that were rich and

complicated. This complex eleventh-century world throve simultaneously and fluidly on both collaboration and conflict.

The Mediterranean in Flux: 1070–95

While the political status quo around the Mediterranean Sea was virtually always contested, and thus always a manifestation of both continuity and change, the final three decades of the eleventh century saw particularly pointed changes in political alignments.

In the western Mediterranean, the late eleventh century saw both Christian and Muslim conquests in the Iberian Peninsula. Starting in the eighth and ninth centuries and escalating in the tenth and eleventh, Christian-ruled polities in the north—Aragon, Navarre, Léon-Castile, Catalonia, and Portugal—both contested with and fought each other, and applied more pressure to the Muslim-ruled majority of the peninsula, as the caliphate had disintegrated into smaller political units known as *ta'ifa* kingdoms, as noted earlier. This pressure took the form of outright conquest as well as the receipt of tributary payments (which helped buy the services of mercenary armies) and acknowledgment of sovereignty and jurisdiction. Latin Christians rulers justified both conquest and tributary relationships in ideological terms as *restauratio* (restoration) of Christian rule to territory that had been ruled by the Visigoths centuries before. Most notably, Alfonso VI of Léon—who styled himself first king, and later emperor—took the city of Toledo in 1085.

In response, leaders of the *ta'ifa* kingdoms sought assistance from Yusuf ibn Tashfin, the leader of the *al-Murabitun* (Almoravids) in North Africa. The *al-Murabitun* originated as a militant Sunni movement in North Africa and had established a powerful state centered on Marrakech. They were notably zealous, and supported their claims to legitimacy with assertions of religious purity. Their first conquests—including the Kingdom of Ghana in West Africa—ensured control of Saharan trade routes, and from there they conquered North Africa. In purported response to appeals from *ta'ifa* rulers, they crossed to the Iberian Peninsula and won a victory over Latin Christian-led forces at Sagrajas in 1086. Frankish contingents, including several future crusaders, marched to an inconclusive campaign against Ibn Tashfin in 1087. In consequence of the Almoravid expansion, the southern Iberian Peninsula and North Africa were connected politically, economically, and culturally in the late eleventh century, and Muslim-ruled southern Iberia was reunited.

In the central Mediterranean, late-eleventh-century conflicts centered on the island of Sicily, portions of the Italic Peninsula, and the Balkan Peninsula. Through the eleventh and into the early twelfth centuries, the Norman Hautevilles and their allies fought—at different times, with sporadic success and setbacks, and not necessarily in a coordinated way—for territories on the southern Italic Peninsula, the island of Sicily, and the Balkans. The wars in these locations variously put the Normans in direct alliance or conflict with the papacy, Latin Christian rulers, the Byzantine Empire, and both independent and Fatimid-affiliated Muslim rulers. After thirty years of warfare, the Norman Count Roger I of Sicily claimed the island in 1091, just five years before the First Crusade.

In the eastern Mediterranean, late-eleventh-century conflicts revolved around the Seljuk Empire, the Byzantine Empire, and the Fatimid Caliphate. In 1081, Alexios I Komnenos became the Byzantine emperor, and sought to rebuild imperial strength after several decades of decline. This placed him in conflict with the Seljuk Turks—both the Seljuk Empire and Seljuk rulers in Anatolia (whose state would become known as the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum)—and both Pechenegs and Normans in the Balkans. Internal contention was another challenge for Alexios I. For their part, the Sunni Seljuk Empire and the Shi'ite Fatimid Caliphate were regional rivals, particularly for influence on the eastern Mediterranean coast and control of coastal cities as well as Jerusalem. This Seljuk-Fatimid rivalry had political, economic, and religious nuances.

Then, in the 1090s, Seljuks, 'Abbasids and Fatimids alike were gravely weakened by a chain of disasters. In 1092 one of the greatest figures in Seljuk imperial history, the vizir Nizam al-Mulk, the power behind the sultans for over thirty years, was murdered. A month later the Seljuk sultan Malik-Shah I died in suspicious circumstances. He was followed to the grave by not only his wife but also his grandson and other powerful individuals. Seizing the moment, a Seljuk sultan named Qilij Arslan reasserted the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum in the northeastern Mediterranean, on the borders of the Byzantine Empire. Then in 1094 the 'Abbasid caliph al-Muqtadi, and the Fatimid caliph al-Mustansir, the second of whom had ruled for fifty-eight years and had fiercely resisted the Seljuks, also died. So did al-Mustansir's vizier, Badr al-Jamali. These losses within the Great Seljuk and Fatimid leadership led to political fragmentation and contention in West Asia. Crusading armies would thus become yet more armies in a region wrestling with coincidental losses of leadership and subsequent pursuit of power by many.

These tensions and conflicts in the late eleventh century were not the result of diminishing resources or impoverishment. Quite the opposite was true. And in Latin Christendom, particularly, the eleventh century ushered in increasing prosperity, population growth, and expansion, even while the late eleventh century saw rising internal conflict.

Expansion, Power, and Piety in Latin Christendom

In eleventh-century Christian belief, Christendom constituted a unified, homogenous, and hierarchical sociopolitical community. It was—or was supposed to be—an unbroken whole that transcended political boundaries, cultural differences, or liturgical variations. Eleventh-century Christian political theories reinforced the idea of an ideally unified and homogenous Christendom. Yet while as an ideal Christendom was a fully united and singular body, even in terms of political theories, it was not unified.

At the eastern end of the Mediterranean, the Byzantine Empire saw itself as the continuing Roman Empire and thus nothing less than Christ's empire. The Byzantine emperor was the earthly representative of God. As God's representatives, Byzantine emperors answered to God alone, and were responsible for the complete and holistic political, economic, and spiritual prosperity of their subjects. Furthermore, as God's

Map 3 The Mediterranean Sea and Environs, *c.* 1090.

Figure 2.1 *Hyperpyron* of Alexios I Komnenos, gold, twelfth century
© Wikimedia Commons (public domain).
Alexios I Komnenos introduced the *hyperpyron* as the new standard gold coin, replacing its predecessor, the *solidus*. The *solidus* had become debased over time and after the various crises that shook the Byzantine Empire in the 1080s, its value was low. Alexios redesigned the coinage system and introduced the *hyperpyron,* which had the same weight as the *solidus* but fewer carats. The *hyperpyron* remained the standard Byzantine gold coin through the fourteenth century and was a staple of international trade in and through the eastern Mediterranean; it was referred to in Latin sources as a *bezant*. This coin depicts Alexios in the ceremonial attire of a Byzantine emperor, including *divitison*, *chlamys*, and diadem with cross. He is holding a *labarum* (Roman imperial banner) in one hand and an orb and cross, a Christian symbol of dominion, in the other. "Hand of God" is inscribed. On the reverse side (not shown) is Christ seated on a throne, holding a Gospel in one hand and raising the other in blessing.

representatives, Byzantine emperors (and the church they led) were at the top of the human hierarchy within Christendom. Only God stood above them (Figure 2.1).

At the western end of the Mediterranean, those who recognized the spiritual authority of the pope or bishop of Rome (in this book, Latin Christians) had their own political theories. In particular, Latin Christians recognized papal spiritual supremacy within Christendom. Until the eleventh century, this was most readily associated with Pope Gelasius I and is sometimes known as the doctrine of the "two swords." In 494, in the letter *Famuli vestrae pietatis*, Pope Gelasius I asserted to Byzantine emperor Anastasius I Dicorus that God stood at the top of Christendom, and below him, there were two powers that ruled the world: the papal power and the regnal power. This concept was understood and expressed as "two swords" in terms of Lk. 22:35-38. Thus, many Latin Christians recognized supreme spiritual authority in the papacy, and supreme temporal

power in monarchs and emperors. Both popes and monarchs/emperors were believed to be God's representatives, each with specific responsibilities, and ultimately cooperating with each other to enact divine will.

But were these "two swords" actually co-equal? Gelasius I did not think so; his purpose in writing to the Byzantine emperor was to assert the superiority of the sacred authority of the pontiffs. Unsurprisingly, many Latin Christian monarchs and emperors did not necessarily accept this. From their perspective, based on biblical texts as well as the legacy of the Roman Empire, a Christian emperor—Latin Christian, not Byzantine—could be God's most important representative.

Box 2.2 Western Emperors

The Byzantine Empire viewed itself as the direct continuation of the Roman Empire. In the early Middle Ages this claim was not directly challenged within Latin Christendom. However, from the eighth century forward, a series of Latin rulers claimed the title of *imperator Romanorum,* "emperor of the Romans". The first ruler so titled was Charles the Great (Charlemagne). Charles, then king of the Franks and Lombards, was crowned emperor by Pope Leo III in Rome in December 799. The coronation occurred after Charles had rescued Leo's papacy and after Leo had declared it was impossible for the Byzantine empress Irene to be emperor because she was a woman. Thenceforward there was consistent political tension between claims to Roman emperorship at each end of the Mediterranean. Byzantines did eventually recognize Western emperors as Frankish or Germanic emperors, but they did not recognize them as Roman emperors or true equals. Meanwhile, within Latin Christendom itself there was also tension and sometimes outright competition for and counterclaims to the title of emperor. In the early tenth century, the tradition began of German princes electing a monarch from among their ranks whom they thought was rightfully the emperor as well as their king. From then on the question of whether a Western emperor was empowered due to the election of his peers or due to papal coronation was another point of contention in Latin Christendom. The relationship between Western emperors and the papacy as the dual heads—"two swords"—of Latin Christendom was also a repeated source of disagreement and sometimes war. Whether other Latin rulers recognized a Western emperor, let alone followed his lead, depended a great deal upon an individual emperor's abilities, wealth, and family relationships, as well as the political context of a particular moment in time.

Furthermore, when we turn to actual political and sectarian divisions, we see a great variety of Christian communities and identities in eleventh-century Afro-Eurasia. In the earliest centuries of Christianity, a variety of distinct Christian sects—some aligned

with ruling Christian dynasties, others not—had formed in North Africa as well as West and Central Asia. Christians visited South Asia as early as the sixth century (the same century when Latin missionaries converted the king of Kent in what is now England) and the Chinese city of Xi'an in the seventh century. Thus Christianity was a global and multicultural religion from virtually its earliest moments, and while the conquests of early Islamic states affected Christian communities, they did not extinguish them. Indeed, a number of Christian sects considered heretical by Byzantine emperors and the bishops of Rome survived under Islamic rulers, who did not view them more negatively than other Christians.

Around the eleventh-century Mediterranean, a variety of different Christian-ruled polities, and Christian communities, existed. In the northeast corner of the Mediterranean, the Byzantine Empire was a theocracy, self-perceived as a continuation of the Roman Empire ruled by emperors who represented divine will on earth. Moving clockwise around the Mediterranean, we encounter Armenian Christians, who also connected their faith with belief in their peoples' right to rule. Further south, in the southeastern Mediterranean and along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden in northeastern Africa, a number of Christian communities—some Arab-speaking, others not—lived alongside Jews, Samaritans, Zoroastrians, and other faiths. Christians continued to live in North Africa under Islamic rule, and in the Iberian Peninsula, under Islamic rule in the south and Christian rule in the north. Within what we now call Europe, there were communities of Christians aligned with the Church of Rome, and others aligned with the Byzantine Church. Local cultures and ethnic practices also influenced Christianity throughout Europe, and Christianity existed in Europe alongside small communities of Jews and Muslims, as well as on the border of pagan societies. Thus, while in theory, Latin Christians in Europe were united by their religion, in practice, they were less so. And certainly in terms of politics—both temporal and within the Latin Church itself—European Latin Christians were divided.

In eleventh-century Europe, earlier tensions between temporal and spiritual powers (the "two swords") came to a head again, in part due to concerns about piety, salvation, violence, and social order. One reason for the increasing articulation of these concerns was the political fragmentation of the Frankish Empire. Charlemagne's heirs were unable to maintain centralized control of the empire he had established in the seventh and eighth centuries, and by the tenth century, real authority was no longer being exercised by the king, nor by many of the great counts. Instead, many Frankish provinces had broken into smaller units, based on castles from which lords and their knights so terrorized their neighborhoods that they came to represent the only authorities, violent, arbitrary, and demanding, that people knew. The Frankish kings' control was actually by now limited to a very small region, the Ile-de France, and while their claims to authority were as large as ever, in practice they functioned as de facto lords among other lords.

While this trend was not present everywhere in Europe—England, for example, continued to be ruled by a king, the Ottonian dynasty was strong within the German states, and city-states were in control in the Italic Peninsula—overall, power became associated with lords who saw themselves as both regional and military leaders.

Lords saw their relationships with those they considered subordinate—whether lay or ecclesiastical—in terms of personal bonds of loyalty, protection, and common customs. The same powerful families filled positions of power within the Latin Church as well as lay society. And lords' conflicts with each other often generated violence that primarily affected the most vulnerable in society.

The Latin Church had reacted by taking the lead in a social movement for the "Peace of God," which expressed popular concern in great assemblies meeting around piles of relics collected from all the local churches, beginning in the late tenth century. These decreed the immunity of the clergy and the "poor" (better translated as "the powerless") from violence and exploitation and banned the use of all force at certain times of the year and on certain days of the week. Attempts were made to pressurize lords and knights into accepting the peace provisions, but they could only be compelled by force. As a result, the peace movement itself engendered military actions against peace-breakers, conducted in the name of churchmen who, if they were bishops and abbots, had their own retinues of knights. In the first half of the eleventh century, the "Peace of God" was joined by calls for the "Truce of God," a parallel movement which sought to prohibit warfare during certain liturgical seasons of the year. These peace movements had waned in France by the 1090s but had spread elsewhere. It is indicative of the fear many felt of the prospect of warfare at home while many were campaigning in the eastern Mediterranean that the peace movement was revived in France at the time of the First Crusade.

Out of the peace movement had come the conviction that the very aggressiveness that seemed to have broken up society could be put to God-given purposes if only the laity could be persuaded to devote their energies to the service of the Latin Church. This would, perhaps, have the additional benefit of settling more finally the question of who stood supreme at the political head of Christendom. All over Europe clerics were turning to the laity for military support, while chaplains in the households of the powerful, concerned to put across the Christian message in terms their employers and their households would understand, drew on Old Testament stories and Christian hagiography for heroic and martial tales that would appeal to their listeners.

Clearly, then, the peace movement did not seek to stop all violence; it did not conceptualize all violence as inherently negative. Rather, it sought to use and direct violence in ways that were considered "good" and Christian, and to ensure that the right people used violence in the right way to promote the right ends. It also sought to convince armsbearers that there were ways to be correctly violent, as Christians, by using violence in service to the Latin Church.

These trends were not altogether new. As discussed in Chapter 1, the history of militant Christianity, Christian holy war, and righteous Christian violence has been traced back to the earliest centuries of the Christian Roman Empire. These ideological and theological threads strongly influenced not only the laity but also the formation and cultural expression of Christian monasticism. And these threads were woven not only in Latin Christian society in Europe but also in the Byzantine Empire. Nonetheless, the clear efforts of eleventh-century clerics to re-Christianize violence in Latin Christendom

were rewarded in the sense that there was evidence of growing piety and outward shows of devotion among many armsbearers.

The peace movement was driven not only by immediate social concerns but also by an ongoing reform movement within the Latin Church. The reformers wanted to free the Latin Church from corrupt practices, which they attributed to the excessive influence of the laity in ecclesiastical affairs. They wanted a purer institution, more akin to the early church they perceived in reading the Acts of the Apostles. Since most of the reformers were monks, engaged in a reform of monasticism that predated and ran parallel to the more general reform of the church, they envisioned a restored Christendom through monkish eyes. It is no exaggeration to say that they wanted to monasticize the Christian world. They dreamed of a clergy, celibate and untainted by worldly values, ministering to laypeople who as far as they were able lived lives and adopted devotional practices that corresponded to monastic ones.

The energy expended by reformers on their cause was remarkable. Reformers encouraged the physical transformation of the Latin Church's presence through the building of parish churches, and fostered scholarship, particularly the study of grammar, history, and canon law, to justify their campaign. Most extraordinary of all is the way the papacy was captured by them; it is no coincidence that so many of the popes of this period had been monks themselves. This, in turn, reflected the fact that many members of the laity supported reformers' goals, and some of the most powerful aided their advance. For example, Pope Clement II, often viewed as the first reformist pope, achieved his office with substantial support from King Henry III of Germany. Henry III summoned the Church Council of Sutri (1046), which put an end to destructive factional infighting surrounding the papacy. In the council's aftermath, Clement II became pope, and proclaimed Henry III emperor. So when Pope Urban II called for "liberation" of the church in 1095, he was using a concept colored by its employment in the last half-century by monastic reformers with an exaggerated notion of liberty, bred in great exempt abbeys like Cluny, which had been accustomed to enjoy "liberties," granted them by the popes, that freed them from the authority of bishops and monarchs—even if the same bishops and monarchs had helped them achieve their freedoms.

This pressure for liberation in Latin Christendom had already led to violence. For over forty years, reforming popes had supported the use of force against those who resisted the new ideas they advanced. To return to the example of Henry III and Clement II, they traveled together to Rome to proclaim the Council of Sutri at the head of a massive army, accompanied by both lay and clerical magnates who had sworn loyalty to Henry III. But popes and monarchs did not always find themselves on the same side of violent conflict. Violence in service of church liberation could just as easily break out between popes and the greatest lay rulers, especially as reforming popes more vocally asserted their divinely granted supreme authority over all of Christendom—including monarchs and emperors.

The most notable incident began around 1080, when Pope Gregory VII allied with a party of German magnates in conflict with their king and emperor-designate Henry IV, son of the aforementioned Henry III. The war spread to the Italic Peninsula. Gregory

was driven from Rome after his Norman allies sacked the city; an alternative pope (an "anti-pope") was established in his place. As a result, Urban II began his pontificate in exile from Rome. His success in rebuilding support culminated in his entry into Rome in 1094 and in the 1095 Council of Piacenza itself, which was attended by a large body of bishops and by a significant number of the representatives of lay powers. But he did not claim full defeat of his own anti-pope and rule of the city of Rome until a crusading army helped decide the matter in 1097, and the anti-pope continued to claim the papacy until his death in 1100.

The summons to "liberate" the Latin Church by means of force was easily applicable to areas outside Latin Christendom, and indeed, explicit connections between military-backed liberation inside and outside Christendom were made from the start of the crusading movement. For example, Urban II used the term "liberation" to describe the Norman Count Roger's invasion of Sicily and King Alfonso VI's wars in the Iberian Peninsula, particularly the conquest of Toledo in 1085. When in 1075 Pope Gregory VII called for Latin Christians to fight Seljuk Turks alongside the Byzantine Empire, he described this as an action of liberation, stating, "If we love God and wish to be recognized . . . we should lay down our lives to liberate them."

Reforming popes did not rely on expediency or simple rhetoric, however. They had also turned to scholars for justification of Christian violence. Particularly important in this respect was what would nowadays be called a think tank, comprising a brilliant group of thinkers gathered around Countess Mathilda of Tuscany, one of the most committed supporters of radical reform. The Mathildine scholars concentrated on reviving and developing the ideas on force of Augustine of Hippo, who was, we have already seen, the most authoritative theoretician of Christian violence. Anselm of Lucca compiled an anthology of Augustine's statements on the issue. John of Mantua based a powerful argument for papal authority on the incident in the Garden of Gethsemane when St. Peter had been rebuked by Christ for drawing a sword and cutting off the ear of the high priest's servant. John maintained that although as a priest Peter had not been permitted to wield the sword himself, he and his successors, the popes, had authority over it, because Christ had told him to put it back into its scabbard rather than throw it away. Bonizo of Sutri took up the idea of martyrdom in battle, which had been occasionally expounded by the papacy since the ninth century, when two popes had averred that soldiers who died in the right frame of mind in combat against infidels would gain eternal life. One of them had reinforced this by promising absolution to the dead, a precedent that seems to have persuaded the canonist Ivo of Chartres, writing at the time of the First Crusade, that death in engagements against the enemies of the faith could be rewarded. Meanwhile, decades before the title of martyr had already been extended by Pope Leo IX to those who fell simply in defense of justice, when he referred to the "martyrdom" of those who had fallen in the defeat of his forces by the Normans in the Battle of Civitate in 1053.

Clearly, then, the First Crusade was preceded by both ideological and practical precedents. That said, as discussed further herein, it was going to be preached as a penance and this, as the conservative opponent of reform Sigebert of Gembloux pointed out, was

Figure 2.2 Matilda of Tuscany, *c.* 1115.
© Alamy Stock Photos.
As a powerful countess, Matilda of Tuscany's achievements were celebrated in richly illuminated manuscripts. This image is from the dedicatory page of the *Vita Mathildis* ("Life of Matilda"). It shows Matilda enthroned under a canopy and holding a plant-scepter. On her right her chaplain Donizo presents the book to her, while on her left stands one of her knights, the two together representing her authority in both spiritual and temporal realms. The inscription asks Matilda to accept the book.

a departure from previous Christian teachings on violence. Even into the twelfth century, opinions on the question of whether fighting could be positively meritorious ranged from doubts of whether sin could be avoided in any act of war to a fierce conviction that altruistic violence could be virtuous. The idea of penitential warfare was revolutionary, because it put the act of fighting on the same meritorious plane as prayer, works of mercy and fasting.

As explained in the previous chapter, papal announcements that fighting for a righteous cause, whether against other Christians or Muslims, could merit a spiritual reward from the papacy date back to the eighth century. But receiving a spiritual reward for fighting is different from believing that the fighting itself constitutes a penance that results in the remission of temporal punishment for sins. Despite the evidence for papal

declarations of spiritual rewards for warfare before the eleventh century, it still seems that Gregory VII was the first pope to state categorically that taking part in a holy war could be an act of charity to which merit was attached and to assert that such an action could indeed be penitential. That said, Gregory did not articulate a fully elaborated theological system. Rather, he left behind a great number of papal letters in which he promised some sort of spiritual reward related to conflict with the Normans, the German kings, and the Seljuk Turks. In at least one letter, he clearly affirmed that "combat itself is the penance."[4]

As already noted, Gregory VII had a close relationship with Mathilda of Tuscany and ideas were exchanged between his circle and hers. It was in the course of this dialogue that the concept of penitential war crystallized, leading one opponent of reform to accuse Gregory of "inciting to bloodshed . . . secular men seeking release from their sins." Sigebert of Gembloux wrote that Gregory had first put forward the idea when he "had ordered . . . Mathilda to fight the Emperor Henry for the remission of her sins." The phrase "remission of sins," echoing the Nicene Creed's definition of baptism, could hardly have had a more potent sound to it. The reasoning behind the idea of violence as penance is revealed in a life of Anselm of Lucca, in which one of Anselm's priests described how he transmitted a blessing from Anselm to Mathilda's army in 1085. "We were," he wrote, "to impose on the soldiers the danger of the coming battle for the remission of all their sins." So Anselm was justifying penitential war with the argument that the act of fighting in a just cause was a penance because it was dangerous.

In theory at least, this created a new category of warfare. Precisely because this development built upon existing precedents, in the decade before the First Crusade the idea that one could fight as a penance must have been spreading through the families and networks of papal supporters, and from sympathetic monastic communities into the countryside around. Like so much of the radical thought bubbling up in late-eleventh-century Europe, it would have been hard to defend on theological grounds, and as Bysted concludes, in the eleventh century, it can hardly have seemed the most useful tool for the papacy. It would never have been easy to justify the inflicting of pain and loss of life, with the consequential distortion of the perpetrator's internal dispositions, as a penance simply because the penitent was exposing himself to danger, however unpleasant the experience might have been. But early in his papacy, Urban II took up the idea of penitential warfare in order to encourage Christian wars in the Iberian Peninsula. And then, fatefully, the First Crusade gave the idea of penitential warfare a compelling context, because it associated the idea with the most charismatic of all traditional penances, the pilgrimage to Jerusalem.

The Launch of the First Crusade

In addition to the broader trends and general movements just described, the First Crusade resulted from the actions and choices of individuals. One such clearly pivotal individual was the Byzantine emperor, Alexios I Komnenos. In the first week of March 1095, an embassy sent by the Byzantine emperor made an appearance at a church council at

Piacenza, presided over by Pope Urban II, who was at the time still not in a position to safely convene a church council in the city of Rome. The embassy asked for military assistance in reclaiming former imperial lands now held by Seljuk Turks in West Asia. It is unclear whether Alexios and his envoys expected the papacy to simply dispatch mercenaries (as Urban II had done before in 1090–1) or help arrange a larger-scale expedition. Either way, Alexios' appeal was one immediate factor that set off the chain of events that led to the First Crusade.

Box 2.3 Mercenaries

Mercenaries—professional armsbearers who made a living waging war—were a constant feature of medieval warfare. A wide range of social classes worked as mercenaries and conditions of employment varied greatly. A mercenary could be anyone from a prince serving as a member of an emperor's elite personal guard to a knightly field general to an impoverished foot soldier. Mercenary work could be temporary or lifelong, and might be pursued individually or as part of a fixed company of armsbearers accustomed to fighting together; there was in fact a strong preference for such established mercenary units. Muslims and Christians both worked as mercenaries and might be variously employed by co-religionists or those of other faiths. Mercenary work was never condoned and frequently critiqued by the Latin Church, but at the same time, it was not viewed as necessarily the worst of all sins. Mercenaries played a role in crusades increasingly as time went on, and it became ever more important to ensure crusades were waged with a sufficiently large body of well-trained and well-equipped fighters.

Another immediate factor was the disposition of the papacy under Pope Urban II. On the one hand, the papacy had been worried about the disintegration of Byzantium's eastern frontier for some time. As alluded to before, in 1074 Pope Gregory VII proposed leading personally a force of as many as 50,000 volunteers to "liberate" their Christian brothers; he stated that with this army he might even push on to the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem. (Of course, this appeal fell on largely deaf ears.) For his part, Urban II had been in touch with Alexios I from the beginning of his pontificate, with the aim of improving relations between the Latin and Byzantine Churches. Similarly, Alexios himself had been corresponding with Latin Christian magnates in the hope that they would assist the empire; in doing so he was following the tradition of making use of warriors, sometimes mercenaries, from the western Mediterranean. It is, therefore, highly improbable that either the words of the Byzantine embassy at Piacenza or Urban's behavior after the council was fully spontaneous.

With hindsight one can see how not only the ideological tumult just described but also Urban's personal upbringing and career had prepared him for the steps he now took. He had been born *c.* 1035 into a north Frankish noble family: his father

was probably a vassal of the Count of Champagne. Educated at the prestigious school attached to the cathedral at Reims, he became canon and archdeacon there, before entering the great Burgundian abbey of Cluny after 1067. By 1074 the abilities that had made him a young archdeacon had brought him to the office of grand prior of Cluny, the second-in-command to the abbot. Cluny was at the center of ecclesiastical affairs and its monks were called upon to serve in Rome under Pope Gregory VII. Ultimately Urban was appointed to the cardinal-bishopric of Ostia, the senior office in the College of Cardinals, succeeding another past grand prior of Cluny. He went to Rome in 1080 and was caught up in the Investiture Contest, particularly during the winter of 1084–5 when he was trying to shore up crumbling support for Gregory VII in the German states. He was one of three persons nominated by Gregory as his possible successor and after the short pontificate of Victor III he was elected pope on March 12, 1088. Urban's time at Reims and Cluny had brought him into contact with some of the leaders of the reform movement and had exposed him to Cluniac views on the role of knights in service to the Church of Rome. His career under Gregory VII had introduced him to the latest reform ideas and their application to ecclesiastical and imperial politics. But, above all, by birth he was well qualified to know the minds of Frankish knights.

With this knowledge of his Frankish knightly audience no doubt firmly in mind, after about a month in Piacenza, Urban journeyed through the northern Italic Peninsula before moving on to Frankish lands. On August 15, 1095 he was at Le Puy, the bishop of which, Adhémar of Monteil, also a member of a noble family, was to play an important part in the crusade. From there Urban summoned the French bishops to a council to be held at Clermont in the following November. He then traveled south to St Gilles, in the dominions of Raymond of St Gilles, the Count of Toulouse and a future leader of the crusade, before traveling up the Rhône valley to Cluny, which he reached on *c*. October 18. He reached Clermont on November 15 or 16 and opened the council on the eighteenth. On November 27 he proclaimed the crusade to a large, but predominantly clerical, gathering at Clermont.

Urban II's travels and preaching continued beyond Clermont. He subsequently traveled through central, western and southern Frankish lands, skirting the area directly controlled by King Philip I of France, whose excommunication for adultery had been confirmed at Clermont. Urban's own efforts were supplemented by enthusiastic preaching by others. At Clermont, and probably at Nîmes, he encouraged all the bishops present to preach the cross themselves. Several followed his instructions, but there is evidence that many did not. Monks were more enthusiastic and many religious communities were centers of recruitment. There were also freelancers like the wandering preacher Peter the Hermit.

Urban did not leave preaching the crusade entirely to others, however; his grand tour continued. For a man in his sixties his achievement was astonishing. He covered about 2,000 miles, entering country towns, the citizens of which had presumably never seen a king or anyone of such international importance in living memory, crowned with his tiara and accompanied by a flock of cardinals, archbishops, and bishops, whose riding

households must have been immense and whose train must have stretched across miles of countryside. He traveled through the liturgical seasons of Advent and Lent and timed his arrivals to coincide with great patronal feasts: he was at St Gilles for the feast of St Giles; at Le Puy, the greatest Marian shrine of the time, for the feast of the Assumption; and at Poitiers for the feast of St. Hilary. He dedicated with all the liturgical theater that could be mustered the cathedrals and monastic basilicas that witnessed to the ambitious building program embarked on everywhere by Frankish clergy. He preached crusading, and we have references to the sermons he delivered at Limoges at Christmas 1095, at Angers and Le Mans in February 1096, and at Nîmes in July. He also presided over dramatic and presumably preplanned ceremonies at which Frankish knights took the cross and vowed to crusade: possibly at Le Mans; certainly at Tours in March 1096. He recrossed the Alps into the Italic Peninsula in August 1096. By then the crusade was under way.

The Appeal

The speed with which the First Crusade developed testifies to both the persuasive nature of the appeal and the receptiveness of those who responded to it. Surprisingly, it is notoriously difficult to pin down the precise details of the 1095 call to action. As noted, Alexios I wanted military assistance, in some terms not fully clear to us. Yet even if that is true, it appears that Urban II represented the call to action, presumably deliberately, in different and more elaborate terms. Above all, Urban assumed the right to wage holy war claimed previously by Gregory VII. Either Urban believed he was in agreement with Alexios, or, more likely, he believed that his approach was the one likely to work in the ways he wanted.

There are many surviving descriptions of the message Urban II was trying to get across at Clermont and on his tour of Frankish lands in Latin chronicles. Most require careful historical reading because they were written after the crusade had liberated Jerusalem, when no Latin Christian writer was immune from a euphoria that bathed the immediate past in an artificial glow, and when many deliberately set out to craft accounts of the crusade that fit neatly into triumphal or apocalyptic Christian history. It is also worth noting that no accounts of the crusade written from a pro-imperial perspective have survived; all surviving narrative accounts favor the papal side of the Investiture Conflict. This reminds us that the crusade was a move in the internal struggle for dominance within Latin Christendom, and that our accounts of it are colored by those dynamics.

However, there is contemporary material that helps us balance out evidence from the post hoc chronicles of the crusade, particularly Urban's own letters. After all, in addition to preaching the crusade personally, Urban sent letters or embassies to Flanders, Genoa, Bologna, Pisa, and Milan. The crusade was discussed at councils he held—at Clermont in November 1095, Nîmes in July 1096, Bari in October 1098, and Rome in April 1099, all before the Latin conquest of Jerusalem in July 1099—and those councils left records, many of which we still have.

Interestingly, documents from the late 1090s demonstrate that the appeal to crusade was not universally inspiring. For example, the council of Clermont had agreed a body of legislation on the crusade, but only one canon—on the remission of sins—survives in the form it was decreed. Very few manuscripts of the council's decisions included it, since they tended to contain only those canons of interest to the bishops who had them copied (and, presumably, the crusade did not particularly interest them). We are also able to see how contemporaries viewed the significance of Urban's statement of remission of sins in very different ways. For example, one manuscript documenting the Clermont canon on the remission of sins was a list made for Bishop Lambert of Arras. But this may have reflected the perspective of the list's compiler, rather than Lambert's own perspective, since he left us his own account of the council, in which no mention at all is made of the crusade; for Lambert the most important result was the pope's confirmation of the standing of his own bishopric.

While the sparsity of conciliar evidence apart from Urban's letters makes it hard to nail down specifics, it is possible for us to make out at least the outlines of Urban's appeal. At Clermont and throughout his preaching tour he stressed that he was speaking on God's behalf. He wrote of the crusaders as inspired agents of God who were to be engaged in God's service out of love for him. He told them they were followers of Christ, and he may well have referred to them as militia Christi, "armsbearers of Christ." In doing this he was using language that had originally been used to describe monks, and had already been appropriated by the reformers to refer to their military supporters—but he appears to have been taken literally in the late 1090s. Above all, he called for a holy war of liberation, to be waged by volunteers who had vowed to fight as an act of penance that would bring them spiritual reward.

More specifically, Urban proclaimed a war with two distinct "liberating" goals. The first was the freeing of Christians in West Asia, especially in Jerusalem, from Muslim rule. This was the liberation of people, of a branch of Christendom purportedly under existential threat. The second was the liberation of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, a specific place and one that seems to have appealed to the crusaders far more than the idea of the liberation of their Christian brothers and sisters. At any rate, it is clear that Urban coupled the liberation of Christians and the Holy Sepulchre with that of the whole church and Christendom itself. In this he was like his papal predecessors, who had always associated violence on behalf of specific people or places with the needs and renewal of Christendom at large.

The city of Jerusalem was a powerful component of Urban's ultimately successful appeal. It used to be argued that the goal of Jerusalem was secondary, perhaps long term, and that in preaching the crusade Urban's first concern was to help the Byzantines against the Seljuks in Anatolia, in order to improve relations with the patriarchate of Constantinople. There is, however, overwhelming evidence in the descriptions of Urban's tour, the decisions of the council of Clermont and the charters of departing crusaders for Jerusalem having a central role from the start. And we now know that in a period when interest in the city—or rather in Christ's empty tomb at its heart—had become obsessive, the Byzantine emperor Alexios I had already been tempting Latin Christian nobles with the prospect of its liberation. That said, we should remember that in appealing for Latin

Christian military action against Seljuk Turks in 1074—an appeal that was recognized by contemporaries as a precursor to Urban's appeal—Gregory VII also invoked Jerusalem and the Holy Sepulchre, without success.

The goal of Jerusalem made the crusade understandable as both a war and a pilgrimage, which reinforced and legitimated the idea that warfare and violence could be penitential. In his letters, Urban used some language that gestured toward pilgrimage—*iter* (journey), *via* (way), *labor* (work), though not the most explicit *peregrinatio* (pilgrimage)—and also clearly employed the military term *expeditio* (expedition of war). The penitential nature of the warfare was unambiguous. The council of Clermont decreed that whoever joined the army "for devotion alone, not to gain honour or money . . . can substitute this journey for all penance." Urban himself promised the crusaders that if they went forth "not because they desire earthly profit but only for the salvation of their souls and the liberation of the Church, we . . . relieve them of all penance imposed for their sins, of which they have made a genuine and full confession." This was envisioned as both holy and penitential war.

That said, Urban was not solely concerned with Jerusalem. He also sought Latin Christian expansion in the Iberian Peninsula and it is plausible to see a connection between his expansionary interests there and his appeal for an expedition to Jerusalem. In 1089, almost at the start of his pontificate, he had enthusiastically supported—indeed perhaps himself inaugurated—a drive to occupy Tarragona, a ghost town between Christian and Islamic rule, 50 miles down the coast from Barcelona. The Count of Barcelona, who was being encouraged to take Tarragona, made it over to the papacy as a "land of St Peter." Urban appointed an archbishop, fostered colonization, enjoined the notables of the region to rebuild the town "in penitence and for the remission of sins," and suggested that those planning to make pilgrimages, even to Jerusalem, should instead work for and make financial contributions to the restoration of Tarragona, which, he assured them, would gain them the same spiritual benefits. When he learnt later that Catalans were planning to crusade to Jerusalem, he ordered them to stay at home where, he promised them, they could fulfill their crusade vows, "because it is no virtue to rescue Christians from Muslims in one place, only to expose them to the tyranny and oppression of the Muslims in another." Although Urban was spectacularly unsuccessful in the Iberian Peninsula, since at least two of the four counts he addressed paid no attention to him, he continued to equate crusading warfare in the eastern Mediterranean with Christian warfare in the Iberian Peninsula. Although Christian warfare in the Iberian Peninsula had been couched in the terminology of holy war, and supported by the papacy, for centuries already, at the very least Urban laid the foundations of explicit crusading in Iberia.

Some historians have been worried by apparent contradictions in Urban's declarations and the wide range of ways in which people at the time interpreted his declarations. Was he merely dispensing his fighters from the performance of penance imposed in the confessional? Or did the crusaders themselves assume that he had relieved them from the punitive consequences of their past sins in this world or the next? In the context of contemporary penitential theology, however, there can have

been no contradiction, because the terms Urban used came to the same thing. His crusade "indulgence" was not really an indulgence at all, as the idea would be later understood. Rather, Urban had authoritatively stated, as pope, that the penance the crusaders were taking on themselves was going to be so severe that it would be fully "satisfactory." In other words, God would be repaid not only the debt of punishment owed for recent sins, for which penances had not yet been performed, but also any residue of debt left over from earlier penances which had not been satisfactory enough. Urban was not granting a spiritual privilege, which was what the developed indulgence would become. Instead, he was proclaiming a war in which the fighters would be imposing appropriate punishment on themselves by their own efforts. In one sense, then, the summons to crusade was a pastoral move, giving armsbearers the chance of contributing to their own salvation by undertaking a severe penance that did not entail the abandonment of their profession of arms and the humiliating loss of status involved in pilgrimaging abroad as normal penitents, without weapons, equipment, and horses.

There can be no doubt that the crusaders understood that they were performing a penance and that the exercise they were embarking on could contribute to their future salvation. Running through many of their charters is a pessimistic piety, typical of the age, expressing itself in a horror of wickedness and a fear of its consequences. Responding to Urban's emphasis on the need for sorrow for sin, the crusaders' charters openly craved forgiveness. People joined the expedition, as one charter put it, "in order to obtain the pardon that God can give me for my crimes." The same sentiments were put more elaborately, with a nod toward a desire for reciprocity, in another:

> Considering how many are my sins and the love, clemency and mercy of Our Lord Jesus Christ, because when he was rich he became poor for our sake, I have determined to repay him in some measure for everything he has given me freely, although I am unworthy.

And sometimes, simpler language sufficed. While Miles of Bray from Champagne was absent on crusade, he was reported "doing penance for his guilt."

A consequence of the connection between holy war, pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and penance was that crusading came to be considered by some as a kind of alternative to profession into the religious life. Describing the crusade in the aftermath of the liberation of Jerusalem, Latin Christian writers portrayed the army on the march as a nomadic abbey, its days and nights punctuated by solemn liturgy, its soldiers dedicated to austerity and brotherhood, and enduring a temporary religious exile. Since at the time, reformers saw the monastic life as a measure against which everything should be set, it is tempting to see this monasticization of war as a rationalization of the apparently miraculous triumph of the First Crusade, or even more simply as a consequence of the fact that most surviving sources for the crusade come from Latin Christian reformers. However, without denying these factors, at least three men changed their minds about entering a religious order on hearing about the crusade's preaching. They joined crusade

armies instead, as if military service of this kind were already equivalent to religious profession. So some, at least, were comparing monasticism and crusading even before the armies marched.

Urban's introduction of the vow was another very significant innovation. The exact terms of the promise taken by the first crusaders are not known. However, based on later evidence, their vows must have at least involved a commitment to travel to Jerusalem combined with a pledge to "liberate" it by force. Pilgrims had never been under the general obligation to make vows and one must suppose that most never did. The misconception that crusader vows originated in those of pilgrims probably stems from the fact that in the surviving pontificals and manuals, dating from the third quarter of the twelfth century onward, actions that earlier had been separate were conflated. Reading these later sources led to the belief that the rite for the taking of the cross must have developed out of the ceremony for blessing the insignia of pilgrims. Instead, it can be demonstrated that in the earliest period of crusading there was not one action that signaled a commitment to crusade, but two: the taking of the cross (i.e., making a vow and putting on the cross) and the granting of a pilgrim's purse and staff, which would follow separately, perhaps some time later.

The use of crosses in crusading was a stroke of genius. Urban was reported by those who had heard him at Clermont associating the taking and wearing of them in a highly charged way with Christ's precept, "If any man will come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow me" (Mt. 16:24 or Lk. 14.27). The language the pope was reported using suggests that he knew he was doing something new and that he intended the crosses to be distinctive. Crosses on standards and banners were a common element of Christian warfare from late antiquity onward. But by wearing crosses on their clothing, crusaders were certainly conspicuous, distinguishable from their contemporaries and perhaps even from other pilgrims, with whom crosses had never been regularly associated. It is easy to forget how visible the ordinary cloth ones must have been. Crusaders were obliged to wear their crosses at all times and were not supposed to take them off until they had fulfilled their vows.

Urban's use of vows and crosses was not just brilliant PR. It also underlined his commitment to the parallel between crusading and life in a religious order, and between crusading and a long tradition of Christian warfare. In essence, he was proposing the crusade as a "way of the cross." Hitherto that way had involved a retreat into the cloister, but monastic profession was neither a desirable nor a responsible option for many, who knew well that their families depended on them remaining in the world. Now the laity had something to do that was almost equivalent to monasticism and that invoked the language of the New Testament alongside the heroic military achievements of Christian emperors.

At the same time, it was important to contemporaries that crusaders should be marked out visibly with crosses so that people could be held to their vows. Leaders of the early contingents became convinced that there was a reservoir of additional help in Europe which could be deployed if only the church would make laggards, who should have been identifiable, fulfill their vows. Authorities made periodic attempts to establish

just how large the number of war-shy were. It was always easier to rail against "false" crusaders than to make them do what they had promised, but the public pressure put on them surely underlined the seriousness and desired visibility of the commitment they had made.

No matter how carefully we analyze Urban II's intentions and words, we must remember that in the minds of many Latin Christians, including Latin Christians in religious orders, Urban's appeal to fight the enemies of Christ and the church was open to a wide range of interpretations and depended in large part on how exactly "the enemies of Christ" was understood. The appeal thus should be understood in intellectual, emotional, and social terms. European society consisted of many tight, interlocking circles, made up of families, each of which was bound together by the knowledge that its members were kin and therefore "friends," obliged to care for each other's interests, and of clusters of vassals and clients round lords, which made the same demands on their members. These relationships imposed on people the related obligations of defensive and retaliatory violence, in which they were bound to draw their swords in the interests of their relations, lords, or fellow dependents. The first appeal for crusaders was expressed in intimate, even domestic, terms, and in response, as discussed at length herein, many kin groups pooled their resources to enable crusading. Furthermore, as already alluded, Urban's appeal was made to Latin Christian societies with preexisting ideologies of Christian holy war. The phenomenon of Christian holy war predates the First Crusade. Although the Church of Rome had not been outstandingly successful in its appeals for armed assistance before 1095, its self-perception and the laity's aspirations at last met in the response to Urban's call. It is surely no coincidence that the pope who engineered this meeting of minds was himself a product of that class the church had been most concerned to energize.

The Response

The news of the pope's appeal seems mostly to have spread by word of mouth—so fast, according to one contemporary, that there was no need of preaching—and it is clear that it was passed within families from member to member. Concentrations of crusaders were to be found in armsbearing families in Limousin, Flanders, Lorraine, Provence, the Ile-de-France, Normandy, and Burgundy. Outstanding examples were the comital house of Burgundy and the castellan family of Montlhéry in the Ile-de-France. For example, of the five sons of Count William Tête-Hardi of Burgundy, three were crusaders and a fourth, as Pope Calixtus II, preached the crusade of 1120. A grandson and granddaughter also took part. And three members of the house of Montlhéry were involved, together with the members of an astonishing array of related families. Indeed the two generations of the Montlhéry clan active at the time of the First Crusade produced twenty-three crusaders and settlers, all closely related, of whom six became major figures in the Latin East. We can picture a chain of enthusiasm stretching across northern France.

This chain was not limited to what is now France; while comparatively less studied, "first" crusaders came from elsewhere in what is now Western Europe, too.

Elements can be identified which may help to explain why some kin groups were predisposed to respond strongly to the appeal to crusade. Among them were family traditions of pilgrimage to Jerusalem, attachment to Cluniac monasticism and the reformed papacy, and the veneration of certain saints. Female kindred, moreover, appear to have carried the message to the families into which they married. Of four sisters in the comital house of Burgundy, three were the wives of first crusaders and the fourth was the mother of one. Although there were probably independent traditions in the Le Puiset clan, its matriarch was one of four Montlhéry sisters, all of whom were the wives or mothers of crusaders; so were both her daughters.

The response to the summons to crusade was large enough to cause comment at the time, but just how large is now difficult to judge. Leaving aside the numbers on the third wave of the crusade—the so-called Crusade of 1101, recruitment for which may have been stimulated by the news of the liberation of Jerusalem—the following can be suggested very tentatively. Around 5,000 knights gathered on the second wave before Nicaea (Iznik) in June 1097. One should multiply that by a factor of four to include their supporters (e.g., grooms, shield bearers) and add on something for foot soldiers. So *c.* 25,000 might be a fair estimate of the number of combatants. There were also many poor people with the crusade and with them its size may have reached *c.* 40,000. Crusaders continued to overtake the army right up to the fall of Jerusalem and beyond, even though the numbers during the siege of Jerusalem had fallen to 15,000. We should add *c.* 5,000 for late departures. The armies of the first wave could have been almost as large as those of the second and might have comprised another 30,000 persons. This gives us a total of *c.* 75,000, of whom perhaps *c.* 7,000 would have been knights. We then have to take into account the substantial number who took the cross but did not leave; perhaps *c.* 38,000 or 50 percent of the number departing would be reasonable. So we end up with an estimate of 113,000 recruits, of whom about 10 percent would have been knights.

These are guesses, of course, but even much lower estimates produce figures which were very substantial for the time and beg the question why so many responded. The population of Europe, which had been steadily growing, had reached the point at which the systems of inheritance and marriage practices were being put under severe pressure. And by 1096 several years of drought had led to poor harvests in France and shortages, and hence to ergotism (also known as St Anthony's Fire), a terrifying condition which could lead to insanity and death and was brought on by eating bread made from rye which had not had ergot removed from it. In addition, the age was one of colonization on the frontiers of Latin Christendom and even in forests and on marginal lands. As a result, it was natural for a few commentators at the time and for many historians since to assume that the crusade was a particularly attractive colonial venture situated in a legendarily wealthy land referred to in scripture as "flowing with milk and honey." On the other hand, without fully denying the colonial aspect of the crusade, most commentators then maintained that the chief motivation was a genuine idealism.

Whatever the reasons, the poor were very numerous in all the armies of the First Crusade, despite Urban's efforts to encourage participation from armsbearers, restrict

the participation of priests, forbid the participation of monks, and discourage the poor, the old, the sick, and women unaccompanied by male family members. It is possible that many of the poor were taking advantage of the chance to seek a new life for themselves, but we know very little about them, let alone their ideas and aspirations. They presumably suffered a very high death rate, and it is hard to envisage the survivors having the means or energy to return home once the campaign was over. Some remained in Anatolia when the armies marched south. Others must have stayed on in the region of Jerusalem when the crusaders who could afford it left for home.

Were the poor seeking better material lives for themselves? And were the more powerful among the crusaders pursuing territorial ambitions? Definitive evidence that armsbearers were collectively engaged from the first in a colonial venture is relatively weak. Certainly, stronger cases can be made for the territorial ambitions of some leading figures, including Bohemond of Taranto and Baldwin of Boulogne. In addition, some families acquired substantial territory and sociopolitical dominance in the new states established after the First Crusade, such as the Montlhéry clan, with its remarkable cluster of crusaders. But despite this eventual outcome, the Montlhéry family seems to have been initially drawn to the enterprise primarily by its spiritual benefits.

It should be remembered that although the crusade began the process by which western Europeans conquered and settled in many of the coastal territories of the eastern Mediterranean, it is unlikely that this was planned from the start. The papacy and the military leaders of the crusade assumed that once armies reached Constantinople they would be elements in a much larger force under the command of the Byzantine emperor, to whose empire Jerusalem had once belonged, and that from then on the campaign would be one which, if successful, would restore Byzantine rule all the way to Jerusalem. This would not have precluded Latin Christian settlement, of course, but as we will see in later chapters, most crusaders returned to Europe once their campaign was over.

It should also be remembered that achievement of a better material life was not necessarily incompatible with spiritual reward. As Fulcher of Chartres' recounted Urban II's sermon at Clermont, "the sorrowful here will be glad there, the poor here will be rich there, and the enemies of the Lord here will be His friends there."[5] Fulcher and the many writers who offered similar commentary saw no need to distinguish between spiritual, material, and social benefits. In any event, while the history of crusading, Christian expansion, and Christian colonization are connected, as many chapters in this book will discuss, colonization and permanent settlement as a primary or sole motive for the armsbearers who participated in the First Crusade remain unconvincing.

Another common explanation of motive is that the early crusades were little more than large-scale plundering expeditions, with which Latin Christian knights were already familiar from their forays into the Iberian Peninsula, the Italic and Balkan peninsulas, and elsewhere. The bishops at Clermont had certainly been concerned that men might join the crusade "for money" and there can be no doubt that the war attracted violent and ambitious individuals. There were no means available for screening recruits for suitability, other than the decisions of magnates on the composition of their own households; indeed, there could not have been, because crusades were pilgrimages and

as such had to be open to all. The appetites of some may well have been sharpened by their experiences as they sacked their way eastward. In particular, looting and extortion marked the vicious persecution of Jews in the Rhineland in 1096, and the passage of the crusaders through the Balkans was punctuated by outbreaks of pillaging.

At the same time, the unpalatable reality was that plunder was essential for the crusaders' survival, and indeed the survival of any army on an extensive journey, because they had no system of provisioning. While in Europe they were dependent on handouts from local rulers; once in West Asia, they were far from any worthwhile rendezvous-point with Latin Christian shipping until they reached Antioch, and then they were near one that brought them only limited supplies. All the leaders, from great to small, had to live with the fact that their followers expected from them at the very least a subsistence level of provisioning, and may well have been expecting more than that from their leaders. This alone would have accounted for an obsession with plunder. There is, moreover, very little evidence for crusaders en masse returning wealthy, which is not surprising when one considers the costs of the return journey from the eastern Mediterranean and the impracticability of carrying riches in kind over long distances in eleventh-century Latin Christendom. Indeed, it was reported that many who sought to return home in the autumn of 1099 were impoverished even before they reached Constantinople. Lastly, we should recognize that for Latin Christian contemporaries, looting was compatible with the performance of sacred violence as long as the pursuit of loot was not the motivation for the violence; in other words, the taking of plunder does not in itself constitute evidence for a lack of sincere religiosity.

A third stubbornly popular explanation of the attraction of crusading is that rising population was forcing landowning families to take measures to prevent the subdivision of their estates, either through the practice of primogeniture or through a primitive method of birth-control, according to which only one male in each generation was allowed to marry. The other young men were encouraged to make themselves scarce. Departure on crusade was thus an appropriate way for such a "younger son" to reduce the burdens his family was facing.

An entirely different picture emerges from the documents. Crusaders were not conscripts or vassals performing feudal service. Most were volunteers and those who lacked the support of a rich noble had to finance themselves. Information about the distance to Constantinople and then Jerusalem must have been freely available to them, since many Latin Christians had been on pilgrimage and a significant number of knights had served as mercenaries in Byzantine armies. The distance and consequent expenses may not have deterred the very poor, who expected nothing and may have believed that their situation could only improve, but it was a different matter for knights and the nobility. They were expected to bring with them the equipment, horses, pack animals, and servants required to fulfill their function efficiently. To give a sense of this cost, a Rhineland knight called upon to serve in warfare in the Italic Peninsula half a century later needed to put by twice his annual income for such a campaign. The factor by which a Frankish knight would have had to multiply his income in budgeting for a campaign to Jerusalem can only be guessed at, but a factor of five or six would not be unreasonable.

This makes the traditional picture of landless knights departing without a care in the world ridiculous.

It is not surprising to find in monastic and cathedral cartularies examples of the steps crusaders and their families took to provide themselves with funds. Land prices were depressed after several years of drought. A magnificent harvest in 1096—to many, an apparent physical expression of God's approval of the crusade—broke a run of poor harvests, but it had come too late for many of the crusaders, who had already been selling or pledging their lands. These disposals of land were so numerous, and the number of individuals or institutions capable of providing large amounts of ready cash so few, that the value of property in Frankish lands was said to have fallen as a result.

One strategy for generating funds for the crusade, which seems to have been attractive to the lords and richer knights, was to surrender to religious communities on disputed claims or questions of rights unfairly exercised in return for cash. This strategy had multiple benefits for a crusader, who could leave with a clearer conscience—pilgrims did not like to leave behind anyone with a grudge against them—as well as with a contribution toward crusade costs. Since some lords had been extremely rough neighbors, this was an opportunity open to many. The clergy seem to have fastened on to these agreements—capitulation for cash and reconciliation—as good ways of ending what must have been exhausting and stressful contests. The compositions were often expressed in groveling terms, which perhaps were demanded by monks and canons in return for their money. For example, the castellan Nivelo of Fréteval allowed the drafter of his charter of renunciation to refer to him, quoting from Pope Gregory I, as "raised in a nobility of birth which produces in many people an ignobility of mind." Nivelo also allowed his claims to be described as "the oppressive behaviour resulting from a certain bad custom, handed on to me not by ancient right but from the time of my father, a man of little weight who first harassed the poor with this oppression."

Property might also have to be pledged or sold to raise funds for crusading. Some sales were substantial and could include whole lordships. Most pledges were *vifgages* (estates given as security for a debt), which technically avoided usury and was presumably convenient. However, a disadvantage of *vifgages* for crusaders and their families was that the lands passed out of their control until the pledges were redeemed. It goes without saying that disposing of property to an ecclesiastical institution would have been a last resort, since it could be lost to the market forever, but it was often only churches and religious communities that had available funds, either because they were rich or because they could realize cash from the disposal of valuables treasurized in their shrines. Nevertheless, 16 percent of the surviving pledges and 13 percent of the sales were agreed not with churchmen but with laymen and laywomen. The percentages may not look impressive, but the surviving records are almost entirely ecclesiastical and it would have been rare for a deal negotiated among the laity to surface in them. These records indicate quite a lot of activity in the lay world devoted to raising money for the crusade. A total of 10 percent of the pledges and 9 percent of the sales involved the crusaders' close relations and it is notable that some of these were female, including sisters who perhaps could

call on their husbands' assets at a time when the male members of a family were short of cash.

The disposal of property was something that involved all a crusader's kindred, men and women alike, since what was being alienated was patrimony, in which they had an actual or potential interest. Family members could make difficulties and passionately dispute arrangements made to support crusading, but this was unusual. Apparent acts of generosity by relations—particularly maternal uncles, who often had an interest in protecting their sisters' children, as opposed to paternal uncles who were potential competitors—may have been intended to prevent the degradation of patrimonies.

In the documents recording the alienation of family property, we can see families making wise decisions for the family, and can even see glimpses of what must have been involved family discussions. For example, of the surviving agreements with clergy at least 43 percent of all disposals for cash were of assets that were of doubtful value, because possession of them was disputed or questionable, or because they were already pledged. This suggests that many families adopted sensible policies when it came to alienation of family property, choosing to dispose of the most questionable assets and keep the most secure. Furthermore, in the detailed terms of many documents we may be hearing echoes of conferences of the kindred, summoned to decide whether assets could be saved or, if not, what type of property should be offered for pledge or sale. A record of one such conference surfaces in a Breton document in which the crusader Thibald of Ploasme informed his brother William that if he, Thibald, was not helped financially he would have to sell his inheritance. William did not want Thibald's share of the estate to be lost, so William raised money from the monks of St. Nicolas d'Angers by selling them part of his share of a mill that was already pledged.

Crusading therefore involved costs rather than gain, and those costs were shared by whole families, suggesting a shared commitment to crusading that went beyond material considerations. That said, the enhanced standing of many of the crusaders on their return and the value of any relics they brought back with them could have helped to ease any financial burdens their families faced. In addition, amid the dangers and hardships of a crusade, close association with a great lord could lead to advancement and, in an age when family fortunes could be improved by marriage, ex-crusaders might well have found that they could arrange more advantageous matches for their sons and daughters. Nevertheless, the disposal of assets to invest in the remote possibility of settlement after a 2,000-mile march or in the hope of improving one's status at home would have been a stupid gamble. This is especially true since one could have improved one's financial situation simply by waiting until after the agricultural depression had passed and the flood of properties on the market had subsided. The only strategy for which there is evidence is one in which the kindred cooperated in damage limitation once a relation had taken the cross. There is no evidence to support the view that crusading relieved families of burdens; on the contrary, the evidence points overwhelmingly to families taking on burdens to help individual members fulfill their vows.

It makes sense, therefore, to suppose that many of the crusaders, and their families, were moved by idealism, even if they combined that idealism with additional motivating

factors. This was an age of ostentatious and extravagant generosity, and religious communities benefited greatly from it. The phenomenal growth of Latin Christian monasticism in the central Middle Ages was due as much, if not more, to those who endowed the communities as to those who entered them. The same is true of the crusading movement. Behind many crusaders stood a large body of men and women who, in authorizing the disposal of property to help them set out, or even just to ensure prayers on crusaders' behalf, were prepared to make sacrifices.

All that said, the popularity of crusading can be exaggerated. Although it was an activity that appealed to Latin Christians living in many areas, with a wide range of perceptions, both cerebral and emotional, there was always a majority that was not prepared to engage in something so inconvenient, dangerous, and expensive. We do not, in other words, have to find explanations for motivation involving all Latin Christendom. Even among the armsbearers, about whom we have most information, the figure of, say, 12,000 respondents (of whom about half did not actually depart) represents a fraction of the total numbers. In England alone there were *c.* 5,000 knights and in Frankish lands and the Frankish-speaking German territories at least 50,000. So we are concerned with the reactions not of an entire class but of a fraction of it, defined by its response to the summons of the pope and by the support of the kindred.

CHAPTER 3
THE FIRST CRUSADE

The very name "the First Crusade" suggests a centrally organized and coherent enterprise. This was not in fact the case. Armed contingents, accompanied by many non-combatants, left Europe in three waves of men and women between 1096 and 1101. In between there was a stream of parties traveling independently, so that the forces of the second wave were being continually overtaken by new recruits, and crusaders were still entering West Asia as those who had won Jerusalem were leaving for home. There was, moreover, a counterflow of deserters back along the path, so that the disillusioned, the sick, and the fearful were beginning to drift back to Western Europe as early as the winter of 1096. What historians have condensed into a single category for the purposes of analysis was messy, like many, if not most, wars or popular initiatives. Similarly, while this chapter distinguishes between three "waves" of crusading between 1096 and 1101, these "waves" could not always be readily separated at the time.

Anti-Jewish Violence in Europe

Both the first and second waves of the crusade opened nightmarishly, affirming a connection between anti-Jewish violence, forced conversion, Jewish martyrdom, and crusading that would persist for centuries. To begin, there were outbreaks of violent anti-Judaism in Frankish lands shortly after the council of Clermont. These spread to German states and Central Europe, where they were associated with the first wave of crusaders leaving for the eastern Mediterranean. On May 3, 1096, the crusaders' storm broke over the Jewish community at Speyer, where a south German army had gathered under Emich of Flonheim. Emich proceeded to Worms, where he and his fellow crusaders began massacres on May 18, and then to Mainz, where he was joined by more Germans and by a large army of Frankish, English, Flemish, and Lorrainer crusaders. Between May 25 and 29 crusaders, accompanied at times by local Christians, decimated the Jewish community at Mainz, one of the largest in Europe. Some crusaders then marched north to Cologne, from where the Jews had already been dispersed into neighboring settlements. For the next month they were hunted out and destroyed. Another band seems to have gone southwest to Trier and Metz, where the massacres continued. It is possible that Peter the Hermit's crusading army forced almost the whole community at Regensburg to undergo baptism. The communities at Wesseli and Prague in Bohemia suffered from the attentions of yet another army, probably that led by a priest called Folkmar.

The crusaders, and many who later celebrated their deeds, seem to have found it impossible to distinguish between Muslims and Jews. If they were being called upon, as they saw it, to avenge the injury to Christ's "honor" of the loss of his patrimony to the Muslims, why, they asked, should they not also avenge the injury to his person of the Crucifixion—a much greater disparagement—particularly in the light of a popular legend circulating at the time in which Christ on the cross had called on the faithful to avenge him? For the papacy, events from long ago—the Crucifixion in 33 CE and the Rashidun Caliphate's occupation of Jerusalem in 638 CE—could not justify retribution. Rather, a present injury—Seljuk occupation of the holy city—justified the crusade. This distinction clearly held little water for many crusaders and those who commemorated them in writing, lay and clerical alike.

Box 3.1 The *Vindicta Salvatoris* Tradition

Those who participated in and wrote about crusades sought to place them, especially the First Crusade, within the broader framework of Christian history. As they sought to do so, they emphasized connections between crusading and earlier events and/or legendary traditions. One of the earliest and most persistent legendary traditions connected to crusading was that of the *Vindicta Salvatoris*, "the vengeance of the Saviour." This tradition, which can be dated in textual sources to the eighth or ninth century, refashions Titus and Vespasian's 70 CE capture of Jerusalem and destruction of the Second Temple. Historically, this destruction—ordered by Vespasian, executed by his son Titus, neither of whom were Christian—served to suppress organized Jewish rebellion against Roman rule in the province. The legendary tradition, in contrast, positions the capture and destruction of Jerusalem as righteous vengeance against the Jews for the crucifixion of Christ. While there are many variants, the legendary tradition generally recasts Titus and Vespasian as new converts to Christianity, thanks to the persuasiveness of the veil of Veronica, and presents their bloody destruction of Jerusalem and its Jewish inhabitants as the fulfillment of a prophesy made by Christ on the cross. The story in many variants was transmitted through the Middle Ages in Latin and in various vernacular languages. It was directly referenced in crusade chronicles and incorporated into crusade literature, starting with the twelfth-century *Song of Antioch*, which begins with Christ on the cross prophesying his vengeance. The story also informed the later medieval narrative traditions of the *Destruction of Jerusalem* and the *Siege of Jerusalem.* As discussed later in Chapter 12, these remained popular and intimately connected to crusading into the modern era, traveling as far as European empires in the Americas.

Why was this the case? Part of the answer rests in the familial relationships used to motivate and describe crusaders. Invoking familial language from the New Testament,

Latin Christians were called upon to go to the aid of their oppressed "brothers and sisters," Christians in the eastern Mediterranean, whom they were obliged to love; to the aid of their "father" and "lord," Jesus Christ, who had been humiliated and disregarded and had lost his "inheritance" or patrimony; and to the aid of their "mother," the church. This "aid" was expressly described in lay and clerical texts as armed and violent, either as an act of defense or an act of retribution:

> I address fathers and sons and brothers and nephews. If an outsider were to strike any of your kin down would you not avenge your blood-relation? How much more ought you to avenge your God, your father, your brother, whom you see reproached, banished from his estates, crucified; whom you hear calling, desolate and begging for aid.

However, all that said, references to the notion of vengeance are relatively rare in the earliest sources for the First Crusade; calls for vengeance became a more prominent feature of later-twelfth-century crusading.

A more substantial part of the answer can be seen if we acknowledge that the First Crusade occurred in an environment increasingly concerned with the relationship between Judaism and Christianity—and eager to assert the superiority of Christianity—in late-eleventh and early-twelfth-century Latin Christendom. The correlation in action between crusader violence against Jews and Muslims mirrored a correlation in thought between anti-Jewish polemic and crusader narratives, as Katherine Smith continues to demonstrate.[1] Those Latin Christians who wrote about the First Crusade in the twelfth century also wrote anti-Jewish tracts, deliberately made use of anti-Jewish polemical tropes in discussing crusader violence against Muslims, and positioned the crusaders as "new Israelites," a superior replacement for the Jews with a special relationship with God. In other words, both the crusaders themselves, and those individuals, so often clerics, who wrote about their actions after the fact, drew connections between anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim sentiment. This suggests widespread cultural assumptions with Latin Christendom about the superiority of Christians and Christianity, the purported harm done by both Jews and Muslims, whose identities were conflated, and divine sanction for Christian holy war.

Contemporaries explained the massacres in different ways. In the early twelfth century, some Latin Christians attributed the pogroms to avarice, and the crusaders certainly made financial demands of the Jewish communities and despoiled them. But Hebrew accounts ascribed greed more to some of the local bishops, their officials, and townspeople than to the crusaders, whom they describe as more interested in forcing conversions. Everywhere Jews were offered the choice of conversion (i.e., forced baptism) or death. Christians desecrated synagogues, Torah scrolls and cemeteries, and the Jews feared that the crusaders intended to wipe their religion out in the districts through which they passed. All this occurred despite the prohibitions against forcible conversion of non-Christians in canon law, and local bishops, with varying degrees of success, tried to stop it.

From a modern perspective it may be hard to reconcile calls for vengeance with demands for conversion: one was an act of retaliation or punishment while the other would have been regarded by the perpetrators as the conferment of a spiritual benefit. Apocalyptic prophecy provides one way of understanding the crusaders' coercion and violence; forcing baptism on Jewish communities may have reflected a conviction that the Last Days would be ushered in by their conversion. At the same time, we should recognize that although theologically prohibited, forced conversions to Christianity accompanied Latin Christian expansion from late antiquity through the early modern period. In addition, at the risk of generalizing, holy war has a tendency to turn inward. Its participants come to believe that it can never be successful if the society that has bred it is unregenerate and impure. The Christian crusade led easily to—indeed, emerged in part from!—the pursuit of religious uniformity and the elimination of non-Christians and the "impious." Church authorities believed that God required that Jewish people should survive in a servile condition as providential witnesses, and this made it impossible for popes and bishops to condone the use of force against them. Nonetheless, in the eyes of some Latin Christians, Jews constituted an alien group and it may be that baptism was being forced on them with the aim of creating a uniformly Christian society.

It may be tempting to ascribe the anti-Jewish violence of the First Crusade to the laity, or to the "lesser" members of society. From this view, educated members of the Latin Church and the social elite "knew better" than to succumb to raw emotionality and commit such heinous acts of violence against Jewish people. However, the evidence does not support this view, which problematically seeks in some ways to elevate "real crusading" above anti-Jewish violence, as though violence against Muslims was somehow morally better. Anti-Jewish violence occurred in both the first and second waves of the crusade, some clerics and members of the laity of different social classes were involved, and similar violence would accompany later crusades. In addition, Latin Christian accounts of the First Crusade authored by highly educated members of the Latin Church hierarchy further relied on anti-Jewish polemic and were written by those who also wrote anti-Jewish polemic, making it clear that, at the very least, anti-Jewish violence was viewed in uncomfortably mixed terms.

Most Latin Christian accounts of the First Crusade simply do not discuss the massacres, replacing them with textual silence. Those that do present us with ambivalent and complicated textual evidence. As the cleric Albert of Aachen explained in his twelfth-century account of the First Crusade, setbacks suffered by the crusaders in Hungary reflected a loss of divine favor:

> In this the hand of God is believed to have been against the pilgrims [crusaders], who had sinned in his eyes by excessive impurities and fornicating unions, and had punished the exiled Jews (who are admittedly hostile to Christ) with a great massacre, rather from greed for their money than for divine justice, since God is a just judge and commands no one to come to the yoke of the Christian faith against his will or under compulsion.[2]

The massacre of Jewish people in the Rhineland was, for Albert, only one among a number of wrongdoings, including fornication. Furthermore, Albert is careful to remind his reader that the Jewish people were indeed "hostile to Christ," thus raising the question of whether the massacre would have been equally exceptionable if the crusaders *had* been motivated by "divine justice" or if the massacres *had not* included forced conversions. Albert continues his account by describing "another abominable wickedness in this gathering of people on foot, who were stupid and insanely irresponsible" (59): they believed that the Holy Spirit inhabited and inspired a goose. It is clear that Albert did not wholeheartedly approve the massacres of Jewish people; it is less clear what in particular he found problematic, and exactly how wrong he considered the massacres to be.

The First Wave

The first wave of crusaders left very early, in fact far too early to be effective, in the spring of 1096. The most famous of its leaders, a popular preacher called Peter the Hermit, had begun to recruit in central Frankish lands even before the council of Clermont. This has led a few historians to revive the story, believed by one or two of Peter's contemporaries and assiduously propagated by Peter himself, that the crusade was his brainchild. Peter the Hermit collected a substantial following before moving on to the Rhineland in April. In advance of him and probably on his instructions, a large body of foot, led by eight knights under the command of Walter Sansavoir (not "the Penniless," as is popularly supposed: Sansavoir was the toponym of the lords of Poissy) entered Hungary on May 21. They then marched in a fairly orderly fashion to Constantinople, although there was a serious outbreak of violence at Belgrade, predictably over foraging. The absence of more trouble is remarkable considering the fact that Walter's early arrival took the Byzantine authorities by surprise.

Walter was joined at Constantinople by parties of pilgrims from the Italic Peninsula and on August 1 by Peter the Hermit, who had left Cologne on April 20 and had had a much more difficult crossing of the Balkans, for which the indiscipline of his followers was largely to blame. His army had marched peacefully through Hungary, but at Zemun, the last town in the kingdom, a riot broke out, the citadel was stormed and many Hungarians were killed. The crusaders were naturally anxious to escape retribution by crossing the river Sava into Byzantine territory as quickly as possible and resisted attempts by a Byzantine force to restrict their movement. They were in an ugly mood by the time they reached a deserted Belgrade, which they probably sacked. The Byzantine governor at Niš, unprepared though he was, tried to be cooperative and allowed them to buy supplies in exchange for the surrender of hostages. As they were leaving, some crusaders set fire to mills outside the town and the governor sent troops to attack the rearguard. Many of Peter's followers, ignoring his orders, turned on their attackers and were routed and scattered. The crusaders lost many men and women and all their cash. Luckily for them, by the time they reached Sofia, the Byzantines were ready to receive

Map 4 Waves of the First Crusade.

them. They were now kept supplied and on the move and reached Constantinople without further incident.

The Byzantine Empire was quite understandably surprised by the crusade. It had been just a year since imperial envoys had asked for some form of military aid—most likely *not* massive, independently led armies—at the Council of Piacenza. Now, the first of what seemed likely to be several waves of independently led and already-violent armies accompanied by large numbers of non-combatants, all of whom claimed friendship but none of whom explicitly recognized the authority or direction of the emperor, were making their way through the empire toward its capital city, Constantinople. For Alexios I Komnenos, the line between potential threat and possible opportunity must have seemed thin. Faced with this novel situation, Alexios and his subordinates adopted traditional Byzantine diplomatic and logistical strategies to manage the crusaders, seeking to avoid outright violent conflict unless absolutely necessary.

In the case of the first wave, Alexios received Walter and Peter well and advised them to wait until the other bands of crusaders, which were known to be assembling in Europe, arrived. But Peter's impatient followers took to raiding the surrounding countryside and the Byzantines decided that the sooner they were moved on, the better. On August 6 they were ferried across the Bosporus. They then marched to Kibotos, a suitable assembly-point where they could wait for the rest of the crusade. While there, differences arose between German and Italian crusaders on one side, who elected as their own leader a noble called Rainaldo, and the Frankish crusaders on the other. From Kibotos the Franks raided as far as Nicaea and, not to be outdone, Rainaldo's party broke away and established a base beyond Nicaea. On September 29 they were surrounded by forces of the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum; they surrendered eight days later. Those who agreed to renounce Christianity were sent eastward, but all who refused were killed. When the news of this disaster reached the main body, Peter the Hermit was away in Constantinople and the remaining Frankish crusaders, ignoring Walter Sansavoir's appeal for caution, advanced into the interior on October 21. A Seljuk party ambushed and annihilated them.

Walter and Peter at least reached West Asia. Three other armies, which marched at about the same time, got no further than Hungary. A force of Saxons and Bohemians was destroyed at Nitra. Another unruly band under a Rhineland priest called Gottschalk was forced to surrender to the Hungarians at Pannonhalma. The large army of Rhineland—Swabian, Frankish, English, and Lorrainer crusaders under Emich of Flonheim—was halted before Wieselburg on the Hungarian frontier where, after taking six weeks to build a bridge over the river in front of the town, its first assault dissolved into panic and flight.

It is wrongly assumed that these forces, misleadingly named "The People's Crusade," consisted almost entirely of peasants, in contrast to those that left Europe later in 1096. This was certainly an explanation given by some contemporaries for their massacres of Jews, their indiscipline in the Balkans, and their failures in West Asia. But these were not mere gangs of peasants, prone to riot and unprofessional on the march. Although there may have been more non-combatants than in the later armies, there was a strong

knightly element as well. Walter Sansavoir was an experienced knight. So were Peter the Hermit's captains, one of whom, Fulcher of Chartres, was to end his days as a lord in the county of Edessa, the earliest Latin settlement in West Asia. Emich of Flonheim was an important noble. So was Count Hartmann of Dillingen-Kybourg, who joined him at Mainz. They were probably accompanied by at least four other German counts. The army of Frankish, English, Flemish, and Lorrainer crusaders, which also met Emich at Mainz, was apparently large and well equipped and was led by an outstanding group of Frankish knights: Clarembald of Vendeuil; Thomas of Marle, lord of Coucy; William the Carpenter, viscount of Melun; and Drogo of Nesle. They may have made up a Frankish advance-guard, because after the destruction of Emich's forces they joined Hugh of Vermandois, the king of the Franks' brother, and continued their journey east with him.

One of the reasons for the catastrophes that befell this first wave of crusaders was that it left Europe before the date set by the pope, which was August 15, 1096. Because they left while Western Europe was still in the grip of near-famine conditions, before the marvelous harvest of that summer, the crusaders were short of food from the start. In the Balkans they had to pillage when markets were not available to them. Even with access to markets, they were anxious about supplies and over and over again disputes about provisions led to disorder. The Byzantine government, moreover, was understandably logistically unprepared for the crusade. It had not set up an organization to guide crusaders, nor did it have abundant supplies to give them. And the failure of the armies of Folkmar, Gottschalk, and especially Emich of Flonheim to get through at all meant that Peter the Hermit and Walter Sansavoir did not have adequate forces on the eastern side of the Bosporus.

Box 3.2 Noble Households on Crusade

A bird's-eye view of any crusade would have revealed circles of dependence around the greater lords. Each had a household comprising household knights, chaplains, and servants. This would be relatively small. A charter issued by Count Louis of Blois, a leading crusader in 1204, reveals the presence of five knights, two of whom were accompanied by their own sergeants, and two clerics, one of them the count's chancellor. We do not know whether any of Louis's knights were absent and his servants do not feature in this list, but the household that is revealed compares quite well with the one that Odo of Burgundy, count of Nevers and lord of Bourbon, had with him in West Asia sixty years later: four knights and three chaplains, together with seven squires, nine sergeants, thirty-two servants, five crossbowmen and four turcopoles. The standing of a great lord, however, depended on a wider circle of those who attached themselves to him for all sorts of reasons. Closely associated with him but outside the household—indeed many had households of their own—were kindred and vassals. And beyond them, but still in the magnate's following, could be independent crusaders who latched on

to anyone whom they thought could provide for them, although they could easily transfer their loyalties to another lord if they were dissatisfied. Since the English word "lord" (Latin *dominus*) is gendered male, it is worth noting that lordships could be inherited by women, particularly in the central medieval period, and there were female lords (*domina*) who led their households on crusade, such as Mathilde de Courtenay, Countess of Nevers, Auxerre and Tonnerre, who crusaded in the early thirteenth century with her first husband, Hervé IV of Donzy.

The Second Wave

The second wave of crusaders began to leave Western Europe in the middle of August, on or after the date fixed by the pope. They traveled at first in separate corps, each mustered from a region and many under the leadership of great magnates. Hugh of Vermandois left France in the middle of August and proceeded by way of Rome to Bari, from where he set sail for Durazzo (Durrës). But a storm scattered his ships and Hugh, who was forced to land some way from Durazzo, was briefly detained before being escorted to Constantinople. At about the same time Godfrey of Bouillon, the duke of Lower Lorraine, left with his brother Baldwin of Boulogne and a party of Lorrainer nobles. One of two Danish armies, under the leadership of a member of the Danish royal family and accompanied by two Danish bishops, went with Godfrey. It may seem remarkable to see crusade leaders from such wide-ranging regions, but many of them were related by marriage; they were literally family. For example, an impending marriage connected the ruling houses of Denmark, Portugal, and Burgundy until the Danish prince involved, Svend, died on crusade in 1097; his fiancée Florina, also on crusade, survived the attack that killed Svend only to be later captured. We are reminded that crusading was often a family affair that at the highest levels served to connect the powerful in Latin Christendom.

Godfrey of Bouillon is the most famous of the first crusaders, but the hardest to understand. He had been born in *c.* 1060, the second son of Eustace II of Boulogne and Ida of Lorraine. His elder brother, Eustace III, who also crusaded, although separately, had inherited Boulogne and the family's great estates in England a little after 1070. Six years later Godfrey was left the duchy of Lower Lorraine, the marquisate of Antwerp, the county of Verdun, and the territories of Bouillon and Stenay by his maternal uncle. But Henry IV of Germany postponed confirmation of the grant of Lower Lorraine and Godfrey only acquired the duchy in 1087. Meanwhile he had to fight what amounted to a ten-year war against his aunt by marriage, the formidable Mathilda of Tuscany, who had no intention of renouncing her claims to her husband's lands, and her allies, the bishop of Verdun and the count of Namur. Godfrey had not been demonstrably pious, and it is clear from the terms of the pledge agreements he drew up that in 1096 he had no definite intention of settling in West Asia. In ecclesiastical politics, moreover, he had been firmly on the side of Henry IV of Germany against the reforming papacy. His

maternal grandfather and uncle had been imperialists, and those who had stood in the way of his inheritance, Mathilda of Tuscany and the bishop of Verdun, were partisans of Pope Gregory VII. Godfrey himself had fought for Henry IV and had probably taken part in the seizure of Rome in 1084.

The personality of Godfrey's younger brother Baldwin of Boulogne is clearer to us. Born between 1061 and 1070, he had been destined for the Latin Church and presented with prebends at Reims, Cambrai, and Liège. But in the new climate of reformist opinion, holding such multiple revenues was frowned on and it may be that he was forced to surrender some of his benefices. This helps to explain the animosity he would later show to reformers and reform ideas, and in this respect, his politics agreed with those of his brother, Godfrey. At any rate Baldwin had left the church by 1086, too late to share in the family inheritance, which had already been divided between his brothers. His need for money may have led to his marriage in *c*. 1090 to Godehilde of Tosny, the child of a powerful Anglo-Norman family, who was to die during the crusade. Baldwin was intelligent, calculating, and ruthless. He was not pleasant, but his strength of personality and quickness of mind were to be of great value to the crusaders and early settlers.

Passing through southern Germany, the brothers reached the Hungarian border in September. Here they delayed to get clearance from the king, who had already smashed three crusading armies. Baldwin was persuaded to be a hostage for the crusaders' behavior, and Godfrey issued strict instructions against plundering. Late in November he reached Byzantine territory. Hearing a rumor that Hugh of Vermandois was being held prisoner by the emperor, he allowed his followers to pillage the region around Silivri until he was assured that Hugh was free. He reached Constantinople on December 23 and camped outside the city near the head of the Golden Horn, the enormous creek that was Constantinople's chief port.

Bohemond of Taranto, member of the Norman Hauteville family, crossed the Adriatic with a small force a fortnight after Hugh of Vermandois. About forty years old, Bohemond was the nephew of Roger I of Sicily and eldest son of Robert Guiscard, the duke of Apulia, and had played a leading part in his father's invasion of Byzantine Albania in 1081. Robert had left him his conquests on the eastern shore of the Adriatic, which the Normans were already losing, and in consequence Bohemond had found himself effectively disinherited, since his younger brother had been left Apulia. Although in the late 1080s he had carved out for himself a large lordship in the southern Italic Peninsula, there can be no doubt that he wanted a principality, possibly to be won at the expense of the Byzantines who had retaken the lands he thought he should have been enjoying in Albania. One admittedly hostile contemporary believed that this was the sole reason for him taking the cross. On the other hand, according to an admirer he was "always seeking the impossible."

The Byzantines, who believed that he had also inherited from his father designs on the Byzantine Empire itself, recognized that Bohemond was very capable. He was, in fact, to prove himself to be one of the most effective generals the crusading movement produced. He was intelligent and pious, and he was perhaps the only leader who really understood the motives of the reforming papacy. At the same time, his half-brother,

Guy of Hauteville, was one of Alexios' advisors and bore the honorific title "sebastos." Guy was one of quite a number of Normans who saw opportunity in the Mediterranean and Byzantium in particular. So while Bohemond was, from one perspective, a former enemy of Alexios, he was also positioned to understand imperial perspectives and serve as a diplomatic point of contact between Alexios' court and the crusaders. Judging from his subsequent actions, Bohemond seems to have clearly recognized that playing a diplomatic role in relations with the Byzantines could be of benefit.

Byzantine officials were prepared for Bohemond's arrival, but the local inhabitants, who had after all experienced a Norman invasion quite recently, understandably refused to sell him provisions. So his followers had to forage until they were assured of supplies by the Byzantine government once they had passed Thessaloniki. They also destroyed a small town that they claimed was occupied by heretics and had a brush with Byzantine troops who tried to hurry them along. Bohemond had to spend time and energy trying to restrain his followers from looting even in Thrace. When he went on ahead to Constantinople, which he reached on April 10, 1097, his nephew Tancred, who was to prove himself to be one of the ablest of the early rulers of the Latin settlements in West Asia, allowed the Normans to forage in the countryside.

Bohemond was closely followed by the count of Toulouse, Raymond IV (sometimes known as Raymond of St Gilles) who was then in his mid-fifties and by the standards of the time an elderly man. He had spent thirty years patiently reassembling his ancestral lands, which had been scattered into other hands, and was now master of thirteen counties in southern Frankish lands. He belonged to an extraordinarily complicated kinship-group, the result of the marriages of his mother, Almodis of La Marche, who was in turn wedded to and bore children with Hugh V of Lusignan, Pons of Toulouse and Raymond Berengar I of Barcelona.

Almodis maintained connections with the children of her previous marriages, and her political career was energetic, creative, and active. For example, with Raymond Berengar, she presided over assemblies, adjudicated disputes, administered justice, and accepted oaths of fidelity. She also played a significant role in the construction of a cathedral in Barcelona, made trade and security agreements, and proactively built stronger diplomatic relationships. Although she was excommunicated by Pope Victor II for supporting Raymond Berengar in challenging his grandmother's possession of his county, many of her children from all three marriages were committed supporters both of papal reform and of the crusade. Hugh VI of Lusignan and Raymond IV of Toulouse were *fideles beati Petri*, that is, recognized supporters of the papacy, and Hugh, Raymond and probably their half-brother Berengar Raymond II of Barcelona took the cross, as did the husbands of their nieces Philippa of Toulouse and Ermessens of Melgueil.

In addition to his connection to papal reform and crusading through his mother and her extended family, Raymond IV of Toulouse was also connected by marriage to the Iberian royal houses and it is possible, though not certain, that he had already fought on behalf of Latin leaders in the Iberian Peninsula. Although it is by no means clear that he really understood what the cause of church reform entailed, Pope Urban II regarded him as an ally and had picked him to be the leader of the crusade before it was proclaimed

at Clermont. The pope visited St. Gilles before the council and must have discussed the expedition with Raymond there, because, in what was a pre-arranged coup de théâtre, the count's ambassadors arrived at Clermont the day after Urban's sermon to commit their master to the enterprise. There were even rumors that Raymond had vowed never to return home. Whether they were true or not, this elderly man had made the decision to desert the lands he had taken so long to consolidate, leaving his eldest son in charge of them, and to go with his wife on a hazardous journey. He had prepared for this more efficiently than any of the other leaders and his followers fared better in the ordeals ahead than did other crusaders, but he was chronically ill, which is not surprising when one considers his age.

Raymond shared leadership of perhaps the largest force of crusaders with Bishop Adhémar of Le Puy, who had vigorously upheld the cause of reform in southern Frankish lands since the 1080s. Adhémar had been appointed papal legate on the crusade by Urban and dominated the councils of the crusade leaders until his early death. Raymond and Adhémar marched through the northern Italic Peninsula, around the end of the Adriatic and through Dalmatia, where the locals were hostile. Escorted by Byzantine imperial troops, who were prepared to treat roughly any who diverged from the route, they reached Thessaloniki at the beginning of April. Raymond arrived in Constantinople on the twenty-first, but before his troops joined him six days later they were severely bruised in a clash with their Byzantine escorts, who must have been trying to prevent them from foraging.

Duke Robert of Normandy, Count Robert of Flanders, and Count Stephen of Blois left Frankish lands in the autumn of 1096. They journeyed by way of Rome and Monte Cassino to Bari. Robert of Flanders crossed the Adriatic almost at once and reached Constantinople at about the same time as Bohemond, in April 1097. Robert of Normandy and Stephen of Blois wintered in the southern Italic Peninsula and joined the others in Constantinople on *c.* 14 May after a peaceful passage through the empire.

It seems that most of the leaders of the second wave were expecting the Byzantines to adopt an active role in the military campaigns to come. In the spring of 1097 Alexios discussed with Godfrey of Bouillon, Robert of Flanders, Bohemond, and perhaps also Hugh of Vermandois the possibility of taking the cross himself and assuming command of all the armies. This may simply have been politic on his part; certainly when Raymond IV of Toulouse arrived and made the emperor's leadership a precondition of his acknowledgment of his subordination to him, Alexios excused himself on the grounds that his presence was needed in Constantinople.

But as far as Alexios was concerned, other issues were paramount. His position in Constantinople was precarious—an assassination plot involving leading figures in the empire had been thwarted only two years before. Furthermore, in the form of the crusade, help of a very different kind to what he had envisaged had arrived. Both waves of crusaders had already caused him major problems as they advanced through the Balkans and approached Constantinople. He was understandably suspicious of them, and he must have sought to manage the situation as best he could, both to prevent actual damage to the empire and to ensure he was upholding his imperial position in the eyes of fellow Byzantines.

In dealing with the leaders of the second wave, Alexios I and the Byzantine government adopted a number of traditional imperial tactics for managing a risky situation, all designed to limit threats to the empire and maximize opportunity. First, he sought to isolate the leaders of the second wave in order to deal with them separately and keep some space between their armies—his daughter and historian Anna later wrote that he feared an attack on Constantinople if they should coalesce—and to demand two oaths. Once those oaths were given, Alexios presented the leaders with large amounts of gold, silver, and other luxury items. Bohemond, who had played a diplomatic role in discussions between the leaders and Alexios, reportedly received particularly rich gifts. Honorary membership in the imperial family may also have been given to some of the leaders.

Alexios' gifts were not as lavish as they might seem, since he obliged their recipients to pay for the goods they had to buy in his markets. In addition, some leaders seem to have found the lavishness—and Alexios' assumption of the position of a generous gift-giver—insulting. But ultimately the crusade leaders needed supplies and passage across the Bosporus, and furthermore, knew they would need imperial support in West Asia if they were to avoid the fate of the first wave. Neither Alexios nor the leaders of the second wave could afford to simply step away from the negotiating table or adopt a hostile position.

Given the later unraveling of relations between Alexios and some (not all) leaders of the second wave, it is common to focus on the precise language of the oaths Alexios required from the crusaders. But the issue may not have been the oaths themselves, so much as how each party interpreted the significance of the oaths. The first of the oaths Alexios demanded was a promise to hand back to imperial control all the lands the crusaders liberated which had once belonged to it. This provided Alexios with legitimate grounds for claiming sovereignty over the territories likely to be won. The second was an oath of homage and fealty, apparently similar to some European contracts of dependency that were not accompanied by the reciprocal grant of a fief. This gave Alexius a limited measure of control. From Alexios' perspective, these oaths may have seemed to ensure the best chance of restored sovereignty over formerly imperial lands, and to affirm the superiority and centrality of Byzantium as the Christian empire. Crusade leaders' perspectives varied. While some took the oaths readily, others balked, some purportedly due to concerns that this oath might be in conflict with their crusading oath but also, presumably, due to reluctance to enter into a lordship relationship with Alexios, which might constrict their future actions or impose future obligations.

Similarly, the leaders' reactions to the demands for these oaths were not consistent. Hugh of Vermandois (as far as we know), Robert of Normandy, Robert of Flanders, and Stephen of Blois raised little objection. Godfrey of Bouillon and Raymond IV of Toulouse made difficulties, and although Bohemond of Taranto did not, his second-in-command Tancred did. It has been suggested that it was no coincidence that the objectors were the men who eventually settled in West Asia and that the divisions among the leaders that surfaced in Constantinople continued for the rest of the crusade. However, it was not at all clear at this stage who would claim principalities and settle, and it is also important to

recognize that attitudes toward Alexios continued to evolve during and after the crusade. It is more reasonable to look at the leaders' situations at Constantinople in turn.

Hugh of Vermandois and Godfrey of Bouillon took the oaths due to a lack of other options. Hugh of Vermandois was a near prisoner when the oaths were demanded of him. He was also virtually alone. He took the oaths. As for Godfrey, it has already been pointed out that he had set out in 1096 with every intention of returning to Europe, at least if he could find nothing better. It is, therefore, unlikely that the oaths were unattractive because they might limit his freedom of action in the future. He was obviously suspicious; he was concerned that Hugh of Vermandois' agreement had been extorted from him and unwilling to take any step before consulting the other leaders whose arrival was expected. Alexios put pressure on him by cutting off his supplies. Godfrey responded to this threat by authorizing his brother Baldwin to raid the suburbs of Constantinople. Supplies were restored and there followed three months of relative peace until Alexios, hearing of the approach of more crusade contingents, cut off supplies once more. Again the crusaders' response was to use force, culminating in an unsuccessful attack on the city on Maundy Thursday. Godfrey must have realized at that point that force was ineffective and so he and his leading followers took the oaths and his troops were immediately transported across the Bosporus.

Bohemond appears to have taken the oaths due to a combination of external pressure and opportunism. By the time he arrived at Constantinople, Alexios had the oaths of Hugh of Vermandois and Godfrey of Bouillon. As a result, Bohemond was in no position to refuse outright, although Tancred managed to slip through Constantinople without submitting. Bohemond was not well off and his force was a small one. But it seems that Bohemond may have had other motives for taking the oath, since he subsequently applied pressure to later leaders who were reluctant to swear, and he seems to have positioned himself as an imperial ally, presumably in order to benefit from the relationship down the road. If the report is true that he unsuccessfully sought the office of Grand Domestic—commander-in-chief of the Byzantine army—it was a sensible move on his part, because he could then have ensured adequate Byzantine military support for the crusade, and may have been able to call upon imperial support in pursuit of his own ambitions. He did, after all, have relatives employed in the imperial court.

Raymond IV of Toulouse took the oaths only under extreme pressure from other crusade leaders, as well as Alexios. He may have made a vow never to return to his native land, and may therefore have hoped for a principality in West Asia. However, it was the performance of homage and the oath of fealty rather than the promise to return territory to the empire that raised difficulties for him. He appears to have believed that paying homage conflicted with his crusade vow to serve God and he would not change his mind in spite of the efforts and irritation of the other crusade leaders. He compromised by taking a more limited oath to respect and maintain the emperor's life and honor, for which there were parallels in the region from which he came. Despite his attitudes toward the oath-taking, after the crusade, Raymond returned to Constantinople and became a strong imperial ally, reminding us that attitudes and alliances often changed over time.

We know nothing of Robert of Flanders' reaction, but by the time Robert of Normandy and Stephen of Blois arrived the precedents had been set and, whether they liked them or not, there was little option but to follow them, or return home. The crusade contingents were being shipped separately across the Bosporus from April 1097 onward and in early June they assembled in one army before Nicaea, the first important city in West Asia that was in Turkic hands.

The events in Constantinople left the crusade leaders disillusioned and frustrated. After long marches they had arrived short of supplies and unsure of the future role of the Byzantine Empire. They found the emperor reluctant either to lead directly or to fully empower them. Alexios was primarily interested in the recovery of imperial territories, which, to be fair, was what he had wanted in the first place, and reflects Byzantine ideologies of empire, which emphasized sovereignty rather than direct rule. Furthermore, Alexios was prepared to use every measure at his disposal, from the distribution of largesse to the denial of supplies, to force each commander in turn to take the oaths. Although Alexius gave them generous gifts, these primarily provided the means to buy provisions in his own markets and could be furthermore viewed as patronizing; certainly the crusaders knew they were beholden to the Byzantines. While Alexios presumably felt that events had played out as best they could, given the circumstances, the leaders of the second wave were not as satisfied.

Once across the Bosporus, the capture of the city of Nicaea was essential before the armies of the second wave could advance down the old military road toward Jerusalem. Although its inhabitants were still mostly Christian, Nicaea was the chief residence of Qilij Arslan I, the Seljuk sultan of Rum and the most powerful Turkic prince in the region. Nicaea was well fortified and held by a strong garrison, but Qilij Arslan himself was away with the bulk of his forces, disputing the territory of Malatya with his chief rival, an emir named Danishmend Gazi.

Recognizing the opportunity, crusaders surrounded the city before the first of Qilij Arslan's troops hurriedly returned. The main body of the Seljuk army failed to break through the crusaders' cordon on May 21, although it inflicted heavy losses. Qilij Arslan withdrew, leaving the city and his wife, family and much of his treasury to their fate, but it was not until Byzantine ships launched on Iznik Gölü, on the shore of which it stood, that Nicaea was entirely isolated. The besieged garrison opened negotiations with the Byzantines and on June 19, the day appointed for a general assault, the crusaders saw imperial banners flying over the town. Alexios had avoided any arguments with the crusaders by having Nicaea surrender directly to himself—which was in accordance with the oaths the crusade leaders had taken—and he took the opportunity to demand and receive oaths from crusade leaders such as Tancred, who had not yet made them. He also discussed the possibility of opening discussions with the Fatimids, who viewed the Seljuks as enemies. While negotiation with the Fatimids presumably seemed sensible to Alexios, a ruler accustomed to operating in a multi-faith regional environment and aware that Qilij Arslan had not been decisively defeated, it may have surprised the crusaders.

In any event, the crusaders must already have made the decision to penetrate further into West Asia. Between June 26 and 28 the crusaders set out, marching in two divisions.

The first division, under Bohemond's command, consisted of Normans from Frankish lands and the Italic Peninsula, together with Byzantine forces and the followers of Robert of Flanders and Stephen of Blois. The second division, under the command of Raymond IV of Toulouse, was made up of the southern Franks, the Lorrainers and the force of Hugh of Vermandois. The divisions became separated and lost contact, for reasons that were unclear even then. Close to Dorylaeum, at dawn on July 1, Kilij Arslan's forces, supplemented by troops provided by other Seljuk princes who had surrounded Bohemond's division during the night, launched an attack, forcing the Latin knights back onto the mass of armed and unarmed pilgrims with them. This confused crush of people, although unable to strike at the enemy, could defend itself quite effectively and the battle remained deadlocked for two or three hours until the second division surprised and routed the Seljuks.

The crusaders rested for two days. They then resumed their advance by way of Akşehir and Konya through a country already laid waste in the aftermath of the Turkic invasions and further devastated by a scorched-earth policy adopted by their enemies. On a march of 105 days (including 15 rest days) they averaged just over 8 miles a day, which was good going when one considers the number of non-combatants they had with them. At Ereğli on *c*. September 10 they put an army blocking their way to flight.

Tancred and Baldwin of Boulogne now broke away to raid Cilicia, taking advantage of the existence in that region of a string of petty Armenian principalities, driven from their original homeland and established precariously out of the chaos of the last few decades. Tancred and Baldwin did not cooperate with one another, but their quarrelsome progress was welcomed by the Armenian population and they took Tarsus, Adana, Misis, and Iskenderun before rejoining the main army.

Baldwin left again almost at once with a small force, and with an Armenian adviser who had attached himself to him, to follow the seam of Armenian principalities eastward. He took two fortresses, Ravanda and Tilbeşar, with the assistance of local Armenians. He was then invited by Toros, the prince of Edessa (Urfa), whose position was newly established and insecure, to become his adopted son and partner. On February 6, 1098, Baldwin reached Edessa, but a month later the Armenians in the city rioted, perhaps with his connivance. On March 9 Toros was killed by a mob while trying to escape, and on the following day Baldwin claimed the government of Edessa. In doing so he established the first Latin settlement in West Asia, the county of Edessa, comprising Edessa, the fortresses of Ravanda and Tilbeşar and, within a few months, Birecik, Sürüç, and Samsat.

The region newly under Baldwin's control was prosperous and from the autumn of 1098 money and horses poured out of it to the crusaders. Baldwin gave his brother Godfrey of Bouillon the castle and estates of Tilbeşar and Godfrey's comparative wealth was very apparent in the later stages of the crusade. By means of this wealth he was able to augment his following, significantly at the expense of Raymond IV of Toulouse, and this may have contributed to his eventual election as Latin ruler of Jerusalem. We shall see that Baldwin at Edessa was able in another way to contribute to the crusade's success at a vital moment.

At the same time, Baldwin made no move to restore Tarsus, Adana, Misis, Iskenderun, Ravanda, Tilbeşar, and Edessa to Byzantine rule or even to recognize imperial suzerainty, although the cities had all been held by the empire. In short, Baldwin did not keep his oaths to Alexios; neither did Tancred. Indeed, we have no evidence that either of them even considered the issue of Byzantine sovereignty. This early failure to abide by the oaths takes on resonance in relation to the crusaders' later refusal to restore Antioch to the empire. But whereas Alexios was clearly angered by this later refusal at Antioch, we do not have evidence for similar anger with Baldwin's earlier establishments. At the time, the only Byzantine detachment, under control of Byzantine general Tatikios, was still marching with the main crusading army. In contrast with events in Edessa, the oaths *were* recognized in the appointment of a Latin Christian knight to hold Comana "in fealty to God and the Holy Sepulchre and the princes [of the crusade] and the [Byzantine] emperor" when it was reached.

The leaders of the main forces knew their next goal was Antioch but faced a decision about how to proceed. They must have been advised that passage through the Taurus mountains and the Amanus range was hardly possible if their respective passes were adequately defended. They decided to add about 175 miles to their journey by swinging north to Kayseri and then southeast by way of Comana and Göksun to Maraş (Kahramanmaraş), bypassing the main bulk of the Amanus range. This brought them on to the open plain north of Antioch, which they reached on October 21. They were not yet starving and a Genoese fleet brought more supplies; in a remarkable example of forward planning the fleet had left Europe on July 15 and docked at Mağaracik (Suwaidiyah; Port St Simeon), the port of Antioch, on November 17.

But although starvation was not yet an issue, during the march toward Antioch, horses and beasts of burden had been dying like flies in the summer heat. This especially disadvantaged the knights, who needed chargers to fulfill their functions and maintain their status, as well as pack animals to carry their baggage. They had to carry their own heavy sacks of arms and armor, and this led to embarrassing scenes of panic as they struggled up steep paths during the crossing of the Anti-Taurus mountains. By the time the crusaders reached Antioch there were not more than 1,000 horses left—so already four out of every five knights were horseless—and by the following summer the number of horses had shrunk to between 100 and 200. Most knights, among them powerful men at home, were now fighting on foot or riding donkeys and mules.

Upon arrival at Antioch, an army of possibly 30,000 men and women now found itself engaged in a siege that was to last until June 3, 1098. Situated between Mount Silpius and the river Orontes, with its citadel on the mountain top 1,000 feet above it, Antioch could never be completely surrounded. The crusaders built camps and forts across the river and before the northern and southern gates, but these must usually have been lightly garrisoned, because most of the force was occupied with hunting for rations. Having marched without any proper system of provisioning—indeed it would have been difficult to devise one—the crusaders had to rely on foraging and it is not surprising that within a short time the countryside around the city was stripped bare. They were obliged to search further and further afield, traveling in foraging parties 50 miles and

establishing foraging centers at great distances from Antioch: northward toward Cilicia, north-eastward toward Edessa, to the east to Yenişehir and Harim, to the south to the Ruj and Latakia.

As a result, the abiding impression one has of the siege is not one of warfare but of a constant search for food and related low morale. Predictably, there was famine and death from starvation, illness, and disease. Many crusaders seem to have been chronically sick. There was also impoverishment and even lords of some standing found themselves compelled to enter service with the greater princes. Providing for circles of followers, which were never constant but enlarged and contracted as sources of food became available or scarce, imposed great pressures on the leaders. Already by January 1098 Bohemond was threatening to leave the siege because he did not have the resources for it. By the following summer Godfrey of Bouillon and Robert of Flanders were temporarily in penury. In these stressful circumstances it is not surprising that there were manifestations of homesickness and fear, leading to panic and desertion.

The siege of Antioch lasted for seven and a half months, through a winter during which the crusaders as well as Antioch's inhabitants suffered dreadfully. At the time, Antioch was under the rule of a Seljuk governor, Yaghi-Siyan, who, like others in the region, was dealing with ongoing fallout from the death of the late sultan Malik-Shah I and subsequent succession disputes within the Great Seljuk Empire. These disputes had made it hard for Yaghi-Siyan to secure support to defend the city when the crusaders first arrived. However, late in December 1097 and early in February 1098, Seljuk-led forces of relief, the second of which launched an attack in conjunction with a sortie from Antioch's garrison, were repulsed. A third, and very large, army, including detachments from what are now Iraq and Iran, left Mosul under the command of its Seljuk atabeg Kerbogha in May 1098. It spent three fruitless weeks trying to reduce Edessa—the other example of the importance of Baldwin's initiative—and, collecting additional troops from Aleppo on the way, arrived in the vicinity of Antioch on June 5.

By that time the crusaders' situation had been transformed. Bohemond, whose ambition to possess Antioch himself was already apparent, had entered into negotiations with one of the garrison captains, who had agreed to deliver the city to him. He persuaded all his colleagues, except Raymond IV of Toulouse, to promise him the city if his troops were the first to enter it and if Alexios I never came to claim it in person. He then revealed the conspiracy and received his peers' support. Before sunset on June 2 the crusaders engaged in an elaborate diversionary maneuver before returning to their positions after dark. Just before dawn on the third, sixty knights from Bohemond's force swarmed over the walls halfway up the slopes of Mount Silpius around a tower called the Two Sisters. They then dashed down the hill to open the Gate of St George and their fellow crusaders poured into the city, which was in their hands by evening, although the citadel still held out. Antioch's governor, Yağısıyan, fled and fell from his horse. He was found and beheaded by some Armenian peasants.

The crusaders were now in occupation of a city that had suffered a long siege—and the battle was hardly over. They were almost immediately besieged themselves, as Kerbogha's army came up and camped across the river. Kerbogha was in touch with

the still-resisting citadel of Antioch, led by Yağısıyan's son, from which an assault was launched on June 9. A crusader sortie failed on the tenth and that night the crusaders' morale sank to its lowest. There were so many desertions or attempted desertions that the leaders, fearing a mass breakout, sealed the gates. Those who fled joined Stephen of Blois, who had only recently been elected commander-in-chief but had retired to Iskenderun just before Antioch fell, probably because of ill health. He was now panicked into flight.

What had the Byzantines been doing during the long months at Antioch? Tatikios, the general in charge of the Byzantine detachment, had left the crusaders and gone to Cyprus circa February 1098. Although sources provide radically different explanations for Tatikios' decision, including the possibility that some of the crusaders had urged him to go to clear the path for their own claims to Antioch in his absence, it seems undeniable that Tatikios considered the crusaders' cause destined for defeat. Meanwhile, news of events in the first half of 1098 had reached Alexios, who expressed concern at the crusaders' plight within Antioch and, in the summer of 1098, marched toward Antioch with a considerable force. In addition to whatever concerns for the crusaders motivated him, he had strong reasons to desire the restoration of Antioch to the empire. Alexios' path met that of Stephen of Blois and his companions, fleeing Antioch, at the town of Akşehir. The fleeing crusaders persuaded Alexios of the hopelessness of the crusade's situation, whereupon the emperor led his army northward again. Alexios was worried about a Seljuk counterattack closer to Constantinople, a reasonable concern given events leading up to the Battle of Manzikert in 1071. Given his desire to reclaim Antioch, turning back cannot have been an easy decision in any way. Nonetheless, however reasonable or unhappy a decision, it constituted an abandonment of the crusaders.

Within Antioch, however, morale had begun to rise. Two visionaries had approached the leaders. One of them claimed to have seen Christ on the night of June 10 and to have received assurance from him that the crusaders would prevail, provided they repented of their sins. The other reported a series of visits from St Andrew, who had shown him the hiding-place of the Holy Lance, the tip of the spear with which Christ's side had been pierced during the Crucifixion. This relic was "discovered" on June 14 at the bottom of a trench dug in the floor of the reconsecrated cathedral. In spite of the fact that many of the magnates, including the papal legate, were skeptical, the ordinary crusaders were elated.

The leaders decided to resolve the crisis in which they found themselves by seeking battle. One last embassy was sent to Kerbogha to seek terms and afterward, on June 28, the crusaders sortied out of the city under Bohemond's command. They were marshaled in four divisions, each made up of two squadrons of horse and foot, although the number of mounted knights must have been very small, given the lack of horses; even Godfrey of Bouillon and Robert of Flanders had to beg for horses. Each division engaged in turn in a complicated maneuver, switching from column to line, so that in the end three lines were advancing side by side, with the infantry in front masking the few mounted knights, and with their flanks covered, on the right by the river Orontes and on the left by high ground. The fourth division, under Bohemond himself, marched in reserve. The

Figure 3.1 Adhémar of Le Puy at the Battle of Antioch, thirteenth century.
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This miniature is from a thirteenth-century illuminated manuscript of William of Tyre's *Histoire d'Outremer* ("History of Overseas"), a history of the crusader states that was immensely popular and influential throughout the medieval period and beyond. The miniature depicts first crusaders riding into battle. Bishop Adhémar of Le Puy is on the left, wearing his bishop's mitre and carrying the relic of the Holy Lance. Born into the noble comital family of the Valentinois, Adhémar was known for his piety, political acumen, and military skill, and as Latin Christian bishops often did, he led armsbearers and at times fought alongside them in battle. The dragon depicted on the shield of the crusaders' opponents represents the relationship Latin Christian contemporaries perceived between Muslims and dragons, a symbol of demonic and "pagan" threats to humankind.

crusaders attacked in echelon, presumably at walking pace, and Kerbogha's army fled, whereupon the citadel surrendered to Bohemond.

This extraordinary victory has never been fully explained. It may be that Kerbogha, who should never have allowed the crusaders' army to emerge from a single gate across a bridge before engaging it, could not prevent his forces being sucked piecemeal into the mêlée. Bohemond's skill as a military commander should also be taken into account. The crusaders themselves rationalized their victory by ascribing it to the appearance of a heavenly army of angels, saints and the ghosts of their own dead, which intervened on

their side. Such assistance presumably served to confirm for many that they were indeed ushering in the End of Days.

The Battle of Antioch was, in fact, the turning point of the second wave, but that cannot have been apparent at the time. The army sensibly decided to wait until November 1, when the summer heat would be over, before continuing its march. However, an epidemic, probably of typhoid, claimed the life of the papal legate, Bishop Adhémar of Le Puy—a blow to the morale and cohesiveness of the second wave—and scattered the other leaders to their foraging centere. When they returned in September there were signs of division over two issues and in November these surfaced dramatically.

The first issue was possession of Antioch, which Bohemond claimed for himself. Raymond IV of Toulouse, who still held some parts of the city, including the governor's palace and a fortified bridge over the Orontes leading to the road to the port, spoke up for the oaths sworn to Alexios I Komnenos. His motives for doing so are unclear; he may have wanted Antioch and envisaged that the best way to achieve this was to defend imperial sovereignty and be granted control of the city by Alexios. In any event, no one could deny that oaths had been sworn and homage had been paid to the emperor, and that Antioch was a former possession of the Byzantine Empire. Furthermore, the leaders had agreed before the city fell that it would be surrendered to Alexios if he came in person to claim it. In line with this condition, after the Battle of Antioch the crusaders had sent a high-powered embassy to invite Alexios to present himself and take the leadership of the crusade and, presumably, Antioch itself. This "invitation" had noted that a failure to reply would be considered a sign that the agreement between the crusade leaders and Alexios had come to an end. Despite this, Alexios' reply did not reach the crusaders until the following April, when they were well to the south: he promised to join them in June; asked them to delay their advance until his arrival; demanded the return of Antioch; and railed bitterly against Bohemond's perceived usurpation of the city.

In the meantime, while the crusade leaders waited for an imperial reply to their envoy, Bohemond's supporters argued that Alexios was indifferent, even hostile, to the crusaders and had failed to be a good lord in spite of the leaders' oaths to him, which, they claimed, had been extorted from them by force. They further asserted that the departure of the Byzantine general Tatikios, who in their view had abandoned them, and the withdrawal of Alexios and his army from Akşehir when the crusade was most in need within Antioch, demonstrated that the Byzantines had not kept their side of the bargain. Lastly, they contended that the delay in Alexios' reply to the message delivered by the crusade's embassy after the Battle of Antioch revealed the empire's military ineptitude and lack of commitment. Of course this was special pleading, but the crusaders felt let down and their need was pressing. Furthermore, while later events demonstrate Alexios cared deeply about rule of Antioch, his actions in 1098 and 1099 lacked urgency.

In the absence of Alexios and Adhémar of Le Puy, and facing internal dissensions, the crusade leaders were conscious of, even obsessed by, the large number of armsbearers whom they believed had taken the cross but never departed Europe. The existence of this perceived reserve of force was often in their thoughts and the Latin bishops with the crusade excommunicated those who had not fulfilled their vows and expressed the

hope that their colleagues in Europe would do the same. At the same time, some new recruits were in fact coming out to join the armies of the second wave. Most of these were traveling overland and the crusaders expected that many others would follow the same route, as indeed they were to do in the crusade of 1101.

If additional armsbearers were to reach the second wave successfully, then Antioch, dominating the passes from Asia Minor into Syria and holding the northern coastal road open, had to be held by someone reliable. In most Latin eyes, Alexios had not proved himself to be that. Public opinion in Latin Christendom supported the crusaders' abandonment of their oaths: although Bohemond stayed behind in Antioch and did not fulfill his own vow in Jerusalem until five months after its liberation he was not criticized in Europe for what he had done, and in fact his return visit to Frankish lands in 1106 was a triumph.

All that said, it is important to note that the story of Latin-Byzantine relations during the First Crusade is not a simple one of steadily deteriorating trust and increasing hostility. There was cooperation between the Byzantines and Latins during the siege of Nicaea and then a significant and helpful Byzantine presence as far as Antioch. Meanwhile, in the second wave's wake, an imperial army concentrated on re-establishing Byzantine control over the coast of West Asia as far as Antalya. While Tatikios' departure from the crusade is still hard to understand, by early summer 1098 Alexios was moving with an imperial army and recently arrived crusaders to assist the crusade at Antioch. He turned back, as we have seen, faced with dire reports from Stephen of Blois and other deserters from Antioch and concerned about leaving the back door to Constantinople open should he press on further. And while Alexios fiercely contested Bohemond's claim to Antioch, he did not similarly contest Baldwin of Bouillon's claim to Edessa, or other similar claims to territory made by crusade leaders. The implication is that Antioch was of strategic importance for the empire, but that Alexios did not object wholesale to the establishment of Latin Christian rule in West Asia. Finally, in the aftermath of the Battle of Antioch, even while many crusaders were turning decisively against Alexios, others (particularly Raymond IV of Toulouse and those associated with him) declared themselves imperial allies and advocates. Latin-Byzantine relations were complicated and widely varied.

The second issue the crusade leaders faced in November 1098 was the date at which the march to Jerusalem should be resumed. As a step in this direction, non-elite crusaders forced the princes to agree to besiege the town of Ma'arrat al-Nu'man (al-Ma'arra), miles south of Antioch. These "ordinary" crusaders suffered from divisions among the leaders and feared starvation if the crusade remained becalmed much longer. In the middle of November 1098, with the leaders dithering, the mass of crusaders became fiercely critical and threatened to elect their own commander. They forced Raymond IV of Toulouse and Robert of Flanders to lead them to Ma'arrat al-Nu'man. This fell on December 11–12, 1098, but the princes still could not bring themselves to make a firm decision and a conference early in January 1099 came to nothing. When on *c.* January 5 Raymond IV of Toulouse's followers heard that the conference was going badly they pulled down Ma'arrat al-Nu'man's walls, depriving him of his base. Raymond had no option but to

recommence the march to Jerusalem on the thirteenth. The ordinary crusaders still in Antioch also began to raise their voices and Godfrey of Bouillon, Robert of Flanders, and Bohemond had to bow to public pressure. They convened a general assembly on February 2 that decided on a muster at Latakia.

One of the chief reasons for this paralysis was the fact that the second wave, like the crusade as a whole, had no central leadership. On four separate occasions attempts were made to provide the armies of the second wave with a commander-in-chief. Alexios turned down the proposal in the spring of 1097. It was put to him again by the embassy that left Antioch in July 1098. In the spring of 1098 Stephen of Blois was elected overall commander, but he deserted soon afterward. In September 1098 crusade leaders wrote to ask Pope Urban II to journey out and take command; he did not. In January 1099 Raymond IV of Toulouse, under pressure from his followers to continue the journey, offered to take the other leaders into his service for large sums of money, but most of them refused to serve him.

The fact was that not one of the leaders was strong enough to dominate the others. It is generally supposed that these men led "armies," but that is far from the truth. Each was accompanied by a household, including relations and dependents, and each came to provide for a wider body of people as the shortages began to bite. But the bulk of effective armsbearers, the petty lords (many of them commanding their own little forces) and the knights, were independent. Their allegiances constantly shifted as circumstances changed and the ability of the leaders to reward them and their little entourages came and went.

Thus the second wave was characterized by a kaleidoscopic shifting of allegiances as minor figures moved from one contingent to another. No leader's following was coherent or permanent enough to provide him with a platform from which he could dominate the rest. A result was that the second wave was run by committees and assemblies. Each leader took counsel with his most important followers and there were general assemblies, but most important of all was a council of the leaders. This was quite effective while the papal legate Adhémar of Le Puy was alive, for he had the personality and authority to dominate it. His death on August 1, 1098 removed the only objective and authoritative leader and the committees became deadlocked. When faced with deadlock, and sometimes simply when it was in their own personal best interests, leaders acted independently of each other and on their own initiative.

Regardless of these shifts, and notwithstanding the efforts of some leaders to pursue their own ambitions, the second wave as a whole continued to view their enterprise as holy war. To modern eyes, perhaps the most surprising manifestation of this confidence was crusader cannibalism of Muslims at Ma'arrat al-Nu'man. Virtually all Latin Christian accounts of the First Crusade acknowledge the cannibalism, although they differ in both the reasons they ascribe for it and their attitudes toward it; Islamic sources are in turn quite silent on the phenomenon. Jay Rubenstein has painstakingly analyzed the evidence and convincingly argued that crusader cannibalism of Muslim inhabitants of Ma'arrat al-Nu'man—not Jewish or Christian co-habitants—was one of perhaps

several instances of deliberate cannibalism on the First Crusade. Latin Christian writers were consistently uncomfortable with this and attempted to rationalize it by blaming the cannibalism on the moral failings of the poorest crusaders or suggesting a time of famine. However, we have no reason to suppose only the poor participated nor that famine was a factor. Furthermore, it seems that those who performed these acts did so quite deliberately. Drawing upon a constellation of cultural themes and biblical texts, public acts of cannibalism served to underscore the idea that the crusaders were waging, and winning, "a holy war, whose rules of combat were inherently different from normal warfare."[3]

The region into which the crusaders advanced, as holy warriors in their own eyes and yet another set of armies in the eyes of others, was in just as much political turmoil as northern locales had been. As a result, the crusaders faced little opposition to their advance. The Seljuk emirs of Aleppo and Damascus were at odds with one another. The Arab dynasties in control of Shayzar and Tripoli were even more hostile to the Seljuks than to the Latin Christians. The Fatimids, who had only just regained control of Jerusalem, reacted to the developing threat by resorting to diplomacy. Early in 1098 a Fatimid embassy spent several weeks in the crusader camp at Antioch, before returning to Cairo with crusader envoys, who were then detained for a year. These envoys were released in the spring of 1099, when they accompanied another Fatimid mission to the crusade, which was now besieging ʻArqah, 15 miles from Tripoli. Raymond IV of Toulouse had marched there by way of Kafartab, where he met Robert of Normandy and Tancred, and Rafniye. Before the end of March he was joined by the other crusade leaders, except Bohemond who remained behind to guard Antioch.

The investment of ʻArqah did not go well. The crusaders were demoralized by this and by the death of Peter Bartholomew, the visionary to whom had been purportedly revealed the whereabouts of the Holy Lance in Antioch. Peter's visions had become so eccentric that he had antagonized a large section of the second wave and he had volunteered to undergo an ordeal by fire, which he did not survive. The crucial factor, however, that led the crusaders to raise the siege of ʻArqah was a breakdown in their negotiations with the Fatimids. Realizing that if they delayed their advance on Jerusalem they would have to face another, and very formidable, army of relief once they were besieging it, and knowing that this was the harvest season, which would provide them with the supplies they needed, the crusaders took the road south again on May 13.

Up to this point—and two years had elapsed since the siege of Nicaea—the second wave crusaders had moved quite slowly. They had been concerned to cover their rear by reducing some of the major fortresses that could have barred their communications back through Antioch and West Asia to Constantinople. They also pursued their own interests episodically, as we have seen. Now all caution was abandoned and in another reckless decision the majority of the second wave decided to bypass the great strongholds in front of them and make a dash for Jerusalem. Their progress changed from a crawl to a gallop. They crossed the Nahr el Kelb north of Beirut six days after leaving ʻArqah and marched rapidly south by way of Tyre, turning inland north of Jaffa and reaching Ramle on June 3. They arrived before Jerusalem on June 7. On the previous day Bethlehem had fallen to

Tancred, who had deserted Raymond IV of Toulouse, whom he had agreed to serve, and had transferred his allegiance and contingent to Godfrey of Bouillon.

Jerusalem was, like Antioch, far too large to be surrounded, but, whereas Antioch had been besieged for seven and a half months and then occupied only through treachery, Jerusalem was taken by assault after five weeks. The crusaders at first concentrated most of their strength against the western wall, but then divided their leaders and their respective forces between the western section of the northern wall and Mount Sion to the south.

For a time the siege went badly, in spite of the arrival of Genoese and English ships at Jaffa and an expedition to the north into Samaria, which provided wood and other materials for the construction of two siege-towers, a battering-ram and some catapults. Meanwhile news arrived of the march of a Fatimid relief force that everyone, not least the garrison of Jerusalem, had been expecting. On July 8, following apparent divine instructions transmitted by a visionary, a great penitential procession of crusaders wound its way from holy place to holy place outside the city walls and gathered to hear sermons on the Mount of Olives. The fourteenth of July was spent filling in the ditch to the south and by evening Raymond of Toulouse's siege-tower was closing on the wall.

However, it was Godfrey of Bouillon's men, who had switched their point of attack eastward to level ground (slightly to the east of the present-day Herod's Gate), who succeeded in bridging the gap between their tower and the wall on July 15. Two knights from Tournai were the first across, followed by the Lorrainers. The trickle became a torrent as crusaders poured over the wall and through a breach already made by the ram, some making for the Temple area and some beyond, down to the southwest corner where citizens defending against Raymond IV of Toulouse were forced to withdraw.

The crusaders sacked Jerusalem, which was not well populated but had become a place of refuge for the inhabitants of the countryside around of various faiths and sects. The extent of the crusaders' massacres in Jerusalem has long been a subject of historical debate. Benjamin Kedar has argued that the crusaders massacred a large number of inhabitants and refugees in Jerusalem during the conquest proper on July 15; others, who had found temporary refuge or been promised protection by some crusade leaders, were killed on July 16; and on July 17, the Fatimid garrison surrendered and departed, accompanied by some additional Jewish and Muslim citizens.[4] In contrast, Konrad Hirschler has argued that the earliest Arabic sources for the 1099 conquest do not suggest that the massacre(s) were larger in scale than those of other crusade conquests, and further, that the historiography of the 1099 conquest changed detectably several decades later, with the conquest and its violence only becoming a standardized and dramatic part of the Islamic narrative of the region in the thirteenth century.[5]

We can feel relatively certain that the conquest of the city was accompanied by massacres, even though the scale remains debatable. The only contemporary evidence in Arabic suggests that the number of deaths may not have been *quite* as high as has been supposed. At the same time, Latin Christian writers commented repeatedly on the extraordinary character of the Jerusalem massacres, even in comparison with both earlier and subsequent crusader massacres. While some Latin Christian writers

described the slaughter in celebratory terms, others showed compassion for those the crusaders killed. Meanwhile, a small number of surviving Judeo-Arabic sources suggest that only a small number of Jews were able to escape or be ransomed. Certainly, the Muslim and Jewish communities in Jerusalem at the time of the crusaders' conquest did not remain intact in its immediate aftermath, and we do not have evidence for mass relocation or enslavement.

The massacres in Jerusalem, some episodes of which seem to have been, like crusader cannibalism, quite deliberate and intentional, can be most convincingly understood as an expression of sacral warfare. It has long been recognized that the Latin Christian accounts that celebrated the violence in Jerusalem—which were the majority of accounts—used apocalyptic and biblical language to describe the killings. As Luigi Rosso has most recently argued, this was surely not accidental, nor can it be readily understood as a simple result of the cultural diffusion of Christian references.[6] Rather, we should view these descriptions as careful and deliberate attempts to locate the crusaders' violence within the framework of Christian history and to emphasize its holiness. It signifies the crusaders' ongoing commitment to Christian holy war, and their chroniclers' celebration of that fact, rather than their abandonment of it.

On July 22, crusade leaders elected Godfrey of Bouillon the ruler of a new Latin Christian settlement centered on Jerusalem. This new settlement, the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, became the third Latin-ruled "crusader state," the first having been the county of Edessa and the second the principality of Antioch. Godfrey's first task was to organize Jerusalem's defense against the Fatimid counter-invasion. He had some difficulty in persuading the other crusade leaders to commit themselves and their forces entirely, but by the evening of August 11 the whole Latin army was at Ashdod, where the herds the Fatimids had brought to feed their troops were captured. At dawn on the following morning the crusaders surprised the Fatimid host, still encamped just north of Ascalon (Ashqelon), and a charge by the Latin knights, who seem by now to have been able to replace their horses, routed the enemy. The Battle of Ascalon is conventionally used to demarcate the end of the second wave of the First Crusade.

To Latin armsbearers of the central Middle Ages the second wave of the First Crusade was the single most important event of the recent past. Celebrated in a cycle of epic poems, elaborated in family memories, illustrated in frescos, tapestries, and carved tympana, it quickly became legend and those who had taken part were celebrated as heroes. For example, the exploits of Hugh of Chaumont-sur-Loire, lord of Amboise, were long remembered by his descendants. And the family of Arnold II of Ardres, which was correctly maintaining a century later that he had been there, explained the absence of his name from the lists of knights recorded in the epic *La Chanson d'Antioche* by asserting that he had refused to bribe the author to include it. It was similarly momentous for the Church of Rome as well. As Cecilia Gaposchkin has emphasized, it was incorporated into the devotional heart of Latin Christendom. The Feast of Jerusalem on July 15 was added to the formal liturgical calendar, annually celebrated as part of the sacred time returned to each year.[7]

In many ways, the second wave did have a heroic quality about it when seen through Latin Christian eyes. The campaign was marked by great sieges—Nicaea, Antioch,

Ma'arrat al-Nu'man, 'Arqah, Jerusalem—and every advanced technique of warfare and form of siege-engine available at the time were deployed before Jerusalem to ensure a speedy conquest. Battles were won on the march at Dorylaeum and Ereğli. Even more impressive were the defeats of armies of relief—one at Nicaea, three at Antioch, and one at Ascalon—because it was generally held that the most dangerous situation in which any force could find itself was when it was attacked from the rear while laying siege to a city. All this was achieved by forces that had lacked provisions and constantly had to forage, had lost their horses and had to fight for much of the time on foot, had no firm or clear leadership, had sometimes disintegrated into anarchy, and had endured heavy losses. The most recent estimate of mortalities concludes that over 37 percent of the armsbearing crusaders died. The fatalities among those not bearing arms must have been much higher. That said, any perceived heroic quality of the crusade required averting one's eyes from other episodes, or seeking explanations for violence and brutality that even at the time discomforted some of the most ardent enthusiasts. And of course, the second wave was hardly seen in heroic terms by those who suffered and died as a result of that Latins warfare, as well as all those around the Mediterranean who were affected by it.

It would be a mistake, moreover, to attribute the accomplishments of the second wave to heroism. Notwithstanding the military effectiveness of certain leaders, such as Bohemond, as well as the commitment and endurance of many crusaders, the vast majority of historians identify the political instability in West Asia as the primary reason for the success (from a Latin Christian perspective) of the First Crusade. As described in Chapter 2, the chain of deaths in the highest offices in Seljuk, Fatimid, and 'Abbasid polities in the 1090s were devastating and deeply destabilizing. As existing hierarchies tried to shore up their leadership, and ambitious newcomers sought to make good on an unprecedented political opportunity, West Asia was significantly disrupted. Those who marched on the First Crusade did not know it, but they marched toward an open door.

The Third Wave and Thereafter

After the 1099 Latin conquest of Jerusalem, most of the second-wave crusaders decided to return home. From the winter of 1099–1100 they began to reappear in Europe, bringing with them spiritual riches in the form of relics, which they gave to local churches, and the palms they had collected and kept as evidence that they had fulfilled their vows.

But already in the spring of 1099, even before the second wave had reached Jerusalem, Pope Urban II had commissioned the archbishop of Milan to renew crusade preaching in Lombardy. There was a fervent response and as news spread of the 1099 conquest—which Urban, who died on July 29, 1099, never heard—new armies were raised. Urban's successor, Pope Paschal II, threatened, as Urban had done, to excommunicate those who had not yet fulfilled their vows and his words were repeated by Latin bishops.

Paschal also threatened to excommunicate deserters. Hugh of Vermandois and Stephen of Blois were among the prominent individuals in this humiliating condition

who now decided to retrace their steps east. Not only personal sentiment but also, surely, social pressures moved such crusaders to try again. After all, those who had fled from the crusade had brought dishonor not only on themselves but also on their kindred. For example, Miles of Bray and his son Guy Trousseau deserted in 1098, and it cannot have been coincidence that when Miles went again with the 1101 expedition he was accompanied by the other senior member of the family, his brother Guy of Rochefort. And Stephen of Blois' return to crusade seems to have been due in part to pressure from his wife, Countess Adela of Blois, the sister of fellow crusade magnate Robert of Normandy. Adela had financed her husband's initial journey on the second wave, ruled the county alone in his absence and after his death, and was praised for her *virtus* (meaning both "strength" and "moral virtue") by crusade chronicler and abbot Baldric of Bourgueil.

But in addition to deserters and those who hadn't already fulfilled their vows, many Latin Christian men and women who had not yet committed themselves to crusade flocked to the renewed banners. Papal legates were sent to Frankish lands. They held a council at Valence in September 1100, went on to Limoges, where Duke William IX of Aquitaine and many of his vassals took the cross, and from there moved to Poitiers where, at a council assembled on 18 November, the fifth anniversary of the opening of the council of Clermont, they preached the crusade. It seems clear that the effect of crusade preaching continued beyond 1100, since it was only in 1101 that additional Danish forces left for Jerusalem under King Erik the Good. Erik died en route, but his wife, Queen Bodil, led the Danish forces to Jerusalem and the Mount of Olives, where she died.

As a result of all this activity and enthusiasm, the armies of the third wave were probably as large as those which had left in 1096. The ecclesiastical contingent under the chief papal legate, Hugh of Die, archbishop of Lyon, was certainly stronger. The lay princes were of equal or greater rank than their predecessors: William of Aquitaine, Stephen of Blois and Hugh of Vermandois, William of Nevers, Odo of Burgundy, Stephen of Burgundy and Welf of Bavaria. Under the surface glitter of knight-errantry that surrounded these magnates, there are indications of a serious religious purpose and of attempts to learn from the mistakes of their predecessors. One such indication was the portable wealth that gave these crusaders such a bad name for luxury: on the third wave, magnates carried cash and jewelry that could be readily exchanged en route.

The armies of the third wave operated independently of each other, and none made it more than 1,000 kilometers beyond Constantinople. The first to depart were the Lombards, who left Milan on September 13, 1100; they would not get far into West Asia. Disorder punctuated their wintering in Bulgaria and encampment outside Constantinople for two months in the spring of 1101. Alexios, as before, tried to force them to cross the Bosporus by refusing them licenses to buy supplies. As their predecessors had done, they reacted violently and launched an attack on his palace of Blachernae, but this so embarrassed their leaders that they subsequently agreed to be ferried across to Asia. At Izmit the Lombards were joined by the first and smaller of the

German armies, by men from Burgundy and northern Frankish lands under Stephen of Blois, and by Raymond IV of Toulouse, who had reached Constantinople in the summer of 1100 with his household and had reluctantly allowed himself to be attached to these third wave contingents as an adviser.

Raymond of Toulouse was not very successful. Against his advice and that of the Byzantines and Stephen of Blois, the new crusaders decided not to wait for additional forces but to march for Niksar, where Bohemond, who had been captured in the previous summer by the Danishmendid Turks—rivals of the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum—was incarcerated. It is even possible that the Lombards were planning to enter what is now Iraq from the north and to lay siege to Baghdad itself. In June they marched from Izmit to Ankara and then northeast to Çankiri before swinging east again. In the early part of August, somewhere near Merzifon, they were met by an army raised by a coalition of Turkic princes. There followed several days of fighting before the crusaders panicked and fled.

The second army of the third wave, under William of Nevers, reached Constantinople in June 1101 and, overtaking the force of William of Aquitaine that was already there, crossed the Bosporus. On the twenty-fourth this army set off to catch up with the Lombards. At Ankara it gave up the chase and turned south toward Konya, which it reached in the middle of August, after a three-day battle on the march. William failed to take the town and moved on to Ereğli, which was deserted, its wells blocked. After several thirsty days the crusaders were routed.

Meanwhile a third army under William of Aquitaine had left Frankish lands in the middle of March and joined the Bavarians under Welf before marching in an unruly fashion through the Balkans. It reached Constantinople at the beginning of June and remained near the city for five weeks, purchasing supplies and taking advice from the Byzantines, although a number of Germans wisely chose to go on directly by sea. In the middle of July William and Welf set off eastward, along the route followed by the second wave of crusaders, but the land had been devastated by regional conflict, including the passage of earlier crusaders. In spite of careful planning they soon ran out of food. Near Ereğli their army was ambushed and annihilated.

For the most part, the leaders of the third wave did not face the same fates as their armies. William of Aquitaine and Welf of Bavaria escaped, as had William of Nevers, Stephen of Burgundy, Stephen of Blois and Raymond IV of Toulouse from the earlier disasters. Hugh of Vermandois died of his wounds at Tarsus. Some of the survivors joined Raymond IV of Toulouse and took the town of Tartus, which was to be his base for the creation of another settlement. Then most gathered in Jerusalem where they fulfilled their vows. Some, delayed from departure by adverse winds, joined the settlers' forces to meet another Fatimid invasion. They were heavily defeated on May 17, 1102, and Stephen of Blois was killed. Whereas in 1096 crusader armies had marched into a politically fragmented and distressed region, in 1101 crusader armies met allied Seljuk forces and were resoundingly routed.

The First Crusade thus obviously expanded beyond the conventional chronological dating of "1096–1099." Was it over in 1102? The short answer is no. To give just one

reason why, in 1105–6 Bohemond, now self-proclaimed prince of Antioch, and clerical allies rallied recruits in Europe to join the Latin principality of Antioch in crusading against the Byzantine Empire; this crusade is discussed in Chapter 5. Furthermore, so-called independent crusaders—armsbearers who on their own or in small groups went on crusade and who saw their actions as connected to much larger, and somewhat more cohesive, expeditions like the First Crusade—were a constant from 1100 onward.[8] These are only the most obvious examples of how crusading was an ongoing, unspooling phenomenon.

Once launched, crusading would roll on, ebbing and flowing rather than stopping and starting. A good example of this can be seen in Norway. An independent Norwegian fleet had also departed for Jerusalem in 1100. Many members of the fleet survived and returned to Norse lands by way of Constantinople. Their positive reports back to King Sigurd led to a further, larger fleet that set sail in 1107 and ultimately helped Baldwin I of Jerusalem conquer the city of Sidon. And the very next year Archbishop Adalgod of Magdeburg called upon the Danes to crusade against the pagan Wends, making explicit comparison with the First Crusade.

Clearly, then, one substantial consequence of the First Crusade was the establishment of the idea—or ideas—of crusading. In the early twelfth century, a slew of histories, literary works, family accounts, art, and architecture helped build and express a common Latin Christian understanding of "crusading," based loosely on the events of the expedition we know as the First Crusade as well as preexisting ideologies of Christian holy war. As discussed at length starting in Chapter 5, these cultural patterns of crusading were influenced by both ecclesiastical and lay ideas and practices, and would continue to evolve over time. The Latin Christian consensus that the events of 1095–99 were a unique and significant moment in Christian history, both a fulfillment of prophecy and divine will, and the beginning of a new phenomenon, remains today in the very emphasis Western historiography places on them as the "*First* Crusade." Jay Rubenstein has argued that the First Crusade was viewed by many as nothing less than *the* Apocalypse playing out in real time.[9]

At the same time, voices outside Latin Christendom expressed their own distinct interpretations of the events of 1096–9. In the Byzantine Empire, it is far from clear that the crusaders' 1099 conquest of Jerusalem was viewed as a triumph; the massacres in the city were commented on disapprovingly. The crusaders' military strengths and some individuals' courage and intelligence were praised at the same time as the expedition's overall religious zeal was described with concern and condescension. While the Byzantines never contested the establishment of some Latin Christian polities, such as the county of Edessa, the crusaders' claim of Antioch and Jerusalem directly undercut Byzantium's claims to sacred, imperial sovereignty. And events related to Antioch and Jerusalem were still unfolding. The First Crusade had restored Nicaea to the empire and solidified the Komnenoi dynasty, but it had also created ongoing complications, as discussed in later chapters.

Despite the immediate effects of the crusaders and their armies in West Asia, Armenian historical accounts were relatively slow to discuss the First Crusade in depth. It

is only in the late twelfth century that writers located the First Crusade within Armenian history. While it remains hard to pin down a single "Armenian" interpretation of the First Crusade, the emphasis seems to have been on fitting the events of the First Crusade, and subsequent Latin influences, into a traditional Armenian historical framework. Liberation for Armenia was consistently hoped for, but the idea of a triumphal Christian emperor in the mold of Constantine remained consistently more appealing to Armenians than expeditions like the First Crusade.

Our sources for Islamic responses in the earliest years of the twelfth century are limited, and it should be remembered that while Byzantium constituted a unified polity, "Islamic responses" came from many different political, religious, and ethnic contexts around the Mediterranean and in West Asia. Contemporary Muslim poems reveal dismay and mourning for the loss of Jerusalem and the deaths and suffering of its people. One polemical text, al-Sulami's *Kitab al-Jihad*, provides us with a clear call for a unified Islamic military response to the First Crusade. But it is hard to know the actual influence of this text in the first decades of the twelfth century. As Niall Christie has demonstrated, Muslim writers ascribed a wide range of motives to crusaders, from the material to the territorial; in the early twelfth century, only al-Sulami claimed that the crusaders believed they were engaged in holy war.[10]

Similarly, there was no singular "Jewish" perspective on and response to the First Crusade. We have accounts in Hebrew of the Rhineland massacres from Jewish communities within Latin Christendom, as well as much more fragmentary epistolary evidence from Jewish communities in West Asia. Both sets of sources note and mourn the crusade's destruction, slaughter, and disruption of families and livelihoods. The Hebrew accounts of the Rhineland massacres were primarily concerned with commemoration and memorialization of those who had died, placing them within a tradition of Jewish martyrdom at the hands of gentiles, and ensuring they would be remembered by future generations. The fragmentary letters, in turn, focused on attempting to ransom and rehome holy texts and a small number of Jewish refugees from Jerusalem.

A major consequence of the First Crusade, therefore, was the quick establishment of many different perspectives on it. Two additional consequences were more directly political in nature. First, in 1097 crusading armies had removed Pope Urban II's competition—the anti-pope Clement III—and reestablished Urban's papacy in Rome. While tensions and outright warfare between popes and Latin Christian monarchs would continue for many centuries to come, the papacy had successfully asserted the right to direct holy war on behalf of God and Christendom, and in the eyes of Latin Christians, the conquest of Jerusalem validated this claim. Second, the establishment of four Latin Christian-ruled polities on the eastern Mediterranean meant that all in the Mediterranean had to reckon with a new political status quo.

CHAPTER 4
THE EARLY CRUSADER STATES, 1099–1150

As a result of the First Crusade, new Latin-ruled states—referred to here as "the crusader states"[1]—were established in West Asia. Their purpose was represented as defense of pilgrim roads and maintenance of Christian cult-centers for pilgrims. These states led to the creation of a powerful new fusion of devotional warfare in Latin Christianity, the military orders. At the same time, the crusader states represented individual and family ambitions, they competed as much as cooperated with each other and Christian Byzantium, they were populated by a pluralistic population and roughly tolerated a wide range of religious practices, and they allied with Muslim neighbors when expedient, at times against other Christians. While government in these states had changed hands, for many people, daily life there must have remained recognizable.

Conquest and Rule

Leaders of the First Crusade, sometimes with local or Mediterranean allies, established four Latin Christian-ruled "crusader states" in the eastern Mediterranean between 1098 and 1109. These were, from north to south, the county of Edessa, the principality of Antioch, the county of Tripoli, and the Kingdom of Jerusalem. The region thus colonized, nearly 600 miles from north to south, has a geographical unity. Mountains, bounded or broken by a depression carrying the Orontes, Litani, and Jordan rivers, run parallel to and at some distance from the coast, toward which rocky fingers of hillside sometimes extend. Since the wind is a prevailing westerly, winter rainwater is deposited on the high ground, which retains it (better then than now because there were more trees) and gradually releases it back to the coast throughout the dry season. Therefore the plains between the mountains and the coast are fertile and were well populated. Some areas beyond the mountains are quite fertile too, before they merge into the desert which borders the region to the east and south. While the location of Christian holy sites was a factor in the choice of some territory, it was not the only factor. Latin Christians showed a clear strategic preference for the major cities of the Mediterranean coast as well as agriculturally productive regions.

The establishment of the crusader states was only the latest political change in a region that had been populated for thousands of years and weathered many political changes in that time, including a number in living memory. These political changes would continue. For example, portions of the crusader states were conquered by Nur al-Din and Salah al-Din in the later twelfth century before being conquered again by Latin Christians.

Map 5 The Crusader States, *c.* 1110.

While this warfare and the coinciding changes in governance certainly affected those living in the region, it is easy to overstate the importance of such governmental changes and overestimate their immediate effects on daily life.

The indigenous inhabitants of the colonized region were connected to each other by a wide range of religious and sectarian bonds. In terms of religious identity, there were three major indigenous Christian communities present—Melkites, Jacobites, and Armenians—each of which claimed orthodoxy, as well as smaller Christian communities such as the Maronites and Nestorians, and perhaps also Copts, Ethiopian Christians, and Georgians. These Christian communities were differentiated not only by theology but also by language and cultural practices, although these differences did not preclude peaceful coexistence in the region. There were both Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims in the region, including a range of different Shi'ite sects, such as the Twelvers, the Isma'ilis (including the Nizaris), and the Druze. Both Rabbinite and Karaite Jews were present, as well as Samaritans. At the same time, as Christopher MacEvitt has emphasized, religious and sectarian identities and relationships were only one aspect of communities. People were also bound together by relationships of family, ethnicities, cultural practices, languages, locale/neighborhood, and profession.[2]

And, of course, the crusader states were bounded on all sides by a variety of political neighbors. To the north was the Byzantine Empire, a larger, wealthier, and more powerful Christian state that sought recognition of its sovereignty over other Christian-ruled polities in the region, as well as the recently formed and still nascent Christian-ruled polity of Armenian Cilicia. The crusader states also bordered an ever-shifting number of Muslim-ruled polities in the early twelfth century. Antioch and Edessa faced Turkic-ruled Aleppo and Mosul and, after 1133, a small, but fiercely independent, enclave established by the Nizaris. On the borders of Tripoli were a group of lesser Muslim-ruled cities and principalities, including Shayzar, Hama, and Homs. Jerusalem faced Seljuk Damascus (Sunni) to the east and the Fatimid Caliphate (Isma'ili Shi'ite), centered on Cairo, to the south. After the initial shock of the First Crusade the reaction of most of the smaller states in the region had been to attempt to reach a form of coexistence with the Latin settlers. But this did not mean absolute peace.

Latin occupation of the region proceeded piecemeal and via military force as the opportunity arose for land or the control of a trade route. The first and most substantial phase of Latin military expansion and settlement lasted until *c*. 1130. It was characterized by an uneven combination of diplomacy, opportunistic military endeavors with varied success, and the beginning of remarkable yet haphazard programs of castle-building, since castles or walled towns enabled effective administration and defense of a region with comparatively small groups of fighters. During this first phase, Latin Christians also progressively took coastal ports. By 1153, Latin Christians held the whole of the eastern Mediterranean coast from Iskenderun to Gaza.

Latin control of these eastern Mediterranean ports assured them and their allies a land route back to Antioch and from there deeper into West Asia, but far more important in the long run was the effect on maritime traffic. Due to geographical factors, it was customary for ships heading east from the western Mediterranean to sail in the northern

part of the sea for as long as possible before directing their course southward for the eastern Mediterranean coast. By occupying the eastern Mediterranean coast, the Latins helped prevent the Cairo-based Fatimid fleet from interrupting northern Mediterranean shipping lanes, since the Fatimids could no longer easily resupply from the now Latin-controlled coast. It furthermore positioned them to engage with trade routes that connected the eastern Mediterranean to the Red Sea, and from there East Africa and South Asia, as Adam Simmons has recently argued.[3]

All that said, the history of the crusader states is one of contention and coexistence, rather than a simple narrative of conquest and dominance. Because of the strategic and intrinsic value of the territory that was colonized, as well as both internal tensions and external pressures, the borders of the crusader states fluctuated, sometimes dramatically, over the course of the twelfth century. Furthermore, the leaders of these crusader states engaged in a complicated dance of diplomacy and shifting alliances with both subject populations and powers in the region. Elite members of the crusader states were variously each other's competitors, adversaries, and allies, depending upon circumstances.

The first Latin state to be established was the county of Edessa claimed by Baldwin of Boulogne and his cousins during the First Crusade. The city of Edessa was 160 miles northeast of Antioch, and the county straddled the River Euphrates in an area that had been a Byzantine frontier for centuries. The countryside was fertile but very exposed, and Latin settlement was sparse and confined to isolated fortresses. The population was mostly Christian—primarily Jacobites and Armenians—and the Latin counts, who were comparatively rich, tended to get on quite well with their subjects. This was partly because their standing was ambiguous enough for them to look like warlords vaguely linked to the Byzantine Empire like their predecessors, and partly because they associated themselves closely with the Armenian nobility. Relations between the counts of Edessa and Byzantine emperors in the twelfth century were polite.

The same could not be said for Byzantine relations with the principality of Antioch, which lay between Edessa and the sea, and had been established by Bohemond and his nephew Tancred during the First Crusade. The principality's control over the northeastern corner of the Mediterranean coast was spasmodic, but it came to hold the eastern Mediterranean coastline as far south as Baniyas. It extended inland to Maraş and 'Azaz in the northeast and, with its frontier skirting Aleppo which always remained in Muslim hands, to al-Atharib and Ma'arrat al-Nu'man in the southeast.

Bohemond and Tancred had gained the bulk of this territory against the interests of the Byzantines, and the early years were dominated by a military struggle with the Byzantines for the control of the northeastern coast in the north and the port city of Latakia in the south. As previously discussed, in 1105–6 Bohemond and clerical allies had recruited Latin armies to crusade against the Byzantine Empire in Constantinople. This attempt fizzled as the Latin forces drifted apart, and, ultimately, Bohemond signed the Treaty of Devol with Alexios I Komnenos in 1108. The treaty stated that Bohemond ruled as the emperor's vassal and that the principality was subject to the empire's sovereignty; this meant that, for example, patriarchs of Antioch were to be appointed by the emperor. After signing, Bohemond returned to Europe and his heir, Tancred, resisted

recognizing the treaty. Byzantine-Antiochene relations would prove complicated for some time to come.

South of the county of Antioch, the activities of Raymond IV of Toulouse ultimately led to the establishment of the county of Tripoli in 1109. Raymond had probably been looking for territory ever since he had entered the region, and in doing so, was at times in conflict with other crusaders. Foiled at Antioch and again at Jerusalem, he may have tried to establish a principality near Ascalon or Arsuf, and in 1102, he laid siege to Tartus. (In doing so he was, strictly speaking, in breach of an oath he had been forced to make to Tancred.) Tartus fell and, although other attempts at conquest failed, Raymond set up a siege-camp on high ground about 3 miles inland from the important port of Tripoli, which he gradually enlarged into the castle of Montpèlerin. As described in the previous chapter, Raymond had cultivated a stronger relationship with Alexios in the later years of the crusade and Alexios supported Raymond's efforts at conquest. However, the city of Tripoli itself was not taken by Latins until 1109, after Raymond's death. The conquest of Tripoli and virtually all port cities on the coast of the eastern Mediterranean was accomplished only with the help of fleets from the central Mediterranean, especially the city-states of Pisa, Venice, and Genoa.

Farthest south, the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem was nominally headed by Godfrey of Bouillon, brother of Baldwin of Boulogne (now Count of Edessa). Godfrey's election to the rulership on July 22, 1099 remains a shadowy affair. The formal decision seems to have been made by the leaders of the crusade after a debate in the presence of the whole army, but informal approaches had also been made beforehand to Robert of Normandy and Raymond IV of Toulouse; indeed, Robert may well have been the favorite.

Godfrey was now comparatively rich, thanks to the efforts and conquests of his brother Baldwin, but his own resources were not large enough for him to carry alone the burden of defending what had been taken by the crusades. In August 1099 he was in control of the city of Jerusalem and a belt of land stretching through Ramle to Jaffa on the coast. His household was fully stretched administering Jerusalem and this tongue of land to the coast. Godfrey thus needed the support of individuals who had armed men at their disposal or were rich enough to recruit them, and he needed to reward them in ways that gave them latitude to govern and defend their territories and recruit and support their own supporters in turn. As a result, he allocated land as fiefs to trusted supporters. He also began presenting supporters in towns with money fiefs, that is, a fixed annual payment in return for military service. In some cases, supporters were given both land and money fiefs.

Box 4.1 Fiefs, Lords, and Vassals

Despite an extraordinary amount of scholarship to the contrary, led by Susan Reynolds's magisterial *Fiefs and Vassals* (1994), the erroneous belief that society and politics in medieval Europe were strictly organized around a consistent

and simple hierarchy known as "feudalism" remains widespread. As a result, it is worth emphasizing that there was no such static and uniform sociopolitical institution, as is commonly imagined. What we can clearly identify, however, are fiefs, lords, and vassals. A fief was a grant of resources from a more powerful individual (lord) to a less powerful individual (vassal). It might be a grant of land or money. Its worth might vary widely. Rights to the grant might be considered inheritable or not, and if inheritable, partible or not. The status of lord and vassal likewise might range widely; one monarch might be a vassal of another, and equally a low-ranking castellan might nonetheless have a single vassal. Furthermore, individuals could have multiple lords and vassals simultaneously. Rather than a series of simple vertical bonds, then, lord/vassal relationships were, like family relationships, a web of personal obligations that exerted pressure in many directions within medieval European society. Indeed, it seems to have been always understood that both lord and vassal had obligations to each other, especially fealty (loyalty), good counsel, and military aid, and that failure to meet those obligations might be met with a revocation of the relationship—or even direr consequences. While most lords were men, female lords were more common than is sometimes imagined, especially in the central Middle Ages. Patriarchal norms notwithstanding, noble families were generally happier to see their dynastic lines continue under effective female leadership rather than fail completely due a lack of male heirs.

Godfrey's decisions were pragmatic, and his emphasis on fiefs and decentralized rule was deliberate. It has been supposed that the Latin settlers, coming primarily from decentralized regions in Western Europe, simply brought with them their understanding of a natural order of things, but contemporaries did recognize the advantages of centralized and highly organized government, as the aspirations of the Normans in England and Sicily show. It is much more likely that a decentralized system of lordship and fiefs was the only system believed to be workable in the crusader states and that this was established at the start, when the rulers would anyway have been hard-pressed to find any other solution to their problems.

A consequence was that the crusader states were not only divided among themselves but also internally fragmented. This was less apparent in Antioch, where some sort of provincial system seems to have been imposed, partly because the demesne of the prince was relatively large and comprised all the greater towns. But in the Kingdom of Jerusalem the great lordships became palatinates, free of royal control in day-to-day affairs, in which lords could administer full justice in their seigneurial and public courts with hardly any reservation of cases to the crown. Lords could also conduct their own foreign policy, making peace or war with their neighbors of whatever faith without reference to the central government. The monarchs were powerless to intervene as long as fief-holder obligations were met.

Among the obligations of fief-holders was, of course, military service, which was seen as vital for the continued existence of the crusader states. In Europe it became common for this to be commuted for money payments, but there is no evidence that the rulers of Jerusalem ever allowed such commutation. These rulers also had the right to demand of female fief-holders aged between twelve and sixty the "service" of marriage, so that armsbearing men could perform military service for their wives' fiefs. Clearly military service was a precious commodity and its performance could not be neglected. On the other hand, the lords, including the monarch, appear to have had no control over inheritance of fiefs, even though the customs concerning inheritance were extremely complex. Nor did rulers in the Kingdom of Jerusalem have the right to wardship of minors. It seems that, above all, everything should be done to encourage potential fief-holders from taking their tenancies and the military obligations that went with them. When we compare customs related to fiefs in the crusader states to those in Western Europe at the same time, we can perceive a society concerned about the numbers of noble and militarily capable settlers and the uninterrupted occupation of fiefs and performance of military service.

In relationship with the other crusader states, the rulers of Jerusalem presided over a confederation of lordships, in which the ties binding lords to them were not uniform nor the hierarchy absolute. In the far north, Antioch was legally independent, being a vassal-state not of Jerusalem but of Constantinople. That is not to say that the rulers of Jerusalem were powerless there. In fact, as long as the princes of Antioch were in conflict with their legitimate overlords, the Byzantine emperors, they would be forced to treat Jerusalem's claims to paramountcy seriously. All monarchs of Jerusalem in the first half of the twelfth century committed military resources in support of Antioch at various times. Crucially, however, these interventions were those of a paramount leader, the head of a confederation, not those of an overlord.

In contrast, Edessa and Tripoli were vassal-states of Jerusalem, although both had been founded independently of the crown of Jerusalem. In the case of Edessa, the first two counts wound up becoming kings of Jerusalem and thereby ensured the homage of their successors. In the case of Tripoli, homage would only be given when Baldwin I of Jerusalem arbitrated in a succession dispute in 1109. Lordship gave the monarchs of Jerusalem rights and obligations in both counties, but the way Edessa and Tripoli had been established allowed their rulers a large measure of independence. They were not generally regarded as constituent parts of the kingdom, at least in the twelfth century, and it seems that in them the ruler of Jerusalem was treated as the personal overlord of the counts rather than as sovereign.

In such a fragmented and yet interdependent society, one reliant on military obligation, ruling individuals' personal vigor and political skills mattered substantially. This was particularly true of the kings and queens of Jerusalem for two reasons. First, their power as individuals to change the course of events in this frontier region was great, and yet, second, their constitutional authority and independence remained limited in comparison with Latin states in Europe. Their ability to win loyal support and prove themselves worthy individual rulers mattered because the powers of their crown were relatively limited.

When Godfrey died on July 18, 1100, Baldwin, his brother and Count of Edessa, and Bohemond of Antioch were the two obvious candidates for the succession. Both had played positive parts in the crusade and had already consolidated their hold over substantial territories. Of the other possible contenders Raymond IV of Toulouse was away in Constantinople and Godfrey's elder brother Eustace had returned to Europe.

Others divided their support between Bohemond and Baldwin, meaning succession was not straightforward. Tancred supported his uncle Bohemond, as did Archbishop Daibert of Pisa. Daibert was appointed papal legate by Pope Urban II, reached the eastern Mediterranean with a Pisan fleet in August 1099, and was now the Latin patriarch of Jerusalem. From the point of view of the church reformers like Daibert, Bohemond was preferable to Baldwin because Baldwin's family had long been unenthusiastic about church reform. Yet Baldwin was not without supporters; members of Godfrey's household who held positions of trust in the region backed his claim.

The succession thus took place among and was shaped by factional maneuvering and military efforts. Baldwin of Edessa preserved the principality of Antioch from attack by coming swiftly from Edessa and reinforcing the Armenian garrison of Malatya. He then arranged for his cousin Baldwin of Bourcq to be invested with the county of Edessa before journeying to Jerusalem on October 2. He entered Jerusalem on November 9, assumed the title of king on the thirteenth, and was crowned in the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem on Christmas Day.

Baldwin I of Jerusalem was a conqueror whose attitude was dominated by self-interest. He greatly extended the territory he inherited from his brother Godfrey, and his prestige was such that he was recognized throughout the crusader states as paramount ruler. But in spite of three marriages, he had no children. His death on April 2, 1118, thus threw the kingdom into a second succession crisis. This crisis provided the Montlhéry family, which produced so many of the early crusaders and settlers, and which as we shall see influenced royal politics in the crusader states for decades, with the opportunity to stage a coup d'état. Their preferred candidate and a member of their clan, Baldwin of Bourcq, Count of Edessa, was anointed king while the late king's elder brother, Eustace of Boulogne, was still on his way to Jerusalem from Europe.

The new Baldwin II of Jerusalem rapidly rewarded those who had placed him on the throne with gifts of land and position. Later in his reign he strengthened his position further by marrying one daughter to the new prince of Antioch and probably betrothing another to the son of the count of Tripoli. He seems to have been genuinely pious and happily married, and was an active and responsible leader of men. But he does not seem to have been very popular with either Latin nobles or clergy; his reign was never secure. While he was held prisoner by the Seljuks a party in the kingdom even offered the crown to Count Charles of Flanders. He probably had to face a revolt from the lord of Transjordan and toward the end of his reign he was in conflict with the patriarch of Jerusalem. Perhaps to deflect criticism, but likely also to ensure and consolidate his own power and rule, Baldwin II adopted a highly aggressive policy toward his largely Muslim neighbors.

Despite these internal challenges, Baldwin II did what he could to assure a peaceful succession, and after long negotiations, his eldest daughter, Melisende, was betrothed to Count Fulk V of Anjou. Such negotiations were necessary because of the questionable legitimacy of both Baldwin's position and Melisende's status as an heiress to the throne, an issue that would have been on everyone's mind because of the parallel case of Mathilda of England, another woman whose succession was raising doubts. It has been suggested that the English precedent, in which King Henry I declared Mathilda (d. 1167) to be his heir on January 1, 1127, was echoed in the recognition of Melisende as royal heir. In addition, the inheritance and rule of Queen Urraca of León-Castile (d. 1126) was another contemporary precedent. In any event, Fulk of Anjou was a desirable spouse for Melisende. He had already shown himself to be an enthusiastic supporter of the Latin settlements during and after his first crusade in 1120, and had proven himself in war against the heirs of Eustace of Boulogne, the "rightful heir" to Jerusalem who had been displaced by Baldwin II.

Again the Montlhéry family was deeply involved. The offer of Melisende's hand was carried to Frankish lands by the Montlhéry William of Bures-sur-Yvette, and the crusade of 1129 that served to escort Fulk to the eastern Mediterranean was encompassed, like the coup d'état in 1118, by Montlhéry activity. It appears as though the choice of Fulk was a Montlhéry device to shore up the government established in 1118, and when a son was born to Melisende and Fulk, almost Baldwin's last act was to further secure the family line by conferring royal power jointly on Fulk, Melisende, and their baby son, also named Baldwin.

Melisende and Fulk faithfully served Baldwin II until he died on April 21, 1131, but they had their own distinct vision for the Kingdom of Jerusalem. From the start of his reign Fulk was determined to change the direction in which the realm had been moving and to reverse the policies of the 1120s. He signaled this by choosing to be crowned not in Bethlehem, as his two predecessors had been, but in Jerusalem, under the rotunda of the Holy Sepulchre. He also brought in new men of his own to replace old household officials. This upset the Montlhérys and must have contributed to a revolt early in the reign.

Melisende herself had a strong and assertive personality as queen regnant, demonstrated first in her independence of her husband as well as Latin lords who contested her rule, and later her reluctance to surrender power to her son. The historian William of Tyre, as well as centuries of illustrators in Western Europe, recognized the exceptionalness of Melisende's role and abilities. Most likely bilingual and the first royal woman in Latin Jerusalem to have a personal seal, she was close to her Monthléry cousins and obviously attached to her sisters, particularly the youngest, Yveta, for whom she built the church of St Anne in Jerusalem and the abbey of St Lazarus of Bethany. Fulk died in 1143, but Melisende ruled and remained dominant even after her son Baldwin III came of age in 1145. She governed with the assistance of another Monthléry cousin, Manasses of Hierges. Melisende effectively excluded the young king Baldwin III from rule until he asserted himself in the spring of 1152. She had support from the Latin church and nobility in this exclusion of her son, suggesting that, as some contemporary accounts state, her rule was seen as meritorious.

But despite the many initiatives of the rulers of Latin Jerusalem, the mechanisms of rule ensured that they were extraordinarily dependent on their greater vassals inside the Kingdom of Jerusalem and in the other crusader states. Since monarchs of Jerusalem had no public courts and therefore no apparatus of public justice outside the royal domain, they could only reach the bulk of subjects through their nobles' mediation. At the same time, monarchs had clear legal obligations toward their noble vassals, in particular the duty to maintain them in their fiefs unless it could be proved in the royal court that they had failed in their duties to him.

This royal court, the High Court, was made up of the monarch's vassals and combined the functions of a court for the whole kingdom and a seigneurial court of the royal domain. On occasions of national importance it was even the nucleus of a much larger gathering, a *parlement* attended by the representatives of other interests in the kingdom. The obligations of the crown meant that power legitimately rested with this body and a result was that constitutional development and the independence of the crown were restrained compared with Europe. For example, there never developed, as there did in European states, a regular system of taxation by consent. Instead, Latin Jerusalem's central government remained most largely influenced by the nobility, as well as by the Byzantine and Islamic administrations that had preceded it.

The power of Latin nobles in Latin Jerusalem was further reinforced by financial and family stability. After an early period marked by instability and waves of migration, in which fiefs rapidly changed hands, the greater lordships settled into the possession of families that were to hold them for several generations. After *c.* 1130 noble succession became regular, genealogies became continuous and clear, and there began a process of consolidation through marriage and inheritance into the hands of a few noble families. Stability was further supported by the composite nature—that is, both territorial and money—of many fiefs. By the third quarter of the twelfth century no more than ten families held the twenty-four most important lordships.

Stability among the Latin nobility manifested itself in a consciousness of class and in the gradual whittling away of the prerogatives of the monarchs of Jerusalem. In the early decades of the twelfth century, monarchs alone had been able to mint coins, levy shipwreck, and exploit international trading ports and the roads from them into the interior. They had probably control of the highways. Already by the time of Baldwin II, however, only the rights of minting and the control of ports and their communications were mentioned as royal prerogatives, and within a few decades even these were challenged. The lords of Haifa and Caesarea were developing their ports, and it is possible that the lords of Transjordan and Sidon had begun to mint their own coins in the third quarter of the twelfth century.

Nonetheless, it would be wrong to think of the twelfth-century monarchs as utterly powerless. They *were* monarchs, first of all, and kingship and queenship implied more than just overlordship. Whatever the realities they suggested a ministry for God, symbolically conveyed through the use of vestments and regalia, and a public authority relating to all subjects, whether vassals or not. Monarchs could legislate. Their court had reserved for itself the right to judge minors who were accused of theft and rear-

vassals who were accused of stealing from another lord. They could summon a mass levy of armsbearers from all subjects in a moment of crisis. They had a large say in the appointment of bishops. They were, moreover, the possessors of the holiest city in Christendom, even if it had nothing in economic and little in strategic terms to commend it, and they sat on the throne of David. This gave them immense prestige. And they were autonomous. Papal approval was sought and given for Baldwin I's assumption of the crown in 1100, but in no sense was Jerusalem a vassal-state of the papacy.

The monarchs were also richer than their vassals. The royal domain was vast in comparison to the fiefs of Jerusalem. It consisted of Jerusalem, Acre, and Tyre, with the lands around them, and at times it also encompassed Ascalon and Jaffa, Samaria, Beirut, Hebron, and Tall al-Safi, although these were sometimes apanages, sometimes independent fiefs, and Dayr al-Balah. The cities of Acre and Tyre gave the kings wealth through the taxes that could be levied on trade and therefore the power of patronage. Being richer than their vassals, they could always buy mercenaries to supplement their armies, and this gave them a certain independence of their subjects, since they were not completely reliant on their military services, however important these might be. They could also make great use of money fiefs and could therefore have a large number of direct vassals.

Governance and Trade

The crusaders took over a region accustomed to established and sophisticated governments under Roman, Byzantine, and Islamic rulers. It is thus not surprising that elements of all previous administrations remained in place, if occasionally altered to suit Latin Christians' expectations. The survival of the Byzantine imperial system is shown by the appearance under the Latins of dukes, praetors, and judges, the administrators of the late-eleventh-century Byzantine *themes* or provinces. Elsewhere, the changes over four and a half centuries of Islamic rule had been less drastic than one might suppose. Roman provinces had become, with some changes, Muslim *junds*. In summary, administrative boundaries were relatively stable over long periods of time.

In some cases, official roles were also stable over time and between regimes. Mediating between new Latin lords and villagers were two officials whose roles—in one case certainly, in the other probably—predated the conquest. This, too, suggests that institutions of Muslim local government had survived. One of these officials was called a scribe (*scriba*), an accurate translation of the Arabic *katib*, an official in Muslim treasury departments. He was responsible for the collection of revenues and the overseeing of property boundaries. A high proportion of those whose names are known to us—fourteen, perhaps sixteen, out of twenty-five—were indigenous. The second official was called a *dragoman*, or *interpres*, which confirms that his name was a corruption of the Arabic *tarjuman* (interpreter). The role may have descended from the Muslim *mutarjim*, an assistant of the judge in his dealings with the many peoples under Islamic rule, and it looks as though its responsibilities were judicial.

In the larger towns and cities, too, old taxes and returns continued to be levied, and the persistence of typical Byzantine and Muslim practices underlines again stability in systems of governance. Scribes were again very much in evidence, operating particularly at the points of entry or departure—the gates, and the harbor in the case of a port—and the markets, where goods were registered for taxation or taxation was levied. Goods being exported were charged an exit duty. Imported goods seem to have been initially registered, since the entry duty was combined with the sales tax and levied later in the markets. The harbor office, known in Acre as the *Chaine*, from the chain that could be raised to close the harbor entrance, also ran the port and imposed an anchorage tax and a capitation levy on the crew and passengers in a ship, which in a pilgrim port must have been profitable. Some markets, such as those in which products such as meat, fish, and leather were sold for domestic use, were independently run, but in large towns the chief markets involved in international trade were administered collectively by an office called the *Fonde.* Goods were weighed by official measurers, and duties were taken after sale. Most of these taxes were based on the estimated value of goods—only wine, oil, and grain seem to have been charged according to quantity—and in Acre the percentages varied from just over 4 percent to 25 percent.

Box 4.2 Slavery in the Medieval Mediterranean

Slavery was ubiquitous in the medieval Mediterranean. People of all religions were enslaved through various means, whether as a legal penalty or political decision, as prisoners of war or captives of raiding intended to acquire slaves, through voluntary indenture or because of accidental circumstances such as shipwreck. Likewise, Christians, Jews, and Muslims around the Mediterranean claimed to own, trade, ransom, and gift enslaved people and depended upon their work, whether that work involved manual labor, agricultural labor, domestic service, sexual service, skilled trades, or the waging of war. The legal meaning of slavery in the medieval Mediterranean, how one could expect to be treated, and what paths out of slavery were available varied enormously based on circumstances. While it was possible for some enslaved individuals to enjoy comfortable conditions and even considerable power, such individuals were outliers. They confirm the variety and range of slavery in the medieval Mediterranean, not the "superior" or "kinder" nature of this slavery in comparison with later transatlantic chattel slavery.

As one might expect from the ubiquity of slavery in the medieval Mediterranean, the relationship between religious identity and enslavement was not simple. None of the monotheistic traditions developed an anti-slavery position and the guidelines each developed to govern slavery served to "stabilize rather than weaken the institution."[4] While Christians, like Jews and Muslims, were not supposed to enslave co-religionists, work-arounds were developed. For example, the Byzantine Empire profited from enslavement, and Latin Christians

also enslaved Byzantine Christians. One result of these work-arounds is that from *c.* 1200 onward, ethnic labels found in documents related to the trade in enslaved people could serve to de facto justify those peoples' enslavement.[5] Furthermore, conversion to Christianity was not necessarily a route out of enslavement in Christianity, in part because the sincerity of conversion was subjective but also because the nature of the relationships between conversion and enslavement, and between procreation and enslavement, was repeatedly questioned. Slavery was a component of both Byzantine and Latin society, and the Church of Rome and religious organizations (such as monastic orders and later military orders) owned enslaved people.

Enslaved people were another and major economic commodity in the medieval Mediterranean, and in the crusader states, use and reliance on the labor of enslaved people was thus another continuity with life before the Latin conquests. However, Latins now took predominantly Muslim captives through deliberate slave-raiding or as a result of warfare, as Brian Catlos has summarized.[6] Captives could, of course, be sold on for immediate profit, often westward through the merchant networks of the Italic city-states—Acre had a slave market—but that was not the only value in enslavement. High-ranking prisoners, such as two Islamic jurists in 1177, could be ransomed for large sums or prisoner exchange. In addition, enslaved people of all genders could perform a range of work that was badly needed given the relative low numbers of Latin settlers from Europe. For example, after 1240 skilled Muslim craftsmen rebuilt the castle at Safed for the Templars.

Figure 4.1 Captives of war before Byzantine emperor Romanos III Argyros, late eleventh century. © Alamy Stock Photos.
In this manuscript illumination, prisoners of war are being presented to the Byzantine emperor. Constantinople contained a market for the "sale" of enslaved people, who were most often employed for household or industrial work within its urban environment.

The old systems were not left entirely unaltered, however. Latin Christians found it hard to come to terms with the fact that justice and finance were separately administered in the Byzantine and Islamic systems. These were usually conjoined in Latin Europe, and as a result it is not surprising to find the Latin settlers giving at least two of the revenue offices, the *Chaine* and the *Fonde*, additional judicial functions.

In the countryside, the status of indigenous villagers in the new crusader states remained largely unchanged. They were tied to the land and in ordinary circumstances could not leave or alienate their shares in the arable fields. Christopher MacEvitt has persuasively argued that this was the only way in which the status of indigenous peasants in the early-twelfth-century crusader states resembled that of peasants in Western Europe.[7] Each village seems to have been run by a council of elders presided over by a respected leader, a *ra'is*, a common Arabic title for one who had authority over a community and acted as intermediary between government and governed. This office carried with it more land and a larger house than the other villagers had and the *ra'is* presided over the agricultural decisions made by the community as a whole, levied the returns owed to the lord, and was almost certainly the community judge.

The structure and operation of indigenous villages also remained largely unchanged and consisted generally of an inhabited nucleus, a cluster of houses, with a cistern, perhaps a mill, an oven and threshing-floors, around which were vineyards, gardens, and olive-groves held in personal possession by the villagers. Beyond were arable lands, which were communally farmed and often stretched so far that abandoned settlements some distance away were occupied for a few weeks each year to work the fields around them. In certain districts, at least, a two-year crop rotation was practiced. The harvest was threshed on the village threshing-floors before it was divided into piles of grain, of which each family had a share, expressed in terms of a fraction of the village lands. Before the division took place the lord's share was subtracted, to be subdivided if the village had several lords. This was the ancient tax of *kharaj*, which usually amounted to one-third or one-quarter of the arable crop and one-half or one-quarter of the produce of vineyards, olive-groves, and orchards. To it was added: a poll tax on Muslims and Jews; a "personal gift," again very ancient, called *mu'na*; a charge on those who owned goats, sheep, and bees; and various minor impositions. These dues could be combined and commuted for a cash payment, but it was more usual for them to be paid in kind, which is why one can still occasionally see in the countryside the ruins of barns in which the returns from several villages could be stored.

There were also settlements of Latin Christians from Europe, which were strikingly different in appearance and similar to western European "newtowns" (*villeneuves*), including planned development along a street, with a tower, courthouse, and Latin church. At Qubeiba there are still the foundations of substantial stone houses of two stories, each with a cistern and plumbing. Our understanding of the scale of this Latin colonization has been transformed. Whereas we used to think of about 20 examples of colonial settlements, Ronnie Ellenblum has identified 200, ranging from villages to independent farmsteads, surrounded by irrigation systems and other signs of landscape management. Most of these were to be found in districts where there was an indigenous

Christian majority, suggesting that Latin settlers wanted to live where their co-religionists were predominant.

Latin settlers came from across Western Europe. At Bet Guvrin in the mid-twelfth century, for example, one can identify people from Frankish lands, German states, the Italic Peninsula, and Iberia, attracted by generous terms. Colonists received reasonably large individual parcels of land to cultivate, which they were free to alienate if they wished. The returns they paid were not burdensome—10 percent together with certain other dues at one settlement—and were treated as rent. Like indigenous villages, their communities had their own system of justice. As in many places in Latin Europe, it was presided over by an official called a *dispensator* or *locator*, who combined the responsibilities of president of the court and agent of the lord in the advertising and disposal of shares in the settlement. Nonetheless, numbers of Latin settlers remained small, as discussed further herein, and settlement was not continually ongoing. All the new towns which have been identified were established in the twelfth century and the movement must have run out of steam in the thirteenth.

Whether indigenous or colonial, one feature of the village economy in the crusader states was significantly different from that in Western Europe: most lords lived at a distance from their rural holdings. There was very little demesne land, the home farm which in Western Europe involved a lord in the agriculture of his village and on which peasants performed labor services for him. In the crusader states, demesne land was generally only to be found in the gardens and sugarcane plantations that lined the coast; and very few villages were coastal. As a result, most villagers owed little in the way of labor services—usually not more than one day a week—and in many districts labor seems to have consisted primarily of transporting the lord's share of the harvest to collection centers, together with some work on roads and aqueducts. Consequently there was very little reason for a lord, whose chief concern was to get his due share of the crop, to involve himself directly in the agriculture of his villages. Thus, although a few buildings have been identified as "manor houses," landlords did not generally live in the countryside but tended to congregate in the towns and cities.

Town life was readily available and highly valued because the region had long contained flourishing urban societies. Outside the crusader states were the great cities of Damascus and Aleppo, which were necessary outlets for coastal ports under Latin control. The crusader states' own products, especially sugar from the later twelfth century on, were in demand throughout the Mediterranean region and beyond, and they straddled a major trade route to East Asia. Spectacular excavations have revealed the sophisticated town-planning in Acre, the greatest of the city-ports, where fine buildings and elaborate sewage and water systems have been uncovered. It was to towns like this that most Latin settlers came: of *c.* 150,000 Latins resident in the crusader states, *c.* 120,000 lived in the towns, most being burgess freemen. These burgesses, members of a class that included those in colonial villages as well as those in the towns, paid rent for their properties, called *borgesies*, which they had the right to buy and sell. Legal cases relating to them were subject to their own courts, the *Cours des Bourgeois*. They were not fief-holders and were therefore not tied by feudal obligations. However, they were subject to public law,

the *Assises des Bourgeois*, which varied a good deal from place to place, because each town had its own customs.

Virtually every major port city now under Latin rule also came to possess self-contained communities of merchants and their families from the city-states of Pisa, Venice, and Genoa. Already familiar with the region, these cities had been given special privileges by new Latin leaders, including particular port and market access, the building of their own churches, and jurisdiction over their own people. It is now largely recognized that while Venetians, Pisans, and Genoans certainly did have commercial considerations in mind and were not averse to trade and alliance with non-Christians, they regularly combined those considerations with a commitment to Christian holy war. Motivations that seem disparate to modern minds were not necessarily viewed as conflicting, and people then were no less complex and multifaceted than people now. Nonetheless, the same merchant communities also traded with Muslim and Jewish merchants and markets, and had similar small, self-contained communities in Muslim-ruled port cities elsewhere in the Mediterranean, particularly North Africa, as well as in Constantinople.

In spite of early attempts to drive Muslims and Jews away, there were also substantial indigenous communities of various faiths in many towns, not only of workers but also of shopkeepers, merchants, and artisans. For example, in the twelfth century, the dyeworks at six towns were in Jewish hands. Jews played a part in the great glass industry at Tyre and engaged in trade as moneylenders and shipmasters. The regions conquered by the Latins continued to serve as nodes of production within the Mediterranean, as well as a nexus for trade. We also have records of Muslim sea captains, and in the thirteenth century there was an important trading community of indigenous Christians in Tyre. And, even in the matter of elite military status, we have evidence for indigenous knights in the first half of the twelfth century.

While clearly indigenous inhabitants of various faiths remained present and in some cases achieved significant prosperity and status, it is difficult to assess Latin treatment of their indigenous subjects in the early twelfth century. This is primarily due to the nature of surviving source evidence. The evidence for the legal status and treatment of non-Latin Christians is from the thirteenth century. As Christopher MacEvitt has noted, these sources reflect a thirteenth-century cultural and social reality markedly different from that of the twelfth century and, in particular, showcase the concerns of many in the thirteenth century to delineate differences between sects and communities.[8]

It does seem clear that there were limits to Latin toleration of other religions and other Christian sects. Only Latin Christians had full rights in law, because only their witness was considered fully valid. Furthermore, while Christians of all sects originally had the intrinsic right to freedom, non-Christians did not. This hindered conversions, because lords, even when they were clerics, were reluctant to allow their enslaved people to be baptized and therefore freed. (Much later Pope Gregory IX would rule that baptism would not automatically free the enslaved, a measure that was also applied in the Iberian Peninsula and along the Baltic shores.)

Non-Christians seem to have suffered further social and legal restrictions in the twelfth century. While these may have stemmed from a modification of the Islamic *dhimmi*

laws, which the crusaders had found in place on their arrival, MacEvitt has noted several clear differences between early-twelfth-century society in the crusader states and the *dhimmi* system. He has proposed instead that after an initial period of high intolerance, characterized by expulsions and violent persecution, we see in the early-twelfth-century crusader states a unique form of social relations characterized by "rough tolerance." This "rough tolerance" was made possible by avoiding the formal categorization and ranking of different groups. Instead, people avoided speaking of or recognizing differences, and thereby allowed for "the easy flow of persons and practices across social and religious boundaries."[9] Relationships were centered on local dynamics; while there might well be violence toward a particular group in a particular place, that violence was not interpreted as "an attack on an entire community" or as a sign that systemic violence was imminent.

Notwithstanding MacEvitt's general point, some rulers in the early crusader states seem to have reversed and adapted some aspects of *dhimmi* laws to govern non-Latin Christians. For example, in the Kingdom of Jerusalem we find that *kharaj* was levied on lands, although given the fact that the Latins maintained their predecessors' system of revenue-collection this may not mean much. Jews and Muslims, but not Christians, paid a poll tax. Jews and Muslims were supposed to be differentiated in dress and could not witness in cases involving Latins, except to prove a Latin's age or descent, or to provide evidence on estate boundaries. At the same time, Jews and Muslims could practice their religion, as discussed more herein. Rabbinical tribunals and Jewish academies flourished in Acre and Tyre, and although no record survives of a *qadi* (a Muslim judge) in post in the kingdom, there was one at Jeble in the principality of Antioch in the 1180s. Benjamin Kedar has pointed out that the absence of any reference to Muslim *qadis* in the crusader states should not surprise us, since we would have known nothing about the rabbinical tribunals had they not been so prestigious that their *responsa* (written decisions) were circulated and preserved.

Religion in the Crusader States

As already noted, the crusaders and Latin Christian settlers who followed on their heels had entered a region in which many religions and sects had long coexisted and to which pilgrims from various regions of Afro-Eurasia had long traveled. At first Latin crusaders and settlers were determined to expel all non-Christians, whether Muslims or Jews, from centers of religious or military significance. The policy was already in operation in the winter of 1097–8. At Tilbeşar, Ravanda, and Artah crusaders slaughtered or drove out Muslims while allowing indigenous Christians to remain. The crusaders adopted the same approach in the following June when they took Antioch, although it was said that in the darkness before dawn they found it hard to distinguish between the Christian and Muslim inhabitants of the city, and again in July 1099 when they took Jerusalem. The Muslims and Jews who survived were expelled and not permitted to live in Jerusalem, although they could visit it as pilgrims; in fact a few were in residence in the city later in the twelfth century. The indigenous Christians of Jerusalem were allowed to stay, but

the relatively small number of inhabitants led to extraordinary measures to increase the size of the population, including the relocation of indigenous Christian villagers from Transjordan. Latin settlers were presumably expected to take the place of the Muslims and Jews who had been expelled, and in many of the earliest examples, settlement was accompanied by the foundation of a Latin bishopric.

Despite these early trends, Latin Christians could not maintain ethnic cleansing indefinitely once it became clear that Latin settlement was never to be on a large enough scale to create a Latin Christian state solely inhabited by Christians. The taking of Sidon (Saïda) in 1110 marked a change of policy and the acceptance of the fact that non-Christians had to be allowed to live in the larger cities.

Along with their pastoral duties, newly appointed Latin bishops were also expected to exercise military command along the lines of some frontier sees in Latin Europe. At the same time the crusaders were careful, at least at first, not to displace the existing Byzantine bishops, whose legitimacy and authority they recognized. For example, the Byzantine patriarch of Antioch, John IV, who had been inside the city and suffered during the siege, was restored to his cathedral, once it had been reconsecrated. But a ruling at the council of Clermont, made with reference to the Iberian Peninsula, which had stated that liberated churches would "belong" to the principalities of those who conquered them, was used to justify the appointment of Latin bishops where no Byzantine see existed or where there were vacancies.

But relatively quickly Latin toleration of non-Latin bishops broke down. At Christmas 1099, Daibert, now patriarch of Jerusalem, consecrated Latin archbishops of Tarsus, Misis, and Edessa and a Latin bishop of Artah. These towns had substantial indigenous Christian populations and it is hard to believe that in all of them the bishoprics were vacant. The consecration was followed six months later by the forcing of the indigenous patriarch out of Antioch and his replacement by a Latin Christian.

The change in policy toward resident indigenous bishops should be viewed in the context of the Byzantine Empire's manifest desire to gain control of Antioch. Tarsus, Misis, Artah, and Edessa were all strategic locations in relation to Byzantium. The establishment of lines of Latin bishops was at least in part a response to military and political concerns. Again we are reminded that neat modern distinctions between "religion" and "politics" do not hold up in the medieval period.

The internal politics of Latin Christendom also affected the establishment of the Latin church in the new crusader states. The First Crusade had been launched by a pro-reform papacy, but the new Latin church overseas wound up subordinate to the monarchs of Jerusalem, who did not support the reform movement or reform popes. Indeed, the first rulers of Jerusalem had sided with Henry IV of Germany and his supporters in the Investiture Contest against Pope Gregory VII.

Faced with anti-reform monarchs in Jerusalem, in the early twelfth century some Latin church leaders in the kingdom attempted to secure greater power for the new Latin church in relation to these monarchs. Ultimately, however, these attempts failed and indeed were overwritten by the papacy itself. The problem was, of course, that neither Latin clergy in the kingdom nor the pope was willing to assent to anything that might damage the Latin

settlement. The need for strong government in the new states tended to take precedence over other considerations. One is left with the paradox of an old-fashioned, unreformed Latin church created by one of the greatest initiatives of the reformed papacy.

In the early years of the crusader states, clergy—often those with preexisting relationships with prominent crusaders—were the most enthusiastic settlers. Of the eighty-nine known crusaders who settled permanently, twenty-one were clerics, though only one was a bishop, and he withdrew from active life. The clerical settlers' enthusiasm was not necessarily matched by their moral probity. For example, Arnulf of Chocques, the first Latin patriarch of Jerusalem and tutor to Robert of Normandy's sister, was quite a well-known scholar and an admired preacher, but he was also reputed to be a womanizer. The first priest in charge of St. Mary of the Valley of Jehoshaphat had been an abbot in Europe and Godfrey of Bouillon's chaplain. He had memorably branded a cross on his forehead, claimed that he had been marked by an angel, and financed his crusade out of oblations made to his forehead cross by the faithful. It must have been clear to everyone but themselves that these early clerical settlers badly needed supplementing. However, the same trends in clerical settlement continued in the early twelfth century. Of the settlers in and around Jerusalem who can be identified before 1131, over 51 percent were clerics. It is clear from their toponyms that many of them had come directly from Frankish regions, and while some senior churchmen were sent by the papacy, others may well have been summoned by the leaders of the new states, who were often family.

Despite the abundant clerical enthusiasm, it became a prime objective to rebuild or renovate great Christian shrines only after the establishment of the Kingdom of Jerusalem and its Latin church. The crusaders originally assumed Christian holy places would be restored to the Byzantines. Some were in ruins and others needed reconstructing, or at least restoring. The building program began relatively slowly, but it and the correlating creation of sumptuous devotional furnishings and liturgical books reached a crescendo in the 1140s under the leadership and patronage of Queen Melisende.

Indeed Melisende, again similarly to Urraca of León-Castile, perhaps most successfully demonstrated and supported her reign as a royal patron of architecture and art. Among many projects, Melisende, together with Patriarch William of Malines, was responsible for the vigor and architectural taste displayed in the rebuilding and renovation of Christian holy places in Jerusalem. This work contributed to a culture of triumphal—and royally led—Christian holy war in the crusader states, and also served as a strategic political tool. But it was also governed by respect for the sanctity of shrines and the requirements of Latin Christian pilgrims, whose devotion enhanced that sanctity.

More Latin Christian pilgrims than ever were now coming to Jerusalem. They wanted to visit the claimed location of biblical events, since they believed that in those locations, their prayers would be more efficacious. They also wanted the assurance that their own prayers would be supplemented by those of clergy resident at the site concerned, as well as a sympathetic environment that would assist their devotions. This did not necessarily mean that the atmosphere should be reverentially quiet. The twelfth century was an intensely theatrical age, in which every technique was used to heighten public emotion, through dramatic display in liturgy, ritual, and situation. A shrine-church, reached at the

Figure 4.2 Ivory cover of the Melisende Psalter, twelfth century.
© The British Library Board.
Psalters—collections of psalms with other devotional materials—were popular and widespread in medieval Latin Christendom. Some were quite modest, while others were lavish and served to communicate the status as well as the piety of their owner. This extraordinary psalter was most likely commissioned for Queen Melisende of Jerusalem. It was completed prior to 1143 by a team of artists who incorporated Byzantine, Armenian, Islamic, and Latin artistic styles. The illuminated folios of the psalter are contained within two intricate ivory covers decorated with small turquoise beads. The front cover depicts scenes from the life of King David interspersed with female personifications of Christian virtues, while the back, shown here, also emphasizes the role of pious monarchs by representing a king or emperor in ceremonial garb engaged in charitable acts. The tiny inscriptions underscore that these are six of the "corporal works of mercy" described in the Gospel of Matthew (25:35-36): feeding the hungry; giving water to the thirsty; sheltering the homeless; clothing the naked; visiting the sick; and visiting the imprisoned.

end of a long and wearisome journey, was rather like a stage set on which the holiness of the events or people it commemorated could be dramatically reproduced, generating public displays of fervor.

The intention was representation, not imitation. The spiritual reality of holy places was more like that to be found in icons: to provide gateways to an unchanging truth that

lay beyond them. The new rulers in Jerusalem never intended, therefore, to reproduce accurately in tableau form the physical actuality of the scenes the locations represented. They wanted to give an impression of them, if possible, and enhance reality through the use of other elements. In some places their aims had already been adequately met by prior generations of Byzantine renovations, and the buildings were anyway so familiar that drastic alterations would have been counterproductive. In other places, Islamic architecture left nothing to be improved upon. Thus, for example, Latin settlers converted the Islamic shrine of the Dome of the Rock into a church, but left it and the Church of the Nativity at Bethlehem more or less untouched in architectural terms, although they decorated the interiors.

Most important of all, of course, was the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, which was dedicated, if not yet entirely completed, on July 15, 1149, the fiftieth anniversary of the conquest of Jerusalem. When the crusaders took the city there had not been one church but a compound containing several separate shrines around an open courtyard, including the Tomb, Calvary nearby and, somewhat apart, the ruins of Constantine's basilica, built over the spot where his mother Helena had reputedly discovered the wood of the True Cross in 320.

The Latin building program for the Holy Sepulchre, in which masons, sculptors, mosaicists, and painters from Europe and Asia were engaged, was strikingly original. Most significantly, the Latins decided to roof over the courtyard. The locations of Christ's death and resurrection were to be physically related to one another for the first time in a single enormous, sumptuously decorated building, which would have the familiar elements of a great European road-church, including an ambulatory (walkway), but would also contain a number of additional and associated holy sites. Each of these—the Chapel of Adam, the Chapel of St Helena and the Grotto of the Cross, Christ's Prison, and the Place of Anointing—would have been the center of a major cult in its own right in Latin Christendom.

The Holy Sepulchre Church is, in fact, the best illustration of the settlers' devotional policies. The decision to roof over the courtyard and construct one building unifying all the disparate elements described in the Christian Gospels meant that an enclosed stage set had been created in which visitors could wander at will. The advantages were obvious. The pilgrims would no longer be distracted by having to cross an open court when going from one shrine to another. In an enclosed space, recollection (focusing of the mind) could be more easily maintained, while everything that would contribute to a favorable ambience—the smell of incense, the sound of bells and chant—could be controlled. Wherever pilgrims went, inscriptions, sculptures, mosaics, and frescos would remind them of the event that had taken place at the particular spot they were venerating. For most pilgrims the representations in mosaic and paint would have meant more than the inscriptions, and the scenes depicted seem to have been quite straightforward and easy to understand. Again, the Latins do not seem to have done away with those already in place which they admired or found helpful; they preferred to supplement rather than replace, and they even transferred a great Byzantine Anastasis (i.e., image of the resurrection of Christ) from the rotunda to the new eastern apse over the high altar.

Overall, the impression one has of Latin Christian Jerusalem in the twelfth century is of a major cult-center that was intelligently managed primarily for the benefit of Christian pilgrims. While most would presumably have been Latin Christians, these were not necessarily the only Christians who would have conducted pilgrimages to Jerusalem. Adam Simmons has made a strong case for recognizing that as early as the twelfth century, Ethiopian Christians, if not Nubian Christians, may have been using Aqaba as a port for pilgrimage. Certainly from 1172 onward Nubian and then Ethiopian Christians were recorded as pilgrims in Jerusalem.[10]

In any event, it seems clear that the priority was accommodation of pilgrims, not residents. After all, the Latin church in the new states was relatively small. In the aftermath of the First Crusade there cannot have been more than between 2,000 and 4,000 Latin Christians in the whole of the new crusader states and although the numbers increased substantially, so that there may have been eventually more than 150,000, the community of Latin Christians was always relatively small. There were some converts to the Church of Rome from among the indigenous peoples; the mere fact of indigenous names appearing in the witness lists to charters testifies to this, since in law only the testimony of Latin Christians carried full weight in court. But it is impossible to estimate the size of the convert community because there was a natural tendency for convert families to adopt the names of Latin saints and so merge into the crowd. For example, the Arrabi family first made its appearance in 1122, when Muisse Arrabi was a knight of Jaffa. Muisse had a son called George, whose four children were named Henry, Peter, John, and Maria: had they not chosen to use their distinctive cognomen their family history would have been lost to us.

Latin Christian bishops claimed formal authority over members of other Christian denominations, although a theoretical distinction was made between the Melkites and the other Christian sects, who were technically considered heretical. Of the other Christian sects, the most numerous were the Jacobites and the Armenians. In the north, where most of them lived and where the Jacobite patriarch and the Armenian Christians resided, they were left alone by most of the Latin bishops, although the vicar appointed to supervise the Melkites in at least one diocese also oversaw them. In the south they were regarded as being under the authority of the Latin patriarch and their archbishops of Jerusalem were treated as his suffragans (subordinates), although this seems to have been no more than a legal technicality. Both communities had cathedrals in Jerusalem and chapels in the vicinity of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.

Just as Latin rulers had to come to terms with governing a population with many non-Christians, so the Latin church found it practical, and virtually necessary, to tolerate open practice of non-Christian faiths. Non-Christians, who were technically forbidden to live in the city of Jerusalem, certainly visited it as pilgrims. Jews visited the Western Wall of the Temple and the tombs of the Old Testament kings on Mount Sion, although the latter had been sealed. Muslims visited the Dome of the Rock, now an Augustinian church, and the Aqsa mosque, now the headquarters of the Templars. Outside Jerusalem, too, non-Christian religious practices continued. A new synagogue was constructed by the Samaritans at Nablus in the 1130s, and mosques at Tyre were mentioned by the traveler Ibn Jubayr in the early 1180s.

Outside major cities and cult-centers, too, the open practice of non-Christian faiths continued. For example, in the village of Jamma Jamma'il near Nablus, Hanbali Sunni Muslim peasants had gathered for Friday prayers with the *khutba*, invoking the name of the 'Abbasid caliph, before some of them migrated in 1156. They left because of extortionate taxation and because their Friday prayers were under threat: their Latin lord was apparently telling them they should be working instead. This case demonstrates not only discrimination but also that until that discrimination, Muslim religious practices had continued in the village. Indeed, Muslim visitors were struck by the way local shrines continued to flourish. Writing about the Nablus region 'Imad al-Din commented that the Franks "changed not a single law or cult practice of the [Muslim inhabitants]." Using similar phrasing, the geographer Yaqut al-Hamawi wrote regarding a mosque in Bethlehem that "the Franks changed nothing when they took the country." Likewise, the traveler Ibn Jubayr, describing a shrine at 'Ayn al-Baqar (the Ox spring) in Acre, noted that "in the hands of the Christians its venerable nature is maintained and God has preserved it as a place of prayer for the Muslims."

Furthermore, shared holy places continued to be a feature of religious life in the crusader states. Near the city of Tiberias a church was shared with indigenous Christians, and the purported healing qualities of Rav Kahana's tomb attracted both Christian and Jewish pilgrims. In the city of Jerusalem, the Templars allowed Muslims to pray in one of their churches close to the Aqsa mosque, and in Acre the Cathedral of the Holy Cross, which was built on the site of a mosque, had inside it an area set aside for Muslim prayer. Just within the walls of the city at 'Ayn al-Baqar there was a mosque-church, incorporating the *mashhad* (oratory) of 'Ali with a Frankish eastern apse. This was used by Muslims—presumably Shi'ites—Jews, and Christians, who believed that it was the spot where God had created cattle for Adam's use. Other shrines that continued to be venerated by both Muslims and Jews included the tombs of Jonah at Kar Kannah and of Hanona b. Horkenos in Safad. The news of the discovery of the supposed tombs of the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob at Hebron in 1119 was a sensation, and on payment of a bribe to the custodian Jews and Muslims could gain entry to them after the Christian pilgrims had left. The same sort of arrangement was to be found at Sivas, where the Latin Christian clergy benefited from gifts made by Muslims wanting to pray in the crypt of St. John the Baptist.

Thus, despite the religious violence that had accompanied the crusade and the foundation of the crusader states, and the bald privileges accorded Latin Christians, shared places of worship were a feature of popular religion in the crusader states and were tolerated by the Latin clergy. Although this kind of toleration was not particularly exceptional in the twelfth-century Mediterranean, it would become a more significant outlier thereafter, as both the papacy and the Byzantine Empire pushed harder than ever for Christian uniformity under each respective supreme leadership.

In terms of cultural and intellectual innovation, the church in the new crusader states and those trained within it remained secondary to Latin Europe. Admittedly, by 1103 the Church of the Holy Sepulchre had established a master of schools and that there was another in Antioch by the late twelfth century. By the 1120s Nazareth was a

cultural center of some importance, providing livings to two figures of minor literary significance: Rorgo Fretellus and Gerard of Nazareth. Its library, the catalogue of which survives, bears comparison with those of European schools. And the crusader states are now considered to have provided a better channel for the transmission of Arabic learning than used to be thought. Europeans traveled to the principality of Antioch to collect and translate Arabic texts and at least one individual in thirteenth-century Acre annotated an Arabic medical treatise.

Nevertheless, Latin settlers looked to Europe for their scholarship and culture. Bright young men such as William of Tyre went to Europe for their education, and to judge from the literature that attracted them, the interests of the lay nobility in the crusader states were practically indistinguishable from those of their contemporaries in Western Europe. For example, the *Chanson des Chetifs* (*Song of the Captives*), a fantastical story of crusaders captured by Muslims commissioned by Prince Raymond of Antioch and composed by a priest who was rewarded with a canonry there, belongs to a European literary genre.

The crusader states did provide Latin Christendom with two important new forms of the religious life, the Hospitaller and the military, which then fused. The uninterrupted history of hospitals as we know them in Europe only began in the eleventh century and the greatest of the early ones was that managed by the Order of Hospitallers of St John in Jerusalem, which was established on top of a preexisting monastic hospital soon after the First Crusade. Benefiting from the general enthusiasm for pilgrimages to the Holy Land, the Hospitallers were endowed with property throughout Latin Christendom and in 1113 were recognized by the papacy as belonging to an independent institute.

The Hospitaller vocation, drawing on the aspirations of the eleventh-century reformers, was to minister to the "holy poor" when they were sick and to bury them when they died. There was nothing new in behavior inspired by the injunction to treat each person with the reverence due to Christ himself, but the Hospitallers went further in their use of contemporary language to put into words the self-abasement they expected of themselves. Each of them promised to be a "serf and slave" of their "lords" the sick; in a sense, the Hospitallers imagined themselves being ruled by their patients. Even after the order had developed a military wing, Hospitaller knights had to surrender their warhorses after battle to provide transportation for the injured.

The hospital took in the poor, whatever their illness (except leprosy), ethnicity, religion, or sex. The admission of Muslim and Jewish pilgrims may help to explain why the sick were to be given sugar, presumably to mix with water, if they did not want wine, and chicken if they could not stomach pork, and why there are references to a second kitchen in which the chicken was cooked. It looks as though the brothers, who in other ways ran the hospital on Latin religious lines, were respecting the dietary requirements of their non-Christian patients. We also know that by the standards of the time, life in the hospital was positively luxurious, including individual beds and a lavish diet, alongside medical care. The total number of those directly serving the sick must have been well over 600, in a ratio of one to every two patients.

The hospital could accommodate 1,000 patients but in a crisis could be enlarged to take in as many as 2,000. It was at the center of a widespread charitable enterprise, because the Order also ran a subsidiary German hospital in Jerusalem, an infirmary in the Judaean hills and a mobile hospital, staffed by surgeons, that accompanied the Christian armies. It had a primitive ambulance service and a major almonry (a building where donations to the poor were distributed) that served the poor of Jerusalem, particularly nursing mothers and their children. It ran a large orphanage that took in abandoned children, who were known as the children of St John. Unsurprisingly, Latin doctors in Jerusalem were influenced by contemporary Byzantine and Islamic medical expertise.

The costs of the order must have been enormous, and thus it is all the more remarkable that within decades of their foundation the Hospitallers had taken on another function as well and were on the way to transforming their institute into a military order. The Knights Templar were the first to adopt that form of Christian religious life, in which brothers (and occasionally sisters) took holy vows and were subject to the usual obligations of canon law, except that some of them had the right and duty to bear arms. The Knights Templar had their origins in 1119–20, when a knight from Champagne called Hugh of Payns formed eight companions into a regular community committed to defending pilgrim roads to Jerusalem, which were still unsafe. The Templars gained the support of Baldwin II of Jerusalem, who lent them part of the royal palace in the Temple enclosure—hence their name—and of Bernard, the influential Cistercian abbot of Clairvaux, who persuaded a papal legate, two archbishops, and ten bishops attending the council of Troyes in 1129 to recognize the order and draw up a *regula* (rule) for them.

With the Templars and other military orders, warfare as a temporary act of devotion became warfare as a devotional way of life. Whereas crusaders were laypeople directing their everyday armsbearing skills for a time into a holy cause, the Templars were members of a religious order and as permanently at war as those in other religious orders were permanently at prayer. They were members, they and their apologists admitted, of a new kind of order of the church, although they insisted that its foundation was foreshadowed and therefore justified in scripture. Wearing the cross, they appropriated for themselves the monastic, and then crusading, title of "knights of Christ."

The founding of a religious order in which professed members took familiar vows, performed familiar rites, and then rode out to kill their enemies was as unprecedented as penitential war had been forty years before. It was abhorrent to some, in spite of the support of the rulers of Jerusalem and the papacy. In fact, it is surprising that the section of clerical opinion which disapproved was not larger, particularly since the foundation of the Templars could be said to have undermined the argument that crusading was something particularly suitable for laypeople to undertake. Indeed, Bernard of Clairvaux and the Cistercians he influenced were later to imply that it was not lay crusaders, but the Templars and those like them, who were authentic "imitators of Christ."

At any rate the Templars quickly gained powerful supporters and inspired others to imitate them. After all, this popularity and the financial endowments it generated in Europe enabled them to take on major military responsibilities in the crusader states,

where the Hospitallers themselves began to adopt some of the features of a military order from the 1120s onward. Although this was done with the support of the local Latin church, the militarization of the Hospitallers was gradual and contentious. In the crusader states, the combination of Hospitaller and military functions would be later imitated by the Teutonic Order, which came into existence in 1198 and will be described more fully in a later chapter, and by the Order of St. Lazarus, which had originated in a leper hospital outside the walls of Jerusalem. In Latin Christendom more broadly, the concept of a military order was to prove popular and flexible, and through centuries to come, many other military orders would be formed in support of crusading and holy war efforts.

The Hospitallers and Templars were members of great international institutions, the first truly centralized Orders of the Church of Rome, with their estates in Western Europe managed by subordinate communities of brothers and/or sisters (known as commanderies or preceptories) and grouped into provinces. While the formal rules of some military orders forbade cohabitation of men and women or designated a subordinate status for female members, there were both single-gender preceptories for men and women, and some double (or mixed) houses, as well as evidence for collaboration between brothers and sisters within an order and relationships between houses and both male and female patrons. Both theoretical attempts to subordinate or limit women and practical disregard for these attempts align the military orders with other religious orders of their time. They also remind us that most members of military orders, whatever their gender, did not fight but rather provided material support to those who did.

Military orders were freed from the authority of bishops by papal privilege and answerable only to the pope in Rome. They have been described as over-powerful "states within a state," contributing to that fragmentation of authority which in the end so weakened the Kingdom of Jerusalem, but this picture of them is a caricature. Constitutionally their position was no different from that of other great ecclesiastical institutions in Latin Christendom, most of which held property under terms that exempted them from feudal services and the jurisdiction of secular courts. The difference, of course, was that they were relatively stronger. They were competitive, sometimes selfish, occasionally quarrelsome, but they never forgot that the survival of the Latin settlements and warfare against those settlements' enemies were the reason for their existence.

Two features of the military orders' contribution to the military operations of the crusader states ought to be stressed. First, the orders' numbers were small. There were never more than about 300 Hospitaller brothers and perhaps 500 Templars stationed in the crusader states. These men operated as the commanders of the mercenaries who made up the bulk of their garrisons and contingents in the field. Given these small numbers, it is not surprising that there was an extraordinarily rapid turnover in personnel, with senior and junior brothers regularly posted from their western European communities to replace losses in the crusader states. Second, the orders' commitment to the crusader states was expensive. Mercenaries had to be paid, and the maintenance of the orders' fortifications was very costly. As a result, in spite of their wealthy estates in Western

Europe and the elaborate machinery evolved for exploiting them, the military orders were often overburdened by their commitments and in financial difficulties.

War and Diplomacy

The crusader states depended on military resources that were never adequate. The total knights' service provided by the feudal system in the whole of the crusader states at their greatest extent was probably no more than 2,000. This was a very inadequate figure for such exposed settlements, even assuming all 2,000 knights could be summoned at once. We have discussed earlier how independent fief-holders could be a military asset, but the same independence could be a liability. For example, from a comparatively early date the vassals of Jerusalem showed a marked aversion to service "abroad," that is, outside the Kingdom of Jerusalem proper. Thus summons to military service outside the kingdom had to be preceded by negotiations; vassals could not be forced to serve by unsubstantiated statements of military necessity. Even for service within the Kingdom of Jerusalem itself, which could be demanded for up to a year, no ruler could ignore the desires or financial capacities of their subjects. Furthermore, at any given time a number of fiefs would be in the possession of minors, old men who had passed the age of service, unmarried women, or vassals who were sick.

The rulers of Jerusalem could call upon military resources other than fief-holders, but those, too, were limited. For example, leaders could call on the service of sergeants from churches, monasteries, and towns. The sum of such service in *c.* 1180 was 5,025 men, but the fact that they served in contingents mustered only in an emergency suggests that they were not highly trained. A mass levy of the population could also be summoned in a crisis, but little is known about the quality of the force that resulted or the use to which it was put. Far more important was the contribution made by the military orders, but we have already seen that the brothers-at-arms were never very numerous, that they acted more as the commanders of bodies of mercenary troops, and that their military obligations often overstretched them.

Faced with these limitations, the war resources of the settlers were supplemented in five ways. First, increasingly heavy use was made of mercenaries, among whom there was an important group who fought with Muslim equipment and were called *turcopoles*, from a Greek term to describe auxiliaries. The crusader states were a prime source of employment for mercenaries, but the settlers were naturally dependent on the cash that could be raised to pay them, which was never enough. This is one reason why large sums of money were periodically sent from Latins in Europe. Second, there were *milites ad terminum* (*knights for a time*), ad hoc crusaders who are to be found from 1099 onward. These individuals came out to serve for a time as an act of devotion. They established a tradition that lasted as long as crusading did. Third, Latin Christian pilgrims who arrived from Europe each year were often called upon to help out in an emergency, but not all pilgrims were willing to take up arms at all times. Fourth, merchant communities originating from the Italic Peninsula, especially those of Genoa, Venice and Pisa, would

sometimes respond to an appeal with maritime assistance, particularly if it involved a threat to a coastal city. Fifth, there were major crusades. Ultimately the settlers regularly appealed to Latins in Europe for military help and very irregularly received it.

That said, it would be a grave mistake to imagine that the crusader states and their political neighbors were engaged in continual holy war in the first half of the twelfth century. As described in earlier chapters, the region in which the crusader states were established had been contested by various powers, both large and small, before the First Crusade, and continued to be so after. Despite the bellicose polemics of holy war in circulation, which were certainly popular with many, those contests for dominance were not always pursued by means of warfare. Diplomacy and treaties were equally, if not more, important in regional jostling, and from the earliest years of the twelfth century onward, Christians and Muslims, of various sects and representing various polities, made both inter- and intra-faith alliances.

These treaties sometimes prevented immediate fighting, but sometimes served to mark the end of a period of war, and sometimes simply delineated allies and enemies just before conflict. And sometimes, a treaty did many of these things at once. For example, between 1108 and 1111, Tughtakin ibn Ayyub and Baldwin I of Jerusalem made a variety of agreements, even while both continued to view each other as adversaries. And a truce between Ridwan of Aleppo and Tancred was made in 1105 after Ridwan's troops were defeated at Artah, but ultimately proved beneficial to both. Ridwan and Tancred subsequently allied against a common enemy, Jawuli of Mosul, and in 1108 Ridwan and Tancred's allied forces fought the similarly allied forces of Baldwin of Edessa and Jawuli. Yet despite these pragmatic agreements, as Yvonne Friedman has explained, both Christians and Muslims viewed peacemaking as only truly possible after the completion of just war, and peace with those outside one's religion "remained something that had to be explained and for which apology was necessary."[11]

Ultimately, understanding warfare and diplomacy between the crusader states and their political neighbors requires us to understand the nature of warfare in the early twelfth century as well as the ongoing relationship between ideological perspectives and practical decisions. First, frequent, intermittent warfare targeted at strategic destruction of property or undermining of power was infinitely preferred to major set battles or prolonged sieges, both of which required substantially more resources and organization and thus constituted a greater risk. Second, warfare and diplomacy were both viewed as means to an end—dominance—rather than a reflection of different goals. Third, while ideologies of holy war in Christianity and Islam were popular and made use of by those in power to rally support against both co-religionists and those of another faith, practical considerations sometimes took precedence. Furthermore, as Hussein Fancy has emphasized, when we examine motivation, we should not presume binaries or hierarchies of rationales where they may not have existed: "Religion is not separable from other processes or from material circumstances."[12] Lastly, and related, warfare was, of course, costly, but it also had the potential to generate revenue via spoils, ransoms, and the selling or forced labor of enslaved captives. In turn, the possibility of captivity and/or enslavement was a major risk of warfare, whether one was a combatant or not.

CHAPTER 5
DIVERSIFICATION, 1099–150

The first five decades of what historians call the crusading movement were characterized by continuity, change, and inconsistency. On the one hand, Latin Christian crusade enthusiasts commemorated and celebrated the First Crusade in epic historical accounts and literary works, and many Latin Christians quickly recognized in crusading a form of warfare that would readily suit their needs, whether those needs were spiritual or otherwise. On the other hand, many Latin Christians, especially in Frankish lands, seem to have returned to more traditional devotional trends such as pilgrimage. Crusades were proclaimed by popes and by a range of lay leaders—sometimes with papal approval, sometimes not—and it could be hard, if not impossible, to distinguish crusading from other forms of warfare, because crusading was distinctly ambiguous. Crusading became a part of the Mediterranean world and the culture of Latin Christendom, but that was due more to its ambiguity and versatility than to any imagined simplicity of purpose. Latin Christians crusaded against Muslims and Muslim-ruled regions in Iberia and the eastern Mediterranean, but also against Byzantine Christians and Latin Christian enemies of the papacy. In some regions, like the Iberian Peninsula and North Europe, it is most accurate to see crusading as a phenomenon that complemented a preexisting ideology and practice of Christian holy war.

Political Change in the Early Twelfth-Century Mediterranean

Chapter 2 outlined changes in the Mediterranean's political status quo in the late eleventh century. As the creation of the crusader states demonstrates, the Mediterranean and West Asia in particular continued to be a politically fluid and contested space in the first half of the twelfth century. Not all contemporaries thought that the First Crusade represented a new kind of warfare or a new Latin desire for expansion, but virtually all had to take the new crusader states and the ongoing effects of their creation into account.

West Asia

Through their conquests in West Asia, Latin Christians had forced themselves into an already kaleidoscopic and competitive system of local politics. They were themselves both on the offensive and seeking to defend conquests already made. In addition to conflict between the principality of Antioch and the Byzantine Empire in the north of the region, the crusader states faced immediate counter-invasions from the Fatimids in the south, as

well as, from 1110 onward, campaigns from the resurgent Great Seljuk Empire to the east. These military efforts were not necessarily represented as military *jihad*. Calls for military *jihad*, or Muslim holy war, against the Latins were at first confined to a few religious leaders in Damascus and Aleppo. They would resurface in various Turkic forces rather than the Great Seljuk Empire, starting with the Turkic army that faced Latin-led forces at the 1119 Battle of Field of Blood, in which Il-Ghazi ibn Artuq, head of the Turkic Artuqid dynasty and then lord of Aleppo, defeated Roger of Salerno, the regent of Antioch.

The city of Aleppo passed through many changes in leadership in the early twelfth century, ultimately leading its citizens to appeal to the Seljuk ruler of Mosul. Aleppo was relieved by Aqsunqur al-Bursuqi, the governor of Mosul, and incorporated into a personal state he was creating for himself before he was murdered in November 1126 by members of the Nizari Isma'ili community (the so-called 'Assassins') founded by Hassan-i Sabbah. The coalition al-Bursuki had created might have broken up on the sudden death of his son Ma'sud in May 1127 had not 'Imad al-Din Zangi been appointed governor of Mosul.

Zangi entered Aleppo in June 1128 and then embarked on a series of ambitious conquests. His initial focus was on the defeat and subordination of rival Muslim leaders, who were his most serious regional competition. By 1135 he had been successful against his Muslim adversaries and had helped secure Aleppo, clearing away Latin forces from the western and southwestern approaches to the city by taking al-Atharib, Zerdan and Ma'arrat al-Nu'man. In 1137 he took Ba'rin on the frontier of the county of Tripoli. In 1144, when the Count of Edessa entered a defensive alliance with local Artuqid Turks against Zangi, he occupied the eastern fortresses of the county and, taking advantage of the count's absence and the temporary weakness of the garrison, came before Edessa itself on November 24. He broke into the city on Christmas Eve and sacked it. The citadel fell two days later.

Zangi's conquest of Edessa, the capital of the first Latin settlement in West Asia, made a great impression in Latin Christendom as we shall see, but there was a widespread and spontaneous reaction within Islamic spheres as well. In the tumult of praise and propaganda, the concept of military *jihad*, voiced only intermittently in Zangi's camp before, became prominent. Showered with honors by the 'Abbasid caliph, Zangi pressed home his advantage, taking Sürüc and laying siege to Birecik, but he was assassinated by one of his slaves on the night of September 14, 1146, and his territories were divided between two of his sons. The younger of them, Nur al-Din, received Aleppo. Since he had not succeeded to Mosul, he was not distracted, as his father had been, by the politics of the eastern Fertile Crescent, but on the other hand his resources were fewer.

In spite of his inexperience, Nur al-Din proved himself at once by rushing to the aid of the garrison at Edessa, which was threatened by Latin Christians hoping to gain some advantage from his father's death. He then entered into an offensive alliance against Antioch with the Seljuk sultan of Rum and took Hab and Kefer Lata, which guarded the passage from the Aleppan plain. He renewed hostilities after the failure of the major crusade of the 1140s (described herein). His army, reinforced by troops from Damascus, utterly defeated an inferior force from Antioch on June 29, 1149.

This victory was a turning point for Nur al-Din. In his own eyes and in the opinion of his contemporaries he became a champion of Islam. The propaganda of military *jihad* was exploited by Nur al-Din and his supporters in every possible way, through poetry, letters, treatises, sermons, and inscriptions. In all these materials, two themes stand out: the obligation to reconquer the coastlands and especially Jerusalem; and the conviction that this could only be achieved through Muslim religious and political unity. As the leader of a resurgent moral rearmament, Nur al-Din also took measures against the Shi'ites and others whom he regarded as heretics and he encouraged the founding of schools, mosques, and Sufi convents.

The emphasis on Sunni piety—including but not limited to military *jihad*—during Nur al-Din's reign should be seen not only as part of his own priorities as ruler, but as part of a broader movement within Sunni Islam that aimed at moral rejuvenation and pious cultural efflorescence. This movement used to be referred to as the "Sunni revival" but more recently, and more accurately, has been termed the "Sunni recentering."[1] As Niall Christie has explained, the city of Jerusalem occupied a prominent position for those seeking such recentering. Jerusalem was the home of prophets, beginning with Abraham; it was the destination of Muhammad's *isra'* and location of his *mi'raj*; and it was to be the place of the Last Judgment.

Despite the highly successful propaganda of military *jihad*, Nur al-Din's ultimate goal was not the elimination of the crusader states but the creation of his own large, unified, and pious state. Achieving this required subduing both Muslim and Christian opponents. He faced minor obstacles, but ultimately forced Damascus to recognize his suzerainty and, in alliance with the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum, he occupied the remaining territory of the county of Edessa in 1151. In April 1154 he was at last able to take direct control of Damascus and with his conquest of the city of Ba'albak in June 1155 the unification of Muslim-ruled Greater Syria was complete.

Byzantine Empire

Meanwhile, in the Byzantine Empire, Alexios I Komnenos' son John II (r. 1118–43) and grandson Manuel I (r. 1143–80) built upon Alexios' achievements. When Alexios had become emperor, the Byzantine Empire was in a state of crisis. By the end of his reign, he had stabilized the empire both internally and externally—sometimes through unpopular means—and his son, John II, like his father an active soldier as well as an all-around governor, further restored the empire. John II achieved military successes that, combined with the tax revenue to field large armies, soon built momentum. He dealt successfully with Pecheneg incursions in the Balkan peninsula as well as various Turkic adversaries in West Asia and his Hungarian in-laws. And like his father, John II continued to employ Latin mercenaries in his army, sometimes at high rank (Figure 5.1).

John II also led two major expeditions into the crusader states, to Antioch in 1137–8 and to Antioch as well as Jerusalem in 1142–3. As Jonathan Harris explains, while various motivations were attributed to John by different writers, in both cases it is most persuasive to see John as interested primarily in forcing recognition of Byzantine

Figure 5.1 Mosaic of John II Komnenos, Eirene, and Mary with Christ, early twelfth century. © Wikimedia Commons (public domain).
Hagia Sophia (the Church of Holy Wisdom) was built in Constantinople in 537. It has had many lives since as a church and a mosque. Although its interior has gone through many cycles of decoration and destruction, a number of early works of art remain intact. This early twelfth-century mosaic depicts John II Komnenos, the Virgin Mary and Christ the Child, and John's wife, the empress Eirene of Hungary (natal name Piroska). John offers Mary and Christ a purse, while Eirene offers a document, symbolizing imperial support of the Byzantine Church.

sovereignty. Thus, while he battered the walls of Antioch until that recognition was granted, swiftly thereafter Byzantine and Antiochene forces, joined by the Count of Edessa, marched together against Aleppo. John's second expedition seems to have intended to again secure Antiochene recognition of imperial sovereignty, and also secure recognition of the emperor's role as protector of the holy places in Jerusalem. This may have been intended to cement in Latin eyes John's status as a virtual crusader himself, thus assisting Byzantine diplomatic efforts in relation to Latin Christendom. However, many in Latin Christendom, particularly the papacy, reacted negatively to John's actions.

After John II's death in 1143, his son and heir Manuel I continued to rule in the same vein as his father and grandfather, at least in the early years of his reign, and the empire continued to prosper. The crusader states were new players in the eastern Mediterranean, but they did not substantially change Byzantine goals and strategies, nor did they disrupt the steadily strengthening success of the Komnenoi dynasty in the early twelfth century.

Sicily

The First Crusade had also affected communities and polities in the central Mediterranean. After fully conquering the island of Sicily in 1091, the Norman Count Roger I of Sicily went on to take the island of Malta, purportedly to help dissuade attack from North

Africa. In 1098, eager to ensure Roger and his Normans continued to support his reformed papacy, Pope Urban II granted him authority over the Latin Church within his domains.

The Norman conquests of the wealthy and strategically positioned islands of Sicily and Malta meant that, politically, the central Mediterranean now tilted decisively toward Latin Christendom. This inclination was further strengthened by familial connections between Norman Sicily and the new crusader states. Bohemond, by then of Antioch, was Roger's nephew, and for a brief time in the 1110s Roger's widow, Adelaide del Vasto, had been married to Baldwin I of Jerusalem. By 1130, Roger II of Sicily had taken advantage of papal politics to extort the title of king of Sicily, Calabria, and Apulia, as well as prince of Capua, from the papacy. (As we discuss further herein, the strength of Roger II's Sicily was viewed as a threat by the papacy, who periodically launched crusades against the Normans.)

The establishment of the Norman kingdom of Sicily was a major political change. Yet, as Hiroshi Takayama has clearly explained, we have to be careful not to overestimate the implications of this change.[2] The Normans constituted a small Latin Christian minority ruling a culturally diverse, religiously plural, and multilingual population. In governance, the Normans adopted and adapted existing institutions whenever possible, employed talented members of non-Latin populations in their government, and sought to profit from established trade routes and relationships across the Mediterranean. Roger II's claims to rule were not immediately recognized by local populations, whom the Normans methodically "pacified"—that is, defeated in civil war—so ongoing military preparation and strength were essential to Norman rule.

Furthermore, it was not a given that the interests of Norman Sicily and the crusader states were harmonious, despite their shared Latin Christian religion and family connections. As Luigi Russo has shown, the power of Norman knights diminished in the principality of Antioch during the first half of the twelfth century. At the same time, both the dispute over the succession to Godfrey of Bouillon and the repudiation of Adelaide del Vasto served to marginalize Norman interests in the Kingdom of Jerusalem and to generate lasting hostility toward the crusader states in Adelaide's son Roger II. In addition, strong familial traditions of crusading did not arise in Norman Sicily as they did in Frankish lands. All these factors contributed to a Norman kingdom of Sicily that concentrated on its own expansion, primarily in North Africa, and was more often in competition rather than alliance with the Kingdom of Jerusalem.[3] As we discuss herein, this meant that the papacy would come to view Norman Sicily as a threat.

Iberian Peninsula

There were political changes in the Iberian Peninsula in the early twelfth century, too. The first half of the twelfth century saw the reigns of several strong and militarily forceful Latin Christian monarchs, perhaps especially Urraca of Léon-Castile, her second husband Alfonso I of Aragon, her half-sister Teresa of Portugal, and Ramón Berenguer IV of Aragon-Barcelona, all of whose relationships shifted back and forth

Map 6 The Iberian Peninsula, *c.* 1100.

on a spectrum from enmity to alliance. The period saw the emergence of Aragon-Barcelona and Léon-Castile as dominant and mutually competitive political forces in the peninsula, as well as the establishment of Portugal as a distinct realm. Latin Christian rulers in the north of the peninsula successfully conquered some cities and regions from Almoravid rule in the south. Aragon, in particular, almost doubled in size due to the conquests of Alfonso I.

Such conquered regions were inhabited by large numbers of Muslims and smaller numbers of Jews, as well as communities of "Mozarabs," Christians who had adopted some Arab cultural practices (and maintained others of their own, distinct from Latin Christendom), and whose language was influenced by both Arabic and Hebrew. As a result, Latin Christian monarchs had to decide how to rule such pluralist populations, as well as to learn how to govern urbanized regions with comparatively large cities and towns. Rather than a strong centralized government, many towns and cities were allowed relative autonomy, as were many bishops.

Latin Christians' treatment of non-Christians varied. In some places Muslims and Jews were allowed to continue to practice their religion and lived largely unchanged lives for the time being, although both communities were subject to specific taxes. In other places Muslim populations were forcibly removed and replaced with Latin Christians, and in yet others, non-Christians may have been enslaved, expelled, or converted. Brian Catlos has described the period from roughly 1080 to 1150 as "the beginning of *Mudejarismo*," that is, the beginning of free Muslim populations (known as *mudéjars*, a term derived from an Arabic word meaning simultaneously "permitted to remain" and "put to use") living under Christian rule in the Iberian Peninsula.[4]

Crusades and Crusading through 1150

In the political changes just described, crusading warfare played a role. In particular, crusading continued to feature in conflicts in the eastern Mediterranean and West Asia, against papal enemies in Europe, and to a lesser degree in the Iberian Peninsula. These early crusades show us points of connection and disjunction between lay leaders and the papacy, Europe and the crusader states, Latin and Byzantine Christians, and crusading and other ideologies of Christian holy war. A picture emerges of crusading as a powerful, complicated, versatile, and unpredictable force in Latin Christendom.

Box 5.1 Women and the Crusades

Women on crusade could attract disapproval as objects of sexual temptation to men, and they were discouraged from crusading. Nevertheless every crusade, whether marching overland or traveling by sea, contained a significant number of women from a range of social classes. Women were not supposed to crusade

unless they were accompanied by their brothers or their husbands, as did Eleanor of Aquitaine, Margaret of Provence, and Eleanor of Castile, but we know other rules for crusading were disregarded and it is hard to know how many women actually did crusade without any male relatives, since no one would be likely to record the fact. Some female crusaders did not bear arms, including both the simply described "women" who assisted with sieges on the First Crusade and distinguished figures such as Hersende, the female doctor who tended Louis IX of France on crusade. But some women are known to have fought and a few nobles, such as Countess Alice of Blois, led their own contingents. Many women who did not crusade themselves nevertheless governed their households while their husbands were on crusade—which, for noblewomen, meant active rule and in some cases military leadership—and some women suffered greatly in the process. Women were also subject to the same sufferings as other crusaders on crusade, including illness and famine, as well as sometimes managing pregnancy and childbirth. Most notably, in 1250 Margaret of Provence negotiated surrender and the release of her husband Louis IX of France days after she gave birth. While we have significantly more evidence for the participation of noblewomen in crusading, there are some singular sources for the participation of non-elite women. We know, for example, of Margaret of Beverly from England, who bore arms, was wounded in the 1187 defense of Jerusalem, and captured and escaped captivity several times, because her younger brother, Thomas, was a monk and he wrote of her deeds on her safe return.

Women are also known to have been successful agents of recruitment, carrying the predisposition to crusade from their families of birth into those in which they married, upholding family traditions and memorialization and even, in the case of fourteenth-century figures such as Birgitta of Sweden and Catherine of Siena, actively promoting the movement beyond the boundaries of family and at the highest levels of the Church of Rome. There were also a significant group of professed sisters of the military orders, who were to be found not only in the eastern Mediterranean but also in both separate and mixed convents in Europe. Neither men nor women in these European convents waged war, but the profits of their estates helped to resource their orders' military activities.

The first new crusade in West Asia highlights the fact that contemporaries were quick to grab hold of crusading as a powerful and versatile mode of warfare against a wide range of enemies. We have already noted how the new Latin principality of Antioch wrestled with the Byzantine Empire for territorial control and sovereignty in the northeastern corner of the Mediterranean. Early in this contest, Bohemond of Antioch, with the support of the papacy, launched a crusade against Alexios I and Byzantium.

In launching this crusade, Bohemond made use of every tool at his disposal: charisma and public appeals, legend and eschatology, holy relics, visible Christian

devotion, alliances, papal support, and perhaps even a bit of forgery. Bohemond, who had been held prisoner by the Danishmendid Turks from the summer of 1100 to the spring of 1103, returned to Europe. After a theatrical visit to the shrine of St Leonard, the patron saint of captives to whom he had made a vow, in 1106 Bohemond embarked on a triumphant tour of Frankish lands, speaking to large audiences. His progress in Europe was marked by gifts of relics and silks to churches—he had stripped the treasury of Antioch on his departure—and a legendary account of Bohemond's experiences as a prisoner of the Danishmendids was soon incorporated into accounts of miracles at the shrine of St Leonard. Many Frankish nobles wanted him to be godfather to their children, and it was said that King Henry I of England discouraged him from visiting his kingdom because he was worried that he might tempt away his best knights. In April or May 1106 Bohemond married Constance, the daughter of King Philip of France, a match that demonstrated the reputation he now had. He dispatched agents to regions he could not visit himself, even to England, and may also have made use of the written word. A forged letter purporting to be from Alexios I to Count Robert I of Flanders, which suggested that the Byzantines had become so desperate in the 1090s that they had been prepared to envisage Latin rule in Constantinople, was publicized at the time.

Ultimately Bohemond and the papal legate, Bruno of Segni, formally proclaimed a new crusade at a council held at Poitiers, with the support of Pope Paschal whom Bohemond had already met. Bohemond and Bruno described the new crusade in First-Crusade terms as a journey to the Holy Sepulchre with the aims of helping eastern Christians and forcing Muslims to disgorge their Christian prisoners, but in truth, Bohemond was more ambitious. He had come to enlist military aid for his principality of Antioch, which was contested by Byzantium and local Turkic rulers alike. Soon after his release from prison he had faced Byzantine invasions and much of his eastern frontier had fallen to Ridwan of Aleppo in June 1104. Bohemond had held a council in Antioch at which it was decided that the only course open to him was a crusade appeal in Europe.

The Byzantines certainly loomed as large in his thoughts as did Muslims, if not larger. There is an account of Bohemond speaking on a dais in the cathedral of Chartres on the day of his marriage. He began by telling the story of his adventures, but in calling for a crusade to Jerusalem he also proposed an invasion of the Byzantine Empire, promising rich pickings to those who would go with him. Over the next few months he developed his case and when, on the eve of his departure, he wrote to the pope, he referred to the "usurpation" of the Byzantine throne by Alexios I Komnenos. He justified an attack on the Byzantine Empire in two ways: Alexios was a usurper who had worked with infidels against Christians during the First Crusade; and, as head of the Byzantine Church, Alexios had generated schism within Christendom. Bohemond was accompanied on his crusade recruitment tour in Europe by a pretender to the imperial throne with an entourage.

These were claims that would be repeated through the twelfth century and were recognized as potentially damaging by Alexios and his heirs. In response to Bohemond's letter, Alexios dispatched letters of his own to Pisa, Genoa, and Venice, urging their governments to be skeptical of Bohemond's claims and avoid his crusade. Alexios also

"secured the release of some Latin knights who had been captured by the Fatimids, treated them well in Constantinople, then sent them back to Italy," hoping their experiences would speak directly against Bohemond's claims.[5]

Bohemond's army, which contained several of his companions from the First Crusade, was mustered in Apulia, and was large enough for the monastic historian Orderic Vitalis to describe it as the "third expedition . . . to Jerusalem." (Orderic must have considered the forces of 1096 and 1100–1—which we have called the second and third waves—to have instead comprised the first and second.) On October 9, 1107, the crusade landed on the Albanian coast at Valona (Vlorië) and then marched for Durazzo, which the Italian Normans had held for a short time twenty-five years earlier. Bohemond laid siege to Durazzo, but the Byzantines cut off his communications across the Adriatic and in the spring of 1108 their forces closed around him. As the summer wore on his army became prone to disease, and a swelling trickle of participants left for home. In September Bohemond surrendered and was forced to sign the Treaty of Devol, which acknowledged that he held the county of Antioch as a vassal of the Byzantine emperor. Some of his fellow crusaders traveled farther on. Most, without the means to continue, returned to Europe. Bohemond himself did not return to Antioch but retired to his estates in the southern Italic Peninsula, where he died in 1111.

The papacy launched the next substantial crusade to the eastern Mediterranean less than a decade later. News of the Battle of the Field of Blood reached Europe in the autumn of 1119. Pope Calixtus II, who heard of it while traveling through Frankish lands, immediately proclaimed a new crusade. While the news of the battle was indeed alarming to many Latin Christians, the speed of the pope's reaction strongly reflects his personal situation and predispositions. Calixtus was from the family of the counts of Burgundy, which had shown itself to be strongly predisposed to crusading. Furthermore, he was a cousin of Baldwin II of Jerusalem and was therefore related to both the crown and the Montlhéry clan. Perhaps due to these family ties, the crusade never seems to have been intended to go to the principality of Antioch, where the Latins had actually been defeated, but was to travel instead 400 miles to the south, to Baldwin's seat of government.

Box 5.2 Papal Bulls

The term "papal bull" refers to a formal proclamation, decree, or charter issued by the papacy and authenticated since the twelfth century with a lead *bulla* (seal). Papal *bullae* (seals) depict Saints Peter and Paul on one side and the name of the issuing pope on the other, while the document thus authenticated—a papal bull—is referred to by its *incipit* (first words). Papal bulls may relate to a wide range of different matters, with crusading just one topic among others. It became standard to issue a papal bull granting indulgences and other privileges to crusaders either when an appeal for crusade was launched by the papacy or in response to a *post hoc* request for crusade privileges from a temporal ruler.

Calixtus planned the crusade on a large scale. He wrote to Venice and probably also to the German states and Frankish leaders, which suggests that a general letter was composed to summon the faithful to take the cross to the eastern Mediterranean. Calixtus furthermore envisioned the crusade fought concurrently in the Iberian Peninsula, echoing with emphasis Urban II's concern that the First Crusade occur at the same time as Latin Christian warfare in Iberia continued. The decree of the First Lateran Council (1123) granted the remission of sins and the church's protection to crusaders, and imposed sanctions on those who would not have left for Jerusalem or Spain by Easter 1124.

There was an enthusiastic response in Venice, to which Baldwin II had also directly appealed; the doge and the leading citizens took the cross and were granted a banner of St. Peter by the pope. On August 8, 1122, a large fleet left for the eastern Mediterranean. The Venetians paused to attack Byzantine Corfu in retaliation for an attempt by John II Komnenos to reduce their economic privileges in the empire, but they left hurriedly on hearing that Baldwin II of Jerusalem had been captured by a coalition of regional Turkish forces. The Venetians reached the eastern Mediterranean coast in May 1123, destroyed a Fatimid fleet off Ascalon, spent Christmas in Jerusalem and Bethlehem, and helped besiege Tyre, which fell on July 7, 1124. The Venetians were rewarded with a third of Tyre and its territory and with important commercial privileges which must have been already promised by Baldwin II as inducements to crusade. They returned home by way of the Aegean, sacking Byzantine islands and territory as they went. Venetian pillaging brought Byzantium to heel, and in August 1126 John II confirmed and extended their privileges. They were, of course, not the only crusaders in the eastern Mediterranean at the time. They carried others in their ships, and there is evidence of men from Bohemia, German states, and Frankish lands taking the cross. It is also possible that a Genoese squadron took part.

Meanwhile, Calixtus was concerned to ensure crusading in the Iberian Peninsula also took place. On April 2, 1123, he issued a letter calling on crusaders in Iberia to fulfill their vows, granting them the same remission of sins as that conceded to crusaders to the eastern Mediterranean, and appointing a papal legate. The crusade was also discussed at a council at Santiago de Compostela, presided over by Archbishop Diego Gelmírez. The archbishop issued a stirring summon, in which he articulated a justification for Iberian crusading that was to be resorted to over and over again through the centuries.

> Just as the knights of Christ and the faithful sons of Holy Church opened the way to Jerusalem with much labour and spilling of blood, so we should become knights of Christ and, after defeating his wicked enemies the Muslims, open the way to the same Sepulchre of the Lord through Iberia, which is shorter and much less laborious.

In other words, there were two paths to the Holy Sepulchre, both hindered by the enemies of Christ, and the shorter and easier path lay through Iberia.

The idea of an Iberian path to Jerusalem was not merely ecclesiastical rhetoric. Alfonso I of Aragon clearly drew connections between events in the crusader states

and many of his own actions, including the establishment of Iberian military orders. He led a major raid into southern Iberia in the winter of 1125–6, marching by way of Teruel, Valencia, Murcia, Gaudix, Granada, and Malaga, where he embarked on a boat to demonstrate that he had crossed the peninsula. He returned to Saragossa bringing with him 10,000 Andalusian Christians and their families, who had decided to emigrate and whom he settled in the Ebro valley. Ongoing military campaigns of ruling sisters Teresa of Portugal and Urraca of Léon and Castile had also been confirmed equivalent to crusading by Pope Paschal II.

Clearly then, in the Iberian Peninsula, too, crusading continued to build momentum in the early twelfth century, although many cases before the papacy of Calixtus II demonstrate the difficulties with defining crusading in the early twelfth century. Adoption of crusading by Latin Christians in the peninsula is perhaps unsurprising, since Latin Christian monarchs in the north of the peninsula were already engaged in ongoing warfare against various Muslim-ruled opponents. That warfare was already framed with religious rhetoric through regional ideology, and as a result, it had already attracted warriors from other parts of Latin Christendom. Furthermore, already in the late eleventh century, Urban II had promised those engaged in these wars the same spiritual benefits as those granted to the First Crusaders.

However, we are quickly reminded that what "crusading" was remained ill-defined. In 1118 Pope Gelasius II formally legitimized a war, to be led by King Alfonso I of Aragon, against Saragossa (Zaragoza). The city, the most important prize to be seized since Toledo, fell on December 19 to a large army which included in its ranks a number of First Crusaders. Evidence suggests the pope considered this campaign to be penitential, but there is no evidence that the Latin Christian fighters took vows or wore crosses, and no comparison was made that we can see with the expedition to Jerusalem. The same goes for Pope Paschal II's grant of a remission of sins for the participants in a war launched in 1114 to conquer the Muslim-ruled Balearic Islands, waged by Catalans and Pisans under Count Raymond Berengar III of Barcelona. It is only with the crusade of Calixtus, already described, that we can speak more certainly about Iberian crusading.

Moreover, as Luis García-Guijjaro Ramos has persuasively argued, crusading was an ideological supplement in the Iberian Peninsula, adopted by rulers when useful in recruitment or in asserting oneself as the premier defender of Christendom, superior to one's Latin competitors in the region. But there was already a preexisting ideology of Christian conquest, the aforementioned *restauratio* (in the eighteenth century termed *Reconquista*) in Latin Christian Iberia. The ideology was distinct, popular, and effective. Crusading could, and did, complement the ideology of *restauratio*, but crusading did not create it, nor was crusading the primary or sole cause of wars of Latin Christian expansion in the peninsula.[6]

We see similar trends in the lands surrounding the Baltic Sea. The eleventh century had seen aggressive missionary activity and wars of expansion in the region, with Latin Christians from across Europe participating in the effort to both Christianize and Latinize the region. Alliances had been formed between Latin Christian rulers in order to "extend Christianity and convert the pagans," and these alliances had been sanctified

by bishops, who asserted that those who so fought would be blessed, considered martyrs by God, and receive rewards in heaven.[7] Additionally, both pilgrimage to Jerusalem and active military service under Byzantine emperors were characteristics of Baltic Latin Christendom.

Just as adherence to the holy war ideology of *restauratio* and crusade helped Latin Christian monarchs compete with each other in Iberia, so too, claims to holy war helped Latin Christian leaders in the Baltics position themselves relative to each other. Crusading heightened but did not simply cause these dynamics. Janus Møller Jensen has described it thus: "crusade ideology became a part of royal ideology and the positioning for power within the Scandinavian societies."[8]

Crusading further propelled existing aggression against non-Christian neighbors, too. In the crusade-rich 1120s, Peter the Venerable congratulated Sigurd I of Norway for fighting the "enemies of the cross" at home (in Småland, 1123) and abroad (Lisbon, the Mediterranean, and West Asia, 1107–10). Sigurd had returned to Norway in 1111 after visiting Constantinople, bearing a splinter from the True Cross given to him by Baldwin I of Jerusalem. When efforts to strengthen the Latin Church in newly conquered and converted regions of North Europe gained steam in the 1120s, Calixtus II sent Gilo of Paris, author of a well-known history of the First Crusade, north as papal legate.

Latin Christian rulers in Iberia and North Europe were not the only monarchs to aggressively pursue their own crusades. At the other end of the Mediterranean, Baldwin II of Jerusalem was similarly proactive. In 1127 more crusaders were sought by the settlers in the crusader states when an embassy was sent from Jerusalem to offer the hand of Baldwin II's daughter Melisende to Fulk of Anjou. The Templar master Hugh of Payns toured Europe recruiting crusaders and a substantial number of them accompanied Fulk to Palestine in 1129 and joined an army of settlers in an unsuccessful assault upon Damascus.

The initiative for this crusade seems to have been Baldwin's own, and it was launched without authorization by the papacy, who remained a bystander. Thomas Asbridge has convincingly argued that in leading the campaign to take Damascus, Baldwin II was continuing an established strategy of aggressive regional conquests intended to secure the Kingdom of Jerusalem and the crusader states. In earlier unsuccessful attempts to take Damascus, Baldwin had been willing to do so in alliance with Muslim leaders in the region. It is even possible, though not proven, that in his campaign for Damascus Baldwin was again negotiating with certain Muslim constituencies behind the scenes. Certainly in his campaign for Damascus, he also marshaled all possible advantages, including calling upon crusading in aid of recruitment and fund-raising and simultaneously ensuring his heir's marriage. Although the conquest of Damascus failed, in the reign of Baldwin II we see an aggressive and pragmatic ruler committed to Latin Christian expansion by whatever means most likely to success.[9]

Within a decade, a third field for crusading and yet another kind of target was at least under consideration. From the late 1120s the papacy was engaged in a struggle against the ambitious and capable Normans in the southern Italic Peninsula, who had emerged as the dominant Latin force in the Mediterranean. Papal propagandists used language

reminiscent of the reformers challenging Henry IV of Germany half a century before. For example, in May 1135 Pope Innocent II presided over a council at Pisa which decreed that those who fought against the pope's enemies "for the liberation of the Church on land or sea" should enjoy the same remission of sins as that granted to the First Crusaders by Pope Urban II at the council of Clermont. There is no evidence that these fighters had to make crusade vows, but this grant of a crusade privilege to those who fought against the political opponents of the papacy clearly links the struggles of the reformers of the eleventh century to the yet-to-be-discussed "political crusades" of the thirteenth. It led to controversy in the years that followed, with, on the one hand, a body of highly critical opinion and, on the other, an avant-garde who passionately supported crusading against papal enemies. One such advocate, Peter the Venerable, the great abbot of Cluny, argued that violence against fellow Christians was even more justifiable than the use of force against non-Christians:

> But whom should you fight more: a pagan who does not know God, or a Christian confessing himself, in words and deeds, opposed to [God]? Who should be most persecuted, someone who is ignorant and blasphemous, or someone who refuses to acknowledge and fights [true Christianity]?

We have already seen how the Battle of the Field of Blood, combined with Pope Calixtus II's familial relationships with the counts of Burgundy, the Montlhérys, and the king of Jerusalem, led to the papal proclamation of a substantial crusade in the early 1120s, with spiritual benefits granted for fighting in both the eastern Mediterranean and the Iberian Peninsula. A similar series of events and steps unfolded following Zangi's conquest of Edessa in 1144. An embassy from the crusader states, led by Bishop Hugh of Jeble, reached the papal court at Viterbo shortly after the election of Pope Eugenius III in November 1145, to be followed by a delegation of Armenian bishops. On December 1, the new pope issued a general letter, *Quantum praedecessores*, in which, after touching on the success of the First Crusade and the grave situation now confronting the crusader states, he called for crusaders, granting them a remission of sins which was more developed than that proposed by Urban II. He also decreed the protection of the crusaders' property, declared a moratorium on the payment of interest on their debts, and eased the way, as Urban II had done, for the raising of money from the disposal of land to cover their expenses. Although it can no longer be maintained with certainty that *Quantum praedecessores* was the first general crusade letter, because there may have been one issued by Calixtus II, its careful delineation of privileges for crusaders set the tone for all later letters of this sort.

Eugenius' letter was addressed to Francia, but there is no evidence that it had arrived there. Instead, the news of the disaster had reached the royal Frankish court independently in embassies from Antioch and Jerusalem. While the news of Edessa did not immediately move Frankish nobility, it did have an effect on King Louis VII personally. Louis' response should be viewed in the context of both piety and the assertion of royal power—as opposed to aristocratic or papal power—within Latin Christendom.

Married to Eleanor, the rich and powerful Duchess of Aquitaine, Louis VII was courteous, pious, and assertive. This was particularly true where royal rights were concerned, even when advocacy for royal rights put him at odds with the papacy. For example, it is probable that he was already considering making a pilgrimage to Jerusalem to atone for deaths he caused in conflict with the county of Champagne; this conflict had pitted Champagne and the papacy against Louis. Louis may also have feared that if he did not act the Montlhéry clan would, because the counts of Edessa were their kin. In other words, news of Edessa may have played into intentions Louis already held and provided a way for him to reinforce his role as a Christian monarch.

Louis carefully timed and arranged his own call for crusade. At his Christmas court at Bourges in 1145 Louis presented Frankish bishops and magnates, whom he had invited in larger numbers than usual, with a plan to go to the aid of the crusader states. The bishop of Langres preached a sermon, calling on all to assist the king in the enterprise. The response of the court was emphatically unenthusiastic, and it was agreed that the issue should be discussed again the following Easter after Bernard of Clairvaux had been consulted.

When seeking a reason for the ultimate launch of what would be a truly substantial crusade, it is important to see the complexity of factors in play. Admittedly the city of Edessa carried symbolic weight as the first city taken and colonized by the First Crusaders, and it is true that Zangi now had his eyes firmly fixed on the crusader states, since he had largely subdued his regional Muslim opponents, especially the Turkic Artuqids. That said, the conquest of Edessa was hardly a simple indication of resurgent Islam striking back at Christendom, since in earlier years Zangi had entered a pragmatic treaty with Joscelin of Edessa, and the counts of Edessa had now fought Zangi with the help of their own Muslim allies.

Pope Eugenius III's own motivations can only be grasped at, and his position was somewhat insecure. In December 1145 he was a brand-new pope, a former student of the great abbot Bernard of Clairvaux, yet one whose election as pope Bernard had strongly protested. Eugenius was unable to reside in Rome itself on an ongoing basis due to the opposition of its citizens, bolstered by critics of the papacy and papal power, which reminds us of Urban II's inability to hold Rome at the time he announced the First Crusade. He clearly lacked the approval of his teacher and mentor, and that may have encouraged him to pursue a crusade, a step which Bernard backed enthusiastically. Louis VII's motivations likewise appear to have been a mix of piety, politics, and opportunity. Taken all together, a major crusade in response to Zangi's conquest of Edessa was neither inevitable nor a simple expression of uncomplicated piety.

It was Bernard of Clairvaux who truly ignited the situation. By this time he was the leading figure in the Church of Rome. He had been primarily responsible for the growth of the Cistercian type of reformed Benedictinism, the most fashionable monasticism of the age. He had engineered the victory of Pope Innocent II over his rival Anacletus in the 1130s, and even though Bernard did not support Eugenius' election as pope, Eugenius had been one of his monks and his pupil.

Bernard was the greatest preacher of his day. Fearless and a brilliant speaker and writer, he was at the height of his reputation in the early 1140s. No wonder he was consulted

by Louis. Bernard was likely to be sympathetic—he had, after all, already brought his considerable influence to bear in support of the Templars—but he characteristically replied that a matter of this importance should be referred to the pope, thereby ensuring that papal initiative was preserved.

Eugenius' response to Louis' enterprise was to reissue *Quantum praedecessores* on March 1, 1146, with a few minor changes, and to authorize Bernard to preach the crusade north of the Alps. At Vézelay on March 31, in a dramatic scene played, as at Clermont, in a field outside the town, Bernard read the general letter to the crowd and delivered the first of his crusade sermons with Louis at his side, wearing a cross sent to him by the pope. The audience became so enthusiastic that Bernard reportedly ran out of cloth for crosses and in a probably deliberate piece of theater had to tear pieces from his own habit to make them.

After Vézelay Bernard energetically and persuasively promoted the crusade in letters and sermons throughout Latin Christendom. The letters that have survived are among the most powerful crusade propaganda of all time, in which a highly developed concept of the remission of sins was combined with a description of the crusade as an opportunity from God for sinful and violent men to redeem themselves. Bernard also emphasized the image of the Christian holy lands as Christ's own; he must have wanted to remind his listeners of the importance to them of their own freehold properties and therefore of the need to protect Christ's patrimony.

Preaching reached into the Baltics. A papal legate arrived in Denmark in 1146 to preach the crusade. He faced a complicated Danish political knot: two claimants to the Danish crown had each been crowned and were effectively engaged in civil war. They agreed on a truce in order to crusade, and it seems that only later did the idea of crusading turn away from Jerusalem toward the local Wends. Møller Jensen has detailed the clear influence of Bernard's preaching on not only Danish crusade preaching but also literary representations of crusade preaching for centuries.[10]

As with the First Crusade, crusade preaching in the 1140s was swiftly followed by anti-Jewish violence in the Rhineland. Indeed, Bernard was first drawn into northern Francia and Germany to attempt to curb another Cistercian monk called Radulf, whose unauthorized preaching helped generate the same violence against Jews as that which had accompanied the First Crusade. From as early as the spring of 1146 through 1147, Latin Christians in the Rhineland committed a range of assaults against Jewish people, synagogues, and holy texts and objects. In some cases, Latin Christian violence deliberately—to our eyes, grotesquely—mirrored the Crucifixion of Christ, and there were, as before, forced baptisms as well as suicides in order to escape that fate.

On the one hand, many rulers and local authorities were quick to provide better protection to Jewish communities. On the other, widely circulated official condemnations of anti-Jewish violence suggest that the issue was not just a local one. Pope Calixtus II issued the first papal bull against anti-Jewish violence, *Sicut Judaeis,* in the 1120s, emphasizing that Christians should not attack Jewish people or force them to convert. In the 1140s, some of the circulated condemnations of anti-Jewish violence and coercion echoed *Sicut Judaeis*' theological principle that Jews were supposed to remain alive

within Christendom as evidence of the superior truth of the Christian faith, while others noted that by inciting anti-Jewish violence, preachers were encouraging Christians to disobey their Christian lords. Both Jewish and Christian witnesses of the violence of 1146 and 1147 clearly connected it to the preaching of the crusade and of the overall call to fight the "enemies of Christ" and the church.

That said, we should see anti-Jewish crusading violence within the context of increasing anti-Jewish sentiment within Latin Christendom, and especially within ecclesiastical and intellectual spheres. The monks of Norwich in 1144 invented or at least provide the first written evidence of the blood libel, the claim that Jews committed ritual murder of Christians. This claim was repeated across Europe from the later twelfth century onward and remains a component of modern anti-Semitism. It is perhaps most accurate to see both the rise of the crusading movement and the rise of anti-Jewish sentiment and violence as reflections of Latin Christians' desire for a homogenous, unified Christendom, their willingness to use force and coercion to achieve this goal, and their erroneous apprehension that they were themselves threatened by non-Christians in their midst.

In November 1146 Bernard reached Frankfurt, where Conrad III Hohenstaufen was holding his court. Conrad was another admirable ruler—shrewd, sincere, intelligent, pious, courageous, and hardworking—and he had already shown interest in crusading. In fact, Conrad had taken the cross in 1124, but the German states were torn by internal feuding, and powerful interests, which he was never able to overcome, had been opposed to his accession. In 1146, Conrad must have recognized that he would be taking a risk if he assumed the leadership of crusaders from the region, who were now being recruited in large numbers as enthusiasm developed a momentum of its own. But after a dramatic sermon preached by Bernard during Mass at the Christmas court at Speyer, in which he directed a personal and highly charged appeal to Conrad, drawing attention to his prospects on the Day of Judgment should he fail to answer Christ's summons, Conrad took the cross. The two most powerful Latin Christian rulers in Western Europe were now committed to the crusade, and enthusiasm had spread to the Italic Peninsula and England, too.

The crusade was looking as though it would be a really major expedition. It also began to assume the features of Calixtus II's ambitious enterprise of a quarter of a century before, although on an even greater scale. Pope Eugenius responded favorably to a request from Alfonso VII of Léon-Castile for an extension of the crusade to the Iberian Peninsula, and he allowed the Genoese and the citizens of the ports of southern Francia to join that campaign. Again, however, we should recognize that Alfonso VII was already pursuing *restauratio* by engaging in wars of territorial expansion against and establishing tributary relationships with Muslim rulers, justified in religious terms as *restauratio*. Thus papal confirmation of crusade status served to aid recruitment and support outside the Iberian Peninsula and inferred privilege and status on those leading the campaigns but was not necessarily the dominant ideology of Christian holy war.

In 1147, a third region was added to the crusade: North Europe. At an assembly at Frankfurt that met between March 11 and 23, 1147, northern crusaders petitioned to

be allowed to crusade against the Wends east of the Elbe rather than against Muslims in West Asia. Bernard agreed to their proposal and persuaded Eugenius, whom he met on April 6 at Clairvaux, to authorize it formally. Bernard decisively justified crusading in the new theater, forbidding the fighters to make any truce with the Wends "until such time as, with God's help, either their religion or nation shall be wiped out." This extraordinary statement, which was echoed in Eugenius' authorization, amounts to a proclamation of an uncompromising missionary war and corresponded to what had long been a feature of Latin Christian expansion. Eugenius' 1147 letter, *Divina dispensatione*, issued at Troyes on April 11, 1147, referred to the eastern Mediterranean and Iberian expeditions at the same time as he authorized the campaign against the Wends.

Bernard and Eugenius' joint emphasis on the "conversion or extermination" of the Wends has never been satisfactorily explained, especially since Bernard expressed opposition to forcible conversion on another occasion. It is worth reiterating that although theologically prohibited, forced conversions to Christianity accompanied Christian expansion from late antiquity through the early modern period. With any propaganda of Christian holy war, we face the underlying contradiction between a desire for conversion—or the conviction that a successful holy war would establish conditions favorable to conversion (and reduce the number of living human beings needing it)—and the theological tradition that non-Christians should not be forced but only persuaded to abjure their errors.

The crusade was now being planned on a gigantic scale. Eventually five armies converged on the eastern Mediterranean: those of Louis VII, Conrad III, Amadeus of Savoy, Alfonso Jordan of Toulouse, and an Anglo-Flemish force that helped Alfonso I of Portugal to take Lisbon on the way. Four more armies took the field in North Europe: a Danish force that joined one under Henry the Lion of Saxony and the archbishop of Bremen, and others led by Albert the Bear of Brandenburg and a brother of the Duke of Poland. In the Iberian Peninsula four campaigns were conducted: by the Genoese against Minorca, by Alfonso VII of Léon-Castile against Almeria, by the Count of Barcelona against Tortosa, and by Alfonso Henriques of Portugal against Santarem and Lisbon. As late as 1148, a fleet from Orkney, with crusaders from Orkney, Norway, and Iceland, departed for Jerusalem via the Mediterranean. On the way, they fought Muslims in the Iberian Peninsula as well as the enemies of the viscountess of Narbonne in southern Francia, and after visiting the Christian Holy Land they followed the pilgrim's road back: through Constantinople to Bulgaria, Apulia, and Rome, and then home. Contemporaries considered all these expeditions to be related parts of an overarching enterprise.

At the same time and deliberately so, Norman Sicily flexed its muscle under the rule of Roger II. Roger was expansionary and ambitious. He sought opportunity wherever it occurred and against whomever it pitted him. Similarly, in his own court, Roger pragmatically welcomed talented individuals who could help him achieve his goals, regardless of their religion, language, or original ethnic identity. For example, Roger entrusted the creation and leadership of his substantial fleet to his admiral (a word derived from the Arabic *emir*) George of Antioch, a Byzantine Christian who had previously served the Muslim ruler of Mahdia. George's leadership was pivotal in

the conquests in the south Mediterranean. In the early 1140s further Sicilian Norman expansion had occurred at the expense of papal territories. In 1147 Roger renewed attacks on the Byzantine Empire, and in 1148 his fleet, led by George, took the North African cities of Tripoli, Mahdia, Sfax, and Sousa, which were already heavily dependent on Sicilian grain.

Roger's campaigns were not technically part of the crusade. In the campaigns of the 1140s, Roger was seeking to strengthen preexisting economic and political advantages, as well as pursuing imperial ambitions. But that is not the main reason why his wars were not deemed crusades, then or now. Above all, Roger II was not aligned with the papacy by even the wildest stretch; he had conquered papal lands and the papacy had already been authorizing crusades against him. The major crusade of the 1140s served as both an opportunity and a challenge for Roger, since on the one hand, Conrad III, Roger's adversary, was removed from the immediate vicinity, while on the other, Conrad and Manuel I Komnenos affirmed a new alliance against Roger. In 1150, perhaps wary of the scales tipping too far against his interests, Roger entered an accord with Pope Eugenius III. We are reminded of the ambiguous lines differentiating crusading from other wars, and the complicated politics informing the perception of Christian warfare then and now.

In many respects great care was taken in the preparation of the crusade. The pope joined Bernard in preaching and recruitment and, although they may have differed slightly in their theologies of penance, the two men proposed a new type of remission of sins. Urban II's remission had been simply a guarantee that the labor of crusading was so unpleasant that it would constitute an entirely satisfactory penance. With Eugenius and Bernard, the emphasis shifted from the penitent's self-imposed punishment to God's merciful kindness, confirmed by the papal Power of the Keys, by means of which the pope could assure sinners of the remission of punishment as a reward for the action undertaken. Eugenius and Bernard also exploited pride in the past crusading experiences of previous generations, which had been locked into the collective memory of some kinships, and they directly appealed to the merchant classes by suggesting the crusade was a "great market" for spiritual wealth.

The success of all this propaganda can be measured not only by the response to it—this crusade, misleadingly labeled the "second" by earlier generations of Western historians, was much the largest since the First—but also by the number of those taking the cross who came from families that had provided recruits to earlier expeditions. This suggests that by the middle of the twelfth century there was a pool of potential crusaders, drawn especially from those committed kindred-groups in which recruitment had been concentrated at the time of the First Crusade. At this stage crusading was developing as much below the surface in the collective consciousness of certain noble and knightly families as in action and in the thinking of the theoreticians. This collective consciousness did not generate a massive response by itself and neither did the arrival of news from the eastern Mediterranean nor the enthusiasm of royal and papal leaders. But all these factors together and combined with highly effective propaganda did result in a large and multipronged military expedition.

Efforts were also made to ensure papal leadership and communicate in advance with key diplomatic contacts. Eugenius appointed papal legates for the Frankish army and for the campaigns against the Wends. Both Eugenius and Louis wrote to the kings of Hungary and Sicily and the Byzantine emperor Manuel Komnenos, informing them of their plans and asking for provisions and passage. Manuel replied cautiously, suggesting in one letter to the pope that the crusaders take the same oaths of homage to him as their predecessors had made to Alexius and asking in another for guarantees from the Franks that they would not harm the empire and would return to it cities that had once been under its control.

Attention was also paid to infrastructure and logistics. Louis embarked on laborious negotiations with institutions in his kingdom to raise funds. Conrad saw to it that roads through Germany were improved and bridges were repaired. There were splendid and solemn assemblies in Frankish and German lands at which plans were discussed.

But from all this planning there was a glaring omission: there was no consultation with the rulers of the crusader states. Twelve years later Pope Adrian IV was to remind Louis forcefully of this, pointing out the harm that ensued. The only possible explanation is that, although of course they planned to end their crusade with a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, Louis and Conrad were intending to march directly across Anatolia to Edessa, bypassing even the principality of Antioch. This plan must have been in the minds of those who took part in the assembly at Étampes on February 16, 1147, which had to make the final choice of a route eastward for Louis' companies. It had before it two options: to follow the overland road by way of the Balkans, Constantinople, and Anatolia; or to travel by sea from Sicily. Conrad III of Germany, who was on very bad terms with Roger II of Sicily, had apparently only considered the overland journey, which made sense if the prime target was Edessa.

At Étampes there were divisions of opinion and a heated debate—it seems that one party, with the support of an embassy from Roger, warned Louis against putting himself at the mercy of the Byzantines by going to Constantinople—but the overland route was decided upon and departure was set for June 15. A similar assembly at Frankfurt on March 13 was informed of the decision from Étampes, announced an itinerary through Hungary and set the middle of May as the date for departure of Conrad's forces, so as to march a few weeks ahead of the Franks. The two armies, which, like those of the First Crusade, contained many unarmed pilgrims as well as crusaders, were to join forces at Constantinople.

Movement of Conrad's armies to Constantinople was not quite as smooth as might have been expected. His forces left on the appointed date and passed through Regensburg and Vienna into Hungary, whose king had been persuaded that their passage would be more peaceful if he paid Conrad a large sum, levied from his church, with which to buy provisions. This ensured that there was no trouble. The expedition then came to the frontiers of the Byzantine Empire.

Manuel was on good terms with Conrad, with whom he was bound by an alliance against the southern Normans led by Roger II of Sicily. Manuel had, moreover, recently married Bertha of Sulzbach, Conrad's sister-in-law. Manuel did not fear and distrust

Conrad's contingents as he did the Franks, and his emissaries merely demanded an oath from them that they would not harm his interests in any way. When they had given this assurance, they were promised provisions and they marched by way of Niš, Sofia, Plovdiv, and Edirne to Constantinople.

But the cordial relationship between Conrad and Manuel could not prevent conflicts between crusaders and people in the locales they passed through. Ultimately, Conrad's forces reached Constantinople after a journey with numerous instances of plundering and dishonest trading, as well as a few brushes with the imperial forces. Most notably, these included a pitched battle outside the walls of Constantinople from which the Byzantines emerged superior.

Like his grandfather Alexios, Manuel was determined to deal with the crusade leaders separately by shipping them and their armies across the Bosporus as soon as possible after their arrival. He had even wanted Conrad to bypass Constantinople and cross the Dardanelles at Sestus. Conrad had demurred when this was first put to him, probably because he did not want to miss his rendezvous with Louis. But at the end of September, after about three weeks at Constantinople and the aforesaid battle outside its walls, Conrad agreed to be transported across the Bosporus, perhaps because the Byzantines had asked him to help them against Roger II of Sicily, who had now invaded Byzantine lands, and the request put him in a tricky position.

At any rate Conrad's army, supplemented by a recently arrived force from Lorraine and minus a few crusaders who chose to abandon the crusade and take up military service for Byzantium, crossed the straits and pressed on into West Asia. At Nicaea it gathered provisions for an advance on Konya. But it was so large—Conrad's followers had rejected his sensible suggestion that the non-combatants should be sent separately to Jerusalem—and its advance was so slow that its supplies were soon exhausted. Somewhere near Dorylaeum it was ambushed and defeated by regional Turkic forces. The crusaders' retreat became a rout, with the Turks harrying the columns at will, and the shattered army reached the relative safety of Nicaea at the beginning of November. Most of the crusaders now tried to return home, leaving Conrad and a much reduced force to send messengers begging Louis VII of France for aid.

Although Louis was viewed with much greater skepticism by Manuel and the Byzantines, his armies also proceeded to Constantinople with minimal issues. At the abbey church of St. Denis on June 11, Louis had venerated the relic of St. Denis, under whose patronage he was to believe himself to be throughout the crusade, had received the oriflamme, and had been presented with his pilgrim's purse by Pope Eugenius III himself. From Metz, which had been chosen as the mustering-point, his army marched by way of Worms to Regensburg, where it found boats ready to carry the baggage down the Danube as far as Bulgaria and where it began to follow the road already taken by Conrad's armies. Louis' contingent was amply supplied by the Hungarians, with whose king Louis was on good terms, and at great personal cost, Louis was able to keep his army provisioned in Byzantine territory until it reached Constantinople on October 4. Throughout the march he was forced to conduct negotiations with Manuel, whose ambassadors had met him at Regensburg, and like Conrad, he refused to bypass the city of Constantinople.

Manuel made much more stringent demands of Louis than he had of Conrad. He knew that the Franks had been in touch with Roger II of Sicily—in fact a party of Frankish crusaders did travel to Constantinople by way of the southern Italic Peninsula—and he must have been conscious of the ties of sentiment and national identity that bound Franks and Normans alike to the settlers in the crusader states. For example, the prince of Antioch was the uncle of Eleanor, Queen of France and Duchess of Aquitaine. Furthermore, Manuel's representatives may well have informed him of statements made by members of a party of crusaders headed by Bishop Godfrey of Langres, which was bitterly hostile to the Byzantines.

Manuel's concerns about Louis' Franks are not hard to understand and, indeed, would seem to have been obvious. Nonetheless the crusaders seem to have been bewildered by the news, which reached them when they were a day's march from Constantinople, that Manuel had made a treaty with the Seljuk sultan at Konya, through whose territory they would have to pass. In their camp before Constantinople, the fortifications of which Manuel had strengthened, the bishop of Langres' faction even proposed launching an attack upon the Byzantine capital. But there was to be no military confrontation between the Frankish crusaders and the Byzantines. Louis was welcomed by Manuel as a visiting ruler, albeit a subordinate one, and pledges were made between them.

Things did not go well for Louis and his crusaders once they left Constantinople. They had waited two weeks for other armies they knew were coming from Western Europe. Rumors of crusader successes ahead of them, which turned out to be false, made them restive, and Louis had to agree to a crossing of the Bosporus. Further negotiations with the Byzantines then held him up on the eastern side of the strait until the reinforcements arrived. In the end, Louis' crusaders paid homage to Manuel and promised not to take any place under imperial jurisdiction. In return they were promised guides and supplies, and the Byzantines recognized that they would have to plunder where provisions were not made available. At Nicaea the crusaders heard of the rout of Conrad's forces, and they were joined by Conrad and the remnants of his army.

At Esseron this combined group turned for the sea, abandoning the goal of recovering Edessa in hopes of an easier and better-supplied passage if they marched through Byzantine lands along the coast. At Ephesus Conrad, who was ill, left for Constantinople via a ship sent by Manuel, but Louis and his contingent pressed on, ignoring a warning that now-allied Danishmendid Turks and Seljuk Turks of Rum were gathering to oppose them. By the time they reached Eskihisar on January 3 or 4, 1148, they were desperately short of provisions, and during the march to Antalya they suffered severely from Turkic harassing attacks, which local inhabitants and garrisons were unwilling to hinder. Eventually the Templars with the group were put in charge of order on the march.

Once at Antalya, isolated and beyond Byzantine territory, the crusaders found little in the way of supplies, particularly for their horses, which were now decimated by starvation. A fleet promised by the Byzantines to transport them all to Antioch proved to be so small that it could only take a fraction of them. In the end Louis left the majority of his people behind and embarked by ship for Antioch, having tried to ensure that the bulk of his force was fitted out for the overland journey. Only a small number managed

to get through. By the time Louis reached Antioch on March 19, he wished only to press on to Jerusalem to fulfill his vow and refused to participate in any military campaign.

But Conrad and the other crusaders with him were already at Jerusalem, together with new arrivals from Europe, and a council of war was held in Acre on June 24 and attended by Latin Christian rulers and nobles from the crusader states and Europe. The council decided to try to take Damascus. The proposal to target Damascus, which was only one of several discussed, was not as foolhardy as it is often supposed to have been. The destruction of the crusading armies to date had put an end to any hope of retaking Edessa. Damascus had already been attacked by Latin settlers in 1126 and 1129, on the latter occasion with the aid of crusaders who had traveled out from Europe. There were strong religious and strategic reasons for occupying the city, and there were sound political arguments as well. Zangi's career had shown how dangerous united Islamic rule in the region could be, and it could only be a matter of time before his son, Nur al-Din, who had just married 'Ismat al-Din Khatun, daughter of the regent of Damascus, took over the city unless he was forestalled.

In the middle of July 1147 the largest army yet put into the field by the Latins assembled at Tiberias under the command of Louis VII, Conrad III, and Baldwin III of Jerusalem. Damascus had sent appeals for help to Nur al-Din and his brother. The Latins approached the city from the west, where the suburban orchards would provide them with supplies of timber, food, and water. Driving the city's defenders back from the banks of the Barada river on July 24, the Latin forces occupied a good position from which to launch an assault, but they now made a bad decision. Knowing that the eastern wall was less well fortified and conscious that the impending arrival of armies of relief made a rapid capture imperative, they shifted their camp on July 27 to an exposed site with no water and little food. They were trapped as a result. The eastern walls may not have been recently improved, but they were strong enough to hold the besiegers up. The crusaders could not return to the western side, which was quickly reoccupied by the Damascenes. They had placed themselves in a position from which they could only withdraw, which is what they did.

This ended the crusade in West Asia, which had affirmed Byzantine relations with some in Latin Christendom and undermined them with others. On the one hand, on his way home Conrad III met Manuel at Thessalonia and agreed on an alliance against Roger II of Sicily. Crusaders from northern Europe also concluded their expedition with a friendly visit to Constantinople. On the other hand, among Louis' Frankish contingents there were bitter recriminations and accusations of treachery. Frankish hostility was fanned when a Byzantine fleet, still at war with Roger II of Sicily, attacked a Sicilian squadron in which Louis and his entourage were returning home. Louis narrowly escaped capture. His wife, Eleanor of Aquitaine, was in another ship and detained by the Byzantines for a time. On his arrival in Europe Louis began to plan a new crusade with Roger II of Sicily and Pope Eugenius III, which, like Bohemond of Taranto's, was intended to wreak vengeance on Byzantium on its way. Awareness of this heightened Frankish anger was surely a major factor in Manuel's deliberately pro-Latin approach to diplomacy from 1150 onward.

Meanwhile, in mid-July 1147, in what is now northeastern Germany a large army under Henry the Lion set out from Artlenburg and laid siege to the Wendish stronghold of Dobin, where it was joined by the Danes. The siege, marked by a Wendish sortie that inflicted heavy casualties on the Danes, ended inconclusively with a peace treaty, according to which the Wends renounced idolatry and the Wendish prince Niklot became an ally and tributary of Count Adolf of Holstein, with whom he had had good relations before the crusade had disrupted them. Early in August the main crusade force under Albert the Bear, which was certainly massive, left Magdeburg. Crossing the Elbe, these crusaders raided enemy country before dividing, with one part laying siege unsuccessfully to Demmin and the other marching on Szczecin (Stettin), which was in fact already Christian.

More was achieved in the Iberian Peninsula. The first party of crusaders to leave home, men from the Low Countries, the Rhineland, and Anglo-Norman regions, set sail from Dartmouth and arrived at Porto (Oporto) in Portugal in June 1147. Latin Christian Portugal had newly declared itself a kingdom rather than a county under the rule of Afonso I of Portugal, son of Teresa, who had defeated the Almoravid governor of Córdoba. The Latin Portuguese persuaded the crusaders to take part in the siege of Lisbon, which was surrendered to them on October 24. In the southeast of the peninsula, Almeria, the chief port for trade with North Africa and the eastern Mediterranean and already contested by the emirs of Granada and Valencia, fell to combined Castilian, Aragonese, south Frankish, Genoese, and Pisan forces on October 17. At the end of 1148 the Aragonese, south Frankish, and Genoese crusaders went on to take Tortosa, and in the autumn of 1149 they occupied Lérida, Fraga, and Mequinenza, the last Muslim-ruled outposts in the northeast of the peninsula.

The Iberian conquests were the only successes of the crusade, as contemporaries were quick to point out. And yet as historians, we can recognize that the Iberian conquests may well have happened without the papal declaration of crusade. Latin Christian rulers in the peninsula were already motivated by their own ideology of Christian dominance and the crumbling of Almoravid power in the peninsula, and the rise of another round of *ta'ifa* kingdoms made the 1140s an opportune moment for expansion. Elsewhere the huge burst of Latin Christian military activity had had insignificant results. A strategy on this scale was never to be attempted again.

The Ambiguity of Crusading

The varied and continued history of crusading in the first half of the twelfth century may tempt us to imagine crusading as a fully conceptualized and uniformly executed phenomenon from the start. The terms we use—such as "the crusades" and "the crusading movement"—hardly help, and neither does the neat sequential numbering of "major" crusades put in place by earlier generations of Western historians and still regularly used. Yet this was far from the truth. Crusading as a form of Christian holy war developed haphazardly and unevenly. Even those who supported the general concept

often disagreed on particulars, and once formed, theories of how crusading should work were often, if not usually, upended by practice. The boundaries between crusading, other Christian wars, and various forms of Christian devotion were likewise vague, particularly in the twelfth century.

The ambiguity of crusading in the first half of the twelfth century reflects two broad issues: the nascent and liminal nature of crusading and the question of evidence. First, as discussed earlier in this book, crusading arose out of related and preexisting traditions of Christian war—including just war and holy war—as well as Christian religious rhetoric and devotional practices. The First Crusade did represent ideological innovation, particularly in the concept of penitential violence, but it also made use of imagery, ideology, rhetoric, and practices already in place. Continuities with existing cultural patterns helped generate the enthusiastic response to Urban II's appeal to armsbearers in 1095, and such continuities also helped ensure that crusading could be hard to distinguish from other elements of surrounding cultures.

Second, the evidence we have for early twelfth-century crusading is more limited than the evidence we have for later centuries of crusading. The early twelfth-century evidence is so limited that it is even hard to tell how well that evidence represents attitudes toward crusading in the early twelfth century. For example, our remaining narrative accounts of the First Crusade conspicuously support the papacy and the reform movement and glorify Urban II and/or the temporal leaders of the First Crusade. Thus, even if we assume the evidence we have is relatively complete, we are forced to acknowledge that it showcases a limited set of views and perspectives. Because even the historical evidence for Latin Christian attitudes toward crusading in the early twelfth century is limited in these ways, historians frequently debate most aspects of the early crusading movement.

It does appear to have been indisputable to Latin Christian contemporaries in the early twelfth century that the enterprise of the First Crusade had been truly divine. The experiences of the crusaders on the second wave of the First Crusade were crucial to the development of this belief. In particular, the conviction that everything they did was subject to the control of God seems to have grown among the crusaders once West Asia had been crossed. It was then that visionaries in the army began to see apparitions—Christ himself, angels, saints, and the ghosts of their own dead—and that the fallen began to be treated as martyrs. This was reinforced by the discovery of relics, by the veneration of sites familiar to every Christian mind, and by fortuitous disturbances in the night skies—auroras, comets, shooting-stars—most of which were preludes to an intense period of solar activity, "the medieval maximum," which began around 1120. The crusaders were not fools. They knew how much at a disadvantage they had been and yet they had still been victorious. Lacking knowledge of the internal dynamics of the various Islamic polities in the eastern Mediterranean and West Asia, and desirous of validation of their actions, it seemed the only explanation was that they had experienced God's interventionary might. The implication was that they were indeed participating in key events in sacred history. The failures of the third wave in 1101 actually reinforced this impression, because they suggested that the opposition defeated by the second wave had been more powerful than it was.

This key idea—that the crusade was a divinely directed and spiritually beneficial holy war and formed part of the divine plan—was taken up and elaborated upon in the early twelfth century by mostly monastic historians and commentators, particularly three Frankish Benedictines: Guibert of Nogent, Baldric of Bourgueil, and Robert the Monk. These men, writing years after the conquest of Jerusalem, placed the crusade in the context of providential history: to Robert, for example, it was the clearest sign of divine intervention in this dimension after the creation and the redemption of humankind on the cross. These writers also put crusading elements firmly into a theological context, relating martyrdom on crusade, for example, to Christian love, and linking calls for vengeance to devotion to and compassion for Christ.

In other words, in their writings the idea of the crusade as a war for Christ was given theological expression. The First Crusade seemed almost a pilgrimage on which knights could fulfill their normal function as warriors in a divinely mandated holy war against God's enemies—almost a quasi-monastery on the move. They were described like monks as "exiles" from the normal world. They had made vows and endured the exigencies of the campaign, taking up their crosses to follow Christ and had abandoned wives, children, and lands for the love of God, putting their bodies at risk out of love for their brothers and ultimately experiencing an almost Christ-like victory. Like monks, they were "imitators of Christ." Like monks, they engaged in regular communal devotions and just as monks made an interior journey to Jerusalem, they made a corporeal one. Since an aim of the reform movement had been to monasticize the whole church, it seemed that here at last the laity was falling into line.

From our perspective, it is easy to question these claims. For example, thanks in large part to David S. Bachrach, we know that Christian armies made communal devotions and otherwise engaged in communal religious practices in wartime from antiquity onward.[11] The bigger point is that monastic writers made an extraordinarily rapid transfer to crusading of phrases and images traditionally associated with monasticism: the knighthood of Christ, the way of the cross, the way to a heavenly Jerusalem, spiritual warfare. This was no doubt facilitated by the intense military symbolism and rhetoric that Katherine Allen Smith has shown was already pervasively embedded in Latin Christian monasticism.[12] In other words, whether or not the reality of crusading warfare was dramatically different in kind from earlier Christian war (and Christian holy war), in the early twelfth century accounts it was deliberately represented as such.

But there was much that was still amorphous and unformed about crusading, even in the most carefully crafted monastic accounts. Many questions had still to be answered. What distinguished a crusade from any Christian holy war, or armed pilgrimage for that matter? Under what circumstances, against what targets, and in what theaters of war could crusades be fought? Could they be proclaimed only by popes? What powers of control over crusaders did the Church of Rome have? How did the assurance of the remission of sins actually work, and to whom did it actually apply? How were crusades, which were very expensive, to be financed? The twelfth century and beyond were to be taken up with providing answers to these questions and yet others. But when we look at the early-twelfth-century crusading movement

in practice, we find such confusion that it has been possible for historian Christopher Tyerman to question whether it existed at all.[13]

One of the central and most pressing problems highlighted by the First Crusade itself was that of control. For the First Crusade, parish priests had been given the job of regulating recruitment—no one was to take the cross without going to his parish priest for advice—but the parochial system was not yet ready to cope. Bishops were supposed to enforce the fulfillment of vows if need be, although it is impossible to know how many of those who carried out their vows on the third wave did so because of threats of excommunication or because they were inspired or shamed by the news of the conquest of Jerusalem. The papal legates and clergy with the First Crusade should have had some control over the crusaders, but as the household-priests of lay magnates, these clergy were not the men to challenge or discipline their employers. The Church of Rome failed to prevent the massacres of Jews in 1096 and the establishment of the new, anti-reform crusader states.

Whether crusaders in fact wished for papal control is a different question. One can discern among the Latin laity both a desire for more direct papal involvement—letters from crusaders back to Urban II asked him to join the crusade to provide direction—and a decided independence of mind. Indeed, despite the efforts of chroniclers to present crusading as an instance of Christian unity, divisions among the lay and clerical leaders of the First Crusade remain clearly visible in the sources.

In the first half of the twelfth century, men and women may have considered themselves free to take the cross at any time, without the precondition of papal proclamation. People certainly felt free to apply the ideas, imagery, and rhetoric of crusading—all of which reflected existing cultural themes—to any conflict about which the promoters or the participants felt strongly, and to launch crusades without prior papal proclamation. For example, Count Helias of Maine, who was devout and had taken the cross, refused to join the First Crusade because King William II of England was threatening his county. He was said to have defended it wearing the cross, as though engaged in a personal crusade. Already in 1103, Henry IV of Germany had committed himself to a penitential war in the eastern Mediterranean without reference to the papacy and had himself authorized the preaching of it by the bishop of Würzburg. (Henry must have been trying to reassert his traditional role as defender of Christendom, which, from Henry's perspective, had been usurped by Pope Urban in 1095.) And as already discussed, any number of expeditions were deemed crusades by the papacy after they had already been launched.

Another point of confusion was the relationship, or lack thereof, between crusading and pilgrimage. During the First Crusade the rules of pilgrimage relating to penance and the carrying of weapons had been modified. Previously, pilgrims to Jerusalem had been supposed to travel weaponless, and this feature of penances was so deeply embedded in contemporary thinking that once Jerusalem had been secured in the Battle of Ascalon in 1099, the ordinary rules of penitential pilgrimage again prevailed. Casting their weapons away, many, if not all, of the crusaders started for home carrying nothing but their palm fronds, which were evidence that they had completed their pilgrimage. They did this notwithstanding the fact that the return journey, at least in its initial stages, must have

been as dangerous as the crusade itself had been, if not more so now that crusaders were recognized as a violent threat.

Some crusaders thus became pilgrims, and some pilgrims proved themselves willing to bear arms: after 1100 pilgrims to the eastern Mediterranean were quite often described as being prepared to fight. The crusader and historian Fulcher of Chartres, who was in the Kingdom of Jerusalem at the time, stated that in 1105 the Fatimids were planning an invasion "because we were so few and were without the help of the usual pilgrims." He also wrote with respect to the year 1113 that "it is usual in these overseas parts for our army to grow daily at this time, because the pilgrims have arrived."

But the military service of these early-twelfth-century pilgrims conformed to a particular pattern: they do not seem to have volunteered for action until after they had fulfilled their religious obligations. Consider, for example, the Norwegians who left Bergen in 1107 in a large fleet under the command of King Sigurd I. After a leisurely journey by way of England, Frankish lands, Iberia, and Sicily they reached Acre in the summer of 1110. Sigurd was persuaded to help King Baldwin take the city of Sidon, but the Norwegians agreed to assist the kingdom only after they had been to Jerusalem, because Christ had ordered "his faithful followers first to seek the kingdom of God and afterwards to find all the beneficial things they sought." So twelfth-century pilgrims behaved in precisely the opposite way to those First Crusaders who had self-consciously reverted to an unarmed state once they had taken Jerusalem.

Furthermore, within Frankish regions, it seems that for half a century after the First Crusade pilgrimaging was far more appealing to Latin Christian armsbearers than crusading. Although most crusaders from these regions did not feel the urge to crusade again, a number of them returned to Jerusalem as pilgrims. The Limousin, where there had been great enthusiasm for the First Crusade, provides us with the name of only one possible crusader for the period from 1102 to 1131, but it generated many pilgrims and an intense emotional attachment to Jerusalem was still in evidence. No crusader has been identified in the period between 1103 and 1147 from Provence, where there had again been an enthusiastic response in 1096, but there were many pilgrims to Jerusalem. Much the same picture is to be found in Champagne. To many armsbearers in these regions, the First Crusade must have seemed a unique opportunity, and now they turned back to the traditional devotional practice of pilgrimage. This stands in stark contrast with the examples already given of those engaged in warfare who eagerly embraced the sanctifying elements of crusading. Crusading as a devotional practice seems to have been less eagerly pursued in the early twelfth century than crusading as a mode of warfare.

When crusading failed, that failure called into question the divine nature of holy war. Faced with this apparent moral paradox—that God had abandoned his own armies—contemporaries put forward a range of different explanations. After the substantial crusading disappointments of the 1140s, two commentators took the view that the whole enterprise had been accursed: the Latin settlers had displayed avarice and the crusaders, who had deviated from rectitude, had been allowed by God to be deceived by preachers and false miracles in order to perish. Other commentators, echoing the interpretations of the disasters of 1101, explained the failures as a punishment meted out

on the crusaders, whose own wicked behavior had led God to withdraw his favor, and they tended to attribute the successes in Iberia to the humility of the crusaders there. In this storm of protest and blame, the forbearance of two leading Cistercian participants stands out. Bishop Otto of Freising, Conrad III's half-brother and the leader of one of his contingents in West Asia, attributed failure to the mysterious but always benevolent ways of God, and expressed confidence that the crusade conferred spiritual benefits on participants regardless of its military failures. Bernard of Clairvaux, the "pseudo-prophet" on whom widespread blame was heaped, similarly asked, "How can human beings be so rash as to dare to pass judgment on something that they are not in the least able to understand? . . . The promises of God never prejudice the justice of God."

CHAPTER 6
DEVELOPMENT, 1150–98

In the aftermath of their defeat at Damascus, Latin Christians in the crusader states and Europe were demoralized. It was impossible to ignore the implication of the Latins' crusading failures in West Asia: God did not favor their cause, which, since these were supposedly holy wars, meant that they had been wrong on nothing less than a question of divine will. At the same time, it is possible to overstate the extent of this demoralization. Crusading failures in the late 1140s in no way undid the success of the First Crusade and other crusades in the early twelfth century, and failure could, furthermore, be a reason to do more and better, and to celebrate moments of divine approval in the past. The crusading movement continued to build in the later twelfth century. As a result of this growth, in some ways, the ambiguity and versatility of crusading in the early twelfth century gave way to greater codification in the second half of that century. But crusading remained more complicated and flexible than might be imagined. It also continued to function as one mode of Christian holy warfare among others in different theaters and against different opponents.

Traditions and Theories of Crusading

Earlier chapters have already described how important kin groups were to the crusading effort. As the twelfth century continued, Latin noble and knightly families built up traditions that would benefit the crusading movement for centuries to come. Many examples are to be found. For instance, Count Thierry of Flanders, a nephew of the Count Robert who had played a distinguished role in the First Crusade, took part in the major crusade of the 1140s and also visited West Asia in 1139, 1157, and 1164. His wife, Sibylla of Anjou, King Fulk of Jerusalem's daughter by his first marriage, ended her days as a nun at Bethany. His son Philip led an armed company to the eastern Mediterranean in 1177 and died during on crusade in the 1190s. His grandson Baldwin would crusade in the early thirteenth century and became the first Latin emperor of Constantinople.

While it may seem at first glance that family traditions mostly involved only the men of a given family, a closer look at all available evidence shows that, rather, the influence of noblewomen in the development of crusading families continued after the First Crusade. For example, the niece of Rotrou III, Count of Perche—as she signed her letter, "B"—wrote eloquently and firmly to her uncle to exhort him to crusade again. Rotrou had already fought on the First Crusade and also in the Iberian Peninsula. His maternal family was prestigious (it could be traced back to Charlemagne) and connected

him, through blood and marriage, to the crowns of Aragon, Sicily, and Navarre. Indeed, historical analysis suggests "B" may have been Blanche of Navarre, writing in the 1140s.[1] Notwithstanding the patriarchal and patrilineal culture of Latin Christendom, crusading was an important part of family traditions for both men and women. Furthermore, while Jerusalem had a central importance, family traditions of crusading fluidly accommodated crusading in different places, precisely because said families often extended throughout Latin Christendom.

In the development of these traditions, laypeople were appropriating crusading for themselves at a time when clerics were expressing a growing respect for the idea of a lay vocation. We have seen that theologians working just after the liberation of Jerusalem in 1099 had been concerned to monasticize the movement and to treat crusaders as temporary quasi-monks. This view of crusaders faded as the element of religious profession was channeled into the military orders, and by the late 1180s and 1190s the movement's character was much more clearly that of a lay devotion. Crusading was connected to lay concerns of lineage, reputation, and domestic custom, just as it was connected to spiritual concerns. As a result of these connections, we see crusading culture becoming part of popular culture in Latin Christian Europe in the twelfth century. Examining a few well-known examples of these cultural expressions will bring this point to life.

We begin with the sculptural group from *c*. 1150 to 1175 known as *Le Rétour du Croisé* (The return of the crusader), originally located in the priory of Belval, founded by the Vaudémont family, and now located in the Church of Nancy in what is now northeast France. This intimate sculptural group shows a man and a woman (Figure 6.1). The man faces us while the woman is turned toward the man, with one arm behind him and the other resting on his chest in front. The man is bearded, with long braided hair and worn-out shoes. He wears a pilgrim's cap and staff and a cross on his chest. The woman wears a long tunic and surcoat, and her hair is covered. It is most likely that the couple represent noble benefactors of the priory of Belval, that is, members of the Vaudémont family.

Nurith Kenaan-Kedar and Benjamin Kedar have persuasively argued that this sculptural group was most likely commissioned by Aigeline of Burgundy, and that the group depicts Aigeline with her husband, Hugh I of Vaudémont, who crusaded in the 1140s before dying in approximately 1155. They note that the intimacy and emotional immediacy of the sculptural group should be seen as a new trend. At the same time, in line with the conventions of the time, the focus of the group is the person being commemorated—in this case, Hugh—while the patron of the piece, Aigeline, is a smaller figure. Together, Hugh and Aigeline represent "the ideal virtues of Christian nobility": piety, fidelity, charity, and humility. The sculptural group then shows us a noble married couple joined intimately in their support of crusading—which was still clearly linked with pilgrimage—and each other. Furthermore, it arguably shows us a noble widow's choice of how to commemorate her deceased spouse.[2]

Twelfth-century literature also reflected a lay focus on crusading, bolstered by an overall growth in literacy and an enormous blossoming of vernacular literature in the twelfth century. The twelfth century saw the establishment of the great vernacular epic



Figure 6.1 *Le Rétour du Croisé* sculptural group, late twelfth century.
© Wikimedia Commons (public domain).

cycles in Latin Christendom. These epics centered on the great deeds of past heroes and thus were known as the *chansons de geste* ("songs of deeds"). One such epic cycle, the Crusade Cycle, which would ultimately become a corpus of related, yet distinct, epics related to the crusades by the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, originated in the twelfth-century *Chanson d'Antioche* (*Song of Antioch*). The quasi-historical *Chanson d'Antioche* was immensely popular, and there were variants in a wide range of vernacular European languages. The epic depicts the conquest of Antioch during the First Crusade, emphasizing themes of divinely inspired vengeance, the conflation of Jews and Muslims as "enemies of Christ," and the crusaders' pious suffering and violence. It also clearly noted the important contributions of individual crusaders, many of whom were carefully named.

Like epic poetry, some lyric songs also expressed crusading themes related to various crusading venues. The earliest that survive date from the 1140s to 1150s and come from a range of medieval genres: *sirventes* (songs with a moral point, often satirical); *pastorela* (songs in which a knight and shepherdess meet, often humorous); *planh* (a funeral lament); and songs of courtly love. The presence of songs with crusading themes reflects

not only that crusading had become part of Latin Christian culture but also that many songs were written by those who crusaded themselves or were patronized by a crusader. Like the sculptural group *Le Rétour du Croisé* and the great epic cycles, these songs reflect noble, lay Christian piety and social values, which both affirmed and diverged from ecclesiastical ideas.

The variety of these cultural elements matched the wide range of theological arguments made by canon lawyers and church theorists in the twelfth century. While there had been little attempt to systematize the theology of indulgences in the eleventh century and first half of the twelfth century, this changed in the later twelfth century, as Ane Bysted has shown. This was not so much a result of crusading per se but, rather, a consequence of the foundation and rapid growth of universities in Europe. Universities served to establish relatively large communities of highly educated individuals focused intently on the debate and clarification of theology in order to understand established Christian doctrines, such as penances and indulgences.[3] There were many different explanations for the mechanics of an indulgence in the twelfth century. Nonetheless, Bysted suggests there were three main threads of explanation: an indulgence worked because the deeds and contrition of an individual were sufficient penance; an indulgence worked because an individual's efforts were supported and enhanced by the community of Christians; or an indulgence worked because it was issued by someone with divine authority.[4] For our purposes, we will refer to these three conceptualizations as "individual effort," "shared effort," and "divine authority." These different conceptualizations of the indulgence had implications for crusading. Whether indulgences' effectiveness was due to divine authority, or an individual's own efforts, or the efforts of all of Christendom, affected how crusading functioned and how its successes and failures were perceived.

In the long run the publication, probably around 1140, of the legal text known as Gratian's *Decretum* helped secure greater acceptance of the idea that crusades were authorized by the papacy, which could be seen as support for the "divine authority" conceptualization of indulgences. The *Decretum* would become the standard compilation of Latin canon law and lent weight to justifications of the Church of Rome's right to direct the crusading movement. A long section, Causa XXIII, was devoted to violence. Although on the surface this section did not deal explicitly with crusading—it started with the issue of the suppression of heresy by force—consciousness of crusading lay behind an armory of arguments for the church's authorization of violence. The Causa led readers inexorably through a panoply of authorities to the conclusions that war need not be sinful, could be just, and could be authorized by God and, on God's behalf, by the pope.

Box 6.1 Canon Law

Canon law is Christian religious law—norms, policies, and regulations to govern Christian behavior and relations toward other Christians and those outside the church—determined by formal councils within a particular church hierarchy.

The name was derived from the Greek *kanon,* meaning "(straight) ruler." In the medieval Latin tradition, canon law developed from late Roman canon law and eventually came to include papal pronouncements as well as conciliar decisions. In the early Middle Ages Latin canon laws were compiled in private collections, but between the twelfth to fourteenth centuries serious efforts were made to standardize Latin canon law and ensure its functionality as a separate legal system. The principle that clerics should be subject to canon law and ecclesiastical discipline and thus not subject to the temporal laws and punishments of various rulers or nations persisted into the modern period in some nations' principle of the "benefit of clergy."

But although papal authority over the crusading movement may have been established by Bernard and Eugenius III and affirmed by Gratian's *Decretum*, the papacy and Latin theologians were not always in firm agreement on which approach to penance was correct for the crusading movement in the later twelfth century. In 1157, 1165, and 1166 Popes Adrian IV and Alexander III resorted to variations of the "divine authority" formulation found in *Quantum praedecessores.* Yet by 1169 the decision had been made to return to the concept of "individual effort." This was stressed in Alexander's appeal of that year by referring explicitly to "that remission of penance imposed by the priestly ministry which Urban and Eugenius are known to have established." For the next thirty years the papacy stuck to the "individual effort" formulation.

At the same time, these three conceptualizations were not mutually exclusive. For example, the great crusade letter of 1187, *Audita tremendi*, used the conceptualization of "individual effort" to explain why crusaders would receive remission of sins:

> To those who with contrite hearts and humbled spirits undertake the labour of this journey and die in penitence for their sins and with right faith we promise full indulgence of their faults and eternal life; whether surviving or dying they shall know that through the mercy of God and the authority of the apostles Peter and Paul, and our authority, they will have relaxation of the satisfaction imposed for all their sins of which they have made proper confession.

That is, if crusading was undertaken with the true faith and right intention— that is, the intention to do penance—a crusader would receive full indulgence for all confessed sins. At the same time, divine and papal authority were also prominently referenced: "through the mercy of God and the authority of the apostles . . . and our authority." Later, *Audita tremendi* also used the idea of "shared effort" to explain why Salah al-Din had been able to conquer Jerusalem—that is, why the crusade effort had so dramatically failed—in 1187:

> Faced by such great distress concerning that land, moreover, we ought to consider not only the sins of its inhabitants but also our own and those of the whole Christian

> people. . . . It is, therefore, incumbent upon all of us to consider and to choose to amend our sins by voluntary chastisement and to turn to the Lord our God with penance and works of piety; and we should first amend in ourselves what we have done wrong and then turn our attention to the treachery and malice of the enemy.

The Latins' loss of Jerusalem reflected the moral status of all Christendom, and any future crusade success would depend on penitence for all Latin Christians together, whether they crusaded themselves or not. All three conceptualizations—"individual effort," "shared effort," and "divine authority"—were echoed in the preaching of the crusade, which was everywhere characterized by calls to repentance. Indeed, this combined train of thought would manifest itself until the sixteenth century in the way general councils, summoned to reform the Latin Church of Rome, were associated with the pursuit of divine will and the need to assure crusading success.

Crusading in Practice

To what extent did crusading in the later twelfth century actually resemble all these theories, or, indeed, the lay idealizations found in family histories and literary dramas? In a word, imperfectly.

After the failures of crusading in West Asia in the 1140s, we see continued interest in crusading there yet little actually done. The planning of a new crusade after Louis VII's return to Europe came to nothing. Crises in the crusader states continued to occur, and they were invariably followed by embassies to Europe asking for help. Most of the appeals were directed to Louis, because of his known piety and commitment, and particularly interesting experiments in public relations were made under Amalric of Jerusalem, including the dispatch to Louis of the keys of the city of Jerusalem, recalling an offer made by the patriarch to Charlemagne three and a half centuries before. In response, as in 1120 and 1145, the popes issued general crusade letters, formally summoning the faithful to crusade in West Asia in 1157, 1165, 1166, 1169, probably in 1173, 1181, and 1184. These appeals did have an effect. In 1166 Henry II of England and Louis VII of the Franks planned the levying of an income and capital tax, similar to the later Saladin Tithe of 1188; some money was eventually sent to Jerusalem. And several small crusading expeditions, like that of Philip of Flanders in 1177, did reach the eastern Mediterranean.

But on the whole, appeals to crusade in West Asia were ignored and with good reason. After all, Jerusalem and most of the territory conquered in the first half of the century were still in Latin Christian hands, and until 1170 the Kingdom of Jerusalem must have appeared quite strong to Latin Christians in Europe, since it had been prepared to embark on its own campaigns of territorial aggrandizement. In any event, crusades—that is to say large armies of temporary soldiers who would return home once their vows had been fulfilled—were not a real answer to the Latin settlers' predicament, because the settlers required not the conquest of new land but an increase in the forces permanently garrisoning the territory already held. This is why there was so much emphasis in these

years on measures to increase the standing defense, such as Henry II of England's promise in 1172 to maintain 200 knights in Jerusalem for a year as part of his penance for the murder of Thomas Becket.

The popes who tried vainly to rouse Latin Christians to engage in holy war in West Asia made few efforts to intervene in other theaters, where Latin Christian warfare, often considered holy, continued on apace, whether considered a crusade by the papacy or not. As a result, just as in the first half of the twelfth century, historians are faced with great problems when they try to distinguish crusades from other forms of Christian holy war and violence. Remissions of sin, for example, were still occasionally granted by local clerics without formal papal authorization. And wars of Latin Christian expansion, clearly framed as holy and in line with the goals of the Church of Rome, continued actively in Iberia and North Europe, as discussed more herein. Against this background of chronic Latin Christian warfare represented as holy, the scarcity of papal crusade letters issued for theaters other than West Asia is striking. Was it a sign of demoralization, an indication that the papacy wanted to channel Latin Christian holy war in a particular direction, or, instead, recognition that the momentum in Iberia and the Baltics required no further papal motivation, especially since local ecclesiastical authorities were issuing their own spiritual assurances?

North Europe

It is too easy to imagine that because explicit papal bulls authorizing crusades in northern Europe slowed to a trickle, Latin Christian holy warfare in the region similarly wound down. This was not the case. After the 1140s, the Danes under King Valdemar I, often in alliance with Henry the Lion of Saxony, were particularly active in their pursuit of expansion and Christianization, stung by raids on their coastline by the Wends. Their efforts culminated in the capture of Rügen in 1168. They then began to attack the peoples living at the mouth of the River Oder. The conquest of Pomerania was accompanied by the foundation of monasteries as centers of active missionary work, which served to ensure the cultural and political subjugation of the conquered. The conquests brought not only new territory and prestige but also greater wealth to the conquerors and the clergy and churches accompanying them. Furthermore, conquered lands were seen as an opportunity for Latin Christian settlement, as was already the case in Iberia and West Asia.

Despite the lack of explicit papal involvement, both Valdemar and Henry the Lion clearly valued piety, and their conquests were admired by the papacy. Valdemar gave half his patrimony to churches, while Henry the Lion made a pilgrimage to Jerusalem in 1172–3. In 1169, Pope Alexander III wrote to the bishop of Roskilde to praise Valdemar, who

> inspired with the heavenly flame, strengthened by the arms of Christ, armed with the shield of faith, and protected by divine favour, has defeated those hard-hearted men by the might of his valiant arm, and has strenuously recalled them from their

Map 7 The Baltic Sea and Environs, *c.* 1100.

> most scandalous enormities to the faith and law of Christ, and has also subjected them to his dominion.[5]

Shortly thereafter, in 1171 or 1172, Alexander III issued the following remission of sins:

> We therefore grant to those who fight with might and courage against the aforesaid pagans one year's remission for the sins they confess and receive penance for . . . just as we usually grant to those who visit the sepulcher of the Lord; and if those who perish in the fight are doing their penance, to them we grant remission of all their sins.[6]

While not the full remission of sins granted to crusaders in West Asia, the papacy was nonetheless drawing a direct comparison between warfare in North Europe and pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and was willing to grant full remission of all sins if a warrior died. Alexander's letter also made clear that the expansion of Latin Christendom via warfare was a noted and admirable goal.

In 1169 Alexander III also confirmed the canonization of Duke Canute (henceforth St. Canute Lavard), father of Valdemar and heavenly protector of those who fought pagans in North Europe. In so doing, Alexander implicitly affirmed the righteousness of Valdemar's own rule. Furthermore, as Kurt Villads Jensen has explained, the canonization of Saint Canute was accompanied by the development of Danish naval confraternities (i.e., organizations of lay Christians) dedicated to piously fighting "pagans" and expanding Latin Christendom. First attested to in the mid-twelfth century, such confraternities claimed Saint Canute's patronage and were emulated by the Danish crown as the twelfth century continued. The confraternities' goal of waging holy war and supporting territorial expansion on an ongoing, local basis, as well as their connections with crusading monarchs and saints, reminds us of parallel developments in the Iberian Peninsula, as well as in Frankish domains and, indeed, the crusader states in West Asia.[7]

Iberian Peninsula and the Western Mediterranean

In the Iberian Peninsula, as in North Europe, there was a relative lack of explicit papal letters authorizing crusades, but no lack of Christian holy warfare. As discussed in the last chapter, in the 1140s, the power of the Almoravids in the peninsula was crumbling, leading to a second rise of small, independent, Muslim-ruled *ta'ifa* statelets and opportunities for conquest. Latin Christian rulers in the peninsula competed with these *ta'ifa* statelets and each other, as well as with the dwindling Almoravid presence. Into this tumultuous political landscape, new actors entered from North Africa: *al-Muwahhidun* (the Almohads).

The Almohads, like the Almoravids, represented an Islamic religious movement that arose in North Africa and quickly claimed political power as well as spiritual authority. Sometimes translated as "Unitarians," their name means, strictly speaking, "those who profess the Oneness of God," and their theology drew on a mix of Sunni

and Shi'ite forms of Islam, as well as ideas from a Muslim rationalist school of thought known as Mu'tazilism. The Almohads defeated the Almoravids in North Africa first and then proceeded to the Iberian Peninsula starting in 1146. Seville and Córdoba were conquered or surrendered by 1149, and the further conquest of Muslim-ruled Iberia was largely complete by 1172. Like the Almoravids, the Almohads envisioned and achieved an empire that encompassed North Africa and southern Iberia, linking the Sahara and the Mediterranean and their respective trade routes.

This imperial vision was not welcomed by all Muslims in the Iberian Peninsula. For example, Ibn Mardanish maintained independent rule of the *ta'ifa* of Murcia for decades, in part by forming key alliances with Léon-Castile, Genoa, and Pisa. And while the Almohads certainly forced Latin Christian rulers in the peninsula onto the defensive, in the first decades of the Almohad conquests, Latin Christians were primarily occupied with their own dynastic contentions. The one Latin Christian ruler who had military success against the Almohads—Alfonso I of Portugal—was also viewed as a serious threat by his Latin Christian peers.

Whether due to low morale after the 1140s crusade, the desire to keep Latin Christian attention on West Asia, or the preoccupation of Latin Christian monarchs, through most of the second half of the twelfth century there were only two papal crusade authorizations with respect to Iberia, written in 1153 and 1157–8. Pope Alexander III seems to have been prepared to grant only limited "remissions of sins" to fighters. That said, papal legates in Iberia, and even local bishops, issued such grants on their own initiative and in 1166 the Council of Segovia was prepared to offer the same remission as that granted to pilgrims to Jerusalem to those who would defend Castile against, apparently, Latin invaders. The participants in the defense of Huete in 1172 were granted remission of sins, but no letter of authorization seems to have been written.

The papal approach to Iberia would change somewhat in the later twelfth century, as conflicts came to a head in the peninsula. Alfonso VIII of Castile came of age in 1169, Ibn Mardanish died in 1172, Alfons II of Aragon-Barcelona reached his majority in 1174, and in 1171, the Almohad caliph Abu Ya'qub Yusuf came to the peninsula to lead his wars in person. In 1189, two fleets of Frisian, Danish, Flemish, German, and English crusaders bound for the eastern Mediterranean helped Sancho I of Portugal take Silves and Alvor. The Almohad caliph returned to Iberia in 1184, and his son and heir, Abu Yusuf al-Mansur, came similarly in 1191 and 1195.

All this activity seems to have generated papal attention. In 1193 and 1197, Pope Celestine III issued crusade letters. In the second of these the pope decreed that residents of Aquitaine might commute to the Iberian Peninsula their vows for Jerusalem. This was in response to the victories of Abu Yusuf al-Mansur, especially his defeat of Alfonso VIII of Castile at Alarcos in 1195, which alarmed the papacy. Yet despite the alarm and the real threat, crusading in the Iberian Peninsula did not really pick up again until the early thirteenth century.

The most significant crusading development in the Iberian Peninsula in the later twelfth century was the establishment of proto-national military orders, drawing their inspiration partly from the Hospitallers and Templars and partly from short-lived

societies founded by Alfonso I of Aragon to defend Saragossa in 1122 and Monreal del Campo in *c*. 1128. The first Iberian military order came into existence when in 1157 the Templars returned the exposed frontier castle of Calatrava to Sancho III of Castile. At the king's court in Toledo was Raimundo, the abbot of the Cistercian abbey of Fitero. One of his monks, Diego Velázquez, who had been a knight, persuaded him to ask for the castle, and volunteers were summoned to defend it. Many of these men were formed into a confraternity, and in 1164 they were admitted into the Cistercian Order and were given a modified Cistercian rule. The foundation of this order, the Order of Calatrava, was followed by those of Evora, later known as Avis and affiliated to Calatrava, soon after 1166; Santiago in 1170; Montegaudio in *c*. 1173, which was absorbed by Calatrava in *c*. 1221; and shortly before 1176 San Julian del Pereiro, which was also affiliated to Calatrava and in the thirteenth century took the name of Alcántara. These orders flourished in Castile, Léon, and Portugal but not in Aragon, where the Templars and the Hospitallers were predominant.

The Iberian military orders were used to defend the invasion routes leading from North Africa, but they also undertook military campaigns, ransomed prisoners, and actively settled border regions under their control with Christian peasants. Their emergence signaled a developing feature of the crusading movement in Iberia and North Europe: its proto-national character. Half a century before, Latin Christians in Iberia had been joined by many volunteers from across the Pyrenees, but now these came less, partly because the Iberians themselves resented them. In February 1159 Pope Adrian IV had to discourage Louis VII of the Franks and Henry II of England from campaigning in the peninsula unless they had the permission of Latin rulers there, and he made it clear that they would not be welcome without prior negotiations.

Eastern Mediterranean and West Asia

The context of crusading in the eastern Mediterranean and West Asia continued to change in the later twelfth century. The Byzantine Empire, led by Manuel I Komnenos, "friend of the Latins," continued to assert its own Christian imperial sovereignty. Warned by the crusade of the 1140s of the potential risks of Latin ill will, from 1150 onward Manuel embarked on a sweeping campaign intended to strengthen his reputation in Latin eyes. Like his father and grandfather, he continued to employ Latins in his court, though not at dangerously high military levels. He also adopted Latin cultural practices like tournaments, encouraged dialogue between the Churches of Rome and Constantinople, and befriended the papacy, married himself and his family members to Latins, and emphatically proclaimed his commitment to the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem.

Manuel's actions did not indicate submission to Latin Christendom or an abandonment of the ideals and goals of his predecessors. Rather, he used these tactics to generate enough Latin goodwill that he was able to march in force to Antioch, publicly humiliate its count, and compel Antioch to recognize Byzantine overlordship without resulting Latin criticism. His relations with the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, meanwhile, could be characterized as not only friendly but also incisive. When Baldwin

III asked for a Byzantine wife in 1157, Manuel sent his niece Theodora and a great deal of wealth, but as a result, Baldwin was expected to—and did—recognize Byzantine imperial sovereignty. The same sequence of events took place after Amalric succeeded Baldwin III on the throne of Jerusalem in 1163.

Manuel used similar adroit maneuvers in dealing with other threats to the empire. He pivoted swiftly from war against Norman Sicily to an alliance with his former enemies in order to forestall the alarming rise of Frederick I Barbarossa. He supported this new alliance with Norman Sicily by funding local groups fighting Frederick and affirming his friendship for the papacy. Manuel dealt similarly with the Seljuk sultan of Rum, Qilij Arslan II, by allying with Qilij Arslan's enemies before embarking on a successful military expedition, which he framed with crusading rhetoric. Manuel's armies also defeated the Hungarians and an incipient rebellion by the Serbs, and, as we shall see, he allied with the Kingdom of Jerusalem in the 1160s to attempt to take Damietta.

Box 6.2 Prester John

Prester John was a legendary priest-king rumored to belong to an eastern sect of Christianity and to reign over a wealthy and powerful nation somewhere beyond the Mediterranean. Latin Christians believed that Prester John would eventually help ensure the complete triumph of Christianity over Islam. References to the legend of Prester John date from the twelfth through the sixteenth centuries, and the documented appeals of various popes and temporal rulers demonstrate the depth of belief in the legend. The precise location of Prester John shifted over time as Latin Christians' understanding of the world beyond the Mediterranean developed; originally imagined to be somewhere in West or South Asia, Prester John's location then moved to various locations in Africa.

Manuel's strategic deployment of diplomacy and war is perhaps most clearly visible in his approach to the maritime republics of Venice, Pisa, and Genoa. These city-states had been engaged as traders in the region before the crusades. At first Pisa and Genoa had had few contacts with the great centers of commerce there, for on the whole their activities had been confined to the western Mediterranean, but Amalfi and particularly Venice were already active.

Alexios I Komnenos had granted Venice major privileges, partly because they were in Byzantine eyes still subjects of the empire, but also, pragmatically, because Alexios saw in Venice an ally against Norman Sicily. A charter issued by Alexius I in 1082, granting Venetians freedom from customs and market taxes in a number of specified ports, was a prototype for the rights given to Pisans and Genoese by John II and Manuel in 1111 and 1155, respectively. Meanwhile many Byzantine ports benefited from the trade of these Latin merchants and at times the Komnenoi found in them, especially Venice, a forceful military ally.

Of course, the Venetians prioritized their own interests first and those of their allies second, and both the Byzantines and the Venetians were willing to use force to compel each other back in line. Thus, Manuel's constant diplomacy vis-à-vis Latin Christendom did not stop him from suddenly arresting all Venetians in Constantinople in 1171 and claiming their property. While this move may have been partly motivated by popular anti-Latin sentiment or personal animus, it should also be seen as a reassertion of imperial control of the capital—the Venetians had attacked the Genoese quarter in 1170—and reprisal for Venice's failure to respond to Manuel's request for a fleet in military support. Venice responded by sailing in force to the Aegean Sea, where they were met by an opposing Byzantine fleet. Ultimately negotiations made progress but had not been finalized by the time of Manuel's death in 1180. This failure to reach formal agreement by 1180 would have dramatic repercussions, as discussed more herein.

Like the Komnenoi, in the twelfth century the rulers of the crusader states granted similar privileges to the maritime city-states who had participated in the First Crusade, and later, merchants from Languedoc, Provence, and Catalonia. These rights may be summarized as follows. First, they were given property, usually quarters in cities, which included administrative buildings, churches, public baths and ovens, although the Genoese family of Embriaco were enfeoffed with the town and lordship of Jubail in the county of Tripoli and in 1124 the Venetians were also given a third of the city-territory of Tyre, in which they settled some of their compatriots as fief-holders. Second, they acquired jurisdictional rights, that is, the ability to judge their own people and in some cases others who were living in their own quarters. Third, they were granted commercial privileges: the right to enter, remain in or leave certain ports, the reduction or abolition of entry, exit and sales dues, and sometimes the possession of their own markets. These privileges enabled them to establish their own *comptoirs* or factories (in the pre-industrial sense of this word): quarters in which their merchants could stay when they arrived from western ports. While it may be tempting to separate these economic factors from the religious motivations of holy war, the two were not necessarily in conflict to medieval eyes. Baldwin I of Jerusalem had inscribed Genoa's privileges in gold letters within the Holy Sepulchre itself.[8]

Yet although these Latin merchants were highly privileged, this meant less than one might suppose until the 1180s, because the bulk of the spice trade from Southeast Asia, easily the most profitable and attractive commerce, did not pass through the eastern Mediterranean ports but through the Red Sea to Alexandria in North Africa. There was, however, enough of it, together with trade in local products such as sugar and cotton and the importation for eastern markets of western manufactures such as cloth, to encourage the trading cities to build up their *comptoirs* and to create administrative structures, establishing in each of them consuls or viscounts or both. These administrators had to cope with the fact that the twelfth-century monarchs of Jerusalem began to adopt a tougher stance toward them with the aim of at the very least keeping them to the letter of the charters of privilege issued to them.

In the last quarter of the twelfth century, however, Asiatic trade routes changed course. Although the reasons for this change are still not clear, in addition to all the regular factors

affecting trade routes—weather, technology, markets, geography—Afro-Eurasia from the tenth to fourteenth centuries saw a general rise in competition over trade routes, due to the large and greatly profitable intensification and expansion of commercial activity in the region. After 1180, spices from Southeast Asia were increasingly bypassing North African ports like Alexandria, and being brought instead to West Asia, where Damascus, Aleppo, and Antioch were major centers. Damascus was becoming especially important, and its chief ports, Acre and Tyre, were in Latin hands. Acre, where Latin merchants were already ensconced and privileged, came to rival and even overtake Alexandria as the chief market on the eastern Mediterranean seaboard.

The resulting growth in the volume of trade benefited both the crown of Jerusalem and the Komnenoi in Byzantium. The hope was that an increase in traffic, which would never have taken place had not merchants been on hand, would more than compensate for any losses incurred by granting privileges in the first place, and indeed, the Kingdom of Jerusalem became quite rich. Revenues from trade enabled it to grant additional money fiefs. But if the crown of Jerusalem and the Byzantine imperial government became richer, so did the merchant communities. For both Latin and Byzantine rulers in the eastern Mediterranean, whether in the context of a crusade or not, the Venetians, Pisans, and Genoese constituted wild cards in an already-complicated game: often allies, sometimes adversaries, and never willingly subordinate.

The Norman kingdom of Sicily occupied a similarly ambiguous and complicated role in Mediterranean politics in the later twelfth century. Roger II died in 1154 and was succeeded by his son, William I. William I died in 1166, succeeded by his son, William II, just thirteen years of age and under the regency of his mother, Margaret of Navarre. William I is remembered as a particularly bad king and William II as a particularly good one, yet they shared many characteristics, and William I in particular had to deal with challenges left behind by Roger II. Both William I and William II sought and maintained a strong, positive relationship with the papacy. Indeed, Pope Alexander III was William I's candidate for the papal see and was subsequently supported by William II, who directly protected Alexander III during the time he was exiled from Rome and lived at Benevento. Both kings preferred to rule at a distance through an established bureaucracy, and both actively pursued peaceful and prosperous alliances: with the papacy, Genoa, Venice, the Byzantine Empire, Angevin England, and German states. Needless to say, these alliances did not preclude them aggressively attacking their erstwhile allies when relations briefly broke down. Both kings also faced rebellions, accompanied by Christian massacres of Muslim inhabitants. While both kings were unable to maintain their hold on possessions in North Africa, they continued to prosper from expanded Mediterranean and Afro-Eurasian trade; theirs was the only twelfth-century polity that minted gold coins. William II, in particular, seems to have been determined to be a preeminent leader in Latin Christendom, willing to attack the Byzantine Empire, Alexandria, and the Balearic Islands, and quick to send military aid to the Kingdom of Jerusalem.

The Kingdom of Jerusalem certainly was in need of assistance. It was wealthy but politically divided in the later twelfth century, and, apart from William II of Sicily, unable to generate large-scale support from Latin Christendom. As we have seen in previous

chapters, Baldwin II of Jerusalem had been ambitious and expansionary, but his plans came to little. From a historical perspective, the military endeavors of Jerusalem from approximately 1150 to 1185 can be divided into two stages: first the attempted conquest of the weakened Fatimid cities of Alexandria and Damietta, and then simple defense. There were failures in both stages, and by 1185, the crusader states faced a unified sultanate, encompassing portions of the eastern Mediterranean, North Africa, and West Asia, under Salah al-Din.

The first stage, from 1153 to 1169, opened with the occupation of Ascalon by Baldwin III of Jerusalem and was characterized by the invasions of nominally Fatimid cities by his successor, Amalric I of Jerusalem, in alliance with Manuel I Komnenos. These naturally involved major urban sieges: of Bilbeis in 1163, 1164, and 1168; Alexandria in 1167; Cairo in 1168; and Damietta (Dumyat) in 1169. While it made sense to try to take advantage of the dramatic decline of Fatimid power to seize these wealthy ports, these endeavors strained the kingdom's resources and led to serious divisions of opinion among Latin Christians, not least because many Latin Christian merchants were dismayed by the disturbances to trade.

The second stage, from 1169 to 1187, was one in which the Latin settlers were fully back on the defensive. The only major offensive undertaken by the Latin Christians was an assault on Hama and Harim in 1177, taking advantage of the presence of Count Philip of Flanders and the arrival of a Byzantine fleet. The crusader states' hero of these years was the young leper king, Baldwin IV, who even in illness ensured that every attack was met by an army, the duty of which was not to seek battle but to challenge any attempt by the enemy to take castles or towns.

These inconclusive military efforts—at times, military failures—resulted from a number of different things, above all internal factors within the crusader states themselves. The Kingdom of Jerusalem was riven by factional disputes centered on royal succession. Although in the 1150s Queen Melisende was determined to remain in power and was supported in her claims by her younger son, Amalric, as well as other powerful supporters, her eldest son, Baldwin III, wanted full control. Eventually Melisende and Baldwin asked the High Court of Jerusalem to formally divide the kingdom between them. Although neither of them liked the court's division, it was Baldwin who swiftly questioned it and initiated civil war. He moved to occupy Melisende's territories, and by the late spring he was in command, although Melisende retained control of part of the royal domain round Nablus, and ultimately she and Baldwin would be reconciled. With Baldwin III's full accession, the dominance of the Montlhérys, a family of middle-ranking Frankish nobles who had taken over the crusader states, came to an end.

Box 6.3 Noble Marriages, Families, and Power

Marriage norms and practices changed significantly during the medieval period. The same Reform Movement in the Church of Rome that influenced the emergence of the crusades also sought to eliminate clerical marriage, insist upon the

sacramentality of marriage, and eliminate a range of practices considered sinful, such as concubinage and the extramarital affairs of both men and women. The efforts of reformers were only partly successful, but it is undeniable that by the end of the medieval period the majority of European Christians recognized marriage as a sacrament that was performed by a priest within a church. Ages at marriage varied based on social class all through the medieval period, with the nobility and royalty betrothed and married at younger ages and those of lesser classes marrying later, often in their twenties. Noble men and women could expect to marry in line with family interests, co-govern their households with their spouse, and choose whether to remarry, sometimes several times; death through childbirth was a cause of concern for women while death through warfare was a cause of concern for men. On a related point, family (i.e., dynastic) considerations were expected to be predominant. The family extended well beyond a single married couple and their offspring, and it was only toward the end of the medieval period that non-partible inheritance, primogeniture, and male-only inheritance became the norm.

Once in charge Baldwin III answered an appeal for military assistance from the north, where the Artuqid Turks had taken the town of Tartus. The town was liberated and an assembly of nobles from the kingdom, the county of Tripoli, and the principality of Antioch met in Tripoli. This assembly did not accomplish its chief purpose—to persuade Baldwin's cousin and Melisende's niece, Constance, princess of Antioch, to remarry—but it attested to the young king's strength, not least because he had been able to summon his vassals to a general assembly outside the borders of the kingdom. Baldwin III ultimately proved himself to be another clever and vigorous king, under whom the final coastal conquest, of Ascalon, was made, but he died young, on February 10, 1163, before he had time to complete ambitious plans that included an alliance of all the Christian powers in the eastern Mediterranean to conquer Fatimid strongholds.

Baldwin III was succeeded as king by his brother Amalric, who was as able and certainly as energetic. The most striking feature of Amalric's reign, the attempt to wrest major ports on the southeastern Mediterranean out of failing Fatimid hands, has already been noted. But the king also tried to find a solution to the main legal impediment to royal control: the impenetrable thickets of privilege that surrounded the great fiefs and shielded them from royal intervention.

Amalric's most important legal act, a law entitled the *assise sur la ligece*, was a response to a crisis in his predecessor's reign. Gerard, lord of Sidon, had dispossessed one of his vassals without a judgment in his seigneurial court. Baldwin III had taken steps to redress the vassal's grievance and Gerard had been forced to submit, return the fief, and compensate his vassal for the damage done. Now, at a meeting of the High Court, Amalric decreed that in future all rear-vassals were to make liege-homage to the ruler, in addition to the simple homage they made to their own lords, and that the ruler had the right to demand oaths of fealty from freemen in any fief ultimately held by the

ruler. While in the long run this law encouraged solidarity among the feudatories, when it was issued the *assise* was an expression of royal strength. In theory Amalric could now call on the support of rear-vassals if their lord was in conflict with him. More important than this, a formal channel of communication to the ruler was opened, since a rear-vassal was now a member of the High Court itself and could raise an issue of injustice in a lordship directly with the crown.

Nonetheless Amalric left his successor a bitter legacy and a contested succession. He was first married to Agnes of Courtenay, the daughter of the Count of Edessa, and by her he had had two children: Sibylla and Baldwin IV. On his accession he was persuaded to have his marriage with Agnes annulled on the grounds of consanguinity and he later married Maria Komnena, the great-niece of Manuel I Komnenos. By her he had another daughter, called Isabella. There is some evidence that even during his reign opinions among the nobles and at court began to polarize between those who sympathized with Agnes and her children, and those who supported the king or were building careers under him and Maria.

Certainly on Amalric's death on July 11, 1174, the two factions began to stake out their positions. The new king, Baldwin IV, was a minor. Of the two men entrusted by Amalric with the regency for his son, one was assassinated, the other put aside, and Count Raymond III of Tripoli, Baldwin's nearest adult relation of the royal line, assumed the regency until the king came of age in 1177. Baldwin naturally favored adherents of his mother, Agnes. In contrast, those close to Maria Komnena and many of those associated with the last years of Amalric's rule found themselves deprived of power and influence. But the new king Baldwin IV was already known to have contracted leprosy. He was assured of a short life, punctuated by periods of prostrating illness, during which lieutenants would have to be found to rule for him. He was certain to have no children.

In 1176 Baldwin's sister Sibylla married William of Montferrat in what was the best match yet made by a member of the royal house of Jerusalem, because William was related to the German king and emperor, Frederick I Barbarossa, as well as Louis VII of the Franks. But William of Montferrat died in the following year, leaving Sibylla with a son, the future Baldwin V. This child was himself sickly, and the factions that had already come into existence gathered again behind the two heiresses to the throne: Agnes of Courtenay's daughter Sibylla and Maria Komnena's daughter Isabella.

Until 1183, the king, Baldwin IV, tended to favor his sister, Sibylla, and her second husband, Guy of Lusignan. But then, deeply hurt by Guy's grudging attitude to his desire for adequate revenues while Guy held the lieutenancy on his behalf, and encouraged by Guy's political opponents who were determined to destroy him, Baldwin removed Guy from office. He then crowned Baldwin V as his co-ruler, passing over Sibylla's rights, and gave his uncle, Raymond III of Tripoli, the lieutenancy with the expectation of the regency of Baldwin V. Furthermore, he sent a truly extraordinary embassy to Europe, which went so far as to offer the overlordship of the kingdom to the Frankish and English monarchs. Baldwin even agreed to a proposal that in the event of his nephew Baldwin V's early demise the pope, the Western emperor, and the Frankish and English monarchs

should decide which of his two sisters was to have the throne. He seems to have developed such a hatred of Guy of Lusignan that he allowed his sister's, and therefore his own, legitimacy to be questioned.

Baldwin IV died in March 1185 at the age of twenty-three and Baldwin V died in August 1186 at the age of nine. The kingdom, which had always badly needed the rule of a strong personality, had already been subjected to twelve years of ineffective government. It was now split over the claims of Sibylla and Isabella, each with her own party of supporters, at a time when Muslim-ruled polities in the region were stronger and more united than they had ever been.

Nur al-Din had successfully unified Muslim-ruled West Asia by 1155, and had reinforced his military conquests with a deliberate and highly successful campaign in support of Sunni piety. After 1155, he spent the next few years consolidating his dominions, although he also took advantage of the Christians' preoccupation with the Nile Delta to raid the northern crusader states. Then, in the 1160s Nur al-Din contended with Amalric of Jerusalem and Manuel Komnenos for the remains of the failing Fatimid state. All three parties recognized the strategic and material advantages to be had in Damietta, as well as the opportunities afforded by Fatimid decline. In the 1160s Nur al-Din's general Shirkuh intervened in the Fatimid Caliphate, becoming its *vizir* (chief minister or deputy) in 1169. The Fatimids now recognized Nur al-Din's suzerainty; the caliphate was abolished and a Sunni regime was set in place. For many centuries thereafter, the political history of West Asia and North Africa would again be connected.

Nur al-Din died on May 15, 1174. Under him the Islamic political scene had been transformed. In place of a shifting collage of petty states there was now a powerful and largely united Islamicate Syria, with the Nile Delta under its shadow. However, Nur al-Din's death led, as might be expected, to a struggle for power among his officers, nominally over the guardianship of his young son. One of these officers was Salah al-Din—often called Saladin by Western historians; his title means "Righteousness of the Faith"—who had succeeded his uncle Shirkuh as *vizir* in Cairo and had, in obedience to Nur al-Din's orders, liquidated Shi'ite Fatimid rule and proclaimed the Sunni 'Abbasid caliphate there in September 1171. Despite Salah al-Din's obedience to Nur al-Din in these matters, he had been much less tractable in others, and one of Nur al-Din's last plans had been an expedition southward to rein him in. Nur al-Din died before he could set out.

Without denying his commitment to pious deeds, Salah al-Din was also a diplomatic, intelligent, and highly energetic leader. As Jonathan Phillips has noted, his ability to be proclaimed *vizir* in the ailing Fatimid regime is a consistently underappreciated achievement; it required him to quickly build relationships with talented administrators across ethnic and sectarian lines, and to grasp the cultural dynamics of leadership in a region not originally his own.[9] Once his base was established and the support of his family, the Ayyubids, was secured, Salah al-Din, like Nur al-Din, set about subduing his Muslim competitors and opponents. In 1174 Salah al-Din occupied Damascus in the name of the unity of Islam, and he then marched on Aleppo by way of Homs and Hama. Resisted at Homs and gaining control of Hama only with difficulty, he failed to take Aleppo, but in 1175 he routed his Muslim opponents at the Battle of the Horns of

Hama. Formally invested by the ʿAbbasid caliph with the government of the lands he now held, he took up the themes of Nur al-Din's propaganda: military *jihad* against the Latin settlements, and religious and political unity. By the time Aleppo fell to him in 1183 some of Mosul's dependencies were also in his hands, and Mosul itself recognized his suzerainty in 1186.

Salah al-Din was at the same time generous and ruthless, pragmatic and pious, while presenting himself as deeply committed to Sunni orthodoxy. Again like Nur al-Din, he accompanied his military efforts with Sunni reform and extensive building campaigns. Yet the reunification of Nur al-Din's territories under his rule took a long time to achieve. His campaigns against the crusader states in these years were frequent, but they do not seem to have engaged his energy and resources to the same extent; his first priorities were clearly to defend the territories he already held and consolidate his control of Muslim-ruled polities. For invasions of the Latin settlements in 1170, 1171, 1173, 1177, 1179, 1180, 1182, 1183, and 1184 all Salah al-Din had to show was the occupation of ʿAqaba on the Red Sea in 1170 and the destruction of the castle at Jisr Banat Yaʾqub in 1179.

Salah al-Din's ambitions, however, had set him on an endless road, since the warfare to which he was committed could only be financed out of further conquest, and combined with his immense personal generosity, this meant he was always in financial difficulties. His empire was vulnerable, resting on the force of his personality and abilities, the support of his extended family, the Ayyubids, and his relations with the ʿAbbasid caliphate. He was an extraordinarily talented ruler, admired by allies and enemies alike, but he also benefited from the fact that the crusader states were weak and divided at the moment his career reached its climax.

Recontesting Jerusalem

The crusades of the 1190s are routinely depicted as an epic contest pitting two heroic leaders against each other—a glittering story of two committed sides facing off in fated conflict. The actual history of events reveals a much more complicated and mundane tale, with internal divisions and backstabbing almost everywhere one looks, and rulers who, while talented, were also fully human. We have devoted so much space to the 1190s in this chapter in order to make this point with as much detail as possible.

Salah al-Din's invasion of the Kingdom of Jerusalem in 1187 struck at a kingdom deeply divided and on the verge of civil war over the claims of the heiresses: half-sisters Sibylla and Isabella. Ultimately Isabella and her adherents were undone. Sibylla, who also had the support of the master of the Templars and the patriarch, was crowned in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and she herself then crowned her husband, Guy of Lusignan. Isabella and her faction gathered defiantly at Nablus, planning to go as far as crowning Isabella and her husband Humphrey IV of Toron. But Humphrey himself destroyed their position by taking flight and submitting to Guy and Sibylla in Jerusalem. This ended the rebellion, which was over by October. Most made their

Figure 6.2 Queen Sibylla crowns Guy of Lusignan, fifteenth century.
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This illumination is from a fifteenth-century French manuscript containing a French translation of the history of William of Tyre, with a continuation through the arrival of John of Brienne in Constantinople in 1229. This late medieval work of art shows us Sibylla in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, labeled in the image by her title as the "Countess of Jaffa." She is crowning her husband, Guy of Lusignan. To her right stands the patriarch of Jerusalem while to her left is the Master of the Temple. Sibylla's crowning of Guy was an event depicted in art with some regularity, particularly in illuminated histories of the crusades.

peace, although Raymond of Tripoli retired in fury to Tiberias, holding out until the following summer, when a disaster for which he was held responsible made his position untenable.

Raymond had, as was his right, made an independent treaty with Salah al-Din and in late April 1187, in accordance with this, he allowed an Ayyubid reconnaissance force to enter Galilee. At precisely this time a mission sent by Guy of Lusignan and led by Balian of Ibelin, the archbishop of Tyre, and the masters of the Temple and the Hospital, was approaching. Ignoring Raymond's warning to stay behind the walls of the castle of 'Afula until Salah al-Din's troops had left the district, the Templars and Hospitallers rashly attacked them and were cut to pieces. The master of the Hospital and the marshal of the Temple were killed. At the same time, having dealt with his Muslim opponents, Salah al-Din had been looking for a reason to put aside a truce he had made with the Latin settlers in 1185. This was provided by Reynald of Transjordan (also known as Reynald de Châtillon), who had pursued an extraordinarily adventurous and aggressive

policy of his own against Salah al-Din and other Muslim rulers for some years, including naval attacks along the Red Sea in the early 1180s. As a result, Reynald had already been identified as a serious threat by Salah al-Din, and when he attacked a caravan traveling from Cairo to Damascus and refused to return the spoils in late 1186 or early 1187, a pretext for war was provided.

In late May 1187, Salah al-Din, with the largest army he had yet commanded, crossed the Jordan just south of the Sea of Galilee. The Latins made what had become a conventional countermove, assembling their army at Zippori. Their army was smaller than that of Salah al-Din, but by stretching their collective resources, it was much larger than usual. As was customary in times of crisis they had brought with them the kingdom's holiest relic, the fragment of the True Cross discovered in Jerusalem in 1099.

Salah al-Din now divided his forces. On July 2 he attacked Tiberias. The town was quickly seized, although the garrison, with Raymond of Tripoli's wife Eschiva, withdrew to the citadel. The bulk of Salah al-Din's army stayed back from Tiberias some 6 miles away. In the Latin camp an anguished debate—the precise details of which are still debated in turn by historians—began. Raymond of Tripoli, by now thoroughly discredited, advised Guy not to move and even to allow Tiberias to fall. Both a sense of his obligations as a feudal overlord to a vassal in peril and his experiences four years before, when he was severely blamed for not engaging Salah al-Din in battle and subsequently fell from favor, may have led Guy to reject this apparently sensible and disinterested advice. At any rate, Guy made the decision to move and the Latin army marched on July 3.

The Latins' army faced massive problems and was swiftly defeated. It was high summer and there were few sources of water on its route; indeed, the springs on the way could never have provided enough for an army with horses. The later stages of the advance, moreover, would have involved a steep descent of 1,500 feet to Tiberias, which is 679 feet below sea level. There followed a two-day battle on the march (July 3–4). No sooner had the Latins set out than they were attacked by Salah al-Din's cavalry. The wings of his army cut off the Latins' retreat, while Salah al-Din held the high ground between them and the steep drop from the escarpment down to Tiberias. By the evening they had been forced to halt at Meskenah, far from their goal and without adequate water. When, hot and thirsty, they resumed their march on the following morning, they seem to have deliberately changed direction, swinging north of the main road on to rough ground in an attempt to reach the only adequate spring available to them, at Hattin. Raymond of Tripoli and a small party managed to break through Salah al-Din's lines and escape, but most of the Latin armies gathered round Guy in a hopeless stand on a hill crowned with two peaks, known as the Horns of Hattin. The survivors were taken prisoner and the relic of the True Cross was seized.

The results of this battle were catastrophic for the whole kingdom. Latin fortresses and cities had been deprived of their garrisons to swell the Latin armies, and so Salah al-Din could proceed through the region with impunity, bolstered by Muslim excitement about the prospect of reclaiming the holy city of Jerusalem. By September he had taken all the important ports south of Tripoli, except Tyre. Results were similar inland: scattered islands of Latin rule were all that remained intact.

The conquest of Jerusalem was without question the supreme triumph of Salah al-Din's career. He took the city of Jerusalem on October 2, 1187, after a fortnight's siege, during which time Balian of Nablus, Sibylla, and Patriarch Eraclius had led the city's defense. Although Salah al-Din may have originally intended to be as merciless as the first crusaders were reported to have been in 1099, the Latins threatened to kill all their own Muslim prisoners and destroy the holy places of the city. Ultimately Salah al-Din allowed the population to ransom themselves on quite generous terms. The result was that at least a proportion were freed, although some were enslaved and many of those freed faced further hardship as they tried to find shelter in towns still under Christian control. That said, some Christian inhabitants remained in Jerusalem, and while some places that had been Christianized under Latin rule were converted to Muslim uses—the Temple area was restored to Islam, and the Hospital of St John became a Shafi'ite college—other churches were left intact.

The news of the Latin defeat at Hattin and Salah al-Din's conquest of Jerusalem reached Europe in the early autumn of 1187, less than a month after Jerusalem was taken. News of Salah al-Din's successes had been first brought to Rome by Genoese merchants, who recognized an opportunity for both holy war and commercial advantage. Hard on their heels came Joscius, the archbishop of Tyre, the only city on the eastern Mediterranean coast still in Latin hands. Tyre was being energetically defended under the leadership of Conrad of Montferrat, the younger brother of Sibylla's first husband, who had arrived in West Asia in the wake of the disaster and himself showered Europe with appeals for help. Archbishop Joscius sailed in the late summer to Sicily, where King William II responded by immediately dispatching a fleet. In the spring and summer of 1188 this saved Tripoli and provisioned Antioch and Tyre.

Joscius must have reached Rome in the middle of October. The old pope, Urban III, died, it was said of grief, on October 20, 1187, and within ten days a papal crusade letter, *Audita tremendi*, was launched by his successor, Pope Gregory VIII. Joscius met Henry II of England and Philip II of France—the first Frankish ruler to so style himself—in January 1188 at Gisors, where the kings were meeting to discuss the drafting of a truce between them. Presented with his appeal, the kings, and Philip of Flanders and the other magnates who were with them, took the cross and began to make plans. Following a practice begun in the 1140s, when the crusaders against the Wends in northern Europe had worn distinctive crosses, it was decided that the crusaders of each nation would wear crosses of different colors: the French red, the English white, and the Flemish green. Henry and Philip agreed to levy a general tax for the crusade, the second of the decade and known as the Saladin Tithe.

The vicious politics of Latin Christendom then intervened. War broke out between Henry's eldest surviving son, Count Richard of Poitou, and the Count of Toulouse. The kings of England and France became embroiled and relations between them reached a low point when Richard switched support to the king of France and by the summer of 1189 was in open revolt against his father. Henry died on July 6, shortly after reaching a settlement on the crusade with Philip, and Richard was crowned king of England on September 3.

Meanwhile, the delays and the reasons for them had generated a storm of protest. The force of public opinion was such that Richard, who had taken the cross earlier than had his father, could no longer put off the expedition, even had he wanted to. In November he agreed to join forces with Philip at Vézelay on April 1, 1190. The date of mustering was later put back to July 1, but English and French crusading forces were at last in train.

The vacillation of the English and French kings looked very bad when compared to the response in the German states. The emperor Frederick I Barbarossa was now nearly seventy and had governed for thirty-six years. He was a vigorous old man, with tremendous physical stamina, and he was intelligent and adaptable, with a strong personality and a penchant for flamboyance that had sometimes led him into scrapes. He had crusaded four decades before, in the 1140s, and his mind had occasionally turned to crusading in the interim. It is hard to tell how far his commitment to the movement was conventional piety, or was speculative and associated with conceptions of the duty of emperors to defend Christendom, or was even eschatological and influenced by the idea of the last Christian emperor who would rule Jerusalem before the advent of Anti-Christ. But whatever the reason, he was in the mood to respond positively to crusade appeals.

Frederick was deeply moved by a crusade sermon preached in December 1187, although, being the man he was, he took a few months to make up his mind that his domains could survive his absence. In a typically theatrical gesture he then summoned a special court, to be presided over not by himself but by Christ, and on *Laetare* Sunday (March 27, 1188), when the introit of the Mass begins, "Rejoice Jerusalem and come together all you that love her. Rejoice with joy you who have been in sorrow!" he and many German nobles took the cross in the papal legate's presence.

The news of the launch of a new and massive crusade understandably caused great concern for Jewish communities in Western Europe, who were well aware that so far, every major crusade brought with it waves of anti-Jewish violence. Such was the case with the crusade of the 1190s, too. Jewish communities in England arguably suffered the worst. However, in France and the German states, Christian authorities were also aware of the strong probability of anti-Jewish violence and took direct measures to prevent or at least limit such violence. Even while a range of other factors helped determine when, where, and how Latin Christians assaulted Jews, there was a clear and additional correlation—visible both at the time and in hindsight—between crusading and anti-Jewish violence. As noted in the previous chapter, anti-Jewish crusading violence was occurring in the context of steadily increasing anti-Jewish sentiment and violence within Latin Christendom. Like crusading, it can be read as a sign of Latin Christians' intense desire for a homogenous and completely Christian society and their willingness to achieve it through violence and coercion.

The date of departure for Frederick's armies was set for the feast of St George, April 23, 1189, and the land route was again chosen. The Hungarians, Serbians, Byzantines, and even the Turks of Konya were told of their plans. The Byzantines received an assurance that there would be a peaceful passage through their empire, and they in turn promised to provide guides and supplies. Final arrangements were made at Regensburg, where the

crusaders gathered on the appointed date, and on May 11, 1189, the army began its march. Frederick's army contained many leading lay and ecclesiastical figures in Germany, and it must have been one of the largest crusading armies ever to take the field. It was very well organized and discipline was strictly enforced, but it began to be harassed by brigands as it passed through regions of the Balkans under Byzantine control. The markets that had been promised were not opened, and there was no evidence of preparations for its arrival.

The Byzantine Empire had been undergoing its own dramatic series of events in the last decades of the twelfth century. Manuel had died in 1180, leaving his eleven-year-old son as heir, with his mother, Maria of Antioch, as regent. A faction predictably formed in opposition to Maria's regency, and in 1182 Manuel's cousin, Andronikos Komnenos, launched a military coup and took the imperial capital. He promptly and violently purged both his extended family, the Komnenoi, and the empire's bureaucratic administration.

Andronikos was not primarily motivated by anti-Latin vitriol, but his violence and that of his troops, who were largely given free rein to do as they pleased, nonetheless hurt Latins in the empire, and the impression that made its way to Europe was of an emperor who harbored a distinct hatred for Latin Christendom. This impression was heightened by Byzantines who fled the empire and sought both Latin and Ayyubid allies to help dethrone the "usurper." William II of Sicily was the most enthusiastic Latin supporter of these efforts and sent armed forces to the Adriatic coast in 1185.

Andronikos' reign was rapidly coming apart at the seams when, almost entirely by chance, the throne came in 1185 to a young nobleman named Isaakios II Angelos, grandson of Alexios I Komnenos. Isaakios faced a number of immediate challenges: domestic turmoil and fear; a still-oncoming army from Sicily; the advances of Salah al-Din; and a number of provinces that were threatening rebellion. Given the situation, the emperor was proactive, quickly seeking alliances with both Salah al-Din and various Latin powers, planning diplomatic marriages, and demonstrating his appreciation for Latin expertise by, for example, putting Conrad of Montferrat in charge of Constantinople's defenses in 1187. After Salah al-Din took Jerusalem, Isaakios was quick to seek recognition of Byzantium's role as protector of the Latin holy places there, which was viewed by many Latins as an anti-Latin and perhaps even anti-Christian action.

It was at this moment that Frederick I's crusade army turned up and caused no little anxiety, because Frederick was an old enemy of Byzantium. Unsurprisingly, Isaakios attempted to use tried-and-tested tactics to protect his empire: divide the crusader forces; deal with them individually; and at all costs ensure they were not in a position to attack Constantinople. As Frederick and his contingents crossed into the empire, obstacles were deliberately, though not very effectively, put in their path; this was perhaps imperial policy, but equally possibly, a result of local initiatives. As Frederick got closer to Constantinople, Isaakios foolishly tried to bring pressure to bear by arresting Frederick's ambassadors and holding them as hostages, while his officers' vain attempt to use regular troops to block the march was brushed aside. By the time the crusaders occupied Plovdiv on August 26 they were in no mood to be thwarted, and they ignored Isaakios' refusal of passage across the Dardanelles until Frederick sent him more hostages and promised

to surrender half his future conquests. The crusaders instead resorted to plundering and Frederick, who had been negotiating with Serbian and Vlacho-Bulgarian rebels against Byzantium, also began to think seriously of attacking Constantinople itself. On November 16 he wrote to his eldest son Henry, asking him to persuade the maritime cities of the Italic Peninsula to raise a fleet to join him before Constantinople in the following March to lay siege to the city.

Isaakios had been forced to return Frederick's ambassadors at the end of October, but the next few exchanges were soured by his refusal to address Frederick by his proper title, another issue on which he had to climb down. Frederick moved his winter quarters to Edirne and now held a large area of Thrace, while negotiations with Isaakios and the increasingly panic-stricken Byzantine government continued. On February 14, 1190, Isaakios at last agreed to furnish ships for transport across the Dardanelles from Gallipoli (Gelibolu); at least, unlike his predecessors, he had persuaded Frederick's forces to bypass Constantinople. He also agreed to provide markets, supplies, and hostages, and to release Latin prisoners he held and pay reparations. He also accepted that the crusaders would forage in regions where provisions were not supplied. The approach that had served the Komnenoi well in dealing with crusade armies in the late eleventh and earlier twelfth centuries had not served Isaakios nearly as well, because the context for the approach had changed.

In Byzantine-controlled West Asia, Frederick's armies met with harassment and non-cooperation. In April they entered Turkic territory and made straight for Konya. On the march they suffered as their predecessors had done—their horses and pack animals died and they ran out of food—but Konya fell to them on May 18. Refreshed by the stores they found there and promised adequate supplies by the local Turks, who were now anxious to let them through in peace, they reached the borders of Cilicia, on the thirtieth. Here they were again in Christian-ruled territory and were greeted with friendliness by the Armenians, but on June 10 Frederick, who had proved that it was still possible to march an army across Europe and West Asia and was exuberant and hot, either succumbed to the temptation of one last dramatic gesture or simply attempted to bathe. Either way, his actions proved fatal. He entered the river Göksu, which is deep and wide. He got into difficulties—perhaps he had a heart attack—and he was dead or drowned by the time his nobles reached him.

Frederick's part of the crusade, which had done so well, brushing the Byzantines aside with icy efficiency and marching in a disciplined fashion across West Asia, was broken by his death. Some crusaders left for home. The rest divided: some sailed to Antioch and Tripoli, while others marched overland, losing many of their number in the process. At Antioch the army was further decimated by disease. It began its journey down the coast in late August, and early in October its sad remnants arrived before Acre, which had been besieged by the Latins under Guy of Lusignan's command for eighteen months.

Guy had been released by Salah al-Din two years previously, in the summer of 1188, after vowing—falsely, as it turned out—not to fight him again. But in the spring of 1189, Conrad of Montferrat, who denied Guy's right to the kingship, had refused him and Sibylla entry into Tyre. The reaction of Sibylla and Guy had been courageous. They had

marched south with very few troops to lay siege to Acre. This action had forced their leading vassals, who until then had remained neutral or sided with Conrad, to join them and by the following autumn many of them were at Acre. This so weakened Conrad that in September 1189 he was persuaded to take part in the siege. By the spring of 1190 Conrad had made peace with Guy and Sibylla, whose rule he recognized in return for the promise of a fief.

At Acre Sibylla and Guy had been joined by various parties of crusaders, among them groups from the German states, Low Countries, and England, in September 1189, and a French army under the counts of Champagne, Blois, and Sancerre in July 1190. It might be supposed that the arrival of Frederick's main force would have strengthened the besieging host, but his armies, demoralized and sick, had continued to sustain heavy losses, among them the old emperor's son, Duke Frederick of Swabia, who died on January 20, 1191. By the following spring most of them were on their way back to Europe.

Meanwhile, in July 1190, Richard I of England and Philip II of France had met at Vézelay and begun their march to the Mediterranean coast. Richard was nearly thirty-three years old. His courage, resourcefulness, and administrative ability showed up best on the battlefield and on campaign: he was to prove to be the finest crusade commander since Bohemond of Taranto but would be critiqued for other elements of his kingship. At that time, however, he had inherited a competent and energetic apparatus of government, which had thrown itself into making preparations from the moment his father had agreed to crusade. The archbishop of Canterbury had organized systematic preaching throughout England and Wales, and the Saladin Tithe had been collected in spite of bitter opposition. Richard had also sold everything that could be sold, ruthlessly exploiting every relationship for cash and every opportunity to raise enormous sums of money. He therefore found himself in fairly comfortable circumstances, and his superior financial resources were apparent throughout the crusade.

For his part, Philip II was a younger man, still only in his mid-twenties, and ten years of royal government had made him careful, distrustful, and cynical. He was not well educated, but he was sharp, with a practical intelligence, and he had a capacity for hard work and taking pains, combined with self-control and a disposition toward prudence and equity. Ruthless he might be but he was usually ruthlessly fair. He ruled a far less centralized realm than Richard did, and he could not override his people's opposition to the Saladin Tithe. He was forced to state publicly that it would never again be levied, and outside the royal domain it was appropriated by his great magnates for their own crusading needs. So he was much less well off than Richard, although he led a larger army.

Richard had expected to find an English fleet at Marseille, but it had stopped off in Portugal and thus not yet arrived. Hiring other ships, he reached Messina in Sicily in September to find his fleet from England and Philip II already there. He had business to transact in Sicily that would help him to raise even more cash for his crusade. His sister Joan was the widow of King William II, and he wanted her dowry back from Count Tancred of Lecce, who had seized the Sicilian throne, together with a legacy left

by William to Richard's father. Richard resorted to violence, seizing the town of Bagnara across the straits from Messina, and then Messina itself, which was sacked by his troops. Tancred was forced to pay 40,000 gold ounces, half for Joan's dowry and half as a marriage portion for his daughter, who was betrothed to Richard's heir. Philip managed to get one-third of the gold for himself on the basis of an agreement he and Richard had made to share their gains.

Philip sailed from Sicily for the eastern Mediterranean in March 1191. Richard, who had stayed to meet his fiancée, Berengaria of Navarre—his betrothal was a delicate issue since he had been previously engaged to Philip's sister Alice—sailed in April. His fleet cruised by way of Crete and Rhodes to Cyprus, which he reached in early May. The ruler of the island, Isaakios Doukas Komnenos, who had declared his independence of Constantinople in the 1180s, had imprisoned some English crusaders whose vessels, including one of the royal treasure ships, had been wrecked in a storm off the southern coast. The great ship carrying Berengaria and Joan was parked offshore, reluctant to land.

Richard at once demanded the return of his people and goods. When this was refused, Richard invaded the island, and by early June, when he left for Acre, it was in his hands. It was to remain under Latin control for nearly 400 years. Richard's conquest of Cyprus served to heighten tensions and hostility between Byzantine and Latin Christendom. Although the island's ruler had declared himself independent, the island was still viewed by Constantinople as part of the Byzantine Empire. From the perspective of Constantinople, then, Richard's seizure was "the first time a crusading army had seized territory directly from the Byzantines and retained it."[10] For their part, Latin writers describing the event felt a strong need to justify Richard's actions. They did so with both the usual claims of anti-Latin hatred among the Byzantines and a new line of reasoning: the wealth gained by taking Cyprus directly benefited crusading efforts. In short, the ends—successful crusading—justified the means.

Meanwhile in Acre, forces had continued to join the blockade during the autumn, winter, and spring of 1190–1, including an English advance party under the archbishop of Canterbury. Like all crusades, the army was a confederation of contingents under different leaders and it continued to be divided over political developments in the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Sibylla and her two daughters, Alice and Maria, heiresses to the crown of Jerusalem, had died of disease caused by insanitary camp conditions in the autumn of 1190.

This meant, of course, that although Guy was the anointed king, the legal heiress to Jerusalem was now Isabella, Sibylla's younger half-sister, who was married to Humphrey of Toron. It will be remembered that it had been Humphrey's defection to support Guy that had destroyed the baronial rebellion in 1186. Furthermore, we have reason to suspect that Isabella's marriage to Humphrey (a minor figure) had been deliberately intended to weaken Isabella's claims. As a result, for many of Isabella's supporters, Humphrey was a liability. Isabella's mother, Maria Komnena, and a group of leading nobles planned to have Isabella's marriage to Humphrey annulled so that she could be wed to Conrad of Montferrat, who was well connected and had proved his ability and the strength of his personality. Isabella herself, however, was not eager to abandon Humphrey, and appears

to have only been convinced by her mother's arguments that she, Isabella, could not rule while married to Humphrey.[11]

Isabella and Conrad hurriedly wed, after an ecclesiastical court, dominated by the papal legate, who was a supporter of Conrad, and by Conrad's cousin, the bishop of Beauvais, had ruled that Isabella's marriage to Humphrey had been invalid. Isabella then formally asked the High Court to recognize her right to the Kingdom of Jerusalem. This was accepted and homage was paid to her. It looked as though Guy of Lusignan was being put aside. But in fact, Richard had already been met in Cyprus by Guy, Humphrey of Toron, and their supporters, with requests for his support.

Philip reached Acre in April 1191, and Richard turned up in June. It was clear that they would be asked to arbitrate in this affair and that their responses would be different, because each was entangled in the skeins of feudal and family relationships. Conrad was Philip II's cousin. Guy's family, the Lusignans, were feudatories, although extremely difficult ones, of Richard's county of Poitou, and they were rival claimants to a prize that had been seized by his father. Given the need to placate an angry family, it is not surprising that Richard was to show the Lusignans exceptional marks of favor throughout the crusade.

The kings of France and England agreed to adjudicate on the issue of the crown of Jerusalem, and the course of events strengthened their hands. Acre capitulated on July 12, 1191, in spite of a last-minute attempt by Salah al-Din to save it, and as conquerors Philip and Richard divided the city between them in accordance with their prior agreement on the division of spoils. This meant that their decisions on the allocation of what had been royal property could effectively decide the winner in the competition for the throne.

On July 28 Richard and Philip announced a compromise: Guy was to have the Kingdom of Jerusalem for the rest of his life, but after his death Isabella and Conrad would inherit it. All royal rents were to be shared and appanages were to be created in the south—Jaffa and Ascalon—for Guy's brother Geoffrey, and in the north—Tyre, Sidon, and Beirut—for Conrad. Philip then gave Conrad his half of Acre, against Richard's wishes, and left for home three days later. A large body of French crusaders, under the leadership of the duke of Burgundy, remained and played an important part in the events that followed.

Relations between the Latins and Salah al-Din remained volatile. The terms of the agreement for the surrender of Acre had been that the garrison was to be released on the promise of a ransom of 200,000 dinars; the relic of the True Cross, lost at Hattin, was to be returned; and a large number of Latin prisoners were to be set free. Hostages were to be held by the Latins pending the fulfillment of these conditions. However, negotiations with Salah al-Din broke down when the first installment of the ransom became due and Richard ordered the immediate massacre of most of them, between 2,600 and 3,000 people, in sight of Salah al-Din's army that was still encamped near Acre. This may have been the result of impatience, anger, political strategy, or simply cold-blooded pragmatism: once dead, the prisoners would not need to be guarded. The killings shocked and infuriated Salah al-Din and his forces, and, perhaps, helped undermine their confidence in Salah al-Din.

Richard then decided to strike out for Jerusalem, which meant first marching to the port of Jaffa, 70 miles down the coast. His army set out in August and was regularly supplied by the Latin fleet. In what has been described as "a classic demonstration of Frankish military tactics at their best," the army kept a steady disciplined progress in spite of being continually harassed by skirmishers and light cavalry. The self-restraint displayed by the infantry was remarkable for the time and, in so far as it was a response to Richard's leadership, demonstrated that he was a field commander of the highest caliber.

Nonetheless, in early September Salah al-Din managed to bring the Latin forces to battle north of Arsuf, where the road passed through a gap between a forest and the sea. He used conventional tactics, seeking to weaken the Latins' formation by archery and by attacking its flank and rear. The Hospitallers in the rearguard, maddened by their horses' injuries, launched into a charge too early, and Richard had to order a general advance before he was ready. He was still able—and this is further evidence of his quality as a commander—to halt the charge once it had achieved its purpose and to reform his line to meet a counterattack. Salah al-Din's forces eventually retired, leaving Richard's army, which had sustained comparatively light losses, in possession of the field. Three days later the crusaders reached Jaffa and began to restore its fortifications.

At this point, there were three options open to Richard: a treaty with Salah al-Din; an immediate advance on Jerusalem, which was dangerous while there was a large hostile army in the vicinity; or the occupation and refortification of Ascalon. Occupying Ascalon would limit Salah al-Din's ability to bring up reserves from the south. At first Richard kept all these options open. He began to concentrate all the troops he could at Jaffa, but he also entered into negotiations with Salah al-Din through Salah al-Din's brother, al-'Adil Ahmad. The central issues under negotiation were control of and access to Jerusalem, the size of Latin territories, the fate of the relic of the True Cross, and the return of prisoners on both sides. Both Salah al-Din and Richard seemed to have taken the negotiations seriously and with respect. Richard even suggested his sister Joan marry al-'Adil Ahmad; she refused to marry a non-Christian and was supported in that decision by Latin nobles, while al-'Adil, for his part, was willing to marry Joan but refused to convert.

By late October Richard had decided to advance on Jerusalem, although he proceeded very cautiously and by late December had only marched halfway from Jaffa. By early January 1192 he was only 12 miles from Jerusalem, but then, on the advice of the local Christian leaders, he decided to withdraw and refortify Ascalon. On the twentieth he reached Ascalon and work on its walls went on until early June. In the midst of this Latin military advance, Salah al-Din had to quash an emerging rebellion against his rule.

Richard then decided to try for Jerusalem once more. His army marched on June 7 and by the eleventh was only 12 miles away again, where it halted until later in the month. However, because his line of supplies back to Jaffa was threatened and he realized that his force was not large enough to hold Jerusalem, Richard again withdrew, after considering the option of an invasion of cities further south. In late July he returned to Acre.

Richard's withdrawal gave Salah al-Din his chance. He launched an attack on Jaffa, which was still weakly fortified. The garrison was seeking terms within days, but Richard

was already on his way by sea to relieve it. He arrived the following day to find Salah al-Din in possession of the town and the garrison in the process of surrendering the citadel. Wading ashore and supported by a sally from the citadel, he drove Salah al-Din's forces out of the town. And an attempt in early August by Salah al-Din to surprise Richard's tiny force faltered in sight of the Latins' solid defensive formation.

Richard was not nearly as successful in politics and diplomacy as he was on the battlefield. His support of Guy of Lusignan was continually frustrated by Conrad of Montferrat, the remaining French crusaders, and local Latin nobles, who had never accepted Philip and Richard's compromise. Knowing that the territory Richard gained would be handed over to Guy, they set out to undermine his military efforts and negotiated independently with Salah al-Din in the hope of getting grants of land directly from him. In February 1192 there was even an unsuccessful attempt to seize Acre from Richard and Guy for Conrad.

Richard came to realize that Guy's political situation was hopeless, and in April 1192 he summoned a council of his army and accepted their advice that Conrad should be king. He compensated Guy with the lordship of Cyprus; he had sold the island to the Templars, but after a revolt against their rule, they were anxious to return it. Within a fortnight, however, Conrad was dead, struck down in Tyre by Nizari operatives. It was never known who had commissioned them. On the one hand, the seizure of Richard as he returned from the crusade by Leopold V of Austria, who had taken part in the siege of Acre, and Richard's imprisonment by Henry VI Hohenstaufen may well demonstrate that they, who were both Conrad's cousins, believed that Richard had been responsible. On the other hand, Leopold and Philip II of France, who was in touch with Henry VI, also considered that they had been humiliated by Richard during the crusade.

At any rate Isabella was now married, with Richard's consent, if not on his initiative, to the crusader Count Henry II of Champagne. Isabella had been pregnant when she married Henry, and so his position in the Kingdom of Jerusalem was now somewhat like that of Guy when he had married Sibylla: consort to the lawful queen who had a child from a previous marriage. Henry was to die in an accidental fall in 1197, after which Isabella would marry Aimery of Lusignan—Guy's brother and ruler of Cyprus—and be formally crowned queen of Jerusalem and Cyprus in 1198.

In 1192, Richard was no longer in full control. In June he had initiated a discussion on the choice of a final crusading goal. A committee, made up of brothers of the military orders, Latin settlers and crusaders, had decided on the Nile Delta, but this had not been acceptable to the remaining French contingent. And by mid-August 1192 Richard had fallen ill. His crusade had lost impetus and was repeatedly torn by division, and he was also worried by news of events in Europe.

At the same time, while fully able to thwart Richard's efforts, especially in regard to Jerusalem, Salah al-Din did not have the resources to conclusively defeat the Latins. Furthermore, since Jerusalem was already in hand, many local Muslim leaders were reluctant to send any further manpower or funds. Meanwhile, through all the military ups and downs, diplomacy had continued between Salah al-Din's brother, al-'Adil Ahmad, and Richard.

It was a stalemate on all sides, and so on September 2, 1192, a treaty between Richard and Salah al-Din was agreed to, which was to last for three years and eight months. The Latins were to hold the coast from Tyre to Jaffa. Ascalon's fortifications were to be demolished before it was returned to Salah al-Din. Christians and Muslims alike were to have free passage throughout the region. Many English crusaders visited the shrines in Jerusalem, although Richard did his best to prevent the French, whom he had not forgiven for frustrating his campaign, from going as well. He sailed from Acre in early October.

It is easy from a historical perspective to recognize the substantial abilities and achievements of both Salah al-Din and Richard. But their truce was not fully satisfactory to those they ruled. As with any good compromise, no one was completely happy. Furthermore, for those who believed that events reflected divine will, the failure of either the Latins or the Ayyubids to fully accomplish their goals was destabilizing.

Perhaps in part because the truce was so unsatisfactory, other Latins were quick to try to launch a new crusade. Henry VI Hohenstaufen, Frederick I's eventual successor, aspired to turn his empire into a hereditary monarchy and to pacify Norman Sicily. His wife, Constance of Sicily, was the rightful heir after William II of Sicily died childless, and both she and Henry were eager to claim the island. However, they had to occupy Sicily by force, which may well have led Henry to consider the reputational advantages of campaigning in the eastern Mediterranean as soon as Richard's truce with Salah al-Din expired. He must also have shared the enthusiasm for crusading that was almost universal at the time, and he may have felt some obligation to fulfill his father's crusade vow, left uncompleted by his death.

Henry VI took the cross in Holy Week 1195 and at a solemn assembly at Bari on Easter Day summoned his subjects to crusade, promising to supplement them with 3,000 mounted mercenaries. In June he left for the German states to promote the enterprise, and on August 1, Pope Celestine III published a new crusade appeal and called on the German clergy to preach the cross. In October and December Henry personally witnessed the enrolment of German nobles. He also agreed to a proposal from Latin Cyprus that the island should become a vassal-kingdom of his empire, and soon afterward the negotiations began which were to lead to the ruler of Cilician Armenia becoming a vassal-king as well. Thus advantaged, Henry VI delivered a de facto ultimatum to Byzantium: provide resources or face a possible invasion.

The arrangements for the crusade were completed at an assembly at Würzburg in March 1196, and a year later an impressive crusading army was assembling in the ports of the southern Italic Peninsula and Sicily. It was led by the archbishop of Mainz because Henry, who had not been well and had to deal with renewed unrest in southern Italy, had probably given up all hope of commanding it himself. In September 1197 the main fleet reached Acre. The crusaders occupied Sidon and Beirut, which had been abandoned by Salah al-Din's forces, and laid siege to Toron, but then news from home caused their crusade to disintegrate. Henry VI had died at Messina on September 28. Constance had their three-year-old son, Frederick II, crowned king of Sicily, with herself as regent. By July 1198, Henry's crusading forces had made a truce in which the Latin possession of

Beirut was recognized, and by the end of that summer most of the leading crusaders had returned to Europe to protect their lands and rights at home.

The crusades in the eastern Mediterranean in the late twelfth century demonstrated that the movement could inspire real and widespread enthusiasm in Europe when there was a crisis in Jerusalem, and that very large forces could be mustered at such a time. And after a slow start the crusaders' achievements were significant, from a historical perspective. In 1188 the Latins had been left only with the city of Tyre and one or two isolated fortresses inland. By 1198 they held nearly the whole of the eastern Mediterranean coast. This ensured that the Kingdom of Jerusalem would last for another century, because it removed any threat from fleets in the Nile Delta to the sea-lanes to Europe at precisely the time when Acre was becoming the chief commercial port in the region. These crusades seem to have been the first to make use of mercenaries on a really large scale. The invasion of cities like Damietta and Alexandria—the center of Ayyubid power and both strategically and economically important—which had long been on the minds of Latin settlers—had also moved to the forefront of crusade thinking.

But in the moment, the events of the 1190s had been disappointing to all involved. The Latins did not reclaim Jerusalem, and Isabella, queen of Jerusalem and Cyprus, was queen of Jerusalem in name only. Rivalries and contentions had continually undermined crusading efforts, which were further complicated by Byzantine–Latin relations and various treaties between Byzantine, Latin, Ayyubid, and Turkic powers. It is crucial to recognize that this had been the case from the First Crusade onward. The dynamics of the 1190s may have been particularly striking, but the fact that crusading was not a simple "us v. them" conflict but rather an arena for competition and maneuvering was not new. At the same time, while Salah al-Din retained control of Jerusalem, he had failed to conclusively defeat the Latins, even after a grueling and extremely expensive series of campaigns. He died of illness at Damascus in 1193, after dividing the lands he ruled among his family, the Ayyubids.

CHAPTER 7
INTENSIFICATION, 1198–1240

In the early thirteenth century, crusading continued to reflect relationships between motivated leaders, papal and lay, and motivated participants. At the same time, the question of what exactly would motivate participants remained hard to predict. The relationship between the idea of crusading, a one-time action with benefits for participants, and the needs of established polities, namely, ongoing defense and expansion, remained tense and interconnected. Crusading continued to be just one tool among many in Latin expansion, and the line between crusades and non-crusades remained ambiguous and sometimes hard to assess, both at the time and from historical distance. Yet crusading occurred on multiple fronts, and while sometimes it was seen as natural to have multiple fronts engaged, at other moments, tension was perceived between efforts in the eastern Mediterranean and elsewhere. Crusading also continued to be undertaken on different scales and in different modes—large-scale, proto-national, local, recurring, perpetual—and directed at both Christians and non-Christians. The sheer amount of money raised for some crusades far eclipsed amounts spent in the twelfth century.

There were changes in addition to these continuities. There were new political realities and actors to contend with in the Mediterranean, as well as shifts in economic dynamics and trade routes. These changes served to both help motivate and undermine crusading efforts in the eastern Mediterranean, while crusading elsewhere continued to be more successful. In addition, the crusading movement again became entangled with papal–imperial conflict in Latin Christendom, and crusading against targets in Europe further intensified. Different kinds of "crusader states" were established and in addition, the Latinization of polities such as the Kingdom of Armenia also served to de facto expand Latin Christendom. Lastly, some truly major crusading movements were generated by the relatively powerless to express both their piety and their discontent with the status quo.

Eastern Mediterranean and West Asia

Innocent III (Lothario dei Conti di Segni) was elected pope on January 8, 1198, at roughly the time the crusade forces of Henry VI Hohenstaufen were beginning to withdraw from the eastern Mediterranean. Innocent III was then aged thirty-seven or thirty-eight and so was a comparatively young man. Vigorous and quick-witted, his judgments of others and his decisions, even on points of law, could be hasty. He had an exceptionally high view of his office as representative of Christ, with authority over all aspects of church

business and a final say in temporal affairs, although it is important to stress that his concerns were primarily pastoral and his decisions were often pragmatic. Both his ideas and his temperament drove him to take far more interest in the direct management of crusades than had his predecessors, who had been content to leave the planning and conduct to the laity, particularly monarchs, once they had preached them.

Indeed, Innocent arguably contributed more to the crusading movement than any other individual pope except Urban II. Crusading appealed to both the speculative and the political sides of his nature, and no other pope seems to have devoted quite so much time to the movement. No other pope preached as many crusades. And yet, as with so much else in his pontificate, Innocent's crusading ideas were too ambitious and his actual power far too restricted. Canon law prohibited priests from military command and the pope was a priest. In spite of his desire to control crusading—the greatest instrument at his disposal as a "papal monarch"—he had to rely for the implementation of his ideas on lay magnates who had their own ideas, schedules, and priorities. Despite the extensive institutionalization of crusading described in the next chapter, events were to demonstrate that the papacy was unable to direct crusades successfully.

Innocent III did not come to the papal throne in 1198 with any preconceived plan for a crusade, although it was only six months after his election that the first signs of one appear, probably in reaction to the collapse of Henry VI's crusade. In August 1198 he issued *Post miserabile*, his first general crusade letter. He called upon Richard I of England and Philip II of France to make a truce for five years and asked Philip to contribute mercenaries, but he made it clear that authority over the crusade in its early stages was to be entirely his. The crusaders were summoned to be ready for two years' service by the following March. Legates were to be sent to the crusader states to prepare for their arrival. Prelates of the church were ordered to send armsbearers or contribute their equivalent in cash. Innocent also released certain limitations on vow-taking and refined the crusade indulgence to make it more appealing, as discussed in the next chapter. The knight Geoffrey of Villehardouin, who played a leading part in the crusade, wrote afterward that "because the indulgence was so great the hearts of men were much moved; and many took the cross because the indulgence was so great."

At first Innocent cannot have envisaged a large expedition, but within a month or so of the issuing of *Post miserabile*, he must have heard of a development that had forced him to change his mind. A truce agreed on July 1, 1198, between the Kingdom of Jerusalem and al-'Adil Ahmad, the senior member of Salah al-Din's dynasty, the Ayyubids, was intended to last for five years and eight months. This made directing a crusade to the eastern Mediterranean inappropriate, and when crusaders did arrive, they were at first told by the ruler of Jerusalem in no uncertain terms that military operations were forbidden. As a result of news of the truce, Innocent's original project seems to have been revised and expanded.

After Salah al-Din's death in 1193 and per his arrangements, the provinces of his empire—Cairo, Damascus, and Aleppo—became largely independent principalities under his kin, the Ayyubids. While one Ayyubid in each generation assumed a precarious suzerainty, and were nominally recognized as sultan—al-'Adil Ahmad (1200–18),

al-Kamil Muhammad (1218–38), al-Salih Ayyub (1240–9)—these leading Ayyubids still faced rivalry within the extended dynastic family. The Ayyubids' primary concern was not ascendancy over the remaining Latin settlers but, rather, the defense of their central domains around the Nile. This was a period of great prosperity for them and for their subjects, partly because of the ongoing boom in trade in Afro-Eurasia and the receptivity of Europe to Asiatic goods, which depended on the transit of those goods through merchants of differing faiths and ports under differing rule. So, although ideas of military *jihad* survived and even flourished, the Ayyubids' emphasis in the early thirteenth century was on coexistence and maintenance of their own internal political status quo, and the period was marked by a succession of truces. This reminds us that religious ideologies, including that of military *jihad*, needed the support of political leaders to blossom into action.

Truces, this time among Latin Christians, also proved essential for the launching of Innocent III's new crusade. This resulted in written records helpful for historians. For example, the revised and enlarged crusade Innocent envisioned can be seen in the terms of a treaty made with Venice by representatives of the crusade leaders in the spring of 1201. Venice contracted to transport 4,500 knights, an equivalent number of horses, 9,000 squires, and 20,000 "well-armed" foot sergeants to Alexandria on the coast of North Africa, which was specified in a secret clause. Had it been mustered, this would have been a massive army by the standards of the day, and over the following centuries, no subsequent plans for seaborne crusading expeditions would compare in size with it. In hiring berths for so many foot soldiers the negotiators surely believed that most were going to be paid mercenaries, engaged in and transported from Europe, and commanded by a nucleus of vowed crusaders. The decision to use paid soldiers on this scale helps to explain the clerical taxation. Although it would have been very expensive to hire mercenaries in Europe and transport them, it would have been impossible to engage them "on the scene" for an assault on Alexandria by a force sailing directly from Venice. The original intention was to muster in Venice in April and sail in late June, arriving at Alexandria later in the summer when the Nile was normally in flood. This would make it hard for the Ayyubids to relieve the city and allow for a series of assaults before the receding waters in late October opened the rest of the country to the crusaders.

The crusaders' interest in Alexandria was understandable. The wealthy cities on the northeastern African coast had been in Latin sights from the First Crusade onward and would continue to hover like a mirage on the horizon of planners for centuries to come. Although in fact Alexandria's commercial preeminence was now being challenged by Acre, it was still the terminus of the most consistently important overland trade route across Asia, and it was the greatest trading center known to Mediterranean merchants. And while Alexandria did not offer direct access to the Red Sea and related trade routes, its conquest could, arguably, open the door in that direction. Further, its harbors were not difficult to break into and the apparent ease with which it could be assaulted seemed to have been demonstrated in 1174, when a large Sicilian force had landed before the city. It was associated with incidents in both the Old and New Testaments, and it had been part of the Christian Roman Empire and still had a large

Christian population. This meant that from the perspective of Latin Christians at the time, its conquest could be justified in terms of the recovery of territory. Although Latin Christian merchants were already active in its markets, its occupation would still be beneficial to European commerce, not only because of its position on the international trade routes, but because of the threat its fleets had long posed in the Mediterranean. More important still were the convictions that success in the region could lead ultimately to the reoccupation of Jerusalem from the south, and that as long as Latin Christians held it they would have the upper hand in West Asia. Lastly, it was known that the River Nile had failed to flood, resulting in economic crisis; it was believed that if Alexandria fell the rest of the Ayyubids' lands would be in no condition to withstand an invasion.

Were the Latin laity as keen to crusade as Innocent III? The answer is mixed. There was a significant popular response to the sermons of the crusade preacher Fulk of Neuilly, but it seems that enthusiasm was slow to develop among the nobles and knights. This changed in response to a sequence of melodramatic and apparently stage-managed cross-takings by elite lords and their major vassals over the winter of 1199–1200. These events were variously connected with both tournaments and Latin holy days, suggesting that both piety and chivalric violence were considered part of successful crusade appeals. Three substantial counts took the cross that winter: Thibald III of Champagne, Louis of Blois, and Baldwin of Flanders, Thibald's brother-in-law. These three counts, very closely related and from families with long traditions of crusading, were the natural leaders of the emerging crusade and they acted together. A later assembly under their direction gave six men, two of whom were chosen by each count, authority to negotiate the best possible terms for transportation with one of the maritime cities. The six delegates, who included the famous trouvère Conon of Béthune and the future historian of the crusade, Geoffrey of Villehardouin, decided to approach Venice.

The counts' representatives put their case in February 1201 to the Venetian ducal council and the doge Enrico Dandolo, who was extremely old and partially blind but experienced, cultured, shrewd, and indomitable. They reached the agreement already described and settled on a reasonable price, which would have to be paid in installments by April 1202. The treaty was solemnly ratified at an assembly in the church of St. Mark, and a copy of it was sent to the pope for his confirmation. The envoys returned home to find Thibald of Champagne dying. After the duke of Burgundy and the count of Bar-le-Duc had refused to take his place, an assembly, meeting toward the end of June 1201, decided to offer Marquis Boniface of Montferrat the command of the whole army.

Boniface was one of the best-known military commanders of his day, his court was a center of knightly culture, and he boasted an impressive set of familial and personal connections. His siblings were intimately connected with the Kingdom of Jerusalem and Byzantium. One of his brothers, William, had married Sibylla of Jerusalem, and another, Conrad, had married her half-sister Isabella after serving Manuel I in Constantinople. A third brother, Renier, had married Maria (Manuel's daughter) and had ranked as a *Caesar* in the Byzantine Empire, indicating that he was an intimate associate of the emperor. Members of the Montferrat family were also very well connected in Europe as

cousins of the Capetian and Hohenstaufen royal houses; indeed, Philip II of France may have suggested Boniface for the leadership of the crusade.

Boniface was also a personal friend and subject of the prominent and ambitious Philip of Swabia, younger brother of the dead Henry VI Hohenstaufen. Philip was a contestant for the position of Western emperor, to which he had been elected in April 1198, and was therefore in conflict with the pope, who instead favored his rival Otto of Brunswick. Philip of Swabia was also allied by marriage to the Byzantine imperial house, because his wife was Irene Angelina, daughter of Isaakios II Angelos. Once again, we are reminded of the intimate webs of association connecting powerful families throughout Latin and Byzantine Christendom.

We are also reminded that events outside of Latin Christendom continued to affect the crusading movement. In Byzantium, further disruptions had shaken the empire. After the coup of Andronikos Komnenos (1182), whose purge of his family and government included Renier of Montferrat, Boniface's brother, the empire had suffered upheaval. In 1185, virtually by chance, the young Isaakios II Angelos had wound up emperor. He had to deal in rapid succession with both internal and external challenges, not least the overland journey of the crusade armies of the 1190s against Salah al-Din. Jonathan Harris has termed this a period of "paralysis" for the empire, in which attempts to cope proved ultimately ineffective, and it was easy to hold Isaakios II responsible.[1] Thus in 1195, his older brother, Alexios III Angelos, led a coup and took the throne. Alexios deposed the still-young Isaakios, blinded him—this was believed to make an individual unable to serve as emperor—and imprisoned him.

The new emperor, Alexios III, immediately tried to do his best to cope with the same challenges that his younger brother had faced, including rebellion and seizure of funds and resources in various localities. Alexios was also particularly proactive in terms of Byzantine–Latin relations, but his efforts in that regard were only partially successful and were weakened by the fact that he had overthrown his brother, which was viewed negatively in Latin Christendom. Meanwhile, the empire's inability to defend the imperatives of the central government, put down rebellions, and handle external threats made it obviously weak. This was what had encouraged Henry VI Hohenstaufen to extort funding for his crusade from the empire in the late 1190s. In Byzantium, this demand had led to increased imperial taxes that in turn led to increased unrest. The Byzantine Empire was caught in a vicious cycle and clearly vulnerable.

The relevance of all these Mediterranean entanglements would soon become clear. After Boniface accepted the leadership of the crusade army and took the cross in 1202, he attended Philip of Swabia's Christmas court at Hagenau. To that court also came the young Alexios IV Angelos—nephew of Alexios III, son of the imprisoned and blinded Isaakios II, and brother-in-law of Philip of Swabia—seeking help to regain the imperial throne for himself and his father. It is possible that the expectation of a postponement of the attack on Alexandria and the use of the crusade instead as a means of forcing a change of government in Constantinople were discussed at Hagenau and was raised with the pope by Alexios IV in the following February and by Boniface in the middle of March. But if so, Innocent rejected any such idea, and no definite decision could

have been made, because the ships built by the Venetians for the crusade were clearly designed for a direct assault on Alexandria.

Unsurprisingly, by the time the crusaders began to reach Venice in the middle of the summer of 1202, the proposal to attack Alexandria had become such common knowledge that news of it had reached that city itself and it was said that the Ayyubid government there tried to buy the Venetians off. They need not have worried. Hiring up to 20,000 foot soldiers was beyond the capabilities and resources of the leaders of the crusade, particularly as there is no evidence that any proceeds of clerical taxation had yet been collected, let alone distributed; the taxes had met with great resistance. Even had it been possible to recruit such an army, the plan to invade Alexandria directly from Venice was grossly overambitious. It is true that the Sicilians had managed to land at Alexandria in 1174, but their force had been much smaller and in the end their assault had been a failure.

There were already signs that the crusade was coming apart at the seams. In April 1202 Innocent was still hopeful about the crusade, at least on the surface, but a sign of his growing desperation must have been his decretal allowing crusaders to take the cross without their wives' permission, discussed more in the next chapter. It was reported that many crusaders were already unhappy with the enterprise. Some did not fulfill their vows; others decided not to travel by way of Venice but to make their own arrangements and go directly to the eastern Mediterranean. Many of those who did not turn up must have supposed that, since the leaders had not been able to recruit and pay for the mercenaries required, the plan to invade Alexandria directly would have to be aborted. No one arrived on time, and in the early autumn of 1202 it was found that only about one-third of the projected men had mustered.

The result was that, in spite of every effort and the generosity of the leaders who contributed what they could from their own pockets, the crusaders were left owing the Venetians 34,000 silver marks for shipping that had already been prepared. The Venetians, who saw themselves as crusaders but who also had involved themselves in a massive shipbuilding enterprise at a cost to their own commercial interests, were understandably determined to get payment. They threatened to cut off supplies to the crusaders, who were encamped on the Lido, the large island closing the lagoon from the Adriatic. Winter was approaching and with it the end of the sailing season. Without even leaving Europe the crusaders had already fallen into two of the by-now usual traps of crusading: major divisions among themselves and a desperate shortage of cash.

It was at this stage that the Venetian doge, Enrico Dandolo, suggested a postponement of the payment of the debt until it could be settled out of plunder, on condition that the crusaders help him recapture the port of Zadar on the Dalmatian coast, currently held by the Hungarians. Zadar was subject to a fellow-crusader, since Emeric of Hungary had himself taken the cross. Whatever the rights or wrongs of Emeric's occupation of Zadar, because he had taken crusade vows, the Church of Rome was theoretically obligated to maintain him in his possession of it, just as it was bound to protect the properties of Zadar's assailants while they were away from home. Even though the papal legate, Peter Capuano, seems to have been prepared to ignore the legal issues with attacking Zadar,

the Venetians refused his credentials and forced him to return to Rome. There were additional defections and before he left Venice, he had to insist that some leading clerics swallow their doubts and remain with the army to assure it of spiritual direction. Even Boniface of Montferrat felt it prudent to leave the crusade and travel to Rome. He did not rejoin the army until after Zadar had fallen. But the remaining crusaders and their leaders accepted Venice's terms.

Once their terms had been accepted Enrico Dandolo and many leading Venetians formally took the cross. A fleet of over 200 ships, including 60 galleys, left Venice early in October 1202. They sailed slowly down the coast in a show of force designed to impress other subject cities before appearing off Zadar in mid-November. The army landed, but it now received a letter from the pope forbidding it to attack any Christian-ruled city and referring to Zadar by name. Several leading crusaders, led by the Cistercian abbot Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay and Simon IV de Montfort, voiced their opposition to the siege in the pope's name and even sent messages to Zadar's defenders encouraging them to resist. They then withdrew some distance and played no further part in the action.

By late November the city fell and was sacked, with the spoil divided as agreed between the other crusaders and the Venetians. And by November 1202, no doubt desperate to see his crusade achieve the aims he envisioned, Innocent III had written to Emperor Alexios III to urge him to provide funding for the crusade, warning him that "you ought most zealously to attend to this [the crusade] as human energy allows, so that you may be able to extinguish or feed the fire in distant regions, lest it be able in some measure to reach all the way to your territories."[2] Innocent was not authorizing or supporting an invasion of Constantinople, as Henry VI Hohenstaufen had done, but he *was* using the vulnerability of the empire and the closing presence of crusading armies to attempt to ensure Byzantine cooperation.

The decision had already been taken to winter at Zadar, since it was now too late in the year to continue the voyage, and it was there that Boniface of Montferrat rejoined the army in the middle of December 1202. Close on his heels came envoys from Philip of Swabia proposing, on behalf of Alexios IV Angelos, that if, on their way to Alexandria, the crusaders would restore him and his father to the Byzantine throne, they would be richly rewarded. The patriarchate of Constantinople would be made to submit to the papacy, 200,000 silver marks would be handed over for division between the crusaders and the Venetians, and the crusade army would be provisioned by the Byzantine Empire for an additional year. Alexios IV himself would join the crusade if his presence was desired. He would anyway contribute an army of 10,000 armsbearers to it and would maintain a force of 500 knights in the eastern Mediterranean at his expense for the rest of his life.

This proposal clearly suggested that the plan to attack Alexandria would be postponed, not abandoned, and that is how the crusaders saw it. Encamped outside Constantinople eight months later, Count Hugh of St Pol reported that an embassy had been sent to the Ayyubids—at the time ruled by al-'Adil Ahmad—threatening war. "You should know," he wrote to Henry of Brabant, "that we will tourney before Alexandria with the sultan of Egypt." Even after the fall of Constantinople, Raimbaut of Vaqueiras, a poet in the

service of Boniface of Montferrat, criticized the new Latin emperor for not launching an invasion of Alexandria. At about the same time, in May 1204, twenty ships from the Kingdom of Jerusalem penetrated a branch of the Nile and spent two days looting the city of Fuwa. So the king of Jerusalem had himself been involved in the project, and his raid must have been planned as a preliminary to the main invasion, which he was still expecting in 1204.

Given the fixation with Alexandria and the severe logistical problems the crusade had already faced, Alexios IV's proposal must have seemed a godsend, since it provided the crusaders with a way out of their current impasse. The opportunity to gain privileges in Constantinople as a result of setting an ally on the Byzantine throne and then to resume course for Alexandria with his material support, both then and in the future, would have seemed to be too good to miss, particularly as the crusader fleet was already equipped to threaten a great fortified port. Alexios IV's terms were accepted by the Venetians and by most of the greater crusade leaders, but this involved flagrant disobedience to the pope, who wanted Alexios III to support the crusade but was unwilling to directly countenance a coup and invasion.

This disobedience weighed heavily with large numbers of others, many of whom appear to have accepted Alexios IV's terms only because the alternative—the dissolution of the army and abandonment of the crusade—was unthinkable. There was general dissatisfaction and anxiety, and there were more defections, including that of Simon IV de Montfort. The crusaders incurred automatic excommunication for their insubordination to the papacy, but the bishops in the army gave them provisional absolution while a delegation visited Rome to explain their action and ask for forgiveness.

Innocent found himself stuck. His eyes still seem to have been focused on Alexandria. The crusade he had hoped for had at last departed and inflexibility on his part might lead to its complete dissolution. He was thus prepared to absolve the non-Venetian crusaders provided they restored what they had taken illegally and did not invade other Christian-ruled lands, but he refused to absolve the Venetians and he issued a formal letter of excommunication of them. Easier said than done. There was tension between Innocent's new prohibition against invading Christian-ruled lands and his own willingness to apply pressure to Byzantium in support of crusade efforts, as well as the fact that earlier generations of crusaders had before laid claim to Christian-ruled lands. Furthermore, the crusaders' only option for transport on their crusade remained the Venetians' ships, making the excommunication of the Venetians confusing at the least: Were the crusaders supposed to abandon the crusade or travel with excommunicates?

In the end, Innocent's reaction does not seem to have mattered too greatly. Zadar was not restored to Hungary. Boniface of Montferrat refused to publish the bull of excommunication of the Venetians on the grounds that he did not want the crusade to break up; he would only deliver it to the Venetians if the pope insisted. By the time Innocent replied in June 1203, demanding that the bull be published and repeating that the crusaders were not to attack any more Christian-ruled territory, referring this time specifically to the Byzantine Empire, the fleet was approaching Constantinople.

Intent on restoring Alexios IV Angelos and his father to the throne, the crusaders sailed from Zadar late in April 1203 and were joined at Corfu by Alexios IV. On July 17 there was a general assault. Although the attack on the city had failed, the emperor Alexios III Angelos fled that night and his brother, the blind Isaakios II Angelos, was released from prison. He reluctantly agreed to the terms his son had negotiated, and on August 1 Alexios IV was crowned his co-emperor. Isaakios was in fact devastated by his mutilation and long imprisonment and so Alexios IV was the de facto sole ruler.

By now the number of non-Venetian crusaders had been drastically reduced by defections and enthusiasm was low. There remained approximately 30 percent of the knights who had left Venice in 1202. On the other hand, the crusaders had every reason to hope that this "prologue" to their crusade was nearly over. Having missed the best time to attack Alexandria, they sensibly agreed to stay on for the winter at the expense of Alexios IV, who wanted them to prop up his regime in its early months. They wrote to the pope and European monarchs explaining what they had done and announcing the postponement of their journey until the following March. At the same time Alexios IV assured Innocent of his intention to subject the Byzantine Church to Rome. Innocent hesitated again—this subjection had long been hoped for by the Church of Rome—and did not reply until the following February. In his reply, he merely reproved the crusaders and the Venetians for their disobedience and ordered them to continue with the crusade; he also told the bishops in the army to see that the leaders did penance for their sins.

For a brief period, relations between Alexios IV and the Latins were close to happy. Having reassured the papacy, Alexios IV declared war on the Ayyubid sultan al-ʿAdil Ahmad alongside the crusaders, and provided the Latins with food and installments of coin. He seems to have been on good personal terms with the crusade leaders, visiting them on their ships for evening parties. Groups of Latins visited Constantinople to marvel at the city's churches and relics. And Latin armies helped Alexios IV regain military control of imperial provinces such as Adrianople, where the just-deposed Alexios III had tried to establish himself.

But by the winter, the situation at Constantinople had gravely deteriorated. Alexios IV had paid the first installments of the money he had promised, but the people and clergy in the city resented the presence of the Latins—both the pressures generated by their payments and other events linked to their presence, including two major fires in the city—and rioting and faction-fighting erupted. Alexios IV could not find the funds needed to meet his obligations to the Latins, despite desperate steps such as seizing and melting down church metalwork. He was well aware that even while he could not meet his promises to the Latins, he needed them to secure his own rule, precisely because his subjects viewed his relationship with the crusaders negatively. In November, after a delegation of crusaders and Venetians presented him with an ultimatum, hostilities broke out. Then late in January 1204 another coup d'état removed Alexios IV and his father and a wave of anti-Latin emotion elevated to the throne Alexios Doukas Mourtzouphlos, a court official, who took the title of Alexios V. He had no intention of fulfilling Alexios IV's promises.

At this point the crusaders could afford neither to proceed nor to return home. They were in a hostile environment, short of provisions and forced to forage. In March they decided that there was only one move left for them to make, the capture of Constantinople itself and the subjugation of the Byzantine Empire, although this worried and distressed many of them. Their own forces would be supplemented by Latin residents of Constantinople—perhaps 15,000 of them—who had been expelled from the city by the Byzantines in August 1203, had sought refuge with the crusaders and, according to an eyewitness, were of great use to them.

On the eve of the assault on the city, elaborate justifications, based on the Byzantines' supposed sin in abetting the "murder" of their emperor and their split from the Church of Rome, were circulated by the Latin clergy to give some relief to consciences. Enrico Dandolo, representing Venice, and Boniface of Montferrat, Baldwin of Flanders, Louis of Blois, and Hugh of St Pol, representing the other crusaders, concluded a treaty that laid the ground rules for their relations once Constantinople was theirs. The terms of their treaty reflect scrupulous attention to equal division and delegation of material goods, political power, and ecclesiastical rights in the new Latin Empire. This attention makes clear that each party—the Venetians and the other crusaders—considered itself distinct from the other. Both parties agreed to petition the pope to make violations of them punishable by excommunication, although judging from recent events, neither side found such excommunications a particular deterrent. Because this treaty so divided authorities and means, the new Latin Empire would be assured of a weak emperor and an over-powerful Venetian presence.

The action began at daybreak on April 9, 1204, against the harbor wall, where an attack seemed more likely to succeed. The attack failed at first but was resumed on the twelfth. By evening the crusaders were in control of a section of the defenses and had begun to penetrate the city. Dusk brought the fighting to a close, and they slept by their weapons in the flickering light of a fire started by some crusaders and raging through the wooden buildings in the nearby quarters of the town. They expected renewed resistance in the morning, but there was none, because the emperor, Alexios V, had fled.

For three days Constantinople was sacked. This was the usual fate of cities taken by assault, but there may well have been an edge to the pillaging. There was in the army an obsession with loot, engendered by the failure of the crusaders to meet their debts to the Venetians, and in addition, a significant proportion of the assault force was composed of embittered and vengeful ex-residents. Constantinople, moreover, was famous for being the greatest repository of relics in Christendom. There had grown up among Latin Christians traditions of *furta sacra*, sacred thefts, in which the stealing of the bones of saints were justified, if successful, by the "proven" desire of the saints concerned to have their relics transferred to another place. The sack of Constantinople was a massive *furtum sacrum*, and items taken—both secular and spiritual—remain today as proud and visible elements in European cities such as Venice. Furthermore, events seemed to have proven that God supported Latin Christendom and Latin subjugation of Byzantium.

Figure 7.1 Horses of the Basilica San Marco.
© Wikimedia Commons (public domain), Venice.
This near-life-size set of four horses, conventionally labeled "bronze" but in fact mostly copper, which can be gilded, dates to the second or third centuries CE. They most likely were part of a *quadriga* (a four-horse chariot) on a Roman monument. Venetians took them from Constantinople during that city's sack in 1204, and they were placed on the façade of the Basilica San Marco. They were looted in 1797 by Napoleon, who returned them to Venice in 1815. Replica horses now stand on the Basilica's façade, while the original statues are kept indoors for conservation purposes.

Once the spoil had been divided the crusaders proceeded to the election of a new Latin emperor. Boniface of Montferrat, who had occupied the imperial palace of the Boukoleon and was betrothed to Margaret of Hungary, the widow of Isaakios II Angelos, must have expected the title, but the Venetians opposed his candidature. After long debates the electors unanimously announced their choice of Count Baldwin of Flanders, who was crowned on May 16 by the assembled Latin bishops, because there was as yet no Latin patriarch for the city. At this point in time, there was significantly little Byzantine resistance, either in Constantinople or in the provinces.

The diversion to Constantinople has led to endless and rather pointless historical argument. Was it the result of a conspiracy, and, if so, who was involved? Enrico Dandolo, Philip of Swabia, Boniface of Montferrat, even Innocent III, have been named in this respect. Was it a sign that the crusading movement had become "corrupted" by material interests and internal divisions? Or was it the culmination of centuries of growing ill-feeling between Latins and Byzantines? In fact, the capture of Constantinople seems to have been the result of a series of accidents resulting from the postponement of the original plan to attack Alexandria and the particular and unpredictable events of the late 1190s and early 1200s. Latin-Byzantine relations had waxed and waned over the course of the prior century, and were always complicated. While we can see trends contributing

over time to the conquest of Constantinople, it was nonetheless far from a forgone conclusion. Equally, while clearly some crusaders chose not to attack Zadar and others were uncomfortable taking Constantinople, we have seen similarly dubious events take place all the way through the history of crusading. Ultimately, as Christopher Tyerman has suggested, it is likely that if the crusaders had indeed continued to Jerusalem, there would then and now be little debate about the conquest of Constantinople.[3]

The inclusion of Innocent's name among those responsible for the diversion to Constantinople contains a kind of justice, since it is likely that the overarching strategy that went awry was his own, and he did not hesitate to apply diplomatic pressure to Byzantium himself in support of his crusade. He certainly knew and approved of the plan to attack Alexandria and he came to an agreement with the Byzantines over provisions for the fleet on the way. But if he was responsible for the idea, it must rank as another of his wildly overambitious ones, and it certainly did not play out as he intended. From the start the crusade proceeded in a way that was galling for him. One act of disobedience led to another. Most of the crusaders, however divided and personally distressed, ignored his advice and prohibitions. All that said, he definitely made the best of things after the event. Instructions to the new Latin Empire flowed from Rome with the aim of taking full advantage of the fall of the Byzantine Empire to bring about, even enforce, church union. Nonetheless, he must have realized that the crusade had ended in a way that was bound to make the desired unification of the Latin and Byzantine Churches much harder.

Whatever his feelings about the establishment of the Latin Empire, Innocent was already thinking seriously about another crusade to the eastern Mediterranean by 1208. He sent appeals to France and northern and central regions of the Italic Peninsula, although the only discernible response came from the passionate crusader Duke Leopold VI of Austria, who later campaigned in Iberia, Languedoc, and North Africa. Crusading continued in Iberia and was undertaken in southern France, as described below, and Innocent resumed efforts for a crusade in the eastern Mediterranean to be launched once the truce made there ended in 1217. In January 1213 he told his legates in Languedoc that he was planning such a crusade and in the following April he proclaimed it, at the same time demoting those in Iberia and Languedoc. As we will see, Innocent's decision delayed the resolution of crusading in Languedoc for years, and it caused dismay in Iberia.

Innocent's demotion of the crusades in Languedoc and Iberia was the first example of a kind of decision-making that became common in the thirteenth century. While in theory the papacy was happy for crusading warfare to proceed on multiple fronts, in practice it was unhappy with the dissipation of effort involved in concurrent crusades. The popes could decide which theater of war needed their support most at a given moment, and the fact that crusaders were increasingly dependent on them for financial subsidies through the taxation of the Latin Church meant that as the century wore on their readiness to intervene grew.

Innocent and his advisers planned the new crusade to the eastern Mediterranean with great care. *Quia maior*, the new general crusade letter, was sent to almost every

province of the church in the second half of April and early May 1213. Then Innocent died on July 16, 1216, just after preaching the cross in the central Italic Peninsula and at a time when he was preparing to embark on a tour of the northern peninsula in the interests of the crusade. His successor, Honorius III, was in his seventies when he became pope. He used to be thought to have reigned in Innocent's shadow, but in the work of Rebecca Rist and Iben Fonnesberg-Schmidt a new picture of Honorius as an ambitious and innovative pope has emerged. Honorius pressed forward with preparations for the crusade, trying to cope with the obstacles that so often obstructed the launching of expeditions of this type.

Honorius was especially keen to enlist the support and participation of Frederick II Hohenstaufen, crowned king of Sicily as an infant in 1198 and king of Germany since 1212. Frederick II was the grandson of Frederick I Barbarossa and the son of Barbarossa's heir, Henry VI, and Constance I, daughter of William III of Sicily. As noted in the previous chapter, Henry VI had just launched a crusade when he died suddenly in 1197. To ensure his succession, in 1198 Constance had their son, Frederick II, crowned king of Sicily, with herself queen regent. She died the same year but her will established another regency for Frederick and named Pope Innocent III as his formal guardian.

The life and long career of Frederick II is surrounded with mythology and was so in his own time; one contemporary chronicler named him *stupor mundi*, "amazement of the world." Frederick was intelligent and well educated, fluent in multiple languages, including Greek and Arabic, and in many ways can be seen as an epitome of the multicultural Mediterranean court culture associated with Byzantium and Norman Sicily. But in other ways he was a conventional Latin Christian monarch. He was pious, or at least concerned to be seen as such. And while he ruled peoples of different cultures and religions and made alliances with Muslim rulers, he also deported tens of thousands of Muslim Sicilians to Lucera on the southern end of the Italic Peninsula in response to resistance to his rule. His relations with the papacy were variable in his early reign but quickly solidified into unquestionable hostility. Indeed, Frederick and his male heirs would become primary crusading targets.

All that was yet to come. Frederick II had taken the cross when performatively re-crowned king of the Romans in Aachen in 1215 but was unlikely to be able to go while his rival, Otto of Brunswick, contested his throne and claim to the title of Western emperor. The papal legates in France had aroused great enthusiasm among the poor but, although the dukes of Burgundy and Brabant, the constable of France, the counts of Bar, La Marche, Nevers and Rodez and the lord of Joinville all took the cross, the French contribution would be proportionately much less than in earlier crusades. The crusade in Languedoc, discussed herein, the aftermath of the French victory over Otto of Brunswick, John of England, and the Flemish in the Battle of Bouvines in 1214, and perhaps knowledge of the planned involvement of Frederick II may have contributed to this lackluster response. The French lack of commitment worried thoughtful clergy, but it was more than made up for elsewhere, particularly in Hungary, the German states, the Italic Peninsula, and the Low Countries, where the success of Oliver of Paderborn,

one of the best crusade preachers, was said to have been literally phenomenal, that is, accompanied by miracles.

King Andrew of Hungary was the first to move. His representatives negotiated with the Venetians for a fleet to meet him at Split. However, when his army, containing contingents led by the dukes of Austria and Merano, and the archbishop of Kalocsa and many bishops, abbots, and counts from the empire and Hungary, mustered there in late August 1217, they faced a serious problem: too many soldiers arrived for the ships available. The main body of their armies had to wait for several weeks before embarking. Many knights returned home or made plans for sailing in the following spring. The army that gathered at Acre in the autumn of 1217 was too large for the food at hand, because a poor harvest had led to famine conditions in West Asia. Crusaders were advised to return home.

The Kingdom of Jerusalem had a new ruler, John of Brienne, who had emerged from relative obscurity in Champagne to marry the heir to the throne, Maria, daughter of Isabella of Jerusalem and Conrad of Montferrat, in 1210. After their marriage, both were crowned. Maria had then died shortly after giving birth to a daughter, Isabella II, who was crowned when only a few days old. Thus in 1217 John had already been regent for his infant daughter, and now his regency was disputed.

John of Brienne—along with the masters of the three military orders of the Temple, the Hospital of St. John, and St. Mary of the Teutonic Knights—had been considering plans for two separate, but simultaneous, campaigns: one to Nablus with the intention of recovering the lands to the west of the River Jordan and the other to Damietta. Now a council of war met and, putting both of these plans aside for the time being, decided to promote a series of small-scale expeditions until the rest of the crusade armies arrived. These small-scale attacks were unsuccessful, and Andrew of Hungary left to return home in January 1218, taking many of his subjects with him.

The crusaders who remained in Acre occupied themselves with the refortification of Caesarea and the building of a great new Templar castle at ʿAtlit (Chastel Pèlerin) until reinforcements arrived. These began to sail into Acre in April 1218. With large numbers of Frisians, Germans, Italians, and Scandinavians now assembling and, just as importantly, with an impressive fleet at their disposal, the leaders decided that the time had come to invade the Nile Delta, starting with Damietta. This was in a sense the fulfillment of Innocent III's first crusade plan, but it also reflected the focus on the major port cities of the Nile Delta that had been growing through the twelfth century.

On May 27 the vanguard of the crusade forces arrived at Damietta; it would be eighteen months before they took the city. Meeting little initial resistance, the crusaders chose a site for their encampment, which they fortified with a moat and wall, on an island opposite the city, bordered by the Nile and an abandoned canal. During the protracted siege that followed, the crusaders were reinforced by yet more crusaders from across Europe, although there were, of course, also departures: Leopold of Austria in May 1219, for example. John of Brienne held the overall command, although that seems to have meant little more than the presidency of a steering committee. In September 1218 the papal legate Cardinal Pelagius of Albano arrived. Pelagius had a

strong personality, and he was prepared to challenge John's assumption that Damietta and its environs would be annexed to the Kingdom of Jerusalem if it was conquered. His voice became dominant on the committee, and John slipped more and more into the background.

In the first stage of the siege the Latins strove to take the Chain Tower, an impressive fortification on an island in the middle of the Nile, from which iron chains could be raised to halt river traffic. Various measures were tried before a floating siege-engine designed by Oliver of Paderborn himself, a miniature castle with a revolving scaling-ladder incorporated into it, was built on two cogs lashed together and was sent against the tower on August 24, 1218. After a fierce fight the crusaders gained a foothold and the surviving defenders surrendered on the following day.

Al-'Adil Ahmad, the Ayyubid sultan of Cairo, was said to have died of shock on hearing the news of this reverse, but it was not a killing blow for the Ayyubids. The remaining Ayyubids set aside their differences and united in support of al-'Adil's son, al-Kamil Muhammad. Near Damietta Ayyubid forces immediately countered the loss of the tower by blocking the Nile with sunken ships, while in October the crusaders had to fight off two determined attacks on their camp. They also labored to dredge the abandoned canal that bounded it so that they could bypass Damietta and bring their ships up above it. The canal was open by early December, but the winter was exceptionally severe and the crusaders suffered intensely from floods that destroyed their provisions and tents. In early February 1219, however, the Ayyubid army facing them abandoned its encampment near the city, and the Latins crossed the Nile and occupied the same bank as Damietta, where they found large stocks of provisions. They now held both sides of the river and built a bridge between them.

This ushered in a period of offers, counteroffers, and skirmishes. Al-Kamil Muhammad's government sued for terms, proposing to surrender all the territory of the Kingdom of Jerusalem except Transjordan and to adhere to a thirty-year truce in return for the crusaders' departure. This proposal for a thirty-year truce was an extraordinary concession in the light of the commonly held belief in Islamic circles that truces of no more than ten years' duration should be made with non-Muslims. John of Brienne was in favor of acceptance, but Pelagius and the military orders were not, even after the Ayyubids added to their offer a rent of 15,000 besants a year for the castles of Karak and Shaubak in Transjorda.

al-Kamil Muhammad's forces had, meanwhile, been reinforced by Ayyubid armies sent by his relatives to the north and throughout March, April, and May they launched attacks on the new Latin camp. The crusaders responded with direct assaults through July, only to be met with a penetrating response from the sultan. By August, the crusaders were clearly in a poor military position.

al-Kamil Muhammad at once reopened negotiations, adding to his previous proposals the promise to pay for the rebuilding of the walls of Jerusalem and of the castles of Belvoir, Safad, and Toron. He also offered the relic of the True Cross which had been lost at Hattin. John of Brienne, the French, the English, and the Teutonic Knights were now for acceptance, but Pelagius, the Templars, and the Hospitallers remained adamantly

against. In fact the garrison of Damietta was now so weakened by starvation that it could not defend the city properly and on the night of November 4, four Latin sentries noticed that one of the towers appeared to be deserted. Scaling the wall, they found it abandoned and the crusaders quickly occupied the city. The Ayyubid army stationed nearby withdrew hastily to al-Mansura and by November 23 the Christians had also taken the town of Tinnis along the coast without a fight.

But the simmering discord between Pelagius of Albano and John of Brienne now came to a head. John left, depriving the crusade of its chief military leader, and the tensions at the top manifested themselves lower in the ranks in riots, exacerbated by disputes over the division of the spoil found in the city. The crusaders made no further move for nearly twenty months, allowing al-Kamil Muhammad to turn his camp at al-Mansura into a formidable stronghold. Again he renewed and in fact raised his offer to them. Again they turned it down. They were now waiting for the arrival of Frederick II, who had promised to send part of his army on the next spring passage and to go himself in the following August.

Frederick's forces duly arrived in May 1221, and at last preparations were made for an advance into the interior. On July 7, John of Brienne, strictly ordered by the pope to rejoin the army, returned, and within ten days the crusaders began to march down the east bank of the Nile. On July 24, against John's advice, they moved into a narrow angle of land, bounded by two branches of the Nile, opposite al-Mansura. There they halted and were eventually trapped and had to sue for peace. On August 30 they agreed to leave Damietta in return for terms that appear distinctly paltry given what had previously been on offer: a truce of eight years and the True Cross, which they were never given, most likely because the Ayyubids did not in fact have it.

Additional reinforcements sent by Frederick II had arrived in the middle of this debacle, and their leaders bitterly opposed the terms that had been agreed. When Frederick heard of the terms, he himself was furious but he was hardly in the position to criticize. He had not fulfilled his pledge to crusade and he was being severely berated by the papacy. His failure to crusade at an earlier point in time did not mean that he was indifferent. He could certainly be ruthless, but, in spite of the scandalous stories told about him in his lifetime, he was conventionally pious and deeply committed to the crusading movement. He was still in his twenties and the long civil war in the German states, as well as the anarchy he found on his return to Sicily and the southern Italic Peninsula, explains his delay in fulfilling his vow. Pope Honorius, however, who had himself been impugned for the crusade's failure, was highly critical. And so in March 1223 Frederick renewed his crusade vow in the presence of John of Brienne, the patriarch of Jerusalem, and the masters of the military orders.

The date of June 24, 1225, was set for Frederick's departure on crusade, and he was betrothed to Isabella II of Jerusalem, the young queen for whom her father John was regent. Frederick offered free transport and provisions to crusaders, but in spite of these generous financial inducements the response was not great and he was forced to suggest a postponement to allow the preaching to have more effect. By July 1225 he had agreed to leave on August 15 1227, and he accepted severe conditions imposed on him by the

pope. He married Isabella II of Jerusalem in Brindisi on November 9, 1225, and took the title of king of Jerusalem, having himself crowned in a special ceremony at Foggia and dispossessing his father-in-law, John of Brienne. He then changed the target of his crusade from Damietta to Jerusalem.

This change in target reflected interesting diplomatic developments between al-Kamil Muhammad and Frederick II. After the defeat of the crusaders in 1221, the Ayyubid unity prompted by the crusade faltered, and jostling for ascendancy resumed. Al-Kamil Muhammad was most concerned about the challenges of his brother, al-Mu'azzam 'Isa, lord of Damascus, and needed allies. Frederick needed allies as well, as he faced down papal disapproval. In 1226 al-Kamil Muhammad offered Frederick terms similar to those he had originally offered the crusaders at Damietta, and Frederick accepted. With an alliance between Frederick II and al-Kamil Muhammad established, Frederick's crusade could of course no longer target Damietta.

There was quite heavy crusade recruitment in the German states and England and by mid-summer 1227 large numbers of crusaders were assembling in the southern Italic Peninsula. They sailed from Brindisi in August and early September. Although many of them dispersed when the news reached them that Frederick II was not joining them after all, the main body marched down the coast to Caesarea and Jaffa to restore the town fortifications, while others occupied and fortified the city of Sidon in its entirety and built the castle of Montfort, northeast of Acre.

Meanwhile Frederick II, who had fallen ill, had put into the port of Otranto and decided to wait until he was better. Pope Gregory IX responded by excommunicating him. It is hard to decide whether Gregory acted in this way because he was exasperated by yet another delay, which was what he claimed, or because he was preparing the ground for his invasion of Frederick's lands in the southern Italic Peninsula, which the church would have been bound to protect had Frederick's crusade been legitimate. At any rate, when Frederick at last sailed in June 1228 he was an excommunicated crusader. On reaching Acre in early September, he found himself in no position to fight a campaign. His army was small, because so many of the crusaders of the previous year had returned home. Moreover, his army was divided, because some did not want to be associated with him now that he was excommunicated.

Negotiations between Frederick II and al-Kamil Muhammad began at once, but the power dynamics of their relationship had changed. In the few years since their initial alliance was made, al-Mu'azzam 'Isa had died, and so al-Kamil Muhammad's position among the Ayyubids was significantly stronger. Frederick, meanwhile, was in a weaker position. The terms of the treaty they finally agreed thus reflected al-Kamil Muhammad's relative strength. On February 18, 1229, they formally signed terms: al-Kamil Muhammad surrendered Bethlehem and Nazareth; a strip of land from Jerusalem to the coast; part of the district of Sidon; the castle of Toron; and, above all, Jerusalem itself, although the Temple area was to remain in Muslim hands and the city was not to be fortified. In return Frederick II pledged himself to protect the sultan's interests against all enemies, including Christians, for the duration of a truce of ten years. In particular, he would lend no aid to Tripoli or Antioch or to the military orders' castles of Crac des Chevaliers, Marqab and Safita.

Figure 7.2 Frederick II and al-Kamil Muhammad, fourteenth century.
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In the fourteenth century, banker Giovanni Villani decided to write a linear history of his city of Florence, Italy, which he called *Nuova Cronica*, "New Chronicles." He included the crusades as part of Florentine history. This illustration, showing Frederick II meeting al-Kamil Muhammad at the gates of Jerusalem, is from the earliest surviving manuscript of Villani's *Nuova Cronica.*

Frederick II entered Jerusalem on March 17 and on the following day went through an imperial crown-wearing ceremony in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, echoing the ancient prophecy of the last Christian emperor in occupation of Jerusalem before Anti-Christ, which had repeatedly featured in crusading thought and may have motivated his grandfather. Jerusalem was to remain in Latin hands for most of the following fifteen years, but it does not seem to have been reincorporated into the kingdom and was treated by Frederick as a personal possession.

Arguably this was, as Paul Cobb has explained, a "diplomatic coup" for al-Kamil Muhammad.[4] For his part, Frederick had gained control of Jerusalem without bloodshed. But neither Latin Christendom nor the Ayyubids and their governed populations viewed this treaty with anything but angry scorn. From a Muslim perspective, al-Kamil Muhammad had given control of the hard-won holy city of Jerusalem away. From a Latin Christian perspective, Frederick II had made a mockery of earlier crusades by

negotiating with al-Kamil Muhammad and defying the pope's excommunications; never mind that earlier crusaders had done similar things. Furthermore, the terms of their treaty meant it was unlikely that Jerusalem would be defensible.

On hearing of the treaty the patriarch of Jerusalem imposed an interdict on his own city. Frederick II returned to Acre in March, where he faced resistance from the patriarch, the nobles, and the Templars. The city was in a state of disorder, with armed soldiers roaming the streets. News of an invasion of Apulia by papal armies and allies forced Frederick to leave hurriedly for home. He tried to depart secretly in the early morning of May 1, but he was pelted with tripe and pieces of meat as he passed the meat markets on his way down to the port. So the crusade originally to Damietta had a curious postscript. Jerusalem had been recovered in a peace treaty negotiated by an excommunicate, whose crusade was not recognized and whose lands were being invaded by papal forces. Jerusalem itself was put under an interdict by its own patriarch. Its liberator returned to Europe not in triumph but showered with offal.

The truce that Frederick II had made with al-Kamil Muhammad was due to end in July 1239, and in anticipation Pope Gregory IX issued a new crusade proclamation in 1234. He gave the Dominicans a special commission to preach the cross. His intention seems to have been to unite all the Latin faithful in support of the crusade by encouraging everyone to take the cross and then, following a precedent established by Innocent III, to raise funds by allowing the unsuitable to redeem their vows for cash. He was also considering a totally unrealistic plan to maintain an army in the crusader states for ten years after the ending of the truce by taxing all Latin Christians.

Unlike twenty years before, the response in France was enthusiastic and in September 1235 Gregory IX had to order the French bishops to ensure that crusaders did not leave before the truce between Frederick and al-Kamil Muhammad expired in July 1239. Of course Frederick II, on whose Mediterranean ports they might have to rely for shipping and supplies, insisted that no crusade army should set foot in West Asia until after the truce ended. And then, in a move no doubt disturbing to those who had taken vows for Jerusalem, the pope changed his mind about the crusade's target. The weak position of the Latin Empire of Constantinople led him in the late summer of 1236 to propose redirecting the crusade to prop up Constantinople. There was resistance to this change and by late May 1237 Gregory seems to have become reconciled to the fact that there were now going to be two crusades: one in support of the Latin Empire and one directed toward Jerusalem.

The Latin Empire—from the Byzantine perspective, the Latin Occupation—was in sore need of assistance. The treaty that had established the Latin Empire also undermined it from the very start, because it had thoroughly divided authority and resources, preventing any emperor from ruling from a position of strength. Meanwhile, Latin emperors faced many of the same serious challenges as their Byzantine predecessors had. A number of smaller principalities ruled by individual Latins or Byzantines quickly emerged all around the edges of the Latin Empire. In particular, Byzantine resistance and renewed imperial claims quietly developed within two principalities, centered on Nicaea and Arta.

Owing to the efforts of the Latin emperor Baldwin II who led it, the crusade for Constantinople was quite large when it left in the late summer of 1239, although it

notably lacked French nobles. It took Çorlu in Thrace in 1240, and its presence bought the Latin Empire a breathing space. Meanwhile the crusaders aiming at Jerusalem, who mustered at Lyon, contained the most powerful members of the nobility of any crusade army recruited in France since 1202. It was headed by two peers: Count Thibald of Champagne, king of Navarre and the son of the early leader of the crusade of 1198; and Duke Hugh of Burgundy. Most of this force sailed from Marseille in August and reached Acre around September 1, 1239.

Their arrival coincided with a debate among the leading settlers over whether to launch an attack on Damascus or Cairo. In the end it was decided to march down the coast to refortify the citadel of Ascalon before campaigning against Damascus. On November 12 a strong Latin army reached Jaffa, where they learned that there was a large Ayyubid force at Gaza. Ignoring the warnings and even the veto of Thibald of Champagne, Peter I of Brittany, and the masters of the military orders, a force pressed on through the night and camped on the frontier beyond Ascalon. Perhaps the project was not as rash as it now appears to have been, but the commanders neglected to post sentries. They consequently found themselves surrounded, and, although many lords deserted, some refused to do so, and some eighty knights were captured. The Ayyubids retired without further engagement, and for their part, the crusaders did not start to rebuild the citadel at Ascalon as they had planned but withdrew back up the coast to Acre. There they stayed.

Thibald then negotiated an alliance with al-Salih Isma'il, Ayyubid ruler of Damascus. Al-Salih Isma'il was worried by a turn of political events that had made his nephew, al-Salih Ayyub, now sultan in Cairo. Al-Salih Isma'il promised to return Beaufort and the hinterland of Sidon, Tiberias, Safad, and all Galilee to the Latins, together with Jerusalem (which had been taken by the Ayyubid ruler of Karak in December 1239), Bethlehem, and most of the southern coast, once a Latin-Damascene coalition had gained victory over Cairo. The treaty was resisted by Muslim religious leaders, and al-Salih Isma'il even had to besiege Beaufort before handing it over. It was also resisted within the Latin kingdom by those who were in favor of a treaty with Cairo, instead. But Thibald led his army to a rendezvous with the Damascene forces at Jaffa.

As al-Salih Ayyub's forces advanced northward, many of the troops from Damascus, who were anyway demoralized, deserted, leaving the Latin force isolated. So Thibald was persuaded to enter into negotiations with al-Salih Ayyub. Again there was opposition within the Latin ranks, and on the face of it his crusade was becoming somewhat absurd, as he proceeded to negotiate two mutually contradictory truces. Nevertheless he secured from al-Salih Ayyub the promise of the lands, including Jerusalem, that had already been granted to the Latins by Damascus: this constituted more territory for the Latin settlers than they had held since 1187. After visiting Jerusalem, now back in Christian hands, Thibald departed for home in September 1240, leaving the duke of Burgundy and the count of Nevers to rebuild the fortress at Ascalon.

No sooner had Thibald left than a second wave of crusaders arrived. There had been a significant response in England to Pope Gregory IX's appeal. Richard, earl of Cornwall and younger brother of King Henry III, had taken the cross in 1236. He had to resist

attempts by his brother and the pope to keep him in England. In 1239 Gregory had even suggested that he send to Constantinople the money he would have spent crusading and had only reluctantly agreed to him making use of the cash that had been collected in England for the Latin Empire. He left England on June 10, 1240, accompanied by William, earl of Salisbury, and about a dozen nobles. Simon IV de Montfort, the earl of Leicester and Amalric's younger brother, who also crusaded at this time, seems to have traveled separately.

Richard reached Acre on October 8. He found the leadership of the Latin settlements still bitterly divided over relations with Damascus (al-Salih Isma'il) and Cairo (al-Salih Ayyub), but he decided to follow the advice of the majority, who were for a treaty with Cairo. Marching down to Jaffa, he met al-Salih Ayyub's envoys and then proceeded to Ascalon to complete the building of the citadel, which he handed over to representatives of Frederick II, the king-regent of Jerusalem, ignoring the claims of those who opposed Frederick. On February 8, 1241 the truce with Cairo was formally confirmed, and on the thirteenth prisoners of war taken at Gaza were returned. On May 3 Richard sailed for home.

North Europe

Although crusading and other forms of Christian holy war were already present in North Europe, in many ways crusading in the Baltics well and truly took off in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. Crusading against "pagans" in the Baltic region invariably relied on a connection between crusading and preexisting ideas of missionary warfare, a connection first explicitly articulated by the Church of Rome (at least in the surviving written record) by Bernard of Clairvaux in the 1140s. As in the eastern Mediterranean—indeed, arguably to an even greater degree—colonization, settlement, and economic expansion followed on the heels of crusading. There were four primary theaters of crusading warfare in the first half of the thirteenth century: Livonia; Estonia; Prussia; and Lithuania and Russia.

The Livonian crusades in the Baltic region—an ongoing effort over many years, rather than a single expedition—had their origins in a mission to the Livs on the river Dvina patronized by Prince-Archbishop Hartwig of Bremen. Hartwig was a member of a German noble family and former clerk to Henry the Lion of Saxony. As "prince-archbishop" he possessed temporal authority to rule Bremen given to him by Frederick I Barbarossa, as well as spiritual authority granted by the papacy. Hartwig saw in the creation of a bishopric at Üxküll the chance of extending his province, but the mission made little progress, although it had the personal support of Pope Celestine III. So, in 1193 and 1197, Celestine granted remissions of sin to those who fought in the service of the new Livonian Church. When the bishop of Hanover was killed during a battle against the Livonians in 1198, Archbishop Hartwig appointed his nephew Albert of Buxhövden in his place. This energetic and brutal man recruited more armsbearers and sought authorization for his actions from the new pope, Innocent III, who, as we have already seen, was enthusiastic about crusading. Ultimately, Albert of Buxhövden would

come to dominate Baltic crusading for thirty years and would establish a church-state, directly dependent on Rome, around Riga.

In response to Bishop Albert's appeals, Innocent III summoned the Latin Christians of the northern German states to the defense of the Livonian Church on October 5, 1199. Innocent justified the use of force as a means of protecting recent Latin converts persecuted by their pagan neighbors; this was a many centuries-old justification of violent missionary warfare. Armsbearers do not seem to have been granted a full crusade indulgence, and only those who planned to make pilgrimages to Rome were allowed to commute their vows to participation in the campaign; that is, those who had made vows to make a pilgrimage to Jerusalem were not allowed to fight in the Baltics instead. In 1204, however, Innocent went farther and licensed Albert to recruit priests who had vowed to go to Jerusalem to work on his behalf instead. Innocent also authorized laypeople who could not go to Jerusalem "on account of poverty or bodily weakness" to commute their vows to fight in Livonia while enjoying a full crusade indulgence. He also authorized Albert's representatives on recruiting campaigns to open churches once a year throughout the province of Bremen, even in places where there was an interdict.

Thus by 1204, Innocent III must have considered that the Baltic wars embodied a complete form of crusading, as some of his predecessors had done, although there are signs that, at least at times, he graded them below campaigns in the eastern Mediterranean. And whether he intended it or not, his papal letters initiated what became in effect a "perpetual crusade": continual crusade warfare that would be considered over only when all perceived enemies had been conquered and/or converted.

Box 7.1 "Paganism" in Medieval Europe

Roman Christians began to use the term "pagan" (from the Latin *paganus*, meaning "rural dweller") to describe and denigrate non-Christians in the fourth century. As a result, the term tells us who people *were not* rather than who they were. Peoples living in Europe followed a wide range of different religious and spiritual practices before and often after formal conversion to Christianity. Since the Church of Rome not only destroyed records of "paganism" but also used syncretism to encourage and support conversion—for example, by reconfiguring existing shrines, deities, rituals, and holy places to accord with Christianity—and since formal conversion did not necessarily mean a complete change in personal behaviors and convictions, it can be remarkably difficult to ascertain what practices and/or beliefs were in place in a particular community and for how long. Adding to the complexity is the fact that some modern pagans are committed to belief in a historical legacy stretching back through the Middle Ages. What is most relevant for this textbook is that a range of non-Christian religious practices and beliefs existed before formal conversion to Christianity, that they were variously outlawed or adapted, and that the label of "pagan" (or "heathen") was used to serve polemical needs and justify violence.

Such warfare required robust logistical and ideological support. Albert of Buxhövden transferred the capital of his bishopric down river from Üxküll to Riga, which could be reached by cogs (roundships) sailing from Lübeck. He returned to the German states every year until 1224 to recruit armsbearers for summer campaigns. These crusaders were supplemented and led by the members of a local military order, known usually as the Sword-Brothers—translated fully from the Latin, "Knightly Brothers of Christ of Livonia"—established by Albert in 1202. A parallel order, the Knights of Dobrzyn, was established in Prussia at roughly the same time by Bishop Christian, who is discussed more below.

These orders' initial focus was on conversion sustained by a constant military presence; preaching alone was not succeeding in converting local peoples to Latin Christianity and crusaders who came and went were ineffective, too. There were probably never more than 120 of the Sword-Brothers, living in six convents, but they organized expeditions of war during the summer and garrisoned strongholds in the winter: crusading in the Baltics relied strategically upon maximum use of fortified religious communities and small castles. Unlike the Templars and the Hospitallers, the two new Baltic military orders were run by bishops and thus not fully autonomous, and their primary and explicit mandate was sustained conversion and expansion of Christianity. Thus we see in them the further evolution and adaptation of the idea of a military order. The Baltic military orders were encouraged and supported by Popes Innocent III and Honorius III in the early 1200s, and Albert of Buxhövden authorized the Sword-Brothers to keep at least one-third of their conquests. By 1230 Livonia had been conquered, colonized, and converted (at least superficially) via a series of grim annual campaigns. Another people in the region, the Lettigallians, subsequently chose to voluntarily submit to the Sword-Brothers.

Estonia to the north was likewise conquered, colonized, and converted in campaigns begun by the Danes during Innocent III's pontificate. Although before 1216 the Danes had concentrated primarily on the conquest of the Pomeranian coast from Lübeck to Gdańsk, their fleets attacked Finland in 1191 and 1202, Estonia in 1194 and 1197, Saaremaa in 1206, and Prussia in 1210. The attack upon the island of Saaremaa was certainly presented as a crusade, and crusading ideas, combined with the concept of Christian missionary warfare, are also to be found in Innocent's letters. For example, in 1209 he encouraged King Valdemar II of Denmark "to root out the error of paganism and spread the bounds of the Christian faith.. . . Fight in this battle of the war bravely and strongly like an active knight of Christ."

In March 1217 Pope Honorius III issued full crusade indulgences to all crusaders in the Baltic region and the campaigns became more serious a few short years later, leading to the conquest of Estonia. In 1219 Valdemar of Denmark invaded northern Estonia and established a presence at Tallinn. He did so in response to appeals from Albert of Buxhövden at Riga, who had been alarmed by an incursion from the 'Rus of Novgorod, and also from Honorius, who had promised him that he could keep the land he conquered. In the following year the Danes, together with the Sword-Brothers and their allies among the Livs and the Lettigallians, subjugated northern Estonia. This led them into

competition with other Latins from the German states, who were advancing into Estonia from Livonia to the south, and the Swedes, who were occupying the northwestern coast. Valdemar used his naval control of the Baltic and the threat he could pose to shipping out of Lübeck to force his fellow-Latins to agree to his control of northern Estonia.

To a limited degree, crusades in North Europe competed with those to the eastern Mediterranean in the thoughts and planning of the popes. For example, Honorius III revoked the indulgence for crusading in the Baltics in 1220 because of the needs of the crusade to Damietta. But he restored the full indulgence in 1221, and in any event, by then the idea of a "perpetual crusade" had long taken root. Northern crusaders were signed with the cross, were referred to as pilgrims and crusaders (*peregrini* and *crucesignati*), and enjoyed a full indulgence as well as legal privileges. Measures were taken to tax the Church of Rome on their behalf. Their campaigns were justified in terms of the expansion of Latin Christendom as well as defensive aid to Latin Christians in distress. And ideologies of northern crusading had been and continued developing. For example, Mary, Mother of God, was becoming the dominant holy figure for crusading in North Europe.

Until 1230 crusading had concentrated on Livonia and Estonia, where by 1230 foundations of Latin control were laid. Although crusading continued in Livonia and was extended by the Swedes to what is now Finland, it came to be concentrated in Prussia, to the west of those regions. In Prussia it was again an aggressively missionary bishop who got the movement going. Christian, a Polish Cistercian monk, had been consecrated bishop of Prussia by Innocent III in 1215. His early successes as an evangelist had won the support of Duke Conrad of Masovia (Mazowsze) and Bishop Goslav of Plock, as well as that of the papacy. With his success there came growing hostility from indigenous peoples, and after several strategies, including the foundation of a new military order, the Knights of Dobrzyn, had failed, Conrad of Masovia intervened. In 1225 Conrad offered another military order, the Teutonic Knights, a substantial holding in the region. Henceforward the Teutonic Knights would be intrinsically associated with the subjugation and rule of Prussia.

The Teutonic Knights—strictly speaking, the Order of the Hospital of St. Mary of the Germans of Jerusalem—had its origins in a German field-hospital at the siege of Acre in 1189–90, which was reconstituted as a military order in 1198. Like the Hospitallers, the Teutonic Knights had the twin functions of fighting and caring for the sick, but their rule drew especially on that of the Templars. Until 1291 their headquarters were in West Asia and they were primarily concerned with the defense of the crusader states there. They had a large estate near Acre, centered on the castle of Montfort, as well as important holdings in the lordship of Sidon and in Cilician Armenia. Like the Templars and Hospitallers, however, they were also endowed with properties in Europe and were involved in campaigns there too.

Prussia was not the first region in Europe in which the Teutonic Knights were engaged in crusading. In 1211 King Andrew of Hungary had given them a stretch of his eastern frontier to defend against the Qipchaq Turks, but the Teutonic Knights made themselves unpopular. They insisted on exemption from the authority of the local bishop and gave

the papacy direct proprietary rights over their territory. They seem to have increased their holdings by dubious means, and they introduced German colonists. King Andrew, who did not want to have an autonomous German religious palatinate (i.e., princedom) on his frontier, revoked their privileges. When they resisted, he expelled them by force.

It was at this moment that Conrad of Masovia's invitation to crusade in Prussia arrived, and it came to a master of the Order, Hermann of Salza, who was exceptionally able and a close adviser of Frederick II Hohenstaufen. Hermann wanted a training ground for his knights before sending them to the eastern Mediterranean, and he was determined to establish the kind of independent church-state which the Order had tried and failed to create in Hungary. He first needed to get authorization from Frederick, and in the Golden Bull of Rimini of 1226, Frederick granted Hermann the status of an imperial prince for the province of Chelmno and all future conquests in Prussia. The next step was to make the new territory a papal dependency. In 1234 Pope Gregory IX took Prussia into the proprietorship of St. Peter and under the special protection of the Holy See, "returning" it to the Teutonic Knights as a papal fief.

Meanwhile Hermann sent his first detachment to the Vistula in 1229, and the conquest of the region began. It was not guaranteed that Bishop Christian and Hermann would work together well, but any potential conflict disappeared when Christian was captured by the Prussians and held for six years. By the time he was released it was too late for him to reverse the subordination of the church in Prussia to the Teutonic Order, in spite of his protests that the Order was more interested in making subjects than converts and was in fact directly hindering conversion.

The Teutonic Order, therefore, was the first of the military orders to be given what would later be regarded as semi-sovereign status, and it was under the leadership of the Teutonic Knights that the features of the crusades in North Europe we have already discerned became more pronounced. Membership and leadership of the Teutonic Order were nearly exclusively German, and their policies of settlement developed out of those already present in the German eastward colonizing drive. From the early 1230s a stream of crusaders flowed into the region and, perhaps because the masters spent so much time in Europe and could liaise directly with the papacy, the Teutonic Knights were able to formulate more clearly the concept of a "perpetual crusade." A series of papal letters, issued particularly by Popes Gregory IX and Innocent IV, granted full indulgences to all who went to fight in Prussia, whether it was in response to a specific papal appeal or not. So unlike those bishops who had occasionally issued crusade indulgences on their own authority in the twelfth century, the Teutonic Knights were explicitly empowered by the papacy to issue them thereafter. Clergy in North and Central Europe were repeatedly instructed to preach crusading.

The military strategy employed by the Teutonic Order was based on the building of castles, using forced Prussian labor, alongside new settlements of German burghers, while Dominican friars under its control Christianized the surrounding countryside. The Teutonic Knights seem to have planned an advance down the Vistula from Chelmno to the Zalew Wiślany and then eastward along the shore in the direction of Livonia, where from 1237 the Sword-Brothers were placed under their rule. After this the conquest of

the interior would begin. The Zalew Wiślany was reached in 1236 and by 1239, with most of the shore in its hands, the Teutonic Knights began to penetrate the interior.

Iberian Peninsula

Crusading also continued in the Iberian Peninsula. As before, this crusading was interspersed with other wars and episodes of violence as the various political actors in the peninsula attempted to expand or defend their holdings, both inside and outside of the framing of holy war.

As the last chapter showed, despite Almohad conquests and papal calls for crusade, crusading and other forms of Christian holy war did not revive in Latin-ruled Iberia until the early thirteenth century. Even then, the revival was uneven. By 1210 Alfonso VIII of Castile felt strong enough to renew the offensive against the Almohads. He and his allies began raiding, fortified by crusade privileges from Innocent III and probably focused on the Calatravan castle of Salvatierra. The Almohad caliph Muhammad al-Nasir resolved to take action and after a siege of ten weeks took Salvatierra in early September, although this success came too late in the year for him to exploit it.

The news of the loss of Salvatierra alarmed Latin Christendom and inspired the pope to proclaim a new crusade in the spring of 1212 in letters written to France as well as Iberia. In Rome itself fasting and special prayers were ordered for a Latin victory. There were penitential processions throughout France. Only one northern Frenchman of importance, Bishop Geoffrey of Nantes, seems to have taken the cross. On the other hand, the response was strong in Languedoc.

In June 1212 a large army was mustering around Alfonso VIII of Castile at Toledo: knights from France, Léon, and Portugal; King Peter of Aragon with a strong force; and, of course, the great Castilian nobles, knights, and city militias. It marched on the twentieth to meet Muhammad al-Nasir's own, more numerous, forces. On July 17 the Almohads were routed at Las Navas de Tolosa after an engagement in which the scales were turned by a heroic charge led by Alfonso VIII himself. After the victory the allied Latin forces took the castles of Vilches, Ferral, Baños, and Tolosa, opening southern regions of the peninsula to invasion, and Baeza and Ubeda, which they destroyed. Like the Battle of Hattin twenty-five years before, the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa was the result of deliberate risk-taking, but this time the gamble came off. The news of the victory was greeted in Rome with euphoria, although Innocent III characteristically refused to congratulate Alfonso VIII of Castile on the success. Victory was to be attributed not to the crusaders but to God, just as defeat was never a failure on God's part but a commentary on the wickedness of crusaders.

Las Navas de Tolosa was a turning point in the Latin Christian conquest of the peninsula, although this would not have been apparent to contemporaries. Most of the leading Latin monarchs were soon dead and their realms became preoccupied yet again with fights over thrones or regencies. Luckily for them, the Almohad state was also

crumbling. In the aftermath of Las Navas de Tolosa, the people of the peninsula endured a decade of local fighting.

For his part, Innocent III was also uninterested in generating a massive Iberian crusading effort; his attention was on the eastern Mediterranean. At the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 the Iberian bishops as a body begged him to restore full crusade status to Latin warfare in the peninsula. He seems to have assured them that, according to the terms of his decision, indulgences were available but only to Iberians. On several occasions his successor Honorius III similarly expressed the opinion that crusading in Iberia should not divert resources from war in the eastern Mediterranean, although shiploads of crusaders from the Low Countries and the Rhineland on their way to the crusader states helped the Portuguese take Alcácer do Sal in 1217. Honorius was prepared to grant a partial indulgence to fighters in Iberia in 1219, but even then he stressed that this was only to be granted to those who could not crusade to Damietta for some good reason. After the capture of Damietta his attitude changed and he renewed indulgences in 1221 for an enterprise to be led by Alfonso IX of León-Castile and in 1224 for one to be led by Fernando III of Castile, although this indulgence, in accord with Innocent's decree of 1213, was confined only to Iberians.

But between 1224 and 1228, the Almohad regime finally fell apart due to its own internal tensions, rebellions, and rivalries. At the same time, succession disputes in a range of Latin principalities in Iberia resolved, with aggressive and ambitious monarchs seated on their respective thrones: Fernando III of Castile, his father Alfonso IX of Léon, and Jaume I of Aragon-Barcelona. A full renewal of indulgences for the Iberian crusades finally came in 1229 in a letter from Pope Gregory IX, and there were crusaders from Languedoc on the expedition of Jaume I to the Balearic Islands in that year. Crusade privileges were also granted to those assisting the Iberian military orders, the activities of which, particularly in the 1230s, are reminiscent of those of the Teutonic Knights.

Jaume I of Aragon-Barcelona led crusades that took Majorca, Minorca, and Ibiza (1229–35) and Valencia (1232–53), reaching a line of demarcation between Aragon and Castile that had been laid down in 1179. In 1230 Badajoz was taken, and in 1231 Fernando III of Castile led a crusade that was marked by his brother's victory over Ibn Hud, the paramount *ta'ifa* emir, at Jerez. The way was now open for Ferdinand's conquests of Córdoba, the ancient Muslim capital, on June 29, 1236, and of the great city of Seville, on November 23, 1248.

There never was a papally authorized "perpetual crusade" in the Iberian Peninsula, even though the peninsula witnessed nearly chronic warfare between Latin Christians and Muslims, much of it framed in terms of holy warfare. Perhaps part of the explanation rests in the fact that Latin rivals fought each other with nearly equal zeal, as did Muslim opponents with each other. Military alliances across religious lines were not uncommon, and territories conquered by Latins contained Muslims, Jews, and Christians whose families had already long been resident there. All this was significantly different from the situation in North Europe. And while local military orders were prominent and powerful in both North Europe and Iberia, in Iberia they operated much more clearly under royal jurisdiction from the start.

What was driving Latin Christian expansion in Iberia, if not massive papal drive and direction? In part, the paramount regional ideology of Christian holy war, that of *restauratio*. But other pressures and motivations also played a role. In the thirteenth century, the Latin-ruled realms in Iberia virtually all experienced large demographic increases due to more productive agriculture that had been, ironically, assisted by the agricultural skills and technologies of the Islamicate world and Iberian Muslims. As a result, Latin Christian towns and cities saw what one historian has called "sometimes spectacular growth."[5] Such growth involved increases in trade and manufacturing, too. Meanwhile, although monarchs stood at the top of the social pyramid in Latin Iberia, local governance often continued to be just that: local. Urban militias, military orders, bishops, and noble families wielded both political and military power, and sought to gain both in reputation as holy warriors and in material terms from further conquests and the resulting plunder and acquisition. Of course part of the resources on offer were human, namely, captives who could be ransomed or enslaved. This meant that enslaved Muslims and free Muslims were both part of Latin Iberian society.

Additional Crusades in Europe

By this point, the fact that crusading took place within what we now call Europe has been well established. That said, it is perhaps easy to think that these crusades always took place on the frontiers of Latin Christendom. This was not the case in the thirteenth century, and it had not been the case in the twelfth: crusades launched by the papacy against its enemies, particularly the Norman rulers of Sicily, began in the 1120s and 1130s. Thus, when Innocent III launched crusades against those perceived to be threats to the Church of Rome in the early thirteenth century, he was building on the 1135 precedent of Pope Innocent II. But additional crusades within Europe did not originate solely with the papacy. In the thirteenth century, common laypeople also increasingly saw in crusading a means of expressing both piety and protest.

Crusading against Papal Enemies

Crusades against enemies of the papacy—and by extension enemies of the Church of Rome, from a papal perspective—resumed in the thirteenth century, at first spurred on by the death of Henry VI Hohenstaufen and subsequent instability in the Italic Peninsula and German states. Early in his papacy, Innocent III launched preaching for a crusade against Markward of Anweiler, an imperial officer who had tried to maintain a presence in Italy after Henry VI's death. Determined to recover the papal patrimony in the center of the Italic Peninsula and acutely sensitive about the southern peninsula and Sicily, where he was regent for Henry VI's son Frederick II, the pope was worried about the activities of Markward and his followers. When Innocent heard that Markward had crossed into Sicily in November 1199, he wrote to the people there referring to Markward as "another Salah al-Din" and "an infidel worse than the infidels." He claimed

that Markward was allied to the Muslims still living in the center of the island and that he was threatening the preparations for the planned-for crusade to Alexandria. He granted all who resisted Markward the same indulgence as that enjoyed by crusaders to the eastern Mediterranean on the grounds that the ports of Sicily might be essential to the coming campaign. Although this sounds as though Innocent was simply reacting to events, in fact, it is clear from other evidence that for nearly a year the pope had been envisaging a crusade against Markward, albeit as a last resort.

This crusade came to very little. Only a few men, the most important being Count Walter of Brienne, who was primarily motivated by concerns about his own political claims, were enlisted—incidentally the young Francis of Assisi seems briefly to have enrolled—and Markward's death in 1202 ended the reason for the enterprise. But the letter of November 1199 was an indication of things to come, as were Innocent III's later denunciations of the Danish dissident Valdemar Knudsen. Similarly, Innocent vehemently protested the English barons who rebelled against King John in the early thirteenth century, whom he also said were "worse than the Muslims," since their rebellion arguably hindered their king from embarking on crusade. It has even been suggested that John's defense of the English kingdom with papal support against the rebels, who were in league with Louis IX of France, had indeed become a kind of crusade and that it was for this that the nine-year-old Henry III of England took the cross at the time of his coronation on October 28, 1216.

These were all crusades directed at particular individuals, but other crusades, those against Frederick II and his Hohenstaufen family and allies, were in quite another class. In a sense the opening campaign had been that conducted by papal armies under John of Brienne (Frederick's father-in-law) in the mainland territories of the Kingdom of Sicily from 1228 to 1230. This assault on Frederick II's lands while he was in West Asia negotiating possession of Jerusalem with al-Kamil Muhammad had been justified by Pope Gregory IX as a war in defense of the church against a man who had oppressed Sicilian clergy and dared to invade the papal states. Armsbearers were promised remission of sins in general terms and had been financed by an income tax levied on the clergy. Churches in Sweden, Denmark, England, and the northern Italic Peninsula all paid a tenth in 1229 and French bishops were asked to send to Rome the final payments of a five-year tenth which had been imposed on their dioceses in 1225 in support of the crusade in Languedoc, on which more later. But full crusade indulgences were not granted, and it is noteworthy that the soldiers wore the sign of Peter's keys, not the cross. In historical hindsight the campaign looks more like an eleventh-century war of the Investiture Contest than a thirteenth-century crusade.

The crusade that was preached against Frederick II in 1239, however, fulfilled all possible criteria. The organization of the crusade began in 1239, and preaching was authorized in the northern Italic Peninsula and German states. The emperor had control of the southern peninsula, and he was close to achieving dominance in the north as well. By early 1240 his army was threatening Rome. Pope Gregory IX had to flee the peninsula and, after Louis IX of France had refused him asylum at Reims, took up residence in Lyon. In February 1241 he allowed his legates in Hungary to commute the vows of crusaders to

Map 8 Western Imperial Holdings and Allies, *c.* 1250.

the eastern Mediterranean to the crusade against Frederick. He asked for aid, although not at first linked to crusading, from the universal Latin Church and money was raised, in spite of much reluctance, in England, Scotland, Ireland, and France. In the summer of 1245, a council was summoned in Lyon, which elected to depose Frederick on July 17. This hardly settled the matter, since by 1248 it would be rumored that Frederick was thinking of marching on Lyon, and the pope now authorized the preaching of another crusade against Frederick in the Italic Peninsula and the German states as well as promulgating another in Iberia. Ultimately the crusade of 1239 achieved little, other than checking Frederick's advance on Rome, but it started a train of events that were to dominate peninsular politics for almost a century and a half.

Crusading against Heretics

In the early thirteenth century, events in Languedoc were leading to a crisis there. For decades the Church of Rome had been worried by the reported growth of heresy in the region. "Heresy" was, of course, a fundamentally subjective category, applied to individuals or groups by the authority of the Church of Rome. "Heretics" usually did not define themselves as such but rather as correct believers, and while they often positioned themselves in opposition to the Church of Rome or demanded reform, sometimes violently, they did not necessarily do so. Rather, in the act of naming them "heretics" Latin authorities established that a hostile relationship was in place. The label of "heresy" therefore tells us a great deal about Latin Christendom and its own self-identity; it does not necessarily tell us nearly as much about those deemed "heretics" or their actual beliefs.

From the perspective of the Churches of Rome and Constantinople, since heretics denied the Church's God-given function as the custodian of divine revelation, they were rebels who had deliberately turned from truth and had chosen—again, deliberately—to disturb the social order and spiritual hierarchy established by Christ. Heresy was therefore treated as an active, not a passive, threat. Heresy was thus *supposed* to be met with violence in order to forestall an active threat and redeem heretical souls by the application of corrective punishment.

By the late twelfth century the Cathars (known to themselves as the "Good Men and Women") and the Waldensians were the most numerous sectaries the church had to face, and their presence was especially strong in the northern Italic Peninsula and Languedoc, both regions in which there was no strong central political authority. Perhaps for that reason, in Languedoc Catharism came to be associated in many minds with *routiers*, bands of mercenaries who were already disturbing the region. Indeed, sanctions against these armed bands, which incorporated crusade ideas, had already been proposed.

That last point is crucial to an understanding of Innocent III's thinking. Since the fourth century the church had normally looked to temporal authorities to generate the fear that had proved itself the most effective way to eliminate heresies. The counts of Toulouse, the nominal lords of most of the territory in Languedoc with which we are

concerned, had limited direct control over their region. Whatever power they did enjoy was further restrained by the conflicting allegiances they themselves owed, because they were vassals not only of the king of France but also of the king of England in the west, the king of Aragon in the south, and the Western emperor in the east. The claims and ambitions of these rulers, embroiling themselves in internal conflicts in Languedoc, had led to savage and debilitating wars. The count of Toulouse was in no position to take effective measures against heresy nor were his overlords. And the king of France, in particular, was far too enmeshed in conflict with the English king in the north to cope with heresy in the south, even if he had wanted to tackle it.

Innocent III was faced by a classic dilemma. Heresy seemed to be permeating all levels of society in Languedoc, including the nobility, and with every year that passed it would be harder to address. Although there were probably fewer than 1,000 fully committed Cathars in the region between 1200 and 1209 a high proportion of them came from noble families. Of those known by name to us, 35 percent were nobles and it is also significant that a large majority, 69 percent, were women, preponderantly noblewomen. And at the same time, the regional temporal powers on which the pope relied could or would do nothing.

The Church of Rome had resorted to various measures against heresy in the course of the twelfth century. Preaching missions had been dispatched to Languedoc. In 1179 the Third Lateran Council had called on all Latin Christians to go to the aid of their bishops, if they decided to resort to the use of force against heretics. Such volunteers would enjoy a limited remission of sins for doing this but were assured of a full remission if they were killed. They would have the same protection of their lands in their absence as had pilgrims to Jerusalem. This was followed in 1181 by a limited military campaign in Languedoc under the command of the papal legate Henry of Marcy. In 1184 the papal letter *Ad abolendam* set up episcopal inquisitions and abolished all privileges of exemption from episcopal authority in this matter; that is, no one could avoid obeying a summons to fight from their bishop. The letter further stressed the need for secular leaders to collaborate in the suppression of heretics who, if still defiant, were to be handed over to temporal authorities for punishment. It is worth noting that a fierce critic of the crusade against Salah al-Din, Ralph Niger, argued in the winter of 1187–8 that knights should not be sent to the eastern Mediterranean because they were needed at home to fight heresy.

When Innocent III became pope in 1198, he tackled the problem with his usual energy. He sent a succession of legates to Languedoc. He took measures to reform the local church—between 1198 and 1209 he deposed seven bishops—and he encouraged the preaching mission of Diego of Osma and Dominic which was to lead to the foundation of the Dominican Order. These preaching missions were ineffective, and Innocent turned to the use of force; there is an echo here of the way that military orders in North Europe were established when conventional missionary work faltered. In May 1204 he called on Philip II of France to bring power of his kingdom to bear on the matter, and he went further than any pope had gone before in attaching to this exercise of temporal power a full crusade indulgence. This inclusion of the most important crusade privilege in a summons to a king merely to do his duty had no effect, which should remind us that

a positive response to crusade appeals was never guaranteed, especially if crusading was not in line with temporal rulers' own priorities. Renewed appeals to Philip in February 1205 and November 1207, the last of which repeated the grant of the indulgence, urged the confiscation of heretics' property, and added the promise to protect armsbearers' properties in their absence, also had no effect. Philip's reply made much of the difficulties he was experiencing in his conflict with John of England and set conditions for his intervention in the south that the pope was in no position to meet. Innocent also sent copies of this 1207 letter to the nobles, knights, and subjects of France. None of this had any effect.

The turning point proved to be the January 1208 murder of Peter of Castelnau, one of the papal legates in Languedoc, in circumstances that led the pope to suspect the complicity of Count Raymond VI of Toulouse, who had already been excommunicated for his failure to deal effectively with heresy. As soon as he heard the news Innocent proclaimed a crusade against the heretics and their collaborators in letters sent to all parts of France and probably to other regions of Europe as well. He called for armsbearers to take vows. and he granted them a full indulgence specifically related to that enjoyed by crusaders to the eastern Mediterranean. Three legates were appointed to organize the preaching of the crusade and lead it, and the pope decreed the abolition of usury and a delay in the repayment of debts, the usual ways in which crusaders were enabled to raise money for their campaigns. Measures were also taken to tax the churches in the regions from which the crusaders came in order to help finance them. Historians refer to this crusade as the Albigensian Crusade, named purely for convenience after the city of Albi.

The novelty of Innocent's proclamation of the Albigensian Crusade did not lie in his encouragement of the use of force against heretics. This had already been comprehensively justified, with reference to historical precedents and authorities stretching back to the fourth century, in Gratian's *Decretum.* Rather, it was the use of crusading specifically, rather than routine violence of temporal authorities, as the expression of force that was new. Furthermore, the belief that any chance of crusading victory could be undermined by corruption or divisions at home, so that holy war would be successful only when a society was undefiled and practicing uniformly orthodox religion, had already been widely expressed following the conquests of Salah al-Din, as we have seen. Everywhere one looks in Latin Christendom around 1200 one can see evidence of a drive to impose uniformity on a society that was already remarkably monocultural, and it is no coincidence that crusades against those deemed heretics came to the fore. In Languedoc as elsewhere crusading was grafted to preexisting expressions of Christian violence, in this case temporal violence against heretics.

The fact that the Albigensian Crusade was in the heartland of Western Europe led to it having some unusual features. Languedoc was not as remote as the eastern Mediterranean, or even Iberia or the Baltics, which is why the crusaders to the region came to take vows to serve there for only forty days at a time. And although the crusaders sometimes called themselves "pilgrims," the goal of their pilgrimage was never clearly identified. The Albigensian Crusade illustrates how crusading was coming to flourish independently of some of the elements that had initially combined to make it.



Map 9 Languedoc, *c.* 1209 and 1229.

The response to Innocent's appeal was enthusiastic, even fervent, and by the spring of 1209 a large force was gathering to attack the south. Raymond VI of Toulouse hastened to make terms and on June 18, 1209, was reconciled to the church in a dramatic scene on the steps of the abbey of St. Gilles, in front of the great western façade on which the Passion of Christ, in a manifestation of orthodox belief, was sculpted in stone. He then underwent a penitential whipping inside the abbey church and, because the crowd was so great, had to be led out by way of the crypt, past the new tomb of the murdered legate, Peter of Castelnau.

Notwithstanding the count's submission, the crusaders invaded the lands of Ramon Rogier of Trencavel, viscount of Béziers and Carcassonne and lord of the Albigeois and of Razès, where heretics were purportedly numerous. Béziers fell on July 22, and large numbers of citizens were massacred, regardless of their religious affiliations. The town of Carcassonne, which held out for two weeks, was treated much more lightly, in part because the savagery at Béziers served as an example and led to a collapse of resistance. In the decades that followed, there would be more massacres, as well as burnings of captured heretics, and the retaliatory violence of those targeted by the crusade was often itself savage.

A secular leader needed to be appointed to administer the Trencavel lands and set up a permanent base for future crusade operations. The choice fell on Simon IV de Montfort, who had opposed on principle the attack upon Zadar and the diversion of the 1198 crusade to Constantinople seven years before. Simon was now in his late forties. Lord of Montfort and Epernon since 1181, he had also inherited the earldom of Leicester in 1204 on the death of a maternal uncle. Courageous, tenacious, and devout, he was a great military commander and a model husband. He was also ambitious, obstinate, and capable of horrifying acts of cruelty.

Because of the seasonal nature of the crusade, Simon IV had a thankless task until his death in the summer of 1218. Every summer parties of crusaders from France and Germany would descend on Languedoc for the campaigning season. Once their forty days' service was completed they would return home, often at inconvenient times, and during each winter Simon would be left almost entirely alone, trying desperately to hang on to the gains made in the previous summer.

His efforts were desperate because, unsurprisingly, inhabitants of the region—whatever their religious affiliations—responded vigorously to the crusaders' attempt to conquer their lands. Resistance was fierce, and even once locales were conquered (or subdued), revolts often broke out when the crusaders' attention turned elsewhere. From the perspective of local inhabitants, the crusade was an unholy war, waged perversely against Christians and thus against God.

In 1210 Simon IV mastered the rest of the Trencavel lands and King Pere II of Aragon, who had earlier refused to acknowledge him, now accepted his offer of homage for them. Raymond VI of Toulouse had still not fulfilled the promises he had made at the time of his reconciliation with the church and, although he seems to have pursued no consistent policy in the interim, the legates were convinced that he was not to be trusted. Simon therefore prepared to attack Toulouse and Ramon's other lands. Throughout 1211 and

1212 he tried to encircle Toulouse itself by taking nearby strongholds, although towns which came over to him in the summer would return to Count Ramon when autumn and the end of the campaigning season came.

In the winter of 1212–13, Pere II of Aragon, his prestige enhanced by the part he had played in Iberian crusading, approached the pope directly on behalf of his vassals in Languedoc and his brother-in-law, the count of Toulouse. This provided Innocent with the pretext to abolish crusade privileges on the grounds that Simon had overreached himself; in fact, abolishing crusade privileges in Languedoc suited Innocent's plans for a new crusade to the eastern Mediterranean. In the summer of 1213 Pere marched to Ramon of Toulouse's assistance, but on September 12 he was killed when his army was decisively defeated by Simon IV's greatly inferior forces at the Battle of Muret. Aragon's expansionist policy north of the Pyrenees was checked. By the end of 1214 Simon was in control of most of Ramon's lands, and the expedition to the south of the new king of France, Louis IX, in the early summer of 1215 was a triumphal procession. In November 1215 the Fourth Lateran Council assigned to Simon those of Ramon's territories that he had taken; the remainder was to be held in trust by the church for the count's son, Ramon VII.

The year 1215 was the high point of Simon IV de Montfort's career, but it was also a turning point, because the nobles and towns of the region began to rally to the dispossessed count of Toulouse and his son. In September 1217 Ramon entered Toulouse and on June 25 1218, Simon was killed outside the city. Leadership of the crusade was assumed by his son Amaury, then twenty-six years old, but he could not reverse the decline of the crusade, despite incredibly proactive support from Pope Honorius III. Even Ramon VI's death in August 1222 did not assist Amaury: the new count Ramon VII of Toulouse was even more popular than his father had been. Amaury was at the end of his resources, and the situation was saved only by the intervention of the French monarchy. In January 1226 Louis IX vowed to crusade in the south again. On September 9 the royal army took Avignon after a three-month siege and almost all the region east of Toulouse declared for the king, who left the administration of his conquests to a new lieutenant, Humbert of Beaujeu.

Humbert embarked on a policy of ruthless and systematic destruction in response to Ramon VII's attempts to regain his territory, and the end of the crusade came three years later, with the Peace of Paris of April 12, 1229. Ramon VII received the western and northern parts of the domains held by his father at the start of the crusade, with the proviso that Toulouse could be inherited only by his daughter Joan, who was betrothed to King Louis IX's brother, and by their heirs; otherwise, it would revert to the king. Joan and her husband would later crusade together, alongside Louis IX. The Peace of Paris also contained clauses dealing with heresy, of which one of the most interesting was the endowment of a fund to establish the salaries for ten years of four masters of theology, two decretists (canon lawyers), six masters of arts, and two masters-regent of grammar at Toulouse. This marked the origins of the university there.

The clauses of the Peace of Paris and the decrees of a council held at Toulouse in November 1229 demonstrated that twenty years of violence had not been effective,

because heresy was as much a concern as ever. Eradicating heresy in Languedoc would ultimately require the establishment of the Inquisition in Toulouse in 1233. Starting around 1250, Cathar leaders would withdraw to Lombardy, though it would take another seventy years for the process to be complete. By 1324 Catharism in Languedoc was dead.

Besides the Albigensian Crusade, there were other minor crusades against purported heretics and schismatics in the early thirteenth century. For example, there was a small crusade authorized by the pope in 1232 against the Stedinger peasants. They had revolted against their lord, the archbishop of Bremen, who in turn accused them of heresy and received authorization to put down the revolt via crusade. The bishops of Minden, Lübeck, and Ratzeburg were ordered to preach the cross in the dioceses of Paderborn, Hildesheim, Verden, Münster, Osnabrück, Minden, and Bremen, and crusaders from the Low Countries as well as Germany took part in a campaign early in 1234. In the same category were crusades authorized in 1227 and 1234 against alleged and unspecified heretics in Bosnia, largely fought by Hungarian crusaders and for which there was the commutation of vows for crusading in the eastern Mediterranean, and in 1238 against John Asen of Bulgaria's alliance with Byzantine Nicaea, which was ordered to be preached in Hungary. These crusades do not seem to have attracted much criticism outside the targeted regions or to have created many problems for the papacy.

Popular Crusades

The first of several episodes of mass fervor that punctuated the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries came in the early decades of the thirteenth century. These upheavals, the so-called popular crusades, were manifestations of the frustration of the poor. Armies for the eastern Mediterranean were increasingly being transported by sea, which meant that many people could no longer afford to go with them. It was one thing to join a force marching overland—all one needed was health and the use of one's legs—but it was quite another to find the money to pay for a maritime passage. Furthermore, crusades within Europe, such as those just described, did not readily welcome non-armsbearers. This meant that the spiritual privileges on offer for those who crusaded were limited to those who could afford them or who could fight themselves. De facto excluded from the crusades launched by the papacy or temporal powers, the poor created their own opportunities.

Remember that by 1212 crusades were being waged on three fronts—along the Baltic coast, in Languedoc, and in Iberia—but there was relative peace in the eastern Mediterranean. At this inopportune moment there erupted a popular movement within Europe dedicated to saving the Holy Land. During the previous winter, preaching for the Albigensian Crusade had—finally—fired popular enthusiasm in northern France and the Rhineland. Enthusiasm was generated further by the news from Iberia of the loss of the castle of Salvatierra and by the penitential processions that were organized by the clergy. Gary Dickson has convincingly established the course of events that followed, so intriguingly, but unhelpfully, known as the "Children's Crusade."

One of the processions, which took place in Chartres in May 1212, was witnessed by a shepherd boy from the village of Cloyes called Stephen. Inspired by his experience, Stephen believed that on his return home he was visited by Christ, dressed as a pilgrim, who gave him a letter to be presented to the king of France. His account of his vision—and probably his own charisma—triggered an uprising of peasants, many of whom appear to have been young. They were probably adolescents, rather than small children, and they were joined by adults as well. A crowd chanting, "Lord God, exalt Christianity! Restore the True Cross to us!" which was estimated at between 15,000 and 30,000 men and women, followed Stephen to St. Denis, on the outskirts of Paris, in the vain hope of meeting the king. They were told to go home. Many of them seem to have dispersed, and Stephen is not heard of again. The rest marched through northern France to Cologne, where their arrival in late July sparked another uprising, under a young leader called Nicholas. Still numbering several thousand, the group journeyed to the Italic Peninsula, making for the coast from which they hoped to cross the Mediterranean dry shod. Disappointed at Genoa, some went on westward to Marseille and others to Rome where they were turned back.

A mass movement among "children" fired the imagination of contemporaries and within thirty years the story was being mythologized. It was said that Nicholas enrolled in the crusade against Damietta and that some of those who reached Marseille were deceived by two merchants into embarking on ships from which many of them were sold into slavery in North Africa or in Baghdad or in the castle of the leader of the Nizaris. We know something about the future of only one individual. In 1220 Pope Honorius III dispensed a poor scholar called Otto, who resided in Friuli but was probably from the Rhineland, from the crusade vow he had made "imprudently, along with other youths (*pueri*)."

CHAPTER 8
INSTITUTIONALIZATION, 1198–1240

The first half of the thirteenth century saw the intensification of crusading. This undoubtedly reflected papal vigor, but it was also due to the firm entrenchment of crusading within noble family traditions and both noble and popular Latin Christian cultures, as well as the entanglement of crusading with preexisting ideologies and practices of Christian holy war and Latin expansion. Alongside this intensification, the first half of the thirteenth century also saw the institutionalization of logistical and cultural elements that cemented crusading within Latin Christian cultures. This chapter seeks to discuss these various forms of institutionalization together. If the previous chapter showed both popes and temporal rulers launching crusades, this chapter shows the Church of Rome and other institutions—social, political, cultural—establishing what it meant to crusade. It also demonstrates the complicated connections between crusades and other trends and initiatives, and the ways in which crusades were one factor among many driving particular kinds of change.

Logistics and Canon Law

In many ways, papal ideologies of crusading and procedures for handling crusade logistics were put in place in the first half of the thirteenth century, primarily thanks to the efforts of Pope Innocent III. With Innocent III's papacy, the various formulae and definitions of crusading reached a mature form and his crusade letters became exemplars for later popes. He extended the use of crusading, but within a largely traditional framework of thought. He was the first pope to tax the Church of Rome for crusades, the first to organize a large-scale crusade against heretics, the first to exploit redemptions and the first to build up an elaborate system for preaching the cross.

In terms of what Innocent III and subsequent popes could control, we see the establishment of substantial precedents that would continue to govern both the spiritual fine details and the practical logistics of launching a crusade for centuries to come. The early thirteenth century saw in particular the concretization of systems of crusade preaching, taxation, and privileges and dispensations for crusaders. At the same time, we have to remember that this elaborate apparatus did not grant the papacy the actual ability to control crusades, as the prior chapter amply demonstrated.

Preaching

Preaching had played a crucial role in crusade recruitment from 1095 onward. Innocent's passion for organization, and perhaps also the difficulties he faced raising military manpower for crusading in 1198–9 and 1208, led him to introduce an elaborate system for such preaching. This system resulted in the production in England, France, and the German states of handbooks for preachers, which set out to equip preachers with central themes and rhetorical devices.

Handbooks were backed up, at least theoretically, with supervision. Innocent personally oversaw preaching in the Italic Peninsula, while northern Europe and France papal legates were charged with organizing recruitment. In every other province of Latin Christendom, the pope appointed small groups of preachers with legatine powers, many of them bishops, who were permitted to delegate the task to deputies in each diocese. He also laid down detailed rules for their behavior and clearly took a great interest in the way they carried out their duties.

After Innocent's papacy, by the mid-thirteenth century, the machinery for preaching had become well established. In general, after a papal proclamation of crusade indulgences and the appointment of papal legates, this machinery would swing into action. Mendicant friars—Dominicans and Franciscans—became the normal preachers of the cross. Model sermons were written, distributed, and collected. Major preaching events were orchestrated in advance, with audiences primed to respond in certain ways and key moments of the event stage-managed for maximum effect.

As Miikka Tamminen has explained, crusade model sermons consistently reiterated the characteristics of a "true" (or ideal) crusader and were aimed at both those who were considering and those who had already taken crusade vows. Different model sermons addressed different audiences, often differentiated by social status. The clerics who wrote model sermons were also demonstrably committed to the moral reform of Christendom in its entirety, and that helps explain their eagerness to not only recruit crusaders but also ensure crusaders were "true." The themes and tone of the dozens of thirteenth-century model sermons that survive vary greatly, but there were some common elements. In particular, Tamminen notes, the "true crusader" of these thirteenth-century sermons was "penitential, mimetic, pious, and soldierly."[1] The sermons do not give us direct access to the minds of crusaders themselves, but they do show us how key members of the pastoral reform movement sought to influence crusaders and what they believed would evoke a positive response in their audiences.

We have some sense of thirteenth-century crusade preaching in France from a portable handbook written between 1266 and 1268 by Humbert of Romans, who had resigned as master general of the Order of Preachers (Dominicans) a few years before. Humbert stressed that preachers should be acquainted with the geography of the world and of the places to which crusades would be directed. They should know about Islam; he suggested they should read the Qu'ran, and provided a further reading list. They should have the technical knowledge required to give advice and to answer questions about papal letters and about indulgences, absolutions, and dispensations. Humbert

included 138 scriptural citations as preaching texts, drawn from both the Old and New Testaments, as well as anecdotes to arouse an audience's interest.

In terms of how exactly to get volunteers, Humbert advised his preachers to arrange to meet great lords privately, since once persuaded, a great lord could induce a wide clientage to join them in taking the cross. Private meetings, however, were never more than supplementary to the set-piece public sermon, of which Humbert gave twenty-nine examples. These should be quite short and should end with a passionate and direct invitation to take the cross. After that, a suitable hymn or popular crusading song should be sung, presumably so that public commitments to crusading, with singing in the background, would form a memorably pious spectacle.

Taxation

Crusading had always been costly but it had become so expensive, especially if fleets were involved, that sooner or later a better supplementary resource than the taxes which had been spasmodically levied by twelfth-century monarchs would have to be found. Over the first half of the thirteenth century, a system of regular taxation in support of crusading developed slowly. In the autumn of 1198, Innocent III wrote to all archbishops, expanding on the demand he had already made for fighters and money and asking them to summon provincial councils to discuss the issue. At least one of the councils met, in Dijon late in 1198, and many of the bishops present promised to contribute to the crusade as much as a thirtieth—that is over 3 percent—of the incomes of their dioceses. A year later, in 1199, Innocent issued another general letter, *Graves orientalis terrae*, which imposed on the whole Latin Church, with a few exceptions, an income tax of a fortieth—that is 2.5 percent—"since the greatest necessity demands it." The laity were also to be encouraged to give alms and chests were to be placed in churches for this purpose. The proceeds were to be granted to crusaders who could not otherwise afford to go and promised to stay in the Holy Land for at least a year, but allowance was made for those who sent soldiers in their stead.

This appeal was unsuccessful. But it was the first step in a process that would lead to an elaborate system of clerical taxation. Perhaps because the 1199 appeal did not succeed, in 1215, Innocent simply ordered a three-year tax of a twentieth of all church income: six times more onerous than his earlier tax. In 1199 he had left the collection of the tax to the bishops, but their lack of cooperation had soon persuaded him to send officials from Rome to oversee it, so in 1215, he put papal commissioners in charge of the funds. Unlike 1199, there was no guarantee in 1215 that the tax would not create a precedent. Indeed, it was imposed with the approval of a general council (the Fourth Lateran Council) and the principle was thereby established that a pope had the right to tax the clergy without any further consent. The ratification of this tax by the general council did not enhance its popularity. It met with particularly fierce opposition in Iberia, since it was accompanied by a downplaying of the importance of crusading there, but it was also resisted in France, the Italic Peninsula, German states, and Hungary.

In the first half of the thirteenth century, it became usual for clergy to be regularly taxed in support of the crusades. Usually apportioned at a tenth, these levies were demanded of the whole Latin Church or of the clergy in particular provinces for periods varying from one to six years. Settlement was usually expected in two equal instalments a year. Grants from the taxation were made to a wide range of individuals, from monarchs to petty lords, often consisting of the cash raised from the churches in their own territories and in those of their relations.

Theoretically, the ability to disperse these funds gave the popes a directing power that they could never have hoped for in the twelfth century, because, with crusading so expensive and crusaders patently in need of funds, they could divert their grants and, therefore, a large part of crusade resources in the direction dictated by their policy at a particular time. In practice, however, their control was never as effective as the theory would suggest. If a grantee failed to fulfill his vow, his subsidy, which had been deposited in the meantime in religious houses, was supposed to be sent to Rome, but the popes seldom got all they should. And the taxation, which tended to become cumulative as new subsidies were demanded while old ones were still in arrears, was extremely unpopular and was strongly criticized on grounds of principle. Papal envoys were greeted with hostility and resistance was such that the returns were often slow in coming and were sometimes not paid at all.

A tangible result, however, was that what grants of cash could be made enabled crusade leaders not only to employ mercenaries but also to subsidize subordinate crusaders. From perhaps as early as the late twelfth century, and certainly from the later 1230s, monarchs and greater lords were entering into contracts for service with their followers, releasing money in return for specified service with a known number of fighting men. This system of indentures enabled volunteers to be paid as if they were in the leaders' employment and it made them more amenable to discipline.

Indulgences, Privileges, Dispensations, and the Liturgy

Alongside a new system of taxation came a new formulation of the remission of sins. Innocent III opted for a remission of the "divine authority" type foreshadowed in the writings of Bernard of Clairvaux and Eugenius III: a crusader received remission of sins because the indulgence was issued by the pope, who acted on behalf of God. In doing so, Innocent definitively established the "indulgence" as it has been known ever since. No longer would the pope simply declare that a penitential act would be satisfactory. Since he was now promising a sinner the remission on God's behalf, the emphasis was no longer on what the sinner did, but on the loving willingness of a merciful God to make good any deficiency by rewarding the devout performance of a meritorious work, following confession and absolution.

Crusaders also became, in effect, temporary clergy, subject to ecclesiastical courts and exempt from most secular jurisdiction in cases that arose after they had taken the cross. They could not be cited for legal proceedings outside their native dioceses. They were released from excommunication. They were allowed to have dealings with

excommunicates while on crusade without incurring censure and they were not subject to interdicts. They could have personal confessors, who were often allowed to dispense them from irregularities and to grant pardon for sins, such as homicide, which were usually reserved for papal jurisdiction. They could count a crusade vow as an adequate substitute for another vow made previously but not yet carried out. They were entitled to a delay in the performance of services and in judicial proceedings to which they were a party until their return; to a quick settlement of outstanding court cases if they so willed and to permission to count the crusade as restitution of some article stolen. They could dispose of or pledge fiefs or other property that was ordinarily inalienable and could, if clergy, enjoy their benefices for a time as nonresidents and pledge them to raise money for the journey. Furthermore, crusaders had the right to a moratorium on debts and exemption from interest payments while on crusade and to freedom from tolls and taxes. They could demand hospitality from church establishments. Their persons were secure and in their absence their families and properties were protected by the Latin Church, though in England the Crown often acted as the guardian of their property. Often the granting of privileges to crusaders were accompanied by strictures. For example, an addendum to the often-replicated decree of 1215 prohibited trade with Muslims in war materials and banned tournaments for three years. It also decreed peace in Christendom for the duration of the crusade and, as we've seen above, instituted a new tax policy.

In September 1201, Innocent III—desperate for volunteers for his crusade intended for Alexandria—went so far as to subordinate a fundamental principle of canon law to the needs of crusading. He decreed that the Christian Holy Land was in such dire straits that a husband could take the cross without his wife's consent. He justified this violation of the natural right of married women and the principle of the parity of both partners in a marriage contract by means of analogies with the temporal world. Canon lawyers were never fully comfortable with this ruling, which argued that since the objections of wives could not overrule the demands of earthly rulers for military service they could not be a hindrance to the mandates of the heavenly king. In taking this step, Innocent developed a theme found in his letters: that, although by its nature voluntary, the vow to crusade was a moral imperative. It was demanded of qualified Christians by God and could not be set aside with impunity.

A crusader who was unable to complete their vow could request a papal dispensation: a release from a vow and its conditions. Early in his papacy, Innocent laid down some general rules for dispensations, which stated that a son was bound to fulfill a vow undertaken and not fulfilled by his father, but also stressed the pope's right to dispense. Easier to obtain than a full dispensation were deferment (the grant of a delay in the performance of the act vowed), substitution (the sending of another in place of the crusader), commutation (the performance of another penitential act in place of the one originally vowed), and redemption (dispensation in return for a money payment). The amount to be paid in redemption should theoretically equal the sum that would have been spent had the crusader actually joined an expedition and thus depended on a crusader's social status.

In 1213, Innocent introduced an important new statement on the enforcement of vows. He had already ruled that as pope he could dispense from vows but he had formerly allowed these only in the context of a strict enforcement of most of the promises made. Now he extended the benefits of crusades. Everyone, whatever their ability to go on crusade, was to be encouraged to take the cross, but those who were not suitable to fight could then redeem their vows for money payments. This reflected the need for money to support crusaders and purchase mercenaries, the desire to limit the participation of those unsuitable for military campaigning, and the desire to extend the spiritual benefits of crusading to all Latin Christians. The notorious "sale of indulgences" originated, of course, in this policy. This was a major innovation, and not everyone approved. The implementation of this policy by papal legates in France caused a scandal and the abuses to which it was liable led to sporadic criticism throughout the thirteenth century and beyond.

Innocent III's ideas and those of canon lawyers since the birth of the crusading movement were summarized and developed in the writings of Pope Innocent IV and his pupil Henry of Segusio (better known as Hostiensis). Both men stressed that the pope was the sole earthly legitimizer of holy war. The indulgence, which only the pope could grant, was an expression of his authority in this matter. The Holy Land, consecrated by the presence and suffering of Christ and once part of the Roman Empire, was rightfully Christian and its rule by Muslims was an offence against which the pope, as vicar of Christ and heir of the Roman emperors, could order retribution. Crusades could also be waged defensively against non-Christians and against those within Christendom who menaced Christian souls.

Indeed, Hostiensis echoed Peter the Venerable's opinion that crusades against heretics, schismatics, and rebels were even more justified by necessity than those to the eastern Mediterranean, and he was much more radical than Innocent on relations between Christians and non-Christians. Innocent IV was prepared to argue that the pope had a de jure but not de facto authority over non-Christians, with the power to order them to allow missionaries to preach in their lands and a right in the last resort to punish them for infringements of natural law. But he stressed that Christians could not make war on them for not being Christian, fight wars of conversion, or invade and claim the realm of a non-Christian unless authorized by the papacy in response to a clear violation of natural law. Thus, Innocent allowed self-government, at least theoretically, to non-Christians. Hostiensis, on the other hand, supposed that the pope could intervene directly in the affairs of non-Christians and that their refusal to recognize his dominion was in itself justification for a Christian assault on them. He even suggested that any war fought by Christians against non-Christians was just by reason of the faith of the Christian side alone. The papal ruling prevailed at the time and thereafter, but we will see that as future centuries unspooled and Latinization further expanded even while homogeneity within Christendom was more and more violently enforced, some in Latin Christendom elevated Hostiensis' arguments for the legitimate seizure of non-Christian lands and peoples simply because they were not Christian.

By the middle of the thirteenth century crusading had become commonplace and many committed families could look back on four or five generations of participants. The privileges that regulated crusader status had become formalized. To the greatest of them, the indulgence, were added substantial rights. The expansion of dispensation to include vow redemption by monetary payment theoretically made crusading—and its spiritual advantages—available to everyone who could so pay. And the question of authority over all those *extra ecclesiam* ("outside the church"), whether living within or beyond the borders of Latin Christendom, had been raised yet again. Crusading had become an endeavor by and on behalf of Latin Christendom as a whole.

Perhaps nowhere is this more clearly communicated than in the liturgical developments outlined by Cecilia Gaposchkin. While the crusades and the Latin liturgy stood in relation to each other from the First Crusade onward, it was Innocent III who "made liturgical supplication a keystone in the new [crusade] strategy."[2] As we have seen, internal reform and external victory were to be pursued simultaneously, and Innocent clearly believed that both goals could be achieved through joint means. Inspired by the apparently successful results of public, penitential processions in the lead up to the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa, in *Quia maior* he prescribed a procession each month throughout Latin Christendom, with men processing apart from women when possible. The goal was to fight the enemies of Christ with spiritual as well as military weapons.

Crusading Cultures

Ideas of Crusading and Related Trends

Innocent III's 1213 papal bull, *Quia maior*, opened with an exposition of crusading thought and dwelt on themes that preachers had been putting to their audiences for a long time. Crusading was an act of Christian charity. The summons to crusade was a divine test of an individual's intentions and also a chance to gain salvation; in this respect, Innocent went about as far as it was possible to go theologically, referring to the crusade not only as "an opportunity to win salvation," but also as "a means of salvation." The Holy Land was the patrimony of Christ. Innocent had never hesitated to exploit the concept of the crusade as a quasi-feudal service to God and he repeated it here, although it was thought by some clerics to be a dangerous metaphor. A feudal relationship implied mutual obligations between God and man along the lines of those between lord and vassal, whereas God, of course, was not obliged to anyone.

Like *Audita tremendi*, *Quia maior* laid great stress on the need for repentance. It decreed monthly penitential processions throughout Christendom and introduced a new intercessory rite to be inserted into the Mass after the Kiss of Peace and before the reception of Communion. Its penitential sections underlined the conviction that crusading could only be successful if accompanied by a spiritual reawakening of Christendom. Innocent III carried the belief of his predecessors in the necessity for general reform to its logical conclusion. In doing so, Innocent was not alone; he was part

of the pastoral reform movement in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, as were the many clergy who wrote model crusade sermons.

The pastoral reform movement sought to morally correct Christendom, ensuring that Latin Christians not only did the right things at the right times, but did them with the right intentions and sincere piety. The 1215 Fourth Lateran Council of the Church of Rome is often seen as the official launch of this movement, and *Quia maior* was issued in conjunction with a summons to this council. The general council opened on November 11, 1215, with a sermon from Innocent in which he stressed the twin aims of crusade and moral renewal. Among the decrees there was one, *Excommunicamus*, which justified, and laid down rules for, crusades against heretics and led some canonists such as Ramon de Penyafort to be concerned lest it would be treated as a standing authorization for crusades of this type.

The cerebral approach of Innocent and their canon lawyers gives no impression of the passions the crusading movement sometimes aroused. Attachment to the cross seems to have become central to thirteenth-century crusading. The cross had always been a major feature of crusading thought, but for the first eighty years of the movement its image appears to have been less significant in the words of preachers and the minds of crusaders (in so far as one can see into them) than the reality of Christ's Tomb (Holy Sepulchre) in Jerusalem. The triumph of the cross in crusading thought, its transformation from a potent symbol of victorious self-sacrifice to both intrinsic justification and statement of identity and purpose correlated with growing devotion to the Crucifixion. In other words, the stress on the cross reflected a popular religion which was becoming more and more cross-centered. At the same time, "taking the cross" was usually a public event, and thus one with significant social as well as spiritual meaning, and thenceforward the crusader's cross served to confirm an individual's identity and commitment. And as early as the mid-twelfth century, crusader crosses were of different colors to indicate national/ethnic identity conjoined to personal spiritual commitment. To some degree, crosses also continued to reflect victorious self-sacrifice in the cultural medium of chivalry.

Medieval chivalry is a thorny knot of interrelated ideas and practices, with great cultural and geographical variation within Europe. Between roughly 1000 and 1400, the word "chivalry"—from the Old French *chevalerie*—moved from being a simple noun designating a group of mounted warriors to a concept justifying and valorizing the ideals of the wealthy, war-waging elite, that is, monarchs and the nobility. The idea of chivalry incorporated elements of lay piety, family and class identity, masculinity, and military values. In assessing it, furthermore, we have to wrestle with the conflict between chivalric literature and the realities of noble life, warfare, and violence in Latin Christendom. Knights and nobles were the main causes of violence and warfare; even in the literature, one important role of "good" knights was to fight against the "bad."

Chivalry, then, was not a fixed quality. It varied from region to region. For example, as Laura Ashe has shown, an idea that served to elevate and justify the nobility in the face of relatively weak monarchy in France served instead to emphasize the

divinely willed rule of monarchs in England, thus justifying those who served said monarchs in war.[3] It changed over time, as it became ever more the province of the most elite and adjusted to changing military technologies. And it contained internal tensions. One such tension was between the ideal of the knight as the protector of the peace and the innocent and the reality that peace and the innocent were almost always threatened by knights. Another tension was between the premium placed on individual character and prowess and an emphasis on blood and inherited family identity. Was one noble because of how one lived one's life or because of who one's family was?

Chivalry emphasized Christian piety, but the Christian piety of a gendered warrior class. It used to be thought that this piety was directly derived from crusading ideology; that is, that the Latin Church successfully infused knights and nobles with crusading ideals. A more nuanced picture has emerged in recent decades. Richard Kaeuper has argued that chivalric piety focused on three main points: to be a knight was to suffer by engaging in violence; this suffering was redemptive and made knights Christ-like; and such suffering was meritorious in any just or "good" cause, not only crusades acclaimed as such by the papacy.[4] Laura Ashe has further argued the point that in the eyes of the nobility, crusading was not the only avenue for chivalric violence, and church-promoted crusading ideology—dependent as it was on papal authorization—had only a limited amount to offer those for whom violence was a way of life not a one-time endeavor.[5] Furthermore, if monarchs ruled with divine approval, then serving those monarchs in war was presumable as meritorious as serving the papacy.

We need not posit a causal relationship to recognize that crusading and chivalry were related cultural elements in Latin Christendom. We have already seen the way these elements were connected even while in tension. Military orders explicitly tried to lay sole claim to Christian knighthood even while those outside the orders rejected that claim. Noble families relished traditions of generational fighting on crusade even while they simultaneously established chivalric lineages. The same powerful nobles and monarchs who cultivated chivalric reputations and claimed the right to enact violence also served as leaders on crusade.

Two examples of individual crusaders may help bring some of these points to life. The first is the owner of the silver drinking cup known as the Resafa Heraldry Cup, housed in the Syria National Museum. As Richard Leson has argued, this cup is of European origin but has an Arabic inscription on its rim and was used for formal, courtly drinking. The eleven heraldic shields engraved within the cup point toward its likely first owner, Raoul I of Coucy, who crusaded at Acre in the early 1190s. The engraved shields within the unifying circle of the cup, believed to have been added at the siege of Acre and thus at a time of great stress, represent an idealized "constellation" of the Coucy family and noble allies, helping "articulate the self-centered familial and dynastic interests of Raoul I."[6] When under pressure on crusade, the head of a noble family appears to have been primarily concerned not with salvation but rather with establishing and perpetuating dynastic relationships and noble alliances (Figure 8.1).

Figure 8.1 The Resafa Heraldry Cup (facsimile), view of basin.
The eleven shields arranged in a circle in the basin of the cup include four shields of immediate Coucy family members—Raoul I and his three sons—and seven shields of Coucy relatives and allies located in what is now northern France. Visually, the circular configuration of the shields within the shelter of the basin echoes the circular form of *mappa mundi* (Latin world maps) and the circular symbolism associated with chivalric culture, most obviously in Arthur's "Round Table." (Leson, "A Constellation of Crusade," 77–8.)

The second example can be seen in the career of Simon IV de Montfort. He was part of the 1198 crusade, which had been intended for Alexandria but wound up conquering Constantinople. Subsequently, he served as the military leader of the Albigensian Crusade. Based on his crusading career alone, we can deduce that he took the question of pious violence seriously and did not ignore the Latin Church. After all, he declined to help sack Zadar and take Constantinople and indeed criticized these actions, and then was among the first to take the cross to fight in Languedoc. Gregory Lippiatt has demonstrated that Simon was directly influenced by Latin Christian thinkers advocating reform in the early thirteenth century. At the same time, he was "his own master," taking his own pragmatic decisions when dealing with criminal clerics and mercenaries during the course of the Albigensian Crusade. As Lippiatt concludes, we should avoid imagining a false dichotomy; lords and theologians did not always agree but their ideas were in dialogue with each other.[7]

In addition to chivalry, other themes already used to explain and rationalize crusading wars continued to be adapted. For example, the theme of defense of Christendom and Christians was used effectively even in regions that had only recently or in some cases never been converted to Christianity, such as the Baltics. By claiming that certain regions in fact "belonged" to Christ, Mary, or key apostles, the call to defend Christian holy lands was effectively applied in every place where crusading occurred. Iberia was the land of St. James; the Baltics, especially Livonia, were the lands of Mary, mother of Christ. Whereas in Iberia relics of St. James served to affirm an already-established relationship between a saint and the land, in the Baltics the importation and veneration of relics such as fragments of the True Cross served to create a new sacred geography. At the same time, veneration of "local" saints, such as St. Olaf, also served to effectively anchor Christian holy war in the north.

Such sacralization of land yet to be conquered was accompanied by the drive to sacralize the heartlands of Latin Christendom. As William Purkis has persuasively demonstrated, sacred objects—tangible connections to the holy and the divine—constituted the primary form of riches exported from the crusader states back to Europe. These objects provided spiritual enrichment but also conferred status and were valuable in material terms.[8] In the early thirteenth century, the flood of relics taken from Constantinople and in some cases sold by the desperate monarchs of the Kingdom of Jerusalem further served to create "new Jerusalems" in Europe. Indeed, some were constructed on an extravagant scale and served to reinforce the power, prestige, and piety of monarchs. Such was Saint-Chapelle, the royal chapel built by Louis IX of France to house relics of the Passion, which is discussed at greater length in the next chapter.

But more modest religious centers also benefited. As Purkis notes, after it acquired a relic of St. John's arm in the late twelfth century, the sleepy town of Groningen transformed into a major devotional center by the early thirteenth century. This transformation was obviously of spiritual value for Latin Christians, and it also enhanced the economic prosperity and overall standing and reputation of the town, as pilgrims came for centuries to revere the relic. Similar points can be made albeit on a grander scale about the identification of St. James with the northwestern Iberian city of Santiago de Compostela, and its famous and still-ongoing pilgrimage, the Camino de Santiago. While the city was linked to relics of St. James before the First Crusade, it was in the twelfth century that it and its pilgrimage assumed "international" prominence within Latin Christendom. In the twelfth century, too, the military Order of Santiago had been established and the legend of St. James *Matamoros* (the Moor-slayer) took hold. We are reminded yet again that the connection between pilgrimage and holy war continued to be intimate and mutually sustaining.

Eschatological perspectives also continued to be relevant, and indeed, the thirteenth century saw the emergence of what would be a centuries-long tradition. Late twelfth-century theologian and abbot Joachim of Fiore conceived of history as divided into three ages—that of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The age of the Father predated Christ's incarnation, the age of the Son was the current time of Christianity, and the future age of

the Holy Spirit would be ushered in by the arrival of Anti-Christ and followed by utopia. Some of his ideas were condemned by the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) but they inspired many, and those whose admired his teachings and expected an imminent End of Days became known as Joachimites. Two main prophetic traditions were prominent among the Joachimities—that of the Angelic Pastor and the Last Emperor—and were used to contextualize and understand crusade-related events, as well as in crusade appeals and justifications. By the thirteenth century, eschatological themes and language were commonplace in crusade bulls and sermons and would continue to feature for several centuries to come.

Attitudes Toward Those Outside the Church of Rome

It is not surprising that the Latin settlers and their correspondents in Europe were interested in Islamic politics. After all, we have repeatedly seen examples of alliances and diplomacy between Latin Christians and Muslims in the eastern Mediterranean as well as the Iberian Peninsula, on both the local and the regional level. War was never the only or default mode of interaction, and the pursuit of war (or other forms of violence) was not simply the result of ignorance. Indeed, within certain limits Latin Christians' knowledge of Ayyubid politics was accurate and detailed. Between 1196 and 1202, for example, four letters addressed to two correspondents by the Hospitaller master, Geoffrey of Donjon, guided them through a particularly tortuous period in Ayyubid politics. And the tone adopted by the writers of such letters was generally restrained. Many of the letters were, of course, private, but even when they were intended for a wider circulation they were neutrally expressed. It is no exaggeration to say that they contain fewer polemics than one would find in the materials for almost any petty ecclesiastical dispute in Europe.

It may be that the relatively neutral language stemmed from the fact that the masters of the military orders and the other leaders in the eastern Mediterranean could not afford to be too emotional. Their responsibility was to defend the frontiers as sensibly as possible, while familiarity with conditions in West Asia bred a relaxed attitude on their part. But on the other hand, they must have believed that the monarchs, senior clerics, and great nobles with whom they corresponded appreciated their matter-of-fact tone, since if they had been convinced that those from whom they were, after all, soliciting assistance were more likely to be responsive to highly colored language they would certainly have used it. The bulk of the correspondence from Europe has been lost, but circumstantial evidence suggests that it was expressed in the same understated and pragmatic way.

This was decidedly not the case when it came to crusading rhetoric and related polemical trends within Latin Christendom at the same time. Heretics (i.e., perceived nonconforming Christians), Jews, and Muslims were all described repeatedly in crusading chronicles, sermons, songs, and epics as the "enemies of Christ." This was a continuity from the twelfth century. At the same time, the twelfth-century genre of Christian polemics *Contra Iudaeos* (Against the Jews) was radically changed by

mendicant religious orders in the thirteenth century "as part of the intensive Christian missionary attack against anyone outside the boundaries of its faith."[9] Thirteenth-century Latin polemics focused on the Talmud as "evidence" that contemporary Jews were no longer identical with the historical Jews (who were owed protection) and that as a result, contemporary Jews were, in fact, heretical. The blood libel continued to be directed at Jewish communities. And "pagan" enemies of crusaders were also termed "Saracens" even while anti-Jewish sentiment flourished in regions in which there were no Muslim or Jewish communities, reminding us that ideologies and polemics of holy violence need not reflect what we might term "reality."

John Tolan has convincingly traced to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the origins of standard anti-Muslim polemics—that Muslims were idolaters, sexual deviants, and/or heretics—and has argued that the general themes of such polemics continued to be deployed in the centuries that followed. At the same time, he has identified a crucial change over time, namely, that as efforts to convert Muslims to Christianity through preaching and "rational" appeal failed, Muslims were more frequently associated with the "stubbornness" and "irrationality" already ascribed to Jews and heretics, who likewise "resisted" Latin Christianity. Those who argued against one group of non-Latin Christians sometimes argued against others simultaneously; as Tolan notes, the twelfth-century polemics of Petrus Alphonsi, Peter the Venerable, and Alain de Lille all addressed more than just one group of non-Latin Christians.[10]

Meanwhile, the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 also pursued the goal of an internally united and externally guarded Christendom through definition and legal restrictions. The first decrees of the council defined the doctrine of transubstantiation, laid down procedures for dealing with heresy, and exhorted the Byzantine Church to "reunite" with that of Rome. Later decrees instituted a range of new restrictions on Jews and Muslims, including the requirement that their clothing serve to distinguish them from Christians, as well as restrictions on their interactions with Christians. The use of the process of inquisition as an ecclesiastical and then papal tool to ensure orthodoxy and order by eliminating heresy and "heretical" behaviors also became more frequent from the late twelfth century onward. Just as the mendicant orders, educated at universities and dedicated to what they saw as a fight for human souls, played a leading role in the revision of anti-Jewish polemics, they also played a leading role in inquisitorial efforts.

Box 8.1 Inquisition

An "inquisition" (*inquisitio*) was a formal judicial inquiry of the Latin Church of Rome into an accusation of heresy. An inquisition sought to determine guilt or innocence of purported heretics and to reconcile them to the Church of Rome. Originally a function allotted to bishops by the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, in the thirteenth century popes began assigning inquisitorial leadership to particular

delegates, often members of the mendicant Dominican and Franciscan Orders. Papal inquisitors possessed expansive authority to conduct their inquiry and gradually handbooks for inquisitors were written and disseminated in an effort to ensure consistent practices. Starting in the mid-thirteenth century, the papacy gave inquisitors the right to allow temporal authorities (i.e., local nobles and rulers) to torture and punish those considered obdurate or recalcitrant—that is, unwilling to recant their heresy. While the use of inquisition by the papacy gradually declined, it was taken up in the late medieval period by some Christian rulers on behalf of their nation-states, most famously in the case of the Spanish Inquisition.

Early thirteenth-century monarchs in Europe pursued their own policies against heretics, Jews, and Muslims. Disentangling the motivations of these monarchs is difficult at best. It will be helpful if we acknowledge at the start that human beings are capable of possessing many different motivations—some potentially in conflict—at the same time. Furthermore, interests that we might now categorize as contradictory were not necessarily so in their own time. Ultimately, self-interest—political, economic, and spiritual—was what various monarchs were pursuing through their policies toward those outside the Latin Church. But to understand their policies, in particular changes in their policies, we have to recognize that if one believes oneself to be a representative of the divine, charged with guardianship of a group of Latin Christians, then self-interest takes on different resonance.

All such Latin Christian rulers sought to shore up their power and pursue the well-being of their societies, as they defined that well-being. But the specific dynamics of their circumstances shaped both their perceptions and the specific policies they adopted. In France, Philip II (also known as Philip Augustus) was the first ruler to style himself not just "king of the Franks" but "king of France," subtly indicating the conceptual shift from rule of a people to rule of a territory, which in his case had been significantly enlarged through the Albigensian Crusade. He was explicitly engaged in strengthening the position of himself and his dynasty. In England (more accurately, the Angevin Empire), Henry III took the throne after the nearly disastrous reign of John I and was concerned with buttressing the position and prerogatives of the Crown and building back up a faltering society and economy. In the Italic Peninsula, Sicily, and the German states, Frederick II—as we have already seen—focused on similar goals, even while fighting papal crusades against him. Meanwhile, Latin Christian monarchs in Iberia were as yet far more focused on conquest itself rather than the post-conquest consolidation of power. And emerging Latin Christian governments in the Baltics were primarily engaged with driving ongoing missionary-crusading warfare, ensuring lasting conversion and obedience of conquered peoples, and thus, in their eyes, expanding Latin Christendom.

If we look at the period from 1198 to 1240 as a single block of time, we see the worsening of the circumstances of all those who were non-Latin Christians living in Latin Christendom. If, however, we look in more detail, we see both local differences as well

as often dramatic swings in policy that surely made life uncertain for those affected and reveal monarchs seeking the best way to achieve their ultimate goals. For example, Philip II's policies toward his Jewish subjects swung from expulsion (1182) to reabsorption into the royal domain (starting in 1198) to a series of increasingly tight legal restrictions of Jewish livelihoods and mobility (1198–1223). Although he did not crusade himself in Languedoc, his leading nobles did, and ultimately the French crown benefited from the submission of the region. As another, different example, in northern Europe there was a brief swing from harsh policies toward newly converted Christians toward more equitable approaches by the middle of the thirteenth century, as described further later in this chapter. Finally, while Frederick II has a persistent reputation as an "Islamophile" and was certainly willing to enter alliances and negotiate with Islamic rulers, starting in 1222 he also forcibly exiled his Muslim subjects to Lucera, with the exception of those individuals directly employed in his court and army. This served to neutralize a political threat, earn some Latin Christian approval—though not that of the papacy, which did not want a colony of Muslims on the mainland—and provide direct income generated from the new colony.

It is relatively simple to identify similar trends throughout Latin Christendom in the early thirteenth century: expulsion and/or toleration only as direct subordinates to the Crown; crusading as only one mode of engagement; policies toward non-Latin Christians adjusted as needed to maximize a range of benefits; awareness of but seldom simple obedience to papal directives or popular opinion. At the same time, it is critical to recognize the variety of discussions, approaches, and perceptions present in Latin Christendom, as Sara Lipton has urged us. If at a distance the story is a simple one of growing exclusion and persecution of all those who were not Latin Christians, closer in, we see "a more complex approach to identity and alterity, one that incorporates contingency and change."[11] Furthermore, the overarching push to reform all of Latin Christendom wholeheartedly included Latin Christians themselves. The overarching problem was thought to be sinfulness and moral failures, which were perhaps most evident in those outside the Church of Rome but also present among those within its bounds. Recognizing the ongoing connection between the desire to reform and perfect Latin Christendom and the exercise of violence is arguably essential to understanding crusades in the context of their times.

It is natural to wonder which was more typical of Latin Christian attitudes: the emotionally charged polemics, the harshest policies, the obvious violence and warfare, or the cooler, more pragmatic tone of more tolerant policies, elite letters, and formal diplomacy. The answer is probably all of the above. There was not one Latin Christian view of or approach to non-Latin Christians but several.

Criticisms of Crusading

In the first half of the thirteenth century, there were some signs of disillusionment with the crusading movement including some who were horrified by the entire tradition of Christian violence. How numerous they were is open to question, but it seems that there

were few of them. It was more common to fail to recruit sufficient volunteers or funds for a particular expedition than to encounter outright opposition or protest. Elizabeth Siberry has pointed out, moreover, that criticism of crusading in the thirteenth century never reached the heights of vituperation that had been scaled in the aftermath of the crusading disasters of the 1140s.

In fact, the most striking thing about the crusading movement, wherever it manifested itself, and despite various peaks and troughs of interest, was its continuing popularity. As previous chapters have demonstrated, although some crusade appeals fell flat, many crusades were waged in all theaters of war and they could not have been fought without crusaders. On the whole, the papal arguments for particular ventures, whether in Europe or elsewhere, and whomever were targeted, were received sympathetically enough for there to be recruits.

But it is possible to let these overarching points effectively erase the evidence we do have for criticism of crusading and related phenomena such as the military orders. While voices of opposition may have been few and far between in Latin Christendom, or hard to identify in the surviving evidence, they did exist. Through the twelfth century, a number of theologians had criticized the military orders, especially the Templars, as was briefly noted in Chapter 4. By the late twelfth century, a small number of prominent voices were criticizing crusading as a whole. As John Cotts has shown, Ralph Niger, Anglo-Norman theologian, chronicler, and supporter of Thomas Becket, critiqued crusading on several grounds. First, he held that it distracted kings from their Christian obligations to their subjects. Second, he denied that bloodshed could be penitential. Third, he saw no moral justification for the killing of "Saracens" (i.e., Muslims).[12] In a similar vein, Walter Map, Anglo-Norman cleric and courtier, argued that missions were a more effective and moral way to expand Christendom than crusading. And after returning from crusade in the early thirteenth century, the abbot of the Cistercian abbey of Perseigne wrote "Christ did not shed his blood to win Jerusalem, but to save souls!" By the mid-thirteenth century, the Franciscan Roger Bacon also advocated mission and dialogue rather than war, writing "waging war against the Saracens achieves nothing."[13]

Thus, there were those, some in positions of influence or who had crusaded themselves, who criticized crusading. They did so on clearly Christian and expansionary grounds. In other words, crusading was problematic precisely because it impeded the successful expansion of Christendom, which would save souls. Furthermore, it distracted monarchs from their divinely appointed responsibilities to ensure an orderly and pious society within their realms.

Successes and Failures of Latinization

As we have already demonstrated, crusading interacted with economic, political, and social trends. In this section, we attempt to assess the extent of Latinization in polities formed or affected by crusading. By "Latinization," we mean the importation, voluntary or forced, of Latin Christian religious beliefs and practices, sociopolitical structures, and/or cultural practices. The imprecision of the term reflects the complexity of the history.

The Crusader States

Latin settlers in West Asia were probably more secure in the 1230s than their ancestors had been before 1187. It is true that they controlled much less territory than had their great-grandparents. After Frederick II's treaty with al-Kamil Muhammad in 1229, they held the coast from Jaffa to Beirut, with a tongue of land extending through Ramle to Jerusalem and a broader bulge reaching Nazareth in Galilee. North of Beirut, the county of Tripoli remained much as it had been in 1187, but the principality of Antioch was now confined to the neighborhood of Antioch itself and to a strip of the coast in the south, from Jeble to the Hospitaller castle of Marqab.

The principality of Antioch and the county of Tripoli came to be united under a single ruler after a war of succession in the early years of the thirteenth century, although each continued to have its own administration and customary law. The war of succession gave rise to incidents which indicate how integrated Antioch was in the complicated regional politics. In 1201, Bohemond IV allied with the Ayyubid emir of Aleppo and the Seljuk sultan of Rum against Cilician Armenia and in November 1203 a force, comprising troops from Antioch and Aleppo supplemented by Templars, plundered Armenian villages near Baghras. In 1209, the Seljuk sultan of Rum invaded Cilicia on Bohemond's behalf. Meanwhile Bohemond, who depended on the support of the commune of Antioch, which had a strong Byzantine element within it, was on bad terms with the Latin patriarch, Peter of Angoulême. Early in 1207, he connived at the enthronement of the titular Byzantine patriarch and in 1208 entered into an alliance with the Nicaean Byzantine emperor Theodoros Komnenos Laskaris. When Peter of Angoulême led a revolt in the city, Bohemond threw him into prison and deprived him of food and water until he died.

By 1216, Bohemond IV had become estranged from his Ayyubid allies in Aleppo and was unpopular in Antioch because of his long absences in Tripoli. A party favoring one Raymond-Roupen, Bohemond's nephew and grand-nephew of Levon I of Cilician Armenia, was growing among the nobles. On the night of February 14, Levon I entered the city and within a few days was in possession of it. Raymond-Roupen was consecrated prince and since at that time he was regarded as Levon's heir there was the prospect of the union of Antioch and Cilicia. But Raymond-Roupen also proved to be unpopular and in 1219 the city rose against him. Bohemond took it over without resistance and held it thereafter, although he was reconciled to the Latin Church only on his deathbed in 1233. There was an uneasy peace with Cilicia, broken in 1225 when Bohemond invaded it in alliance with the Seljuks of Rum after his son Philip, who had married Levon's daughter and subsequent queen-regnant Zabel, was killed in an Armenian revolt.

After 1233, the new prince, Bohemond V, preferred, as his father had done, to live in Tripoli. Antioch was isolated under its commune of Latins and Byzantines. Large parts of Latin territory were in the hands of the military orders, which pursued their own aggressive policies with regard to the petty states in their vicinity. The domains of Bohemond V give the impression of being a splintered confederacy, only surviving because of differences between the various Ayyubid emirs and their desire for peace.

Succession was also a live issue in the Kingdom of Jerusalem. The succession crises of the 1180s and 1190s had ended in 1192 with Isabella I of Jerusalem on the throne. The eldest of Isabella's daughters, Maria, had married John of Brienne. Their union produced Isabella II, who married Frederick II. Isabella II died on May 1, 1228, giving birth to Conrad, who would never set foot in the eastern Mediterranean. Neither did his son Conradin. From 1186 to 1268, therefore, the kingdom was either in the hands of heiresses, who were expected to marry, or absentee rulers, who were represented by regents or lieutenants.

At the same time, a litigious and clever baronial opposition exploited the laws of inheritance and the customs governing the appointment of regents and lieutenants, inventing new laws and manipulating existing ones when it suited it to do so. While she lived Isabella II, as queen regnant, could legally be represented by lieutenants. But after her death, her son was a minor and the laws of regency came into operation. A child's father had the first call on the regency, as long as he came to the crusader states to be formally accepted in office, and Frederick II was regent from his arrival in Acre in September 1228, with the right to appoint his own lieutenants on his return to Europe.

Frederick II's regency aroused great opposition and in 1242 the approach of Conrad's majority was made an excuse for the invention of the legal fiction that a king who had come of age but did not come east to be crowned should be treated as though he was entering a new minority. According to this interpretation, Frederick's regency lapsed and was judged to have devolved on Conrad's nearest heir apparent, dowager queen Alice of Cyprus, third daughter of Isabella I of Jerusalem.

The crown of Jerusalem carried with it great prestige and while the trade routes ran favorably it was also quite a rich prize, which explains the interest taken in it by outsiders such as Frederick II. Frederick's policies and the residual strength of the Crown caused the nobles to fear for what they perceived to be their liberties. The issue was given an additional dimension by the emergence among them of a school of jurists. This had come into existence partly as a result of two features of the law. The first was a usage whereby the king or a lord, as president of a feudal court, could appoint a vassal to help him or another vassal with counsel and could demand the acceptance of this duty as a feudal service. A counsellor of this sort, called a pleader, was not an advocate so much as an adviser. So complicated were the procedures in the feudal courts that it was essential for anyone engaged in litigation to make use of an adviser of this sort.

It followed that those who were skilled in law were greatly in demand, as much by lords as by vassals. It seems to have been common for a man with a reputation of this kind to be granted fiefs in several lordships, which gave him the opportunity to render counsel in as many feudal courts as were involved. Since the second feature of the law was the *assise sur la ligece* which, it will be remembered, had given the king the right to demand liege-homage from all rear-vassals, a liege vassal could also plead in the king's own court.

The pleaders had prestige before 1187 but the disasters of that year increased it immeasurably. In the thirteenth century, it was maintained—whether correctly or not is debatable—that the laws of Jerusalem, or at least some of the more important ones,

each written on a separate piece of vellum and sealed by the king, the patriarch and the viscount of Jerusalem, had been kept in a chest in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. When Jerusalem had fallen to Salah al-Din the chest and its contents had been lost.

At one stroke the character of the law had been changed. It was no longer based on a corpus of written material—or at least had an important written element—but had become customary. The kingdom's lawyers, therefore, had now to depend for their knowledge on custom and hearsay. So it was to the pleaders, above all to those who moved in circles in which the old laws were remembered and discussed, that vassals sitting in judgment would turn.

The appearance in these exposed marches of pedantic and prestigious lawyers, among whom it is probable that knowledge of the law and the ability to plead were more highly regarded, and a more certain way to advancement, than military skill, must seem odd. It should be borne in mind, however, that this was an urban nobility, living off rents and trade with the leisure to engage in learned debate and, it must be added, factional politics, and that Acre was a much more significant cultural and economic center than it used to be given credit for. The quality of its buildings is being gradually revealed through archaeology. Art historians have been coming to recognize the importance of its ateliers of manuscript illuminators and icon painters, where work of the highest standard was being produced, not provincial or colonial but with a distinctive style of its own, combining different elements, although the French influence was assertive. Part of the wealth that supported these artistic efforts came from the growing sugar industry, primarily controlled in the crusader states by the military orders and Italic city-states, of which Acre was a major import/export site. Frederick II was so impressed by what he saw of the sugar industry that he sought men experienced in the industry who would bring their expertise back to Sicily.[14]

The men with legal reputations came from many different groups. Some were rulers, while others were, at least at times, supporters of Frederick II. Yet others raised themselves from the burgess class to knighthood through their legal abilities. The most important comprised members of the higher nobility or men closely associated with them and in the early thirteenth century, three of them were dominant: Ralph, lord of Tiberias; John of Ibelin; and Balian, lord of Sidon. These three magnates, at the center of a circle of lesser lords, knights, and burgesses, gave way to another generation of jurists, most of whom were Ibelins or their relations. In its turn that generation was replaced by another. So here was a school of law largely, it is true, confined to kindred and dependents. Since legal ability, baronial status, and political influence went together, it is not surprising to find so many members of this school expressing political ideas in opposition to the Crown.

These jurists were prepared to treat monarchy primarily in its feudal aspect and hardly at all in its public aspect. To them the monarch was, above all, their *chef seigneur*, their feudal overlord, contractually bound to them in the same way as they were bound to him. It followed that disputes could only be properly decided in the royal court, the arena in which such matters should be discussed. And since equity in feudal custom demanded that a party could not be judge in his own suit, judgment in such cases belonged to the

court, not the monarch. This above all applied to the penal element in judgment that might involve bodily punishment or the confiscation of a fief.

Such a doctrine was to be found wherever there was feudal resistance to kings, but its strict implementation would have made government impossible. No Latin Christian monarch ever kept strictly to the letter of feudal custom and the monarchs of Jerusalem were no different from others in this respect. Their opponents were cleverer than most, but when it came to putting their ideology into practice, they were not very effective, largely because they were blinded by their own ideas.

What they chose to do was to exploit the *assise sur la ligece*, which was originally a law issued by the Crown for its own benefit. To them the *assise* underlined the condition of the feudal contract: there were no occasions on which any lord, even a monarch, could take action against a vassal without the formal decision of his court. A failure to meet contractual obligations laid open a range of options for royal vassals, including withdrawing their service fully from the Crown.

This sounds very impressive and in a state such as Jerusalem where there was a heavy reliance on the military services of the vassals it should have been effective. But it had a fatal flaw. It could only be operative in a dreamland in which all the feudatories acted in unison and the ruler was totally dependent on their services. In the reality of the first half of the thirteenth century, the noble class was never really united, while the wealth accruing from commerce-enabled rulers to survive, at least temporarily, without its services. Attempts by Latin nobles to coerce the rulers of Jerusalem—and vice versa—would repeatedly lead to confrontation, succession crises and debates, and civil wars, involving complicated webs of relationships stretching across the Mediterranean.

Indeed, the crusader states were no longer lonely outposts, because a string of Latin settlements occupied much of northeastern Mediterranean coast. The question whether these were or were not expressions of a colonial movement has often been debated. The early crusader states were not typically colonial in that they were politically independent of mother countries. On the other hand, the Holy Sepulchre could never have been held without the occupation and exploitation of the territory around it and up the coast, and the large-scale immigration and flow of resources to settlements which, if not politically subject to Europe, were financially dependent make it hard to deny entirely a colonial aspect. It is worth noting that all the Latin settlements in the northern Mediterranean established from 1191 onward were on territory which had been taken from fellow Christians, however haphazardly they had come into being, and certain of them—for example, Crete, Euboea, and Chios—were politically as well as economically dependent on Venice and Genoa.

Furthermore, not all changes can be discussed in terms of this or that geographically defined polity. Now that Latin settlements in the eastern Mediterranean comprised several states scattered over a large part of the seaboard, it was no longer only a question of safeguarding a lifeline to Europe from isolated settlements. Maritime contacts had to be maintained between many groups of colonists. Latin settlers had always been dependent on the sea power provided by merchants, particularly those from the ports of Venice, Genoa, and Pisa. These city-states still provided the sea power in the thirteenth

century, but with their territorial gains in the Peloponnese they were themselves politically integrated into the framework they helped to bind together. Thenceforward, the histories of trade, settlement, and crusading in the eastern Mediterranean become virtually indistinguishable.

Cyprus

We have already seen how the island of Cyprus was conquered in 1191 by Richard I of England and was sold to Guy of Lusignan, the rejected king of Jerusalem, in 1192. Guy, who never settled his debt to Richard, died late in 1194 and was succeeded by his brother Aimery, who married Isabella I of Jerusalem in October 1197 after the death of Henry of Champagne. At about the same time, Aimery paid homage to representatives of Henry VI Hohenstaufen and received a crown from them, so that from that date he was king of Cyprus in his own right and of Jerusalem by virtue of his marriage. After both Aimery and Isabella died in 1205, the crowns went their separate ways. Cyprus passed to Hugh I, Aimery's son by his first wife Eschiva of Ibelin. Jerusalem was inherited by Maria, Isabella's eldest daughter by Conrad of Montferrat.

Guy of Lusignan had established a feudal system in Cyprus, peopling it largely with immigrants from the crusader states, particularly from those families that had supported him in his struggle to retain the crown of Jerusalem. They were later joined by many of the leading Latin nobles from the mainland—Hugh I's mother was an Ibelin and, therefore, a member of the most prominent family in the crusader states—and by 1230, many Latin nobles had estates in both kingdoms. These settlers introduced feudal customs from the mainland, and as late as 1369 a particular interpretation of these customs, John of Ibelin-Jaffa's great work of jurisprudence, would become an official work of reference in the High Court of Nicosia.

There were, however, differences. Cyprus *was* a separate realm and it had a different, Byzantine, past. It had a distinct constitutional history, for until 1247 it was a fief of Henry VI's empire, whereas Jerusalem was always an independent state. In certain important respects, the system of agriculture on Cyprus was different from that on the mainland. Before the Latin conquest the island had been exposed to the processes of "manorialization" that had begun to affect Byzantine rural life, with demesne lands in the possession of landlords and heavy labor services demanded of many of the peasants. In some ways, these existing labor expectations provided support for economic priorities brought to Cyprus by the Latins. As Judith Bronstein, Edna Stern and Elisabeth Yehuda have shown, Guy of Lusignan arguably brought to Cyprus the sugar industry—which was labor-intensive—and encouraged emigration of those with related expertise from the crusader states. Sugar became one of the island's most profitable crops, and by the end of the thirteenth century, Cyprus would also be the main distributor of sugar from various origination points to Europe.[15]

The Latin Church of Cyprus, moreover, adopted a more interventionist attitude toward the indigenous Byzantine population and clergy. The number of Byzantine dioceses was drastically reduced from fourteen to four and the Byzantine bishops

became coadjutors to the four Latin bishops, with responsibilities for the churches of the Byzantine rite. There was resistance from the indigenous population, occasional brutal countermeasures from the Latins, and periods of open hostility, but mostly there was quiet resentment.

Latin Empire (i.e., Latin Occupation) and Principalities

Northwest of Cyprus, across the Cretan and Aegean Seas, was the Latin Empire of Constantinople, bounded by the Byzantine splinter states of Nicaea and Epirus, and the Second Bulgarian Empire. The treaty between the Venetians and the other crusaders drawn up before the capture of Constantinople had been modified by two further treaties, agreed in October 1204 and October 1205, as well as by the way various territories had been conquered and by private arrangements made between individual leaders. The territories of the former Byzantine Empire, on the mainland and islands, were now divided among the Latin emperor, Venice, and three leading crusaders in the conquest of Constantinople: Boniface of Montferrat; Marco Sanudo, nephew of Enrico Dandolo; and William of Champlitte, grandson of the early twelfth-century crusader Hugh I of Champagne.

The settlement of a Latin super-stratum, drawn not only from Europe but also from the eastern Mediterranean, from whence many sought the relative security of the Peloponnesian Peninsula, proceeded along the already well-tried lines of the granting of fiefs. The system that resulted is best illustrated by evidence from the Peloponnese, where Latin settlement lasted longest and gave rise to a legal collection, the *Assises of Romania*, the final redaction of which was written in French between 1333 and 1346 and was later translated into Venetian Italian, in which language it survives. Below the prince of Achaea were his direct vassals, divided into liege vassals (who were entitled to have vassals of their own) and simple vassals, men not of the knightly class, such as sergeants (who were not). Among the liege vassals were the barons of the principality who enjoyed a special status and were referred to as the "peers of the prince." They had the right to judge in their courts according to both high justice (justice of blood) and low justice, whereas the other liege vassals had the right to render only low justice and the simple vassals had jurisdiction only over their peasants.

This society of settlers was, like that of Latin Jerusalem, highly class-conscious. However, Latin lords in the Peloponnese, unlike those in Jerusalem, did not primarily live in the cities but rather above them in the acropolises or in isolated castles and fortified manor houses: the remains of 150 strongholds have been identified in the Peloponnese alone, mostly thrown up in the early thirteenth century. This, of course, underlined the distinction between them and the indigenous, Greek-speaking peoples—intermarriage was rare—and it was reinforced by Latin chivalric culture, expressed in the tournaments they loved and in the histories and romances they enjoyed. The French spoken at the court of Achaea at Andravidha was reputed to be as "pure" as that spoken in Paris.

Most of the Byzantines in these new Latin principalities sank into subservience and were regarded by their Latin overlords as unfree. The chief exception was a class

of *archontes*, great landlords or imperial officials before the conquest, whom the Latins tried to conciliate by promising the maintenance of a Byzantine clergy and the Byzantine legal and fiscal systems. But, in fact, the use of Byzantine law ceased in the public sphere and the transference of rights of jurisdiction and taxation to private landlords meant the disappearance of the old public system of taxation. The *archontes* ranked as simple vassals, along with Latin sergeants, but by the middle of the thirteenth century some of them were receiving fiefs and were beginning to be dubbed knights, thus qualifying for liege vassalage. This paved the way for the occasional Byzantine who had not been an *archon* to be raised to the highest class, but for the most part, the establishment of Byzantines as a second tier of citizens generated resentment.

The Latins' policy toward the Byzantine Church further humiliated those they had conquered. In 1204, the Venetians, in accordance with the treaty made between them and the rest of the crusaders, had nominated the cathedral chapter of St Sophia in Constantinople, which then elected Thomas Morosini, of a noble Venetian family and at that time only a sub-deacon, to the patriarchate. Pope Innocent III had to confirm this uncanonical appointment as well as Thomas' near-instantaneous promotion through the clerical orders to priest and bishop, but he also began the long process of wresting the chapter of St. Sophia from Venetian control.

The Byzantines naturally found it hard to recognize the new patriarch, especially when Byzantine successor states in exile formed and elected a new Byzantine patriarch themselves. Most Byzantine bishops deserted their sees or refused to recognize Thomas, or, in the few cases in which recognition was given, objected to a reconsecration of themselves according to Latin rites, which implied that their previous consecration had been uncanonical. The Latins embarked on a policy of substituting Latin bishops for Byzantine ones, although they could not afford to reproduce the complex Byzantine hierarchy. As in West Asia and in Cyprus, they also introduced Latin monastic and religious orders. But everywhere Byzantine monasteries and local married clergy survived *in situ*, even though the population was forced to pay thirtieths to the Latin clergy in place of full tithes.

By the treaties of 1204, the Venetians had acquired three-eighths of the empire. They elected their own *podestà* (highest-ranking civil officer), who was assisted by an administration modeled on that of Venice, although the mother city soon took steps to see that the *podestà*'s powers were limited. The treaty of 1205 laid down a procedure for collectively deciding the scale of potential military threats that demanded military service from all, whether Venetians or not. A council, made up of that of the *podestà* together with the barons of the empire, would do this and it could require the Latin emperor to follow its advice. The same council supervised any judges appointed to arbitrate between him and those from whom he desired military service. Every time a new Latin emperor was crowned, he had to swear to uphold the conditions of the treaties of March and October 1204 and of October 1205, which to the Venetians formed the empire's constitution and gave them a powerful political position, although they would have had great influence anyway, given the size of their territorial holdings. The treaties imposed severe limitations on the Latin emperors from which they were never able

to escape. This was particularly unfortunate because in the first half of the thirteenth century they were the most insecure and exposed of all the Latin rulers in the eastern Mediterranean.

Over and over again, the Latins emperors had to fight two distinct yet often allied forces: the resurgent Second Bulgarian Empire and Byzantine rebel states. The Bulgarians had rebelled against Byzantine overlordship all through the eleventh century but the strong rule of the Komnenian dynasty had stabilized relations in the twelfth century. The weakening of Byzantium from the late twelfth century onward exacerbated resentment—faced with cash shortages, emperors raised taxes—and, in concert with other regional peoples, the Bulgarians rebelled again in force in the late twelfth century. By 1204, they had crowned a king, Kaloyan, who managed to ensure papal quietude despite retaining Byzantine rites. The Bulgarians sought friendly relations with the new Latin Empire but instead, the Latin Empire claimed Bulgarian lands as their own, ensuring continued warfare. As war continued, the Bulgarians consistently allied themselves with the Byzantines in exile, in joint opposition to Latin rule.

These Byzantine exiles had established three expatriate states: Trebizond, ruled by grandsons of Andronikos I Komenos; Epirus, ruled by a cousin of Isaakios II Angelos and Alexios III Komnenos; and Nicaea, ruled by the son-in-law of Alexius III Angelos. As Jonathan Harris has explained, it is quite likely that these statelets might have come to nothing if the Latins had treated their Byzantine subjects better. But they did not, as we have seen, and the resulting resentment gave impetus and support to the ambitions of the courts at Trebizond, Epirus, and Nicaea. In particular, Byzantines left the Latin Empire for Epirus and Nicaea, and the leaders of these statelets, Mikhael Komnenos Doukas and Theodoros Komnenos Laskaris, both had themselves crowned emperor; Theodoros also appointed a new patriarch. Thereafter these two dominant Byzantine successor states, Epirus and Nicaea, competed with each other to reclaim the empire from the Latins. They willingly allied with the Bulgarians when advantageous—and fought them at other times—while pursuing other policies, especially economic ones, that generated revenue and undercut Latin trade.

By 1226, the successor state of Nicaea had emerged as the sole remaining Byzantine challenger, and the Latin emperors had lost all of the Anatolian Peninsula except Izmit, which they held only until 1235. Probably the only factor that saved Latin Constantinople at this time was the fact that both the Bulgarians and the Byzantines wanted the Latin Empire for their own. Indeed, in 1228, in an attempt to secure Constantinople for himself, Ivan Asen II of Bulgaria proposed that his daughter be married to the eleven-year-old Latin emperor Baldwin II.

Rejecting this proposal, the barons of the Latin Empire instead called in John of Brienne. We have already seen John being outmaneuvered in the Nile Delta by the papal legate Pelagius and his son-in-law, Frederick II. John's anger toward Frederick had been such that he had agreed to become commander of the papal crusade forces that invaded Frederick's southern Italic territories. Now, the barons of the Latin Empire offered the hand of their child emperor, Baldwin II, to another of John's daughters, Marie, if John would consent to rule for life as co-emperor.

John arrived in Constantinople by the summer of 1231 with 500 knights and 5,000 men-at-arms, to whom the pope had already granted crusade indulgences. The military and political situation, which was already bad, was worsening. In 1230, Ivan Asen II of Bulgaria had swept through Thrace, Thessaly, and a large part of Albania, eliminating the Byzantine court at Epirus. Ivan Asen, who wanted an autonomous Bulgarian patriarchate, opened negotiations with the Byzantine Nicaeans led at that time by John III Doukas Vatatzes. In 1235, Ivan Asen concluded a pact according to which his daughter was betrothed to John Doukas Vatatzes' son and Bulgaria gained its patriarchate. The Nicaean ruler then crossed the Dardanelles, sacked Gallipoli and joined forces with the Bulgarians before being defeated outside the walls of Constantinople by John of Brienne.

But John of Brienne died himself in 1237. In 1239, as described in the previous chapter, a new crusade shored up the badly crumbling Latin Empire. This was only possible because the Nicaean Byzantines, now well established, were preoccupied, being engaged in consolidating their bridgehead in the Balkans and anxious about the Mongols. Baldwin II, the still-young Latin emperor, heavily dependent on French subsidies, made several fund-raising tours of Europe. The last great relics in Constantinople were disposed of for cash in an effort to keep the Latin Empire together.

Cilician Armenia

East of Constantinople and north of Antioch was the kingdom of Cilician Armenia. In the tenth and eleventh centuries, encouraged by the Byzantine Empire, which sought to replace Muslims living in Cilicia with Christians, and subsequently also driven by the desire to avoid Seljuk rule, Armenians settled in Cilicia. From the First Crusade onward, the Cilician Armenians pursued positive relations with Latin Christendom and the crusader states. By the late twelfth century, power had been consolidated and in 1198, after announcing his intentions to submit the Armenian church to the Church of Rome, the Cilician Armenian ruler Levon I was crowned; his coronation was recognized by Henry VI Hohenstaufen.

Cilician Armenia was Latinized in all sorts of ways. Levon I took Sibylla, the daughter of Aimery of Cyprus and Isabella I of Jerusalem, as his second wife and their daughter and eventual queen-regnant Zabel was, therefore, the first cousin of the rulers of Jerusalem and Cyprus. He gave castles and territories to the Hospitallers and Teutonic Knights and privileges to Genoese and Venetian merchants. His court was transformed as offices changed their character at the same time as they adopted Latin functions and titles. The system of landholding and the relationship between the highest nobles and the Crown were modified in imitation of Latin lordship. Latins held some of the fiefs and the authority of Latin law gradually grew.

It is important, however, not to overstate the extent of Latinization, and to recognize the determination of the Cilician Armenians to govern themselves and assert their own right to rule as Christian monarchs. Cilician Armenian did not view itself as subordinate or inferior to Latin Christendom. In political terms, this can perhaps be seen most readily in the willingness of Levon I to assault the principality of Antioch,

while in their historical accounts, Armenian historians incorporated the crusades while also continuing to emphasize the divine trajectory established for Armenians in particular.

Iberia

As the previous chapter explained, although characterized by dramatic turns and reverses, the first half of the thirteenth century ultimately saw major conquests of Muslim-ruled principalities by Latin Christian monarchs. Thus, when we discuss Latinization in Iberia, we are referring to the results of conquest by rulers who intentionally imported elements of Latin Christian culture and welcomed Latin Christians from elsewhere in Europe into their realms. These conquests delivered not only land-based resources and populations but also major trading ports into Latin Christian hands. Many of the conquered ports were part of trade networks that had long served to connect Iberia with North Africa, the North Sea, and the Mediterranean. In some cases, Italic merchant cities quickly established their own communities in these Iberian ports—for example, Genoa in Seville—in order to maintain their own preeminence.

In newly conquered Latin Iberia, Muslims and Jews remained visible but shrinking minority populations. Many Muslims emigrated south to Muslim-ruled lands, but their numbers varied, from 2 percent of the population in Catalonia to 75 percent in Valencia. Jews, in turn, made up from 2 to 5 percent of the population, again depending on the realm. In some major towns and cities, Muslims were expelled in order to concentrate Christians in these seats of legal and military power. After some conquests, Muslims were enslaved en masse. For example, after Alfonso III of Aragon conquered Menorca—an independent emirate that was a protectorate of Aragon—all those on the island, with the exception of 200 dependents of the emir and those who could pay a ransom, were enslaved and sold. This was not a default action after conquest, however. Overall, the early thirteenth-century laws designed to govern mixed populations of Muslims, Christians, and Jews were pragmatic. They sought to establish and maintain Christian superiority without making life intolerable for Jews and free Muslims; this relative and imperfect tolerance would change dramatically in centuries to come.

Of course, many Christians in Iberia spoke Arabic and had rites distinct from Latin Christendom, and so a major part of the Latinization of Iberia consisted of the establishment and dominance of Latin Christian churches, hierarchies, and norms. In the thirteenth century, many churches were rebuilt in architectural styles borrowed from France. Emerging universities similarly looked to the northeast for influence. At the same time, some of the brightest Christian minds actively pursued knowledge of Arabic, which they imagined would prove an effective tool for conversion; for example, when Ramon Llull wanted to learn Arabic, he acquired an enslaved person to teach him. Learned texts from the Islamic world continued to be translated into Latin, but also, increasingly, into vernacular languages such as Castilian, mimicking the move toward vernacular writing and reading elsewhere in Europe.

North Europe

As the previous chapter explained, crusading in North Europe was driven by the desire of missionary bishops to expand the Latin Church and the desire of Latin Christian monarchs and princes to expand their own holdings. Except in cases where local rulers converted preemptively—thus strategically committing to Latinization—the efforts of these Latin leaders led to "defeat, baptism, military occupation, and sometimes dispossession or extermination" of indigenous peoples.[16] New churches were built, new archbishoprics, bishoprics, and church courts were created, Dominicans, Franciscans, and papal legates turned up, towns were taken over or built, and new garrisons were established. Latinization was followed and supported by the desire of merchants to expand and dominate key North Sea trade routes. In addition, Latinization was supported by the desire of what we might call ordinary Latin Christians to claim newly "opened" land or secure new positions in rising settler towns. While crusading in the Baltics was insistently framed as opposition to recalcitrant paganism, in many cases, tension and struggle for dominance between the Latin and Byzantine Churches was the real context. Thus, for example, in 1222, Pope Honorius III forbade Byzantine religious practices in conquered lands.

Crusading and Latinization in North Europe took on distinctive forms, as alluded to in the previous chapter. "Perpetual crusading" and the dominance of certain military orders, especially the Teutonic Knights, were essential. From the unceasing presence and dominance of the Teutonic Knights would ultimately come the semi-sovereign theocratic state of Prussia, which was subject to papal direction but otherwise an independent principality governed by a military order and dedicated to its goals.

Some have concluded that the Baltic crusades, and the Latinization of northern Europe, were fundamentally materialistic and secular phenomena, with only a light gloss of religion laid on top. But Eric Christiansen has persuasively argued that the popes clearly "made a determined bid for power" in the north, especially in the first half of the thirteenth century, because they viewed this as essential for the overall dominance of Latin Christendom.[17] And in theory, it was possible to view military-established and enforced conversion as the best way to ensure the salvation of as many souls as possible, which was certainly the argument of the military orders that sometimes ruled directly in the region. Furthermore, the monarchs of Denmark and Sweden clearly viewed—or at least, represented—their rule and their conquests in decisively pious terms. Lastly, of course, we have seen the intersection of spiritual and material motivations and pursuits throughout the history of crusading, not only in the Baltics.

The process of conquest and conversion in the Baltics often resulted in second-class status for new converts and was certainly not passively accepted by indigenous peoples. There were frequent and intense rebellions, and the threat of rebellion was viewed by the conquerors as constant. From an ecclesiastical perspective, such rebellions threatened more than the status quo; they risked souls. As a result, steps were taken by some, such as the papal legate James Pantaleon in 1249 in Prussia, to try to ensure that the conquered and nominally converted peoples had access to all the usual rights and privileges of Latin

Christians. This approach limited rebellion, albeit only in the short term, and presumably aided in the voluntary—as opposed to forced—Latinization of the region.

* * *

This chapter, perhaps more than any other yet, raises the question of "what is relevant for the study of the crusades?" The underlying premise of the chapter is that it is next to impossible to discuss the history of the crusades without grappling with the complicated points of connection between crusading and a host of other factors and trends. The papacy and its supporters formalized any number of crusade elements through a variety of means, all while simultaneously pursuing more overarching moral reform. There were a few voices within the church hierarchy that criticized crusading even while applauding the aim of expanding Christendom. Latin Christians themselves both responded and failed to respond to crusade appeals, and generated their own layers of meaning that connected crusading with noble family traditions, elite masculinity, and general piety. Alongside the crusades, Latin Christian polemical approaches against Jews, Muslims, and "heretics" formed that would later become standard, and various state policies toward non-Latin Christians—especially "heretics," Jews, and Muslims—formed and reformed as rulers sought to maximize all their advantages. And Latinization—the voluntary or forced importation of Latin Christian culture, often correlating with crusade activity—was more or less successful in different regions, depending on local circumstances.

CHAPTER 9
AMBITIONS AND REBELLIONS, 1240–1300

In the second half of the thirteenth century, crusades continued to be initiated by the papacy, lay monarchs, and motivated members of the general Latin population against a variety of targets in Iberia, Europe, Africa, West Asia, and the Mediterranean. Popes, monarchs, nobles, and military orders continued to compete for control of crusades, and crusades continued to be launched as part of these struggles for domination within Latin Christendom. The proto-national dimensions of crusading assumed even greater prominence, and some monarchs successfully fused royal identity, proto-national identity, and crusade enthusiasm. Crusading cultures developed some distinctive regional elements, while also promoting similar rhetorical devices, imagery, and themes of holy war.

At the same time, there were dramatic changes. The dominance and extent of the Mongol Empire, the resurgence of Byzantium, and the ascendancy of the Mamluk Sultanate were major political developments that interacted with changing economic dynamics. In addition, the history of Latin Christendom and crusading in the second half of the thirteenth century was one of ambition and rebellion. Rulers—whether lords, monarchs, popes, or heads of military orders—sought territorial expansion, economic gain, and political aggrandizement alongside salvation and the laurels of piety. Leaders with such ambitions often faced rebellion from those they claimed to rule, sometimes with the support of external polities. Crusades were used to put down these revolts *qua* wars, again linking the history of the crusades with the history of colonization, Latinization, and state formation.

North Europe

"Perpetual crusading" and Latinization in the Baltics continued to roll forward under the leadership of the Teutonic Knights and regional monarchs in the second half of the thirteenth century. Nonetheless, these crusades faced challenges, above all Mongol expansion and indigenous rebellions.

The rise and extraordinary growth of the Mongol Empire dramatically reshaped and reconnected Eurasia and thus necessarily impacted the crusading movement, in northern and eastern Europe as well as in West Asia. The Mongol Empire had its origins in an expansionary movement among a group of Turkish and Turco-Mongol tribes northwest of China under a leader called Temujin, who, emerging from a series of feuds, in 1206, took the title of Chinggis Khan, "firm or fierce ruler,"[1] and set out to consolidate, organize,

and expand his rule. In 1211–12, the Mongols took northern China. They conquered the regions east of the Caspian Sea in 1219–20, after which raids were launched across what is now southern Russia. The death of Chinggis Khan in 1227 did not disturb the rhythm of conquest. Between 1231 and 1234, his heirs destroyed the Qin dynasty of northern China, began invading Goryeo Korea (which finally paid allegiance after decades of fighting), and occupied what is now Iran. They conquered central Russia from 1237 to 1239, and the Ukraine in 1240. In 1241, they invaded Polish principalities and Hungary and defeated a German army at Legnica. Only the death of Ögödai, Chinggis Khan's successor, in 1241, eventually interrupted the invasion of lands in Central Europe.

Box 9.1 The Mongol Empire

While the brutality of Mongol warfare is widely discussed, the institutional strengths of the Mongol Empire may be overlooked. As Timothy May has explained, the death of Chinggis Khan did not lead to a succession dispute because the Mongol Empire was built firmly on "a sophisticated system of administration, ideology and control."[2] This system included detailed military administration, civil administration, taxation, and the integration of local governments whenever possible. Furthermore, the empire was made up of semi-autonomous territories ruled by the descendants of Chinggis Khan, known as khanates. From *c.* 1260, these khanates became largely autonomous states that interacted independently with other polities. Despite this independence, throughout Mongol-ruled regions it is possible to discern an overall emphasis on economic prosperity and sociopolitical order. This manifested in firm political control and military dominance, pragmatic tolerance of cultural differences and local social hierarchies—so long as they did not threaten Mongol rule—and proactive support for trade and economic development with any willing partners. In terms of religion, the originally polytheistic Mongols assimilated variously with Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity, depending on the region they conquered and then governed.

Latin Christendom did not know at first how to understand the Mongols and the changes they brought. Some thought the Mongols might be Christians, and thus might be about to bring about the end of Islam. English monk and chronicler Matthew Paris even tentatively suggested they might be the lost tribes of Israel. When all this was known to be false, many, including the papacy, still hoped to convert the Mongols to Latin Christianity. Even later, when the khanates had been established, the papacy continued to imagine that the Mongols might help facilitate the dominance of Latin Christianity over other Christian sects in northern and eastern Europe, particularly the Byzantine Church. Meanwhile, in Europe and West Asia, individual Latin Christian rulers, faced with imminent conquest, came to their own pragmatic decisions, alternately submitting to the Mongols, making alliance with them, or doing their best to resist conquest.

By the 1240s, both the papacy and Latin Christian rulers in northern and eastern Europe saw the Mongols as an unequivocal threat and, unsurprisingly, directed crusades against them. In 1241, Pope Gregory IX proclaimed a crusade against the Mongols. This was confirmed in 1243 by Pope Innocent IV and resistance to the Mongols was on the agenda of the First Council of Lyon in 1245. In 1249, Innocent further allowed crusaders to the eastern Mediterranean to commute their vows to war against the Mongols. By then he had empowered the Teutonic Knights, to whom he had already given the virtual direction of the northeastern frontier of Christendom, to grant plenary indulgences to all taking the cross against the Mongols.

However, crusading against the Mongols in northeastern Europe was not predominant in the minds of the leaders of Latin Christendom. The Mongols were never the paramount or ongoing target of northern crusades. Rather, such crusades remained primarily focused on the conquest and Latinization of lands controlled by pagan and non-Latin Christian rulers. In the second half of the thirteenth century, these crusades emphasized the subjugation of Livonia and Prussia, both sites of major revolts, and the invasion and control of what is now Finland, in competition with the Rus' at Novgorod. While Latin Christian popes and rulers used northern conflicts to contend against the Byzantine Church and each other for supremacy in Latin Christendom, "perpetual crusading" and theocratic state structures from the earlier part of the century took on lives of their own.

By the mid-thirteenth century, Livonia seemed to have been conquered, with Prussia—now a semi-sovereign theocracy under the Teutonic Knights, supported by papal authorization for "perpetual crusading"—not far behind. But, as briefly noted in the previous chapter, Latin claims of conquest and control hid a more complicated reality. While some conquered peoples seem to have been content with the new reality, perhaps because they had agreed terms for their submission that were to their benefit, others were decidedly not. Even after conversion (forced or voluntary), indigenous peoples were sometimes treated by their Latin conquerors as second-class Christians. A few Latins made efforts to rectify the situation, but such efforts were limited and ultimately abandoned. And all the while, unconquered peoples in the region continued to be a factor. They provided many with a reason to resist Latin rule while simultaneously giving others a reason to fight for the Latins, since victory might lead the Latins to redistribute land and resources to their allies. In any event, the later thirteenth century witnessed major, sustained rebellions again the Latin "colonial superstructure" in northeastern Europe.

In Livonia, thanks to a delicate set of compromises, negotiations, and crusade recruitment within Latin Christendom, as well as alliances with select indigenous peoples, a major revolt from the later 1230s was initially subdued by the mid-1250s. But, in 1259, a local people broke a truce and gathered others in support. They ultimately succeeded in killing in battle the master of the Teutonic Order in 1260. This apparent discrediting of the Order's military credentials led to widescale rejection of Latin Christianity and war against the Order. Only by 1290 could it be said that Livonia had been subdued and subjugated, with former indigenous allies denied whatever political agency they had formerly possessed.

These later thirteenth-century uprisings in Livonia were echoed in Prussia, but, in fact, the first revolt in Prussia had come even earlier, in 1242. In consequence, the Teutonic Order lost much of the territory it had gained and had to fight a ten-year war of recovery. This 1242 revolt (led by a former ally) was only suppressed over many years with support from a wide range of individuals with varied motivations. A substantial crusading expedition from Prussia led by King Ottakar II of Bohemia, Rudolf of Habsburg and Otto of Brandenburg in 1254 eventually led to a land-bridge linking Livonia to Prussia.

Then, in the 1260s, the Livonian revolts sparked answering indigenous rebellions in Prussia. Many of the garrisons and colonies established in Prussia were destroyed and the first group of crusaders marching to their relief was annihilated. Pope Urban IV, who had been planning a crusade against the Mongols, instead urged all those who had taken the cross to go to the Teutonic Knights' assistance, offering plenary indulgences for any length of service. A succession of crusades took place, particularly in 1265, 1266, 1267, and 1272.

This subjugation of Prussia was not moderated by theological expectations for the treatment of indigenous converts and it proceeded ruthlessly toward total conquest. Those who continued to resist hoped for support from non-Latins outside Prussia, particularly the princes of the Rus', but without success. There were two smaller rebellions, in 1286 and 1295, but ultimately by 1300, Prussia had become a Latin Christian state governed by the Teutonic Order, ready for larger-scale colonization. Civil liberties that had been promised to all converts after the first revolt were now forgotten and most Prussians became serfs on estates held by the Knights, Latin settlers, and a few indigenous collaborators.

The Prussian crusades may seem far afield from the crusades occurring simultaneously elsewhere, but Eric Christiansen is surely right to point us toward the role of inter-Latin conflict in the ultimate success of the Teutonic Order in Prussia. As he explains, "while papalists and Hohenstaufen fought each other to the death, the grand-masters took their pick of privileges," and the successes of the Teutonic Order were variously in turn claimed by the papacy or the Hohenstaufen. The history of the crusades in Prussia is, therefore, intertwined with the history of crusading against papal adversaries discussed later in this chapter.[3]

In contrast with Livonia and Prussia, crusading in Lithuania and Rus' lands had not seen much success in the first half of the thirteenth century. An invasion of Lithuania by the Sword-Brothers from Livonia had been bloodily repulsed in 1236 and the territory south of the Dvina lost at that time was only won back by 1255. But the union of the Teutonic Knights and the Sword-Brothers in 1237 led to proposals for expansion further eastward. This expansion entailed direct conflict with the Rus'.

The Rus', a loosely allied confederation of principalities centered on major and prosperous trading towns, had converted to Christianity in the tenth century. However, in terms of their Christianity and their economic well-being, the Rus' were oriented eastward, toward Byzantium. While at times they allied with crusaders, they did not share the crusaders' interest in the expansion of Latin Christendom. When the Rus' were not allies, they were clear rivals in northeastern Europe, in terms of both military force

and Christian sectarianism. At times, this led to crusades explicitly targeting the Rus', especially the powerful and prosperous state of Novgorod, which had early on made terms with the Mongol Kipchak Khanate (often referred to as the "Golden Horde"). But at other times, crusading was not so much aimed directly against the established lands of the Rus' as used to compete with the Rus' for the claim of other territories.

Such was the case with what is now Finland in the eastern Baltic. Although the legend of a "first Finnish crusade" in the mid-twelfth century has remained in circulation, it seems clear that the legend emerged in the tumult of fourteenth-century crusading, in support of those later efforts. In the early thirteenth century, the Danes lost and the Swedes gained interest in the region. On the Swedes' part, this interest was spurred on by the fact that some Swedes had already migrated to a coastal part of Finland and established a small settlement with a Latin Christian bishop. This modest Swedish migration was received peacefully by the indigenous peoples living there, the Suomi, who presumably were already familiar with the Swedes from Baltic trade.

However, another indigenous people in the region, the Tavastians, supplemented fur-trading with raiding against Novgorod and other regional peoples, principally the Karelians. Novgorod, for its part, extended its influence by allying with the Karelians and others against the Tavastians—and occasionally raiding Swedish lands. The stage was thus set for large-scale conflict, with Novgorod and the Karelians, the Swedes, and the Tavastians facing off in a roughly triangular configuration. In the late 1230s, Pope Gregory IX became convinced that the Tavastians had actively rejected Christianity and called a crusade against them, thus inserting crusaders into the middle of the three-sided Swedish-Tavastian-Novgorodian/Karelian conflict, on the side of the Swedes. These first crusades culminated in the capture of Pskov in 1240. However, the crusaders' eastward drive was decisively halted by Alexander Nevski, prince of Novgorod. He retook Pskov in the Battle of the Neva later in 1240 and on April 5, 1242, defeated the Teutonic Knights in battle on Lake Peipus.

In Latin Christendom, Nevski's victory made it seem even more urgent that the Swedes conquer the Tavastians, so that subsequently all war resources could be directed against Novgorod. The so-called "second" Finnish crusade was launched in 1249, under the leadership of King Erik XI of Sweden and Birger Jarl; the "third" Finnish crusade, under King Birger of Sweden, came in 1292. With these crusades and accompanying missionary activity, Swedish monarchs hoped to control the region by subordinating the Tavastians before defeating Novgorod and the Karelians. By 1295, the Tavastians were under Swedish rule, and King Birger also proclaimed success in converting and subordinating the Karelians, thus purportedly securing the eastern Baltic from their piracy.

Christiansen has argued that, despite Birger's claims to be defending his people, there was little tangible appeal to crusading in what is now Finland, especially for Swedes who were not of the elite classes, and so it was even more important that it be firmly constructed as holy warfare. Certainly the wrongs supposedly perpetrated by the Karelians, in particular, the purported persecution of Latin Christians and the grotesque torture of both men and women seem to echo the wrongs supposedly committed by

other crusade targets from the First Crusade onward. The cult of St. Eric was promoted and directly linked to crusade efforts. Swedish chroniclers emphasized that these crusades were both pious and chivalric. And as ever, papal bulls framed the crusades as the defense of nothing less than the Christian faith.

It may be tempting to dismiss this moral and devotional framework as superficial, but not all Latins viewed conquest, settlement, and Latinization as inherently right; there was a search for justification and moral clarity. Latin encounters with so many polities that were non-Christian in one way or another had raised critical legal questions, at least for those so inclined. As discussed earlier in this chapter, in the work of Pope Innocent IV, who ascended the papal see after a celebrated legal career, a theoretical framework governing Latin Christian encounters with non-Latin polities and peoples was articulated. Innocent asserted that non-Christians had natural rights to possess property and sovereignty; their conquest could not be simplistically justified on the basis of their lack of faith. To be sure, Innocent sought the global expansion of Christendom, which he believed was headed by the papal see and should encompass all of humanity. But he believed this ultimate triumph was only fully achievable through preaching and conversion, which could be advanced but not achieved outright through conquest alone. Others disagreed, asserting that the conquest of non-Christians was justifiable by virtue of their lack of faith, but for several centuries, Innocent's determination held the day. This meant that conquests of non-Latin peoples and lands required just cause and pious intention, which indirectly supported the ongoing crusade tradition.

Iberia

The dynamic situation of the very earliest years of the thirteenth century—when there was fragmentation and contention among and between Latin monarchs, local Muslim emirs, and the Almohad state—had gradually but uneasily stabilized. By the late 1220s, the Almohads' state had fragmented, various Latin monarchs had emerged from their respective succession disputes, and the papacy was again prepared to grant crusade indulgences for Iberian warfare. Jaume I of Aragon-Barcelona took the realms of Majorca (by 1231) and Valencia (by 1238) while Fernando III of Castile took the cities of Jerez (1231), Córdoba (1236), and Seville (1248). It is easy to connect these events to form a narrative of simple, steady Latinization in Iberia.

Indeed, appearances of holy war could be quite glossy, and Fernando III was particularly recognized throughout Latin Christendom for his successful warfare against Muslim opponents. English public opinion maintained that he "alone has gained more for the profit and honour of Christ's Church than the pope and all his crusaders . . . and all the Templars and Hospitallers." His career demonstrated, moreover, that crusading in Iberia was now largely a royal enterprise. Although the crusade against Seville was authorized by the pope in 1246, few crusaders now came from outside the peninsula and the popes themselves recognized Iberian crusading as a royal responsibility. Ferdinand made good use of the Castilian Church for his wars, especially in the form of the

so-called *tercias reales*, the third of tithes which should have been spent on the upkeep of church buildings and was increasingly directed his way or seized by him. The continual warfare in Iberia had a cost and that was the impoverishment of the Church in Castile, partly because it had to bear the expenses, partly because the migration of people south into conquered lands reduced its revenues. This in turn made it very dependent on monarchs like Ferdinand, who reimbursed himself at its expense, and it also made it insular, reluctant to finance crusades elsewhere.

But a simplistic narrative of Latinization in Iberia would conceal the degree to which divisions and rivalries of all kinds continued to play a role in the later thirteenth century. Although Latin conquests were sometimes devastating for local Muslim populations in terms of deaths, forced relocations, and enslavement, most were accompanied by adjustments that allowed for the presence of both Muslim and Jewish populations with considerable local autonomy and royal, local, and ecclesiastical protections, especially by the Iberian military orders. Crusading was interwoven with these trends in thirteenth-century Iberia.

Furthermore, despite the aggressive campaigns of monarchs like Fernando III and the dissolution of the Almohad state, the peninsula had not in fact been fully conquered for Christendom. By the early 1250s, the majority of the peninsula had been nominally conquered by various Latin monarchs but the southeast corner remained under Muslim rule. This entrenched polity, the Emirate of Granada, was governed by the Nasrid dynasty. Asserting a model of Islamic rule different than that of the Almohads, the Nasrids were determined to maintain as much independence of both Christian and Muslim powers as possible and used great diplomatic agility to do so. Thus, for example, they became vassals of Castile in 1246, paying tribute and at times offering military service, while also trying to remain on distant but not necessarily unfriendly terms with the next Islamic dynasty to rise ascendant in North Africa, the Marinid Sultanate.

Known in reference to the name of their tribe, the Banu Marin, the Marinids had originally served the Almohad Caliphate. As the power of the Almohads waned and their territories disintegrated, several dynasties had risen to power in North Africa by the mid-thirteenth century. In northwestern Africa, in particular, the Marinids assumed their predecessors' idea of a pseudo-imperial state encompassing North Africa and, they hoped, beyond. The Marinids were a potential ally for the Nasrids in Granada, but also, like Latin monarchs in the Iberian Peninsula, a potential threat.

Circa 1240, the ambitions of Latin monarchs in Iberia remained high—after all, the conquest of Seville was yet to come in 1248—but already the first of a series of rebellions in nominally Latin-conquered regions were beginning. Many of these rebellions were among the *mudejáres*, and some were assisted by external Islamic powers. But at the same time, one of the most significant rebellions—rightly called a civil war—was led by the Latin nobility of Castile, who themselves turned to the Marinids for support against their king. Furthermore, all of the rebellions show a complexity of relationships, with some Muslims determined to support their Latin monarchs and some Latins determined to protect their Muslim tenants and vassals. Brian Catlos has rightly concluded that "although occasionally these rebellions took on a confessional flavor and drew on the

rhetoric of religious struggle, they were first and foremost local political events, and were restricted to specific areas of the south. . . . In fact, rather than rebellions *per se,* these episodes represent the final phase in the process of Christian conquest."[4]

The first such rebellion began in 1247 and affected southern Valencia. It was led by al-Azraq, a local Muslim lord and vassal of Aragon, who was dissatisfied with Jaume I of Aragon's overlordship. Loyalties in Valencia and Aragon were divided. The military orders sought to defend their Muslim tenants (even against the king), while *mudejáres* were themselves split, with some rebelling and others supporting the Crown. In order to put down the rebellion, Jaume asked Pope Innocent IV to declare his efforts a crusade. He also compelled another Muslim vassal, the town of Xàtiva, to refuse to supply the rebels. Ultimately, the revolt was suppressed, al-Azraq temporarily left Iberia for North Africa, and large numbers of rebelling *mudejáres* were enslaved.

Crusading and the "pacification" of rebellions continued to be intertwined. Between 1252 and 1254, a crusade was preached to invade North Africa. Alfonso X of Castile tried to recruit Henry III of England and later Hakon of Norway for it and in 1260 the city of Salé, which had rebelled against the Marinids, was held for a fortnight. But Alfonso soon had to face a large-scale rebellion of *mudejáres* in the Guadalquivir valley and the Muslim-governed vassal-state of Murcia in 1264. Murcia was dominated by two powerful and rival dynasties, the Banu Hud and the Banu Ashqilula. Dissatisfaction with the terms of Castilian suzerainty led the Banu Hud to rebel, with support and involvement from both the Emirate of Granada and the Marinid Sultanate.

To undermine this rebellion, Alfonso X worked upon the rivalry between the Banu Hud and the Banu Ashqilula. He also enlisted his bishops to have a crusade preached and successfully appealed to the papacy for a formal announcement of crusade. He further involved his father-in-law, Jaume I of Aragon, Majorca, and Valencia, who also made his own crusade request of the papacy, which continued to enthusiastically support the crusade via indulgences, the diversion of ecclesiastical funds, and preaching. By 1267, the crusade had succeeded in putting down the rebellion, with subjugated territories divided between Castile and Aragon. The Emirate of Granada remained unconquered but sued for peace; Alfonso expelled all *mudejáres* from Murcia; and Muslims enslaved during the course of the crusade were sent as gifts to the papacy, cardinals, monarchs, and others in Latin Christendom.

Jaume I of Aragon, in the meantime, had refocused his crusade attentions on the eastern Mediterranean. In 1267, at the end of the crusade in Murcia, Abaqa, the Mongol ruler of the Ilkhanate, invited Jaume to join him in crusading at the other end of the great sea. After sending an ambassador to the Ilkhanate, who in turn brought back a Mongol emissary, Jaume committed to the enterprise, despite discouragement from Alfonso X and a lack of papal enthusiasm. The crusade fleet launched in 1269. Jaume's ship was blown off course and never arrived, but his sons did make it to Acre by December 1269. However, they were apparently dissuaded from crusading by what they saw of Mamluk military strength and sailed back westward.

In the 1270s, Alfonso X faced an even more substantial revolt in Valencia, this time driven by both *mudejáres* and Latin nobles, who opposed his almost absolutist approach

to kingship. Again the rebels aligned themselves with the Nasrids in Granada; Alfonso's own brother Felipe and other leaders of the rebellion went into voluntary exile in Granada, where they helped the young emir Muhammad II secure his rule. By 1274, Alfonso was able to reach terms with those rebelling against him and also with Granada, but when he left the peninsula shortly thereafter, the Marinids saw their own opportunity and allied with Granada. Combined Marinid and Nasrid forces invaded Castilian territory in 1275.

What followed was messy and complicated. In Alfonso's absence, his eldest son, Fernando, took charge but was killed in the Battle of Écija (1275). Alfonso's younger son, Sancho, then took control of Castilian forces. When Alfonso returned to the peninsula in 1276, a truce was offered and accepted. But then, in 1277, the Marinids returned to invade again. Alfonso avoided direct military engagement and left the Marinids to raid and pillage without confrontation. Given these circumstances, the Banu Ashqilula (in Murcia) gave Malaga to the Marinids, which frightened the Nasrids in Granada into seeking an alliance with Castile against the Marinids. By 1279, the Marinids had retreated and Castile and Granada had both survived. In just two years, the Marinids would be back, but this time as allies of Alfonso, now facing rebellion from his son Sancho and his supporters over the matter of succession.

Meanwhile, crusades continued. Given the interest of Latin monarchs in Iberia in North Africa, it should come as no surprise that they participated in Louis IX of France's second crusade to Tunis (1270), which is described at more length later in this chapter. In 1286 Alfons, brother of Pedro III of Aragon, crusaded to take Menorca, which was then a protectorate of Aragon. In 1292–4, Sancho IV of Castile and Jaume II of Aragon combined forces to take Tarifa. However, the major targets of Iberian crusading in the final third of the thirteenth century wound up being other Latin Christians—specifically the Angevins and the papacy—as is discussed later in the chapter. Indeed, rivalries and various succession disputes between Latin Christians in the western Mediterranean, as well as in the Iberian Peninsula proper continued to play a major role in the history of the crusades.

It is clear that crusading in Iberia continued to be part of the wider world of crusading in Latin Christendom. Ambitious and dedicated monarchs may have played an enormous role in such crusades, but the papacy and the churches and military orders in Iberia were also involved, and of course, fighters had to be recruited and provisioned. In addition, Latin royal ambitions in Iberia, as elsewhere, came into conflict with opposition in the form of rebellion. And crusading by Latin Christians against Latin Christians was a distinct feature of Iberian crusading at the end of the thirteenth century, as discussed more later in the chapter.

Yet, while realpolitik pragmatism was often dominant, and although it remains challenging to attempt to identify individuals' motivations, contemporaries did not see an inherent ideological conflict between political power, military success, and piety. Crusading piety continued to be represented and embraced as part of these varied wars, and indeed, it continued to evolve to fit changing circumstances. For example, Edward Holt has shown how under Alfonso X, ideas of crusading emphasized the Virgin Mary (rather than St. James) as the preeminent military patron of the Iberian crusades, and

conversion was embraced as part of rather than just adjacent to the crusading enterprise.[5] And Linda Paterson has shown how, on three successive occasions, vernacular lyric poems (*sirventes*) urged Jaume I of Aragon to crusade in the eastern Mediterranean and strongly criticized him when his efforts failed.[6] Similarly, some, at least, positioned their dynastic claims and political ambitions within the broader story of the expansion of Christendom. For example, Alfonso X of Castile not only sought recognition of his preeminence among his peers in the Iberian Peninsula and Languedoc but also sought to be proclaimed Holy Roman Emperor throughout his life, as the great-grandson of Frederick I Barbarossa, repeated crusader and founder of the Hohenstaufen dynasty. Alfonso was ultimately unsuccessful in these attempts, for reasons that become clearer next.

The First Crusade of Louis IX of France

Fernando III of Castile was not the only thirteenth-century crusader king dubbed saint; he shared that status with his cousin, Louis IX of France, otherwise known as Saint Louis. At first Louis does not seem to have been fervently committed to crusading, but starting in the late 1230s, a combination of factors—relic devotion, serious illness, family relations and traditions—served to generate a serious motivation to crusade in Louis.

Louis was devoted to relics: he avidly collected them; he built churches to house them and made gifts of them to favored institutions; his travels were punctuated by visits to shrines. In 1238, the Latin emperor of Constantinople, Baldwin II, badly in need of money and military support, proposed to transfer to France one of the best-known relics of Christ's Passion, the Crown of Thorns. Despite competition with Venice for the relic, Louis' emissaries negotiated the transfer of the relic to Louis for 135,000 pounds *tournois* (at a time when the monarchy's annual budget was 250,000). Louis had already learned, probably from Baldwin, of the dispersal of other relics from Constantinople to the crusader states, including a fragment of the True Cross which had been pledged to the Templars for a huge sum, and a phial of the Precious Blood. These relics were also redeemed on Louis' behalf and were brought to Paris in 1241.

In less than three years, Louis IX had acquired a major part of the famous collection from the imperial treasury in Constantinople, including relics relating to almost every stage of the final hours of Christ's life on earth and many others besides. It rivalled even the ancient treasury of relics in Rome and its provenance was in thirteenth-century terms unassailable. To house these relics Louis had already begun to build the Sainte-Chapelle, which was consecrated in 1248.

Baldwin II made the collection of relics from Constantinople over to Louis IX absolutely in June 1247, but if Baldwin had believed that their transfer would help the Latin Empire by encouraging recruitment to a crusade to save it, his intention spectacularly backfired. Paris became not a reminder of Constantinople, but, in the words of one commentator, "as if it was another Jerusalem," a phrase which carried enormous weight, given the reoccupation of Jerusalem by the Ayyubids. It is probable that Louis had heard of this

Figure 9.1 Louis IX of France carries the Crown of Thorns, thirteenth century.
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This stained glass panel was made in Tours, France, in the mid-thirteenth century. It depicts Louis IX of France at the cathedral of Sens, while the relic of the Crown of Thorns was en route to Paris. Though crowned, Louis is otherwise garbed simply. He carries the relic of the Crown of Thorns on top of a chalice and is accompanied by his brother and other members of his court.

reoccupation just before he fell into an illness so severe that it was said that at its height his mother, Blanche of Castile, ordered the relics of the Passion to be brought for him to touch. During the course of this illness Louis made a vow to crusade.

That said, there were other reasons for his crusade vow besides serious illness and preexisting devotion. His decision may have been an act of rebellion against the tutelage of his capable and dominant mother, Blanche, daughter of Alfonso VIII of Castile, who had held the regency during his minority and remained a great influence on him even after he had come of age. She did not support the idea of a crusade and with the bishop of Paris' help persuaded Louis that a vow made during an illness was not binding. Louis' response was to take the vow again once he was well. This defiance of his mother's wishes in a sacred cause echoed similar actions of his sister Isabella, to whom he was very close, and his choice of a crusade as the vehicle for this defiance was a natural one for a man of his station and family traditions on both sides.

Once Louis had made the decision to crusade he threw himself into preparations. As in the early years of the thirteenth century, the target was to be Nile Delta, the center of Ayyubid power. Like his great-grandfather, Louis VII, he had taken the initiative in advance of a papal proclamation of war, reminding us again that crusading did not conform strictly to a set of procedures and that the papacy did not control crusading in practice. Pope Innocent IV, embroiled in crusades against Frederick II, was of very little help to him. It says much for Louis' diplomatic sense that he chose to remain on good terms with both the emperor and the pope.

In preparation for departure, Louis first focused on securing order in France by subduing rebellions, sending out investigators to see if there were hidden grievances against him or his administrators, and taking steps to remedy any problems thus uncovered. Ensuring successful crusade recruitment was also a concern. Preaching for the crusade began during the same period in the mid-1240s. Odo of Châteauroux, the cardinal-bishop of Tusculum, was given charge of it as legate, while preachers were also sent to England, the German states, and Scandinavia.

Preaching aside, Louis IX took it upon himself to underwrite the expenses of French nobles and subsidize a number of knights through contracts of service. He would continue to lend cash during the crusade. He was not the first crusade leader to act in this way, but he was the first to have done so on such a large scale. He also arranged for transport, and concerned himself with port facilities and supplies. Aigues-Mortes, which had already begun to be developed as a royal port, was improved by the construction of a canal and a magnificent tower, to be his residence before departure. Vast stores were sent ahead to Cyprus.

Indeed, when one also considers the cost of his ransom in 1250 and the amount he spent in the crusader states during his stay there, the expenses borne by Louis for his first crusade were enormous. He spent over 1,500,000 pounds *tournois* on his crusade at a time when his annual income was 250,000. It is amazing that he seems to have remained solvent until 1253, when he was forced to borrow funds; this was probably due to the effect of the death of his mother and regent in 1252 on the fiscal arrangements in France.

Louis did take steps to reduce royal expenditure, but the vast sums spent on crusade mostly came from new sources: money from the French Church and confiscated properties and wealth of purported heretics and Jews in France. In 1245, the French Church granted him a twentieth of ecclesiastical revenues for three years, which the French clergy voluntarily increased to a tenth; additional tenths for two years were granted in 1251. Louis also profited from royal licenses to certain chapters and monastic communities to elect their bishops and abbots, and the enjoyment of part of the revenues of some vacant benefices. It has been estimated that the French Church itself contributed 950,000 pounds to his crusade, in other words about two-thirds of his expenses. And there were "voluntary" benevolences which towns in the royal domain were expected to contribute, not once but several times, and which have been estimated to have brought in 274,000 pounds.

A sustained drive to confiscate properties from purported heretics was also fruitful, as was the extortion of money from French Jews. Whereas Philip II of France had

adopted a nuanced and flexible approach to his Jewish subjects, consistently acting in the self-interests of the Crown, Louis VIII removed all crown support for Jewish lending. Louis IX in turn seems to have been personally antipathetic to Jewish people as well as fully convinced that the presence of Jewish communities was spiritually harmful to himself and his kingdom. He offered his Jewish subjects the virtually impossible choice of ceasing to lend money or leaving France, and also oversaw the investigation and trial of the Talmud, culminating in a public burning of manuscripts in Paris in 1242. These actions were aligned with the will of the papacy. While it seems clear that Louis IX was not primarily motivated by financial self-interest, the Crown did benefit from money extorted from Jews, particularly as a result of the campaign against usury. To these funds, as well as church taxation and royal revenues, were added cash realized on the properties of heretics, confiscated particularly in southern regions where heresy was still believed to be rife after the Albigensian Crusade.

Louis IX was determined not to repeat past mistakes but to invade the Nile Delta with maximum force. His crusade sailed at the end of May 1249, reaching the mouth of the Nile by Damietta on June 4. The demoralized defenders of Damietta abandoned the city, which the crusaders entered on June 6. Louis must have been expecting a long siege, since Damietta had held out against crusaders in the early thirteenth century for over a year, and thus it is not surprising that his initial success was followed by a long delay while possibilities were discussed. It was not until November 20, when the Nile was subsiding from its flood and the weather was cooler, that the march into the interior began, an advance that coincided with the death of the Ayyubid sultan, al-Salih Ayyub. The coincidence of his death and the crusade would prove enormously significant.

From the 1220s onward, the Ayyubids had resumed competition for dominance within their family dynasty. That competition often centered on rivalry between two Ayyubid-ruled centers of power: Damascus and Cairo. As in earlier centuries, these Ayyubid sultans each sought external allies in the quest for preeminence, but in the later thirteenth century, the sought-after external allies were sometimes Latin powers in the western Mediterranean. Thus, as we have seen, al-Kamil Muhammad, sultan of Cairo, had made alliance with Frederick II to help ensure his dominance over his brother, based in Damascus. By the 1240s, al-Kamil's son, al-Salih Ayyub, had succeeded him in Cairo, and was engaged in his own contest with his uncle, sultan of Damascus.

Both Ayyubid sultans sought to strengthen their military position in respect to each other. Al-Salih Ayyub had enlarged his armies in traditional fashion with *mamluks*, specially trained soldiers from beyond the frontiers of Islam, particularly at this time Kipchak Turks from Central Asia who had been displaced by the Mongols. These soldiers were legally enslaved during their training as youths and then freed upon adulthood, creating an elite military class uncomplicated by family ties. *Mamluks* had long been a feature of Islamicate armies and they became a powerful force under al-Salih Ayyub, who relied on them for his own bodyguard, the *Bahriyya*. In addition, al-Salih Ayyub allied with other forces from Central Asia, including mercenaries from the kingdom of Khwarazm. Meanwhile, his uncle in Damascus made alliances with crusaders, making territorial concessions to them that alarmed many Muslims.

The death of al-Salih Ayyub in 1249 led to relative unification of the Ayyubids against the common threat posed by the Louis IX and his crusaders. But al-Salih Ayyub's heir, Turanshah, had far to travel from West Asia to reach Cairo, and the crusader threat was imminent; it was no time for a vacuum of leadership. In the immediate aftermath of al-Salih Ayyub's death, Shajar al-Durr, his principal wife and originally enslaved herself, worked with his chief ministers and generals to conceal his death. She had already served as regent in her husband's absence earlier in the year, and now she, with support from his top men, held the reins of power and effectively dealt with Louis' crusade.

After progressing to al-Mansura by February 1250, the crusaders, exposed and isolated and now ravaged by disease, were harassed constantly, while the Ayyubids, transporting ships on camel-back around the crusaders' position and launching them downstream, cut them off from Damietta and their supplies. At the beginning of April, the crusaders recrossed the Nile to their old camp and on the night of the 5th began their retreat to Damietta. They were forced to surrender halfway there. The most carefully prepared and best-organized crusade yet seen had been destroyed, its leader was a prisoner of the enemy, and the ground had been laid for the emergence of a new Islamic power, the Mamluk Sultanate.

The new Ayyubid sultan, al-Salih Ayyub's heir Turanshah, had reached al-Mansura on February 28, but had not succeeded in securing his position. He distrusted the *Bahriyya* and wanted to replace them in the offices of state with members of his own military household. As a result, they assassinated him on May 2, 1250, and proclaimed Shajar al-Durr "sultana." Although she clearly had the confidence of the military and civil elite in Cairo, her rule as an unmarried woman was both exceptional and unacceptable to the caliph in Baghdad. She made a Turkoman emir, Aybak, commander-in-chief and then married him. Aybak was nominal co-ruler, but Shajar al-Durr continued to govern and be referred to as "sultana".

In the meantime, in 1250, negotiations for the surrender of the crusaders and the release of Louis continued, led on one side by Shajar al-Durr and on the other by Louis IX's wife and queen, Margaret of Provence, who managed to lead the crusade in this way just days after giving birth. On May 6, Louis was released. His ransom had been set at 400,000 pounds, half of which was paid immediately. Damietta was surrendered. Most of the crusaders returned to Europe, but Louis sailed to Acre. He wanted to see that his fellow crusaders gained their freedom from the Ayyubids and he was determined to help defend the Latin settlements against any new offensives that might follow from his failure.

Louis wound up staying in West Asia for nearly four more years and effectively took over the government of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, negotiating a treaty with Cairo in 1252 that included the prospect of an offensive alliance against Damascus—this came to nothing—and, in 1254, a two-year truce with Damascus and Aleppo. He refortified Acre, Caesarea, Jaffa, and Sidon on an impressive scale and sailed for home in April 1254, leaving a substantial number of knights, with all their attending personnel, to garrison Acre at his expense.

Louis reached Hyères in Provence early in July, a changed man. He interpreted the disaster of 1250 as a punishment for his sins. His devotions became more intense and penitential. He dressed and ate simply. He dedicated himself to the poor, desired death, and sought to make good kingship a kind of expiation for his offences which, he believed,

Figure 9.2 Mausoleum of Shajar al-Durr, Cairo, thirteenth century.
© Alamy Stock Photos.
Patronage of architecture was one way wealthy Muslims and their families fulfilled the pious obligation of *zakat* (alms-giving) and certainly many rulers used architecture as a political tool. D. Fairchild Ruggles has argued persuasively that Shajar al-Durr in particular used architecture "in innovative ways that were subsequently adopted by her Mamluk successors." (D. Fairchild Ruggles, "Visible and Invisible Bodies: The Architectural Patronage of Shajar al-Durr," *Muqarnas* 32 (2015): 63–78.) She built a highly visible mausoleum complex for her deceased husband, Ayyubid Sultan Al-Salih. She later ordered the building of her own mausoleum complex near the revered shrines of three Muslim women, Sayyida 'Atika, Sayyida Ruqayya and Sayyida Sukayna. This complex originally contained not only the mausoleum proper (shown here) but also *madrasas*, bathhouse, palace, and gardens, which were destroyed by the French in the nineteenth century. Uniquely, her own mausoleum commemorates only herself, since she left no heirs or dynasty.

had brought shame and damage on Christendom. And he continued to pour money across the Mediterranean. During Louis IX's reign funds were focused above all on maintaining a standing body of mercenary troops. This was occasionally supplemented by small bodies of crusaders until funding was withdrawn, perhaps early in 1270, to be integrated into the crusade to Tunis. The donation of funds to provide military forces for the defense of the Holy Land was a tradition that stretched back well into the twelfth century, but Louis' provision was unusual in that it was, as far as we know, open-ended. One cannot get away from the fact that Louis was prepared to dip deeply into his pocket.

Crusading against Papal Adversaries

In many ways, papal-regnal conflict dominated papal initiatives for crusades in the mid- to late thirteenth century. This should not be taken to mean that the papacy no

longer cared about other crusades, but rather, that they felt crusades against non-compliant temporal powers in Latin Christendom—primarily the Hohenstaufen dynasty of Frederick II and the Crown of Aragon—most demanded papal resources and direct leadership, because they were believed to be a direct threat to papal supremacy. In undertaking these crusades, the papacy identified other, more amenable temporal rulers in Latin Christendom as allies, in particular, Charles of Anjou. Underlying crusades against papal adversaries, crusades of "pacification," and crusades against external polities was the vision of a Mediterranean under Latin Christian political and ecclesiastical dominance.

Crusades against the Hohenstaufen and the Rise of Charles of Anjou

In this period, crusades against papal adversaries, wherever they were fought, revolved around the Hohenstaufen family and the fight for Sicily, positioned so strategically at the center of the Mediterranean. Earlier crusading against Frederick II Hohenstaufen was renewed by Pope Innocent IV in 1244 and from 1246, the year after the First Council of Lyon had deposed Frederick, a series of papal letters urged crusade preaching, addressed particularly to the German states where anti-kings were being set up. An army that took the old imperial capital of Aachen for the anti-king William of Holland in October 1248 had many crusaders serving in it, but in the German states there were short bursts of enthusiasm rather than sustained commitment. Innocent IV collected large sums of money from the Latin Church, especially from those originally from the Italic Peninsula and now beneficed in trans-Alpine countries, and from dioceses in England, Polish principalities, Hungary, and the German states. Most of these funds seem to have gone to finance the struggle in the German states themselves. On the other hand, the papal cause was relatively weak in the Italic Peninsula itself and a lack of cash seems to have been part of the reason why an invasion of Sicily in 1249 failed.

Then Frederick II died on December 13, 1250. He passed away in a clear position of dominance vis-à-vis the papacy and its allies. Furthermore, he left behind a large number of children, both legitimate heirs from three marriages and illegitimate but acknowledged descendants, all of whom were related to cousins within the broader Hohenstaufen family, and many of whom were married to other elite families throughout Latin Christendom. Thus, although the crusades against Frederick II himself had been unsuccessful, after his death the Hohenstaufen's position was hard to predict. The extended family appeared to be simultaneously an ongoing threat and potentially assailable, and the papacy and its allies were determined to uproot them. The crusade in the German states was renewed in the following February against Conrad IV, son of Frederick II, and preaching was again ordered there in 1253 and 1254, but the papal priority was the Kingdom of Sicily, which comprised much of the southern Italic Peninsula as well as the island and was, technically, a papal fief.

Because of the resources needed to successfully take Sicily, crusades against the Hohenstaufen would come to be run along the same lines as those to the eastern

Mediterranean. Sicily's invasion would require a large, well-organized, and well-financed army. It would also need a leader of weight and distinction and papal policy in the 1250s was directed toward finding one. Richard of Cornwall was approached; then Charles of Anjou; then Henry III of England, who had taken the cross in March 1250 on behalf of his younger son, Edmund of Lancaster. When negotiations with Henry broke down, the pope turned again to Charles of Anjou. Between 1262 and 1264, the terms for the theoretical transfer of the crown of Sicily to Charles of Anjou were hammered out between Charles and the papacy. Of course, any such transfer would have to be realized through military force.

Charles, beginning in the 1240s count of Provence, Forcalquier, Anjou, and Maine, was the youngest brother of Louis IX of France. Both talented and ambitious, his career was dramatic. He was not a pliant tool for the papacy (or anyone else), but he was willing to ally with the papacy when it was beneficial. Additionally, David Abulafia has called our attention to the way that crusading threaded throughout Charles' career; it was not a sole motivating factor but, nonetheless, it was more than just a convenient accessory to his ambition.[7] Charles crusaded alongside his brother Louis IX to Damietta and then Tunis; he crusaded against the Hohenstaufen; and in the later decades of his career, he would plan a major crusade in the eastern Mediterranean against the resurgent Byzantine Empire.

But in the meantime, the first crusade to take Sicily was preached early in 1255 in the Italic Peninsula and England. By this time, the upholder of the Hohenstaufen cause in the region was Manfred, one of Frederick II's illegitimate sons, and he was named as the target of the crusade. An army under the Florentine cardinal Octavian degli Ubaldini marched to defeat, after which Manfred achieved such dominance that he was crowned king of Sicily in August 1258. Crusade preaching continued, while in the late 1250s, crusading warfare spread into the northern Italic Peninsula and Sardinia. Meanwhile, Pope Urban IV granted Charles of Anjou's request that a crusade to conquer the kingdom of Sicily be preached in France, the western German states, and northern and central regions of the Italic Peninsula.

Charles' crusade to conquer Sicily set out from Lyon in October 1265. On its march, it was joined by contingents in the Italic Peninsula and it reached Rome in the middle of January 1266, a few days after Charles had been crowned king of Sicily in St. Peter's. Short of money, Charles began his campaign at once, and on February 26 defeated and killed Manfred in the Battle of Benevento. The whole kingdom of Sicily was soon relatively under his control, although the crusade had to be revived in April 1268, when Conrad IV's young son Conradin arrived in force to regain his inheritance. In August, Conradin was defeated at the Battle of Tagliacozzo and was executed in Naples in October. The surrender in August 1269 of the last Hohenstaufen garrison at Lucera, the colony of Sicilian Muslims established by Frederick II, ended the first phase of the conquest.

The rise of Charles of Anjou in the Mediterranean political world was meteoric. In 1267, Charles had been recognized as overlord of Latin statelets in the Peloponnese. By 1269, as just discussed, Charles had mostly conquered the kingdom of Sicily. Next came Achaea. In the middle of the thirteenth century, Achaea had been the most dazzling

of all the Latin settlements in the eastern Mediterranean. But infighting had led to disintegration, and in 1267 the dispossessed Latin emperor Baldwin II had confirmed the cession and added to it suzerainty for Charles over the Archipelago, Corfu, and the Latin possessions in Epirus, in return for the promise of 2,000 mounted men to help him recover the Latin Empire. This came to naught, and in 1278 Charles took over the government of Achaea directly. After long negotiations and many years of materially supporting the crusader states, Charles of Anjou had purchased Maria of Antioch's rights to the crown of Jerusalem in 1277 and in September of that year his vicar took up residence in Acre. Of course, the city of Jerusalem itself was under the control of the Mamluk Sultanate.

Having secured the rights to the crown of Jerusalem, as well as suzerainty and direct rule in the eastern Mediterranean and the Peloponnese, and having—as he thought—largely conquered Sicily, Charles turned his sights toward the conquest of a resurgent Byzantine Empire. The Latin Empire had been devastated by internal problems and finally eliminated by effective Byzantine reconquest. The original political structures put in place by crusaders and Venetians had always weakened it, and the Latins' treatment of the majority of non-Latins was resented, as described in the prior chapter. Furthermore, the Latin Empire had faced dire and rapidly disintegrating financial difficulties in the mid-thirteenth century. As a result, its emperor Baldwin II had engaged in complex monetary transactions—including the sale of relics to Louis IX—and even resorting to the pledging of the person of his only son, Philip, who spent his childhood and youth in Venice in the custody of his father's creditors.

While the Latin Empire scrambled to hold together, the Byzantine court at Nicaea had become dominant among its peers, as described previously. On July 25, 1261, while most of the Latin garrison was away on a Venetian expedition to attack the island of Kefken in the Black Sea, a Byzantine force from Nicaea infiltrated the city and occupied it with very little resistance. Baldwin II fled and the Venetian fleet was able to evacuate only the wives and children of the Venetian residents. On August 15, the Nicaean emperor Mikhael VIII Palaiologos made his ceremonial entry into the city and was crowned emperor in St. Sophia. The Palaiologoi would be the final dynasty of the Byzantine Empire, reigning until the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453.

The Palaiologoi's conquest of Constantinople in 1261 prompted immediate papal calls for crusade, with little result until 1267, when Charles of Anjou and Baldwin II, the deposed Latin emperor in exile, agreed terms at the Treaty of Viterbo. Charles would help Baldwin reestablish the Latin Empire in return for half of the imperial territories. However, Mikhael VIII had foreseen a Latin attempt at reconquest and had made his own plans and alliances. He tried to ensure relations with the Venetians were not those of outright hostility, and in 1274, he sent a delegation to Europe. This delegation offered Pope Gregory X the submission of the Byzantine Church to the Church of Rome. Gregory immediately told Charles to halt the impending crusade. By 1278, the papacy was convinced the Byzantines would not in fact submit, and in 1281, the new French pope, Martin IV, excommunicated Mikhael. Earlier in his career, as legate, Martin had

concluded the curia's negotiations that transferred the crown of Sicily to Charles; he had then been helped to the pontifical throne by Charles' political intriguing. Charles' crusade against Byzantium was back on.

It is clear that the hopes of the papacy rested on a huge Latin Christian conglomerate in the Mediterranean, in which Charles of Anjou, as well as his family, played a leading role. Such a conglomerate might have provided Latin settlements with the permanent defensive capability that crusades, of their nature ad hoc and short-lived, could never give. But Charles' political and military dominance was not as secure as it may have seemed. His fledgling dominions were unwelcome to many other Christian powers in the Mediterranean, Latin and Byzantine alike.

The Fall of Charles of Anjou and Crusades against Aragon

What ultimately derailed the crusade against the Byzantine Empire was yet another major rebellion: the "Sicilian Vespers," so-called because it began at the time of evening prayer. Caused by resentment at either weak or overzealous Angevin rule—the precise reason remains a historical debate—on March 30, 1282, Easter Monday, the island of Sicily rose against Charles of Anjou's rule and Angevin-French domination. After trying and failing to secure papal recognition of their cause, the rebelling Sicilians asked Pedro III of Aragon, son of Jaume I, to assist them. It was rumored, and may have been true, that Mikhael VIII Palaoiologos also provided financial support to the rebels and the Aragonese; certainly Charles of Anjou was a common enemy.

Pedro III's decision to support the people of Sicily in their rebellion was influenced by a number of different factors. In 1262, Pedro had married Constance, daughter of Manfred of Sicily and thus granddaughter of Frederick II Hohenstaufen. Constance claimed the Sicilian crown after Manfred and Conradin died, as public documents from her reign attest. Meanwhile, Charles of Anjou's encroachment on Aragonese interests in the western Mediterranean were also viewed with disfavor. And the ambitions of both Charles and Pedro included conquests in North Africa, which made them potential rivals. Once his rule of Aragon stabilized, Pedro had already set about preparing for crusade in Africa, building the best navy in the western Mediterranean and making a truce with other regional powers, including the Emirate of Granada, Genoa, and Pisa.

In fact, Pedro proclaimed that his fleet was aimed at North Africa. He did involve himself in power struggles in the Emirate of Tunis and asked Pope Martin IV to grant crusading indulgences for the war he planned. The pope, however, like the French monarchy, viewed Pedro's plans with skepticism, fearing that his ultimate target was really Sicily, and refused to grant indulgences unless Pedro submitted formally to the papacy, which he was unwilling to do.

Pedro and his fleet set sail in 1282 with their destination as yet unknown to anyone except Pedro. Sealed orders opened at sea directed the fleet to the coastal city of Collo. Once there, facing more daunting opposition than anticipated, Pedro made another

appeal to the papacy for crusading indulgences, which was again denied. And at that moment, the Sicilians made their own appeal for support in their rebellion. In response Pedro sailed from North Africa to Sicily, landing at Trapani in August 1282 and arriving at Palermo, where he was acclaimed as king, in September.

The landing of the Aragonese infuriated Charles of Anjou and Pope Martin IV. Predictably, on January 13, 1283, a crusade was declared against the rebelling Sicilians, but preaching was at first restricted to the kingdom of Sicily itself and was only extended to the northern Italic Peninsula in April 1284. In November 1282, Martin IV had excommunicated Pedro III and then announced, in March 1283, that Pedro no longer held the crown of Aragon, which was claimed as a papal fief. A papal legate was sent to France to organize a crusade against Pedro, while Charles of Valois, son of Philip III of France and Isabella of Aragon, was promised Aragon on terms very similar to those under which his great-uncle Charles of Anjou held Sicily. A four-year tenth was levied on the French clergy and on the dioceses bordering on France to finance the crusade. Preaching in France began in the early months of 1284 and in February Phillip III accepted the crown of Aragon for his son.

These crusades against Aragon were fiascos. In the spring of 1283, the Aragonese themselves carried war on to the Italic Peninsula and they demonstrated their supremacy at sea, capturing Charles of Salerno, Charles of Anjou's heir, in a naval engagement off Naples in June 1284. Charles of Anjou's death in January 1285, which was followed by that of Pope Martin IV on March 28, further weakened the cause. Charles of Salerno only obtained his liberty in October 1288, on terms that involved a commitment from him to work for peace between Aragon, France, Sicily, and Naples, now the capital of a kingdom confined to the mainland.

Meanwhile, Philip III of France had invaded Aragon in the spring of 1285 with an army of at least 8,000 men, but the Aragonese in Gerona held up this crusade all summer. In the early autumn, the Aragonese fleet was recalled from Sicilian waters; on its way out, it destroyed the navy servicing the French and deprived Philip's crusade of its supplies. Philip III was forced to retreat and died himself during the withdrawal, at Perpignan on October 5. At the same time, Pedro was facing rebellion from his barons and looming civil war, but he managed the situation effectively, yielding to the more reasonable of his barons' demands and thus ensuring he and Aragon remained able to resist the Angevin-French-papal crusades.

With the Aragonese advance on the Italic Peninsula held at a defensive line south of Salerno, everyone seems to have wanted peace, especially after the loss of Acre in 1292 (discussed more herein) that made the diversion of resources appear selfish and foolhardy. The papal curia itself was divided, but the election of Pope Boniface VIII in 1294 marked the success of the war party there. In the summer of 1295, Boniface persuaded Jaume II of Aragon (second son of Pedro III) to withdraw from Sicily, but the Aragonese governor of the island—Jaume's younger brother Federico, presumably named after his great-grandfather Frederick II—refused to leave and was crowned king in Palermo in March 1296.

So crusading against the Sicilians, led now by Federico, was renewed in 1296, 1299, and 1302, while it was also proclaimed in 1297–8 against the "Colonna cardinals," a faction in Rome composed of personal enemies of Boniface and allies of Federico. With the somewhat bizarre help of Jaume II, who had renounced his rights to Sicily in the Treaty of Anagni in 1295, the Angevins cleared Calabria in 1297–8 and won a naval victory at the Battle of Cape Orlando in 1299. But Sicily was too strong to be reoccupied and the Treaty of Caltabellotta in August 1302 recognized Federico's rule over the island. Although according to the treaty he was to hold it only for life, the island was destined to remain in Aragonese hands. Meanwhile, the Kingdom of Naples on the mainland, which had previously been ruled jointly with Sicily, continued under separate, Angevin rule.

Assessing Crusades against Papal Adversaries

All these crusades against papal adversaries were justified in traditional ways. The popes, who showed themselves to be acutely aware of the criticism that they were misusing the movement for their own ends at a time when Latin Christians in the eastern Mediterranean were under threat, stressed the need to defend the church and the faith. They argued that their enemies, whom they compared to Muslims, were hindering effective crusading to the eastern Mediterranean. They also went to great lengths to build up an efficient machinery for recruitment.

There was, in fact, a respectable response to their appeals. Preaching in France in the years 1264–8 was particularly successful, not only in recruiting men new to crusading but also in securing the support of experienced crusaders. For example, the armies of 1265–6 and 1268 contained men like Érard of Valéry, who had crusaded with Louis IX and drew up the battle plan for Tagliacozzo, and Peter Pillart, who wrote to Philip III "I have served you and your ancestors in the year they went to Damietta and to Sicily and at the siege . . . of Tunis." And in the Italic Peninsula itself the greatest response came, as might be expected, from districts that traditionally supported the papacy. Norman Housley has shown that there was enough recruitment to make one doubt the common belief that these crusades had little ideological appeal. Furthermore, the ethos in the armies was typically crusading.

To make the crusades possible, the popes diverted to them a large part of the resources, particularly from clerical taxation, which were available for crusades in the eastern Mediterranean. Moneys from England, France, the Low Countries, Provence and the imperial dioceses financed Charles of Anjou's campaigns in the 1260s. Between 1283 and 1302, the whole of Latin Christendom was frequently taxed to restore Angevin rule to the island of Sicily. The heavy taxation extended the papacy's control over the crusading movement and led to important innovations such as the organization of Latin Christendom into collectorates by Pope Gregory X in 1274. The popes themselves became increasingly reliant on credit and banking facilities, and they introduced new taxes in the fourteenth century to reduce this reliance. But the taxation was understandably unpopular and was resisted, particularly in England in the 1250s and France in the

1260s, and there can be no doubt that it had a bad effect on the relations between the papacy and the Latin Church at large.

Indeed, the strongest criticism leveled at crusades against papal adversaries was that such crusades diverted resources and manpower from the eastern Mediterranean. Clearly, the idea that papal and Angevin dominance were prerequisites for crusade success elsewhere was not fully persuasive. Latin settlers in West Asia, Cyprus, and the Peloponnese kept up a barrage of complaints. When Innocent IV was tactless enough to order the preaching of a crusade against Conrad IV at a time when Louis IX's second crusade (described below) was in shreds and Louis himself was in the eastern Mediterranean, the French government and people united in fierce opposition to it.

Perhaps, ironically, this opposition and critique was itself expressed via crusading: the first so-called Shepherds' Crusade of 1251, an extraordinary reaction to the news of Louis IX's defeat and imprisonment. Its leader was a demagogue called the Master of Hungary, who carried in his hands a letter he claimed to have been given by the Virgin Mary. His message was that God had punished the pride of the French nobles and clergy through their defeat by the Mamluks. Thus, just as shepherds had been the first to hear the news of Christ's Nativity so it was to them, the simple and the humble, that the Holy Land would be delivered. His crusade army of the poor reached Paris, where it was well received by Queen Blanche. After this it fragmented into different companies and became progressively more violent until, outlawed by Blanche and with the Master killed, it disintegrated. Against this background it was not likely that the French would take kindly to the use of resources to crusade against papal adversaries, and indeed, Blanche took measures to prevent the preaching in France of the crusade against the Hohenstaufen and threatened to confiscate the lands of any who took the cross for it.

Examples of this sort of reaction to crusade failures have been collected by historians as evidence of critique of the crusading movement. Certainly such reactions were taken seriously by experienced crusade preachers such as Humbert of Romans. But they do not in themselves demonstrate that Latin Christians in general made a distinction in kind between crusading to the eastern Mediterranean and within Europe; it should not be forgotten that crusading to the eastern Mediterranean also attracted a measure of criticism, as described in previous chapters. Neither can one create out of such reactions a picture of widespread disillusionment. While the Shepherds' Crusade of 1251 was an act of popular criticism, it is telling that the method for protesting an ill-timed or poorly led crusade was to engage in a different, purportedly "better," crusade.

Similarly, the majority of critics of the crusades against papal adversaries were either long-standing opponents of the papacy, who would be expected to be critical anyway, or individuals who had particular reasons for expressing opposition to specific diversions of resources away from Latin settlements in the eastern Mediterranean. For example, in the German states, Italic Peninsula, France, Iberia, and the crusader states there was quite widespread criticism of crusades against Latin Christians like Frederick II and his family and allies. The strongest element of such criticism was that such crusades diverted resources from the crusader states. The French government also bitterly opposed the crusade against the Hohenstaufen in 1251, but that opposition was not one of principle;

rather, it served to support Charles of Anjou's crusade of 1265 into Sicily. Although Louis IX was not in favor of the Sicilian venture at first, his only objections to his brother's crusade, which were overcome, seem to have concerned the legality of a denial of the Hohenstaufen claim to Sicily.

In fact, the most striking thing about the crusading movement, wherever it manifested itself, was its continuing popularity and versatility. Crusades were waged in all theaters of war and they could not have been fought without crusaders. Not every appeal led to successful recruitment, but enough of the arguments of popes, rulers, bishops, and lords for particular ventures, whether in Europe or around the Mediterranean, were received sympathetically enough for there to continue to be crusades. It is, therefore, impossible to show, and it is hard to believe, that the prestige of the papacy was seriously or universally diminished by crusades against their adversaries.

For their part, the popes seem to have genuinely perceived the threat to their position to be so great that they had no option but to preach crusades. They also seem to have believed that the future of the crusader states depended on the integrity of the kingdom of Sicily and therefore on the crusades that followed the Sicilian Vespers. All that said, one cannot deny that Latin settlements in the eastern Mediterranean would have benefited from greater resources. It must remain an open question whether they would have survived longer had the papacy and its allies made more resources available.

Baybars, the Rise of the Mamluks, and the Second Crusade of Louis IX

In the 1250s the Mongols arrived on the scene in West Asia. They defeated the Seljuks of Rum at Köse Dağı in 1243. In 1256, they destroyed the Nizaris' headquarters at Alamut. In 1258, they took and sacked Baghdad and occupied regions to the north. In 1260, they pillaged Aleppo, destroying the petty Ayyubid principalities to the north and frightening Damascus into submission. These conquests and others resulted in the establishment of the Ilkhanate, a khanate in the southwestern part of the Mongol Empire that existed from the mid-thirteenth to early fourteenth centuries.

The Mongols' advance westward was stopped in September 1260 in the Battle of ʿAyn Jalut by the Mamluk Sultanate. In the years after the establishment of Aybak and Shajar al-Durr, most of the *Bahriyya* who had originally supported Shajar al-Durr found themselves effectively exiled from Cairo. Shajar al-Durr eventually had Aybak murdered in 1257, and was then killed in turn by Aybak's former wife. After their deaths, Aybak had been succeeded by his son ʿAli. But this succession, in a way that was to be typical of the Mamluk Sultanate, was a shadow hereditary succession, lasting only long enough to allow one of the emirs to emerge as the next ruler, after which the heir by birth was allowed to retire into obscurity.

In the face of the threat from the Mongols ʿAli was deposed and the senior of his father's *mamluks*, Qutuz, was proclaimed sultan on November 12, 1259. Recognizing the seriousness of the Mongol threat, not least because various lesser powers in the region were allying themselves with the Mongols in hopes of survival, Qutuz himself joined with

one of the most prominent members of the "exiled" *Bahriyya*, Baybars, and his current overlord, the Ayyubid al-Nasir Yusuf of Damascus. These three men commanded the combined Mamluk and Ayyubid troops who defeated the Mongols at the Battle of 'Ayn Jalut.

The Mamluks' success at 'Ayn Jalut was not foreseen in Europe, and efforts had in fact been immediately undertaken to send forces to fight the Mongols. Louis IX's own commitment was demonstrated in his reaction in 1260 to the news of near panic from Latin settlements in the eastern Mediterranean. Appeals from the various crusader states were at once dispatched to Europe. The urgency with which they were sent was exemplified by the case of a Templar messenger, who arrived in London on June 16, bringing letters for King Henry III and the commander of the London Temple. He had broken all records, taking only thirteen weeks to reach London from Acre and only one day to journey from Dover. Similarly, a letter from the papal legate in Acre was delivered to all Latin rulers in Europe and supplemented by messages from Latin leaders in the eastern Mediterranean. They spelled out the size and potency of the Mongol armies, the reactions of local rulers regardless of faith, including the speed with which the king of Cilician Armenia and the prince of Antioch-Tripoli had come to terms, and the poverty of the Latin settlements.

The response of the French government was dramatic. It decreed that the cross was to be solemnly preached throughout France. The king and his nobles agreed to tax themselves at a sixtieth of their income for seven years, while the Church in France was to tax itself at a twentieth. Louis, assisted by four nobles and four prelates, was going to oversee the collection of the tax personally. All young men aged at least 15 and worth 100 pounds per annum in rents and all aged at least 20 and worth 50 pounds were to be compulsorily knighted. Tournaments were to be banned for two years. To preserve horses, no one, noble or otherwise, would be allowed to buy or own a charger worth more than 100 pounds or a palfrey worth more than 30 pounds; and no ecclesiastic, not even a prelate, was to own a mount worth more than 15 pounds. It was announced that the pope was summoning a meeting in Rome to consider the steps that should be taken.

Of course the crisis passed when the Mamluks halted the Mongols and it was only a watered-down version of these proposals that was agreed by an assembly convoked by the king in April 1261. And, of course, the king of France was not alone in his concern for the Latin settlements. Edward I of England was later to give substantial support. The papacy organized a series of small crusade expeditions, transmitted large sums of cash, and through its representative, the patriarch of Jerusalem, paid for mercenaries to supplement the French regiment. After briefly focusing on a crusade to reclaim the Latin Empire, as already described, by 1263 the papacy was again writing of aid to Jerusalem and environs.

The reason for that change of plan was the rapid ascension and consolidation of power of Baybars, head of the newly revitalized Mamluk Sultanate. After defeating the Mongols at 'Ayn Jalut and on his way back to Cairo in triumph, Qutuz was stabbed to death on October 24, 1260, by a group of emirs including and supporting Baybars. Baybars then claimed the sultanate. Within three months, he had secured Damascus

Map 10 The Mongol Empire, *c.* 1300.

and he then extended Mamluk rule over Greater Syria including what is now northern Iraq. He installed a member of the 'Abbasid family as a figurehead caliph in 1260 (the previous 'Abbasid caliph had been executed by the Mongols in 1258), replacing Baghdad with Cairo as the seat of the caliphate.

Baybars' top priorities were consolidating his rule over the sultanate and defeating his Muslim rivals in the region, as well as holding the Mongols at arms' length. The Ilkhanate in particular was seeking military alliances with Latin Christian powers at both ends of the Mediterranean, and so, once he had established control over the Muslim-ruled regions of West Asia, Baybars would start to systematically reduce the territory in Latin Christian hands. During his reign a variety of pragmatic tactics would come to be explained and supported with an ideology of holy war, combined with internal efforts at religious "purification." In his strategic approach, he emulated Nur al-Din and Salah al-Din before him, and like Salah al-Din, he was not an Arab, in his case being a Kipchak Turk. He was a good administrator and a fine general—a much better one than Salah al-Din had been—and his methodical approach to the reconquest of the coast laid the foundations for the expulsion of Latin rule.

Baybars began with a devastating raid into Galilee in 1263. In 1265, he took Caesarea and Arsuf and temporarily occupied Haifa. In 1266 he seized Templar Safad, in 1268 Jaffa, Templar Beaufort and the city of Antioch, in 1271 Templar Safita, Hospitaller Crac des Chevaliers and Montfort of the Teutonic Knights. By his death on June 30, 1277, Latin rule was confined to a strip of coastline from 'Atlit to Marqab, with an enclave further north at Latakia.

While he undertook these military endeavors, he also used diplomatic maneuvers to prevent united opposition to his conquests, an approach that Paul Cobb has described as "jihad by treaty."[8] Baybars established relations with Charles of Anjou in 1266 and made commercial treaties with the Palaiologoi in Constantinople, as well as with Genoa. He deployed similar tactics on the eastern Mediterranean coast, making various treaties with Latin leaders at Jaffa and Beirut, and the Hospitallers. And he allied with the Kipchak Khanate as a counterbalance to the Ilkhanate.

For their part, Baybars' military campaigns were not indiscriminately destructive. He seems to have been concerned on the one hand to make it hard for Latins to reestablish bridgeheads on the parts of the coast he had conquered, but on the other to provide Mamluk shipping with the watering-places of which it had been deprived since 1197. Arsuf, Caesarea, Antioch, and Montfort were partially or totally destroyed, but Jaffa survived and estates in the lordships of Arsuf and Caesarea were assigned to Baybars' emirs and given a center at the castle of Qaqun. Crac des Chevaliers, Beaufort, and Safad were repaired and garrisoned, as were Hunin and Toron. A ring of fortresses now encircled Acre like a noose, but Baybars never seems to have made a serious attempt to take the city itself. He made several surprise descents on it, but these were really only impromptu raids; a feature of his serious military moves was their careful planning and equipping. He seems to have been conscious of the fact that his sultanate's prosperity still depended to a large extent on Acre as an outlet for goods and he may have been reluctant to endanger the economic well-being of a large part of his dominions by too hasty an assault on it.

Despite Baybars' diplomacy, as Mamluk armies had begun the systematic conquest of West Asia, Louis IX of France took the initiative to crusade, as he had done in 1244. Late in 1266 he informed Pope Clement IV of his intention to crusade again and on March 24, 1267, he took the cross at an assembly of his nobles. The response in France was apparently not so enthusiastic this time, although the crusade that eventually departed may not have been actually much smaller than that of 1248.

Louis certainly planned it as carefully, if not even more carefully, than he had his first. He was promised a three-year tenth from the French Church and a three-year twentieth from the dioceses bordering on France, to be collected once the Sicilian tax had come to an end. Towns were again asked for aid. His brother Alphonse of Poitiers raised well over 100,000 pounds *tournois*, mostly from his own domains. Louis made contracts with Genoa and Marseille for shipping, specifying that the vessels were to be at Aigues-Mortes by the early summer of 1270. It is a tribute to his near-iconic status and organizing ability that some crusading stalwarts, such as Hugh IV of Burgundy, and some close collaborators in the defense of the Holy Land, such as Érard of Valéry, were engaged. Crusaders were also recruited elsewhere in Europe, particularly in Aragon and England, where the kings wanted to take part, and Charles of Anjou agreed to join his brother.

In England, in the aftermath of the civil war between Henry III and Simon V de Montfort, crusade preaching had led to the formation of a substantial body of crusaders, among them Henry's eldest son, the future Edward I. Edward took the cross in June 1268 after winning over both his father, who had intended to go himself in fulfilment of a vow he had made in 1250, and the pope, who had agreed with Henry that Edward should remain in England.

Edward may well have been under Louis' influence. The two men were in touch by late 1267 and in August 1269 Edward went to Paris to attend a council of war. He promised to join Louis' expedition in return for a loan of 70,000 pounds *tournois.* He made widespread use of similar contracts of service to those employed by Louis, binding to himself the crusaders in his following in return for subsidies. It has been suggested by Simon Lloyd that his crusade was "an extended household operation in all its essentials," but this of course made it expensive and the Crown took every measure open to it to raise cash, including a general tax of a twentieth in 1269–70; the English Church contributed the grant of a two-year tenth in 1272.

As was usually the case with such large crusades, various contingents departed at different times. Led by Jaume I, the Aragonese left first, as already described earlier in this chapter. Edward left England in August 1270, but by then the crusade was already set for failure. Louis had already sailed from France on July 2, a month later than he had intended.

The original plan had been to sail to Latin-ruled Cyprus, but at Cagliari in July 1270, Louis announced that the crusade would be directed at Tunis and initiated several days of consultation on the matter with leading allies. His announcement was a surprise to everyone except his brother, Charles of Anjou, and their advisers. Why did Louis and Charles want to crusade at Tunis, and why did their allies and leading nobles ultimately

agree? It is much easier to answer the latter question. Michael Lower has convincingly outlined a number of reasons why Louis' and Charles' nobles and allies, consulted at Cagliari in July 1270, may have found the proposal appealing and reasonable. Tunis was known to be rich, relatively nonconfrontational, and closer to home. If one wrongly believed that the emir of Tunis was closely allied with Baybars—he was not—then it was also possible to see a crusade to Tunis as the start of an ongoing campaign aimed ultimately at the Mamluks.[9]

The question of what motivated Louis IX and his brother Charles of Anjou remains ultimately unanswerable. The plans made were kept secret, Louis died on the crusade, and Charles left no records of their private counsels. As Lower explains, from the time of the crusade onward, two main theories have been put forth by European sources to explain Tunis: either financial gain sought by Charles or spiritual advantage through conversion sought by Louis. Louis' confessor, Geoffrey of Beaulieu, stated that Louis was attracted by the chance of converting the emir of Tunis, who had let it be known that he would be baptized provided that he had the support of a Christian army. There had, in fact, been a Tunisian embassy in Paris in the autumn of 1269. Taking the broader Mediterranean context and Arabic sources into account, Lower has persuasively argued that Tunis was a target that allowed both brothers to pursue the goals that mattered the most to them. Their respective goals were not seen as antithetical since both ultimately supported the success of Latin Christendom; "the crusade was not about money or souls; it was about money and souls."[10]

The crusade fleet gathered off Cagliari in southern Sardinia and the crusaders landed in Tunis without serious opposition on July 18, camping around a fort built on the site of ancient Carthage. They settled down to wait for the arrival of Charles of Anjou, but in the summer heat dysentery or typhus swept through the camp. The king's eldest son Philip was dangerously ill. His youngest, John Tristan, who had been born at Damietta, perished. Louis himself succumbed to sickness and on August 25 he passed away, stretched out penitentially on a bed of ashes.

Charles of Anjou arrived on that very day and soon decided that the crusade should withdraw. On November 1, 1270, he ratified a treaty drawn up with the emir of Tunis, from which he personally derived most benefit: one-third of a war indemnity the Tunisians agreed to pay, together with a renewal and augmentation of tribute and of Sicilian trading rights, and the promise of expulsion from Tunisia of Hohenstaufen exiles who were fomenting trouble. Responses to the treaty in both camps were mixed, with some on either side criticizing their leaders' willingness to make terms. However, others on both sides supported the pragmatic measures that were arguably preferable to ongoing warfare. Even for the emir of Tunis, who arguably lost the most by the treaty, there were benefits; he used the presence of external enemies to quell internal resistance and consolidate his rule.[11] And while Charles of Anjou benefited from the crusade, the French royal family arguably did not; Lower has asserted that it "nearly broke the Capetian dynasty."[12]

On November 11, the crusaders left for Sicily. They carried with them the remains of Louis, whose body had been immediately dismembered. His heart was left in Africa

with the remnant of the army. His entrails were deposited in the cathedral of Monreale in Sicily at Charles' request. His bones were brought back to France by his son, Philip III, who led a long solemn procession that wound its way through the Italic Peninsula to the Alps and beyond before reaching Paris. After a funeral mass in Notre Dame, Louis' bones were interred in the abbey of St. Denis. Miracles were reported occurring in the course of the journey home to Paris, and they multiplied at the tomb, to which the sick pilgrimaged in increasing numbers.

Edward I of England reached North Africa the day before the crusade left and, although he was not happy with what he found, he sailed with Charles of Anjou and Philip III of France to Sicily, through a storm off Trapani that did great damage to the fleet. He voyaged on to the eastern Mediterranean at the end of April 1271, accompanied by only 200–300 knights and *c.* 600 infantry, and disembarked at Acre on May 9. The English remained inactive while the Mamluks took the Teutonic Knights' castle of Montfort, but on July 12 they raided into Galilee and in November, together with local troops and another body of crusaders under Edward I's brother Edmund, who had reached the area in September, they tried to take the Mamluk castle of Qaqun near Caesarea. They surprised a large force nearby, but withdrew at the approach of a Mamluk army and any further action was prevented by a ten-year truce, which was agreed between Baybars and the Kingdom of Jerusalem in April 1272. There was little Edward could now do. His brother left Acre in May. On June 16, Edward was severely injured when one of his servants tried to assassinate him. For a time he was too ill to move, but he eventually left for home and the throne of England on September 22.

The Mamluk Conquest of the Crusader States

After the Mamluks defeated the Mongols at 'Ayn Jalut in 1260, the Latin settlers had found their hinterland in the possession of two powerful and opposing forces, the Mongols and the Mamluks, with the borderlands between them in the region north of Baghdad. Baghdad itself was in ruins. The trade routes were in chaos. At the same time the unification of Asia under the Mongols ultimately provided the opportunity for the development of new routes to and from East Asia. Two of these routes were to be important until late in the fourteenth century. One passed from the port of Hormuz (Hormoz) on the Persian Gulf to Tabriz, after which it divided, with one branch going to Trebizond on the Black Sea, the other bending south to Ayas in Cilicia, which in the late thirteenth century became an important port with direct links to Famagusta in Cyprus. The other passed through Central Asia north of the Caspian Sea to a group of ports at the northern end of the Black Sea: Azov, Feodosiya, Sudak and Balaklava. This was the second major shift in Asiatic overland trade routes in a century.

The central consequences of this second shift were even more profound than had been those of the first, and all served to undermine the crusader states from the inside out. The first major consequence was the development of "trade wars" between the city-states of Genoa and Venice. The eyes of these merchants began to turn from the

eastern Mediterranean to the Black Sea and competition bred tension among them. Constantinople, which controlled the narrow channel from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean, took on a new importance, and its reconquest by the Palaiologoi in July 1261 undermined the Venetians, who had been active in the Black Sea since 1204. Earlier in the year, the Byzantine emperor Mikhael VIII Palaiologos had signed a treaty with the Genoese that theoretically gave them much the same privileges as the Venetians had had in the Latin Empire. The Genoese never fully enjoyed the rights they had been promised—in 1264, they were temporarily banished from Constantinople—but they got a quarter at Pera, across the Golden Horn from the city, and they gained access to the Black Sea. As a result, the war fleets of both Genoa and Venice were now regularly sent to the Aegean and in the 1260s naval warfare between them spread throughout the eastern Mediterranean. Peace was only made in 1270, mainly because Louis IX insisted on having a fleet for the crusade he was planning. But Genoa was embarking on a period of expansion and this meant further warfare, both with Pisa, which spilled into the eastern Mediterranean in the 1280s, and with Venice, which broke out toward the end of the century.

An early manifestation of this bitter rivalry was urban warfare tearing through the streets of Acre from 1256 to 1258. The conflict, known as the War of St. Sabas because it was sparked off by a dispute between the Venetians and Genoese over some property belonging to the monastery of St. Sabas, involved so many individuals and institutions that it took on some of the features of a civil war. Venice and Genoa, and also Pisa, which began by supporting Genoa but went over to Venice in 1257, sent out fleets and soldiers. Siege engines were set up in the streets and various quarters were fortified. The residents of the city found themselves drawn onto one side or the other. Nobles also were divided, reflecting in many cases long histories of differences between individual lords and the merchant communities. Most leading nobles favored the Genoese, but an important faction under John of Jaffa, who had been regent when the war broke out, favored the Venetians and engineered another change of regencies, bringing in the child Hugh of Cyprus, whose mother Plaisance took over the government and swung it onto Venice's side. The war was only settled in June 1258 when a sea-battle between enormous Venetian and Genoese fleets ended with the Genoese losing half their galleys and *c.* 1,700 combatants dead or taken prisoner. The Genoese decided to abandon Acre and concentrate in Tyre, while the Venetians took over their part of the city.

The second major consequence of the shift in overland trade routes was a sharp decline in the volume of goods passing through Latin-ruled ports on the coast. Signs of financial strain were soon evident. For example, in the late 1250s, Julian, lord of Sidon, began to give away parts of his lordship to the Teutonic Knights and in 1260 he leased the rest of it to the Templars. He was a heavy gambler, but in addition, his territory had long been chipped away by local competitors. The last straw seems to have been a pre-1260 Mongol raid that penetrated Sidon itself and destroyed the town walls which he could not afford to have rebuilt. Similarly, in 1261, Balian of Arsuf leased his lordship to the Hospitallers. Indeed, given the costs of fortification and garrisoning, it is surprising that so many lords held on to their fiefs for so long. As Steven Tibble has pointed out, the fact that Sidon and

Arsuf were disposed of may simply mean that they were the only lordships with enough assets to still be attractive to potential lessees like the military orders.

Simultaneously, conflict between political factions continued to undermine the crusader states. Although factional infighting was certainly not new to the crusader states, these conflicts intensified in the later thirteenth century, in large part due to political and economic changes in the region. This intensified infighting constitutes the third major consequence of the changes in Asia.

To begin, Latin settlers divided over the policy to adopt toward their enemies. Some chose to ally with the Mongols of the nascent Ilkhanate, led by Hulagu Khan, Chinggis Khan's third son. For example, Bohemond VI of Jerusalem and Antioch-Tripoli joined his father-in-law Hetoum of Cilician Armenia in seeking alliance and entered Damascus with Hulagu's armies in March 1260. Bohemond was able to increase his holdings as a result. Other leading Latins chose to ally with the Mamluks, such as the government in Acre, which allowed the Mamluk sultan Qutuz to camp outside the city for three days before the Battle of 'Ayn Jalut and provisioned his army.

Furthermore, individual lords often went their own way. In the 1250s, John of Jaffa appears to have had his county excluded from a truce with Damascus, and in 1261 and 1263 he, together with John of Beirut and Hospitaller Arsuf, made truces with Baybars. He was even prepared to allow Jaffa to be used as a supply point for the Mamluk field army. In 1269 Isabella of Beirut made a treaty with Baybars which enabled her to defy a demand from the king to remarry in 1275. Separate truces with Sultan Qalawun, who had usurped the Mamluk throne in 1279, were made by the Templars in 1282 and 1283 and by Margaret of Tyre in 1285. These lords were, of course, exercising their rights, but the large number of independent treaties shows how weak the central government of the Kingdom of Jerusalem had become.

In fact not only the Kingdom of Jerusalem but all the Latin settlements were hopelessly split into factions. The county of Tripoli offers an excellent example of this phenomenon. It was divided into parties, one of which, made up of Italian settlers and known as the "Roman faction," had been introduced by Bohemond V's wife Lucienne of Segni, Pope Innocent III's great-niece, and was headed by her brother, Bishop Paul of Tripoli. It had grown in influence during the rule of her son Bohemond VI. When Bohemond VII came from Cilician Armenia to take over the government in 1277, he found his rule opposed by this party and by the Templars. They were soon joined by Guy II Embriaco, the lord of Jubail, who had been estranged by Bohemond's refusal to permit the marriage of his brother to a local heiress. For six years the county of Acre suffered a civil war, which ended only when Bohemond immured Guy of Jubail, his brothers John and Baldwin, and a relation called William in a pit and left them to starve to death.

Meanwhile, competition for the crown of Jerusalem remained prominent and decidedly detrimental. This was complicated by the fact that the thrones of Cyprus and Jerusalem were now linked. On the 1246 death of Alice of Champagne—eldest daughter of Isabella I of Jerusalem—the regency of Jerusalem passed to her son King Henry I of Cyprus, but Henry died in 1253, leaving a minor heir, Hugh II, who was granted

the regency of Jerusalem on behalf of the new minor king, Conradin. Being a minor himself, Hugh needed a regent for his minority regency and this office was taken by his mother, Plaisance of Antioch, until she died in 1261. We have already discussed how these developments directly contributed to civil war in Acre.

The brain-scrambling complications of the regency and succession of Jerusalem, with all the opportunities they provided for legal chicanery, were compounded by the fact that the regents were themselves often absentees and so appointed their own lieutenants. Meanwhile, if there were any fissures between formal regencies, vassal regents stepped in. In the 1260s, the regency and ultimately the throne wound up disputed by three claimants, all cousins of one degree or another: Hugh of Brienne, the son of Alice of Cyprus' eldest daughter; Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan, the son of Alice's younger daughter; and Maria of Antioch, Alice's niece through her younger sister Melisende. Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan married his step-sister, Isabella I's third daughter Alice of Champagne, and the crowns were reunited in their grandson, Hugh III of Cyprus and I of Jerusalem, who succeeded to Cyprus in 1267 and to Jerusalem in 1269.

The accession to the throne of Jerusalem of Hugh III of Cyprus in 1269—the first resident king of the bloodline since Baldwin V in 1186—did not go unchallenged. His aunt, Maria of Antioch, had claimed the throne as the nearer heiress to Isabella I, the last ruler actually present in the region. Maria's legal case was stronger than Hugh's, but the High Court of Jerusalem preferred to overlook it in favor of that of a man who was already king of Cyprus and was younger. Maria appealed to Rome, where her case was being heard by 1272.

Hugh, meanwhile, found it almost impossible to actually govern what remained of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. He tried to act with authority. He may have insisted on the right of his court to deal with cases relating to Italian property outside the communal quarters. He was determined not to sanction automatically various distributions of resources made during the years of regency. There are even signs of administrative development in the emergence of an inner council and the use of a privy seal. But at the same time, he faced insubordination, such as Isabella of Beirut's refusal to marry, and hostility from the Templars, whose new grand master, William of Beaujeu, was related to the French royal family and, therefore, to Charles of Anjou.

Hugh must have known that Charles, whose strength in the eastern Mediterranean region was now formidable, was preparing to enforce his claims. Charles was backed by the papacy, the Templars, the Venetians and, very important, by the soldiers provided by France on whom the Kingdom of Jerusalem had come increasingly to rely since their contingent had first been stationed in Acre in 1254. Indeed, the captains of these soldiers had been incorporated into the political establishment by being granted the kingdom's seneschalcy *ex officio*.

Charles of Anjou's strength must have seemed a lifeline to many of the Latin settlers. In October 1276 Hugh III left suddenly, stating that the Kingdom of Jerusalem was ungovernable. Maria of Antioch, whose case was being heard in Rome, then offered to sell the crown to Charles on the advice of the Templars. Her case was withdrawn from the Roman curia in 1276 and the sale of the crown to Charles was completed in

March 1277. In September 1277, his vicar, Roger of San Severino, arrived and claimed the government on his behalf. This could have been met with the defiant appeals to law and custom that Frederick II had encountered, particularly as Roger threatened to exile and disinherit any who stood up to him. But, in fact, there was very little resistance from the vassals of Jerusalem. The baronial movement, which had given rise to such splendid theories and had put up such dogged opposition to royal rule in the past, ended with a whimper.

The Kingdom of Jerusalem was now part of an eastern Mediterranean conglomerate that could be expected to have the resources to support it, and Charles of Anjou took over responsibility for the French regiment in Acre. But Angevin government was not accepted everywhere in the Latin settlements and in the period from 1277 to 1286 there were more divisions than ever. And then the externally supported rebellion known as the "Sicilian Vespers" was followed by Charles' death and the crumbling of Angevin power, as already described.

In the aftermath, Latin opinion in the eastern Mediterranean veered back in favor of the Cypriot royal house and the new king of France, Philip IV, realistically decided to jettison the Angevins in favor of the Cypriot Lusignans and to resume the funding of the French regiment. On June 4, 1286, Henry II of Cyprus landed at Acre and on August 15 he was crowned king of Jerusalem in the cathedral of Tyre, which had become the traditional location for coronations. The court returned to Acre for a fortnight's feasting, games and pageants, including scenes from the story of the Round Table and the tale of the queen of Femenie from the Romance of Troy.

Meanwhile, efforts to launch another major crusade in support of the crusader states in the eastern Mediterranean had resumed. Tedaldo Visconti, who had travelled to Acre in the summer of 1270, had been elected pope in the following year by cardinals who expressed the hope that he would do all in his power to save the Holy Land. He adopted the papal name of Gregory X. Before taking up office he preached a sermon on the text from Psalm 136 (137), 5–6: "If I forget thee, O Jerusalem." In a letter to Edward of England, who was still in Acre, he told how he had hurried directly to the papal curia at Viterbo, not even stopping at Rome, so as to begin work on bringing aid to the Holy Land immediately. Even before he had been consecrated, he sent a letter to Philip IV of France with a proposal for fitting out an expedition.

Gregory X felt, in fact, as obsessively about crusading as Innocent III had done. His first act at Viterbo was to summon a conference of cardinals and of men familiar with conditions in the eastern Mediterranean and it was at this gathering that he decided to convoke a new general council with the familiar twofold aim of reforming Christendom and promoting a crusade, which he would lead himself. He tried to prepare carefully for this, the Second Council of Lyon, by calling for written advice from the clergy, and during it, on May 18, 1274, he issued the *Constitutiones pro zelo fidei*, the most imposing crusade document since the *Ad liberandam* constitution of 1215.

Pro zelo fidei contains many elements found in earlier decrees, especially *Ad liberandam*, but it was also innovative, particular in regards to fund-raising. A six-year tenth was to be levied on the whole church, with exemptions only granted on the strictest

conditions. Christendom was to be divided into twenty-six districts staffed by collectors and sub-collectors. Every temporal ruler was to be asked to impose a capitation tax of one silver penny *tournois* a year within his dominions; this was obviously influenced by Gregory IX's attempted levy of 1235.

Gregory X's aim was to build up a huge financial reserve to fund crusades and had he lived a really major enterprise might have been mounted. Tremendous efforts culminated at the council in the formal reconciliation of the Latin and Byzantine Churches and the promise from the Byzantine emperor Mikhael VIII Palaiologos to do all in his power to help the coming crusade. In 1275, the kings of France and Sicily took the cross. So did Rudolf of Habsburg in return for Gregory's agreement to crown him Western emperor. The plan was for the pope to crown Rudolf in Rome on February 2, 1277, and then, in April, the pope and the emperor would leave together for the eastern Mediterranean. There was even discussion with the Byzantines about their proposal for the crusade to follow the path of the First Crusade in order to reconquer the Anatolian Peninsula on the way.

Gregory X had been planning an immensely ambitious crusade, but he died on January 10, 1276. The huge sums collected for crusading in the eastern Mediterranean were spent instead on crusades against papal opponents, as already discussed. Although proposals for large-scale expeditions would still be put forward—Edward I of England bombarded the papacy with them from 1284 to 1293—small parties, instead, sailed to help the Kingdom of Jerusalem and the French regiment stationed there in its last years. For example, on June 18, 1287, Countess Alice of Blois landed at Acre with a small crusade that included Count Florent of Holland. It was followed in 1288 by a force under John of Grailly and in 1290 by others: of Englishmen under Odo of Grandson and of north Italian crusaders under the bishop of Tripoli.

Obviously, the sudden deaths of Pope Gregory X (1276) and Charles of Anjou (1285) played a role in forestalling major crusade efforts. Another major obstacle to such efforts was the increasing complexity, viciousness and cost of interstate disputes in Europe. Still another was the prevalence of the view that great crusades could be counterproductive. They were difficult to raise, provision, and control, and could be expected to do little long-term good, since they would conquer but not permanently settle territory. What was needed, many believed, was a strengthening of the permanent garrison in the Kingdom of Jerusalem and this explains the money sent eastward in these years by the papacy, France, and to a lesser extent England. The popes, especially, had pinned their hopes on Charles of Anjou and the integration of the Kingdom of Jerusalem into an eastern Mediterranean "empire" that would be able to defend it, especially since it had the backing of France. But the gamble had failed. It would probably have failed anyway with the diversion of Charles' interests toward the conquest of Albania and even the Byzantine Empire. But reality had certainly dawned by 1286, with the crusades against the Sicilians and Aragonese going badly, and Charles dead and his heir a prisoner of the Aragonese.

Meanwhile the Mamluks had begun to advance again. They faced Latin settlements weakened not only by insufficient garrisoning, but also, and relatedly, by internal

Map 11 The Eastern Mediterranean, *c.* 1300.

competition and infighting, and by unlucky alliances. A series of Mamluk conquests unfolded: the great Hospitaller castle of Marqab and the town of Maraqiyya in 1285; Latakia in 1287; the city of Tripoli in 1289. The Mamluk army moved on to occupy Enfeh and Batroun. All that was left of the county of Tripoli were the important Templar fortress of Tartus and the town of Jubail, now held by a cousin of the counts of Tripoli who had married the lord's daughter. He and the Latin residents of Jubail were allowed to remain there under Mamluk supervision until perhaps 1302.

The Latins in Acre sent urgently to Europe for help. Twenty Venetian and five Aragonese galleys arrived with crusaders in August 1290. A truce for ten years had been arranged with Qalawun, but he was presented with a justification for breaking it when the crusaders massacred Muslim peasants who had come into Acre to sell local produce. Qalawun died on 4 November, but his son al-Ashraf Khalil continued with the preparations. In March 1291 his forces marched north toward Acre, joined on their march by contingents from all over the Mamluk dominions. By early April a huge army with an impressive siege train arrived before Acre. By early May the outer fortifications were becoming so damaged that they had to be abandoned and a general assault on the eighteenth overwhelmed the defenders. Henry II of Jerusalem, who had reached the city on the fourth, and his brother Amalric escaped by ship to Cyprus, as did several nobles and their families, but insufficient thought had been given to the evacuation of the population, and large numbers of citizens perished. By the evening the only part of Acre still in Latin hands was the Templar fortress-convent by the sea. Negotiations for its surrender broke down. The Mamluks mined the building and when on the twenty-eighth al-Ashraf Khalil ordered an assault it collapsed, burying defenders and attackers alike in its fall.

Tyre had already been abandoned by its Latin leaders on May 19. Sidon was taken at the end of June, although its sea-castle held out until July 14. Beirut surrendered on July 31 and Tartus and 'Atlit were evacuated by the Templars on August 3 and 14. The crusader states on the eastern Mediterranean coast had been conquered. This moment has long been painted in melodramatic colors in Western historiography and primary sources attest to the real grief it caused at the time within various Christian communities. But we should also recognize that Latin military and political presence in the eastern Mediterranean had not ended: a Templar garrison remained on the island of Arwad; Jubail was occupied; and the kingdom of Cyprus remained strong.

CHAPTER 10
REIMAGINED, 1300–70

The idea that crusading faded away after 1300 is still prevalent in popular culture and nonspecialist historical works. A quick examination of the history of Afro-Eurasia in the fourteenth century would make this seem likely. Between 1300 and 1370, a changing global climate led in Europe to devastating floods, famines, and animal diseases. In addition, the initial phase of the second plague pandemic, known as the Black Death, swept Afro-Eurasia in the mid-fourteenth century. One might think these phenomena would divert energy, time, and material resources away from crusading.

However, the crusading movement was still very much alive, indeed thriving, in the fourteenth century. The papal curia was as committed as ever and there was scarcely a year in the fourteenth century in which there was not crusading somewhere. Monarchs, lords, and other lay leaders also continued to propose, lead, and engage in crusades. As before, crusading served not only to bring together Latin Christians but also as a tool in ongoing competitions for dominance within Latin Christendom. Crusades against papal adversaries, now accompanied by charges of heresy, continued. Many monarchs successfully linked crusading to national identities and ambitions. And as before, crusades were waged against a range of different targets and in a wide geographical range.

Thus, many crusade enthusiasts were being presented with the same options that had been available to their ancestors, and like their ancestors, they could crusade in different times and places throughout their careers. If we look at English noblemen and gentry as an example, many were involved in a range of these enterprises, including, at the lower end of the social scale, Nicholas Sabraham, who had crusaded to Alexandria, Hungary, Constantinople, and Nesebur by the end of his life. The career of Chaucer's Knight, who had "reysed" in Prussia, Lithuania, and Russia and had campaigned in Spain, Egypt, and Asia Minor, was, like all good caricatures, close to the truth.

> He was very worthy in his lord's war,
> And for that he had ridden, no man farther,
> As well in Christendom as in heathen lands,
> And was ever honored for his worthiness.
> He was at Alexandria when it was won.
> He had sat very many times in the place of honour,
> Above (knights of) all nations in Prussia;
> He had campaigned in Lithuania and in Russia,
> No Christian man of his rank so often.
> Also he had been at Granada at the siege

Of Algeciras, and had ridden in Morocco.
He was at Ayash and at Atalia,
When they were won, and in the Mediterranean
He had been at many a noble expedition.
He had been at fifteen mortal battles,
And fought for our faith at Tlemcen.
Three times in formal duels, and each time slain his foe.
This same worthy knight had also been
At one time with the lord of Balat
Against another heathen in Turkey;
And evermore he had an outstanding reputation.[1]

It used to be thought that crusading enthusiasm was increasingly confined to nobles, defined in the broadest sense, who lived by a code of manners in which crusading ideals played an important part. Crusading armies certainly seem to have become more "professional," in the sense that they were more disciplined, due to the employment of mercenaries and the use of contracts for service. These tactics were made possible by the large sums being raised through the taxation of the Latin Church, although it was common for Latin monarchs to make false declarations about their intentions in order to get their hands on the funds. But crusading interest continued to be seen across social classes and there were moments of truly widespread popular enthusiasm, perhaps especially in the 1320s and 1330s. At the same time, we can also perceive weariness, demoralization, and a waning of enthusiasm in those parts of Latin Christendom that did not directly benefit from crusading.

Notwithstanding all these continuities, we can also identify changes to crusading in the fourteenth century. In some cases, these changes appear more like escalations. For example, while order-states had already emerged in northern Europe, in the fourteenth century we see the practice adopted elsewhere, most notably on Rhodes. Many blamed the military orders for the loss of Acre and faced with this criticism, some orders, like the Templars, were dissolved, while others, like the Hospitallers, found a way forward. The logistical and leadership problems involved in undertaking massive, multi-state crusades, combined with increasing nationalism and state power, led to the creation of "crusade leagues." And artists, poets, theologians, historians, and theorists, many outside the papal curia and not subject to its views, reimagined what crusades should be like and their place in the Latin Christian worldview.

Crusading in the Eastern Mediterranean

Crusading in the eastern Mediterranean at the start of the fourteenth century was driven by two related goals: the reestablishment of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, which required crushing the Mamluk Sultanate; and the defense of the remaining Latin settlements, particularly against privateering from the Turkic emirates of Menteshe and Aydin.

Both goals meant that crusading warfare in the eastern Mediterranean became very largely naval. After the dissolution of the Templars early in the fourteenth century and the subsequent ascendancy of the Hospitallers, the Hospitallers would come to play a leading role in virtually every Mediterranean crusade. Yet, as before, crusading in the eastern Mediterranean was interconnected with crusades elsewhere and with the broader religious, political, and economic dynamics of Latin Christendom. The two goals just described thus resulted not only in discrete military expeditions but also in a reorganization of the major military orders as well as further Latinization and the establishment of a new order-state on Rhodes.

Criticism and Adaptation of the Military Orders

Early in the morning of October 13, 1307, nearly every Templar in France was arrested on the charge of heresy and within a matter of days many of them, including the grand master, James of Molay, and his chief representative in the region, Hugh of Pairaud, had acknowledged their guilt. The vast majority of the brothers interrogated by the inquisitor in Paris, by Pope Clement V at Poitiers in the summer of 1308, by French bishops in regional inquiries, and by a papal commission that sat in Paris also admitted that many of the charges were true. Elsewhere, interrogations of a small number of Templars in various parts of the Italic Peninsula produced more evidence. In England, there were very few confessions, although outside witnesses were more forthcoming. In Castile, Portugal, and Cyprus, and in Aragon and the German states where some of them resisted arrest, the Templars protested their innocence.

Box 10.1 The Charges against the Templars

That they were actively not Christian. At their reception, they were called upon to deny Christ—sometimes being told he was a false prophet who could not redeem mankind—and to spit, stamp, or urinate upon a cross or crucifix. That they did not believe in the sacraments of the church and their priests were forbidden to say the words of consecration during the canon of the Mass. Instead they venerated heads or idols of various sorts (or even diabolical cats) and the cords they were accustomed to wear, which seem to have been similar to scapulars, had been laid on a head or idol before being given to them. That they hid their infidelity under a cloak of strict secrecy, since they were not allowed to reveal their modes of reception, the debates in their chapters or even their own rule and were forbidden to confess to any but their own priests. Their deceit was compounded by the fact that their officers, although lay brothers, were in the habit of absolving them from their sins and in this had usurped the sacramental role and canonical prerogative of priests. That at reception, postulants were forced to kiss their receptors, or to be kissed, not only on the mouth but also on the bare stomach, the base of the

spine, the posterior, and even the penis, and were told that although their vows of celibacy meant that they should have no sexual relations with women they could, if need be, have them with other brothers. They should suffer the attentions of these brothers if they desired them. That they had no novitiate. That they were encouraged to augment the Order's goods with no thought for justice. On the other hand, they were miserly in the granting of alms to the poor and did not practice hospitality. That the senior brothers had done nothing to reform the Order.

The charges of heresy laid against the brothers placed Pope Clement V in a delicate position. From one perspective, their arrest was an attack on the Latin Church, an unprecedented denial of the right of professed religious to ecclesiastical justice, particularly since they were members of an order under the protection of the papacy. But at the same time, corruption—if true—would also undermine the church, and furthermore, the support of the French monarchy was a sine qua non for Clement's crusading ambitions. Clement was not in a position of strength in 1308. The pontificate of Boniface VIII had ended only five years before with the pope dying of shock after being kidnapped by troops led by a minister of the French crown. The papacy had been trying to appease France in the intervening years, but Clement, a Gascon and therefore born a French-speaking subject of the king of England, was having to fight off the determined efforts of the French government to have Boniface posthumously condemned. Rome was considered too insecure for residence and, after his election in June 1305, Clement lived at Poitiers before moving his court to Avignon in 1309, initiating the period known as the Avignon Papacy (1309–77).

The Avignon Papacy is conventionally viewed as a time when the papacy was dominated by the monarchs of France, but the situation was not that simple. Clement V wanted and needed the involvement of Philip IV of France in crusading efforts, but also quite clearly desired to maintain some semblance of papal independence. It is even possible that Clement V was aware of the charges to be laid against the Templars before his official involvement as pope. In 1304–5, as Archbishop Bertrand of Bordeaux, he had traveled extensively on pastoral visits. During his circuit, he visited three out of the four Templar houses accused in the later papal trial, and a later letter of his claimed that he had heard of rumors against the Templars in France in 1305. He certainly visited with Philip IV and high-ranking officers within the Temple at Poitiers in June 1307, before the French Templars were arrested in October.

In any event, Clement V tried to seize the initiative in the case by establishing an official church inquiry into the allegations. In November 1307, he ordered the arrest of all the brothers outside France. In the following February he suspended the activities of the French Inquisition, although this led to conflict with the French crown. The compromise reached was that throughout Latin Christendom there would be episcopal investigations of individuals, while concurrently church commissioners would look into the performance of the Order as a whole. The reports of these inquiries and commissions

were considered by a church council in 1311, and their initial vote was against the suppression of the Order. But on March 22, 1312, Clement ordered the first iteration of his formal suppression, followed by the papal bull *Vox in excelso*, and by early April 1312 the Council of Vienne formally accepted his declaration. On March 18, 1314, James of Molay and Geoffrey of Charney, the Templar commander of Normandy, were burned at the stake.

The destruction of the Temple has been treated as an example of what early state machinery could do at a time when a crown, short of cash and with its eyes on rich pickings, controlled the Inquisition and when the papacy was on the defensive. As accused heretics, many of the Templars were tortured. All those arrested were put under pressure of various kinds and an attempt at resistance by some of them in 1310 was stifled when, under royal influence, an episcopal tribunal under the archbishop of Sens and a provincial council under the archbishop of Reims had sixty-seven brothers who were maintaining their innocence burned.

In the prior edition of this book, Jonathan Riley-Smith argued that some of the Templars might have been guilty of the charges against them. It now seems clear that there is insufficient evidence to support this conclusion, but Riley-Smith was correct to point out that the inquiries demonstrated just how badly in need of reform and reorganization the Order had become. The Templars appear particularly mismanaged in comparison with the Hospitallers. The Hospitallers had a system of smaller provinces and, therefore, a greater number of senior officials who were in direct and regular communication with the eastern Mediterranean, representative chapters-general which were also legislatures and a coherent body of law, while the Templars had an anachronistic and inefficient system of autocratic management by the grand master and his headquarters. Many Templar brothers had never even heard their Rule read to them and there was no hope whatever of them comprehending the Order's supplementary legislation, even had it been available. It was repetitious, muddled, often archaic, and copied with no distinction being made between statute, case law and custom. It is not surprising that it was not always obeyed. The state of the Order seems to have been so dire that one wonders how long it could have been allowed to remain in existence, with or without the scandal.

It is also clear that Philip IV was not simply a voraciously opportunistic monarch. He was not opposed to military orders on principle and he was a committed and enthusiastic crusader himself. At the same time as he was pressing for the dissolution of the Templars, Philip was backing a crusade to be led by the master of the Hospitallers. Given his dedication to crusade and his willingness to allow Clement V long-term sanctuary in Avignon, his conflict with the Templars cannot be neatly characterized as a temporal ruler seeking to profit at the expense of piety. From Philip's perspective, his determination to root out corruption and to pursue crusade were both aspects of his identity as a Christian monarch. And he did not in fact receive the majority of assets from the liquidation of the Templars.

Furthermore, the Templars were not alone in being severely criticized at this time. All three major military orders active in the eastern Mediterranean were blamed for the Mamluks' successes. By 1291 the proposals for a union of the Templars and Hospitallers,

which had been raised as early as the Second Council of Lyon in 1274, were convincing enough for Pope Nicholas IV to order them to be discussed in all provincial synods. The Teutonic Knights and the Hospitallers must have felt themselves to be very exposed, and rightly so, for serious charges were being brought against them as well.

Bitter complaints were voiced in Livonia against the Teutonic Knights' behavior. The clergy there, over whom the Teutonic Knights did not have the control they had in Prussia, denounced the Knights' despoliation of the church, their brutal treatment of the archbishop and citizens of Riga, their failure to defend Livonia properly, their hindering of missionary work by acts of cruelty, and their internal corruption. The papal curia was worried by these allegations in 1300 and ten years later Pope Clement V ordered a full investigation of the Teutonic Knights, particularly of the charge that the knights were allying themselves with pagans against their fellow Latin Christians. The Teutonic Knights survived the Livonian scandal, but the final verdict of the Church of Rome in 1324 was critical of them.

The Hospitallers of St. John were also in need of reform, even if they seem to have been better managed than the Templars. The fourteenth century was punctuated by demands from the popes for the Hospitallers' reform. In 1355, Pope Innocent VI went as far as to threaten to reform them himself if they would not make the necessary changes, and internal inquiries in the 1360s and 1370s revealed a very unsatisfactory state of affairs.

Nevertheless, both the Teutonic Order and the Hospital survived, and there is no evidence of a decline in their recruitment. In the case of the Hospitallers, an important reason seems to have been that they had a continuing commitment to the poor and to nursing the sick and were, therefore, locked into conventional patterns of religious life and thought in spite of being also "military." Through their practical concern for poor pilgrims they could draw on ancient Christian traditions of charity in ways the Templars could not, a point unconsciously underlined by James of Molay himself. In a memorandum of 1305, he argued against union with the Hospital, which, he wrote, "was founded to care for the sick" whereas the Templars "were founded solely as a company of knights."

But at the heart of critiques of the military orders was their military failure to forestall the Mamluks, and in the short run, both the Teutonic Knights and the Hospitallers recognized that they must be seen to be doing something unquestionably positive. It can be no coincidence that in the same year, 1309, the grand master of the Teutonic Knights took up residence at Marienburg (Malbork) in Prussia and the Hospitallers moved their headquarters to Rhodes. The era of order-states had begun and would continue, at least in the case of Rhodes, into the eighteenth century. Meanwhile, in the Iberian Peninsula, as discussed later herein, new military orders were created and tied even more tightly than before to Latin monarchs.

The Hospitallers on Rhodes

Rhodes was a large and fertile island with a fine harbor. Only 12 miles off the mainland, it dominated one of the most important sea routes in the Mediterranean. It was, in short,

highly desirable. On May 27, 1306, the Hospitallers' master, Fulk of Villaret, whose headquarters were now at Limassol in Cyprus, came to an agreement with a Genoese privateer for the joint conquest of Rhodes and its archipelago. On June 23, a Hospitaller squadron of two galleys and three other vessels, carrying a small force that included thirty-five brothers of the Order, left Cyprus and, joined by Genoese galleys, began an invasion of Rhodes that took much longer than anticipated. The city of Rhodes does not seem to have fallen until three years later in August 1309 and, although the central convent was moved there immediately, the neighboring islands were not completely subjugated for a few years, their occupation assisted by a mini-crusade led by Fulk of Villaret that sailed in 1310.

The Hospitallers' conquest and subsequent governance of Rhodes was assisted by assets formerly held by the Templars. By the bull *Ad providam* of May 2, 1312, the papacy granted the Hospitallers most of the Templars' estates and properties. In the long run this greatly enriched them, although it took them a long time to get control of even a proportion of the lands to which they were entitled. They took over most of those in France in 1317 on the payment of huge indemnities. In England they had still not assumed full possession by 1338. They failed totally in Portugal and Aragon, where the monarchs siphoned off the Templar assets to create the new military orders of Christ and Montesa. By 1324, however, the Hospitallers' landholdings had doubled and the Templar properties helped to finance the defense of Rhodes and their active role in Mediterranean military engagements.

Despite these additional assets, the costs of conquering, fortifying, and establishing an administration on the island saddled the Hospitallers with crippling debts. Their central convent was not solvent until the 1330s and its finances remained precarious, particularly after huge losses sustained in the 1340s when the leading Florentine banking houses collapsed. Money worries help to explain the comparative efficiency with which the Hospitallers were driven to manage their European estates. Their financial concerns, and the fact that Rhodes was far less secure than Prussia, led the papacy to intervene much more frequently in their affairs than in those of the Teutonic Knights, whom they must sometimes have envied.

Rhodes thus became one of two new "order-states." The other was Prussia, which had stabilized circa 1300 after the brutal repression of rebellions. These order-states were theocracies. They were governed by an elite class of soldiers who had taken full religious vows, originated from outside the state's boundaries, and isolated themselves from an indigenous population that was kept at arm's length. For example, families on Rhodes who would otherwise be qualified to provide recruits to the hospital were barred from membership.

Rhodes' population of *c.* 10,000 Byzantine Christians was now joined by Latin Christian colonists who were offered land on favorable terms. The Hospitallers also held the other islands of the Dodecanese, of which the most important was Cos, and looking ahead, after 1408 they would build a large castle at Bodrum on the mainland. Their relations with the indigenous population appear to have been reasonably good, but the city of Rhodes also came to have a large Latin community. The city was strongly

fortified by 1356 and the Hospitallers continued to improve its defenses and those of other strongpoints throughout the Archipelago.

Starting in the early fourteenth century, the Order's navy became the most distinctive feature of its contribution to crusading in the Mediterranean. The Hospitallers had possessed a number of transport ships before 1291, but the decision to have war galleys was made at the bidding of the papacy and the brothers had built a fleet by 1300. On Rhodes, the Order found itself policing the shipping lanes and opposing the Turkic coastal emirates of Menteshe and Aydin and later the rapid expansion of the Ottoman state. It was well situated for offensive operations, and its galleys prowled the sea, protecting Latin merchantmen and contributing to the naval leagues that struggled for mastery of the Mediterranean. Its fleet was comparatively small, consisting at the most of seven or eight galleys, although three was the more usual number. These were rowed by free indigenous islanders and since every brother knight had to serve three *caravans*—naval expeditions of at least six months—to qualify for a commandery in Europe or a captaincy in the navy, every galley carried twenty to thirty ambitious brothers.

The policy of the Hospitallers toward their non-Latin neighbors, while theoretically defensive in accordance with Christian war theology, was highly aggressive in practice. This was demonstrated by the caravans of the Hospitallers in the eastern Mediterranean and by their use of the *corso*, a supplement to maritime operations that resembled licensed piracy with the element of holy war added. Regulated by a special tribunal on Rhodes and later on Malta, this piracy was financed by the Hospitallers and others, with 10 percent of the spoil going to the Order's master.

Other Latin Settlements in the Eastern Mediterranean

The thirteenth-century Aegean was politically fragmented and diverse in terms of culture, religion, and ethnicity. That did not forestall significant crusade enthusiasm, on the one hand, and neither did it ensure prosperity or stability, on the other.

To the southeast of Rhodes was the Latin-ruled kingdom of Cyprus, governed by rulers of the Lusignan dynasty. The island's heyday was the first half of the fourteenth century when it was very prosperous. The city of Famagusta was a hub of commercial activity, linked to the Asiatic trade routes through the smaller ports of the northeast Mediterranean, especially the Cilician port of Ayas until it was occupied by the Mamluks in 1337. Cyprus was now the cultural center of the Latin eastern Mediterranean and the royal palace in Nicosia was described by travelers as being the finest in the world. Some of the luxury and splendor is still discernible in surviving churches and other ecclesiastical buildings. A substantial network of new pilgrimage sites was established on the island, the vast majority of which appealed to multiple religious communities. The Hospitallers had significant land holdings on Cyprus, including particularly lucrative sugar plantations, and from the fourteenth century onward enslaved people were sold from markets at Famagusta and Nicosia.

Many of the survivors of the mainland Latin settlements were now in Cyprus. Indeed, the feudal system in Cyprus, represented at the apex by the High Court in Nicosia, was

strongly influenced by Latin Jerusalem and it overlay, as on the mainland, an earlier administrative apparatus, in this case Byzantine. The constitutional traditions of the mainland were maintained and at first were strong, manifesting themselves in a typical display of ingenuity, in which the Ibelins played a large part, when in 1306 King Henry II was removed from government and replaced by his brother Amalric, who ruled as governor for four years. However, these traditions would gradually fade.

West and northwest of Cyprus were Venetian Crete, the duchy of the Archipelago, and the other island-lordships in the Aegean. The most important were Venetian Euboea; Lesbos, granted to the Genoese by the Byzantines in 1354 and ruled by the Genoese family of Gattilusio; and Chios, the world center for the production of mastic, which had been seized by the Genoese in 1346 together with Foça, a major source of alum on the mainland. The capital city, Candia, was a major center for the transcontinental and interstate trade in enslaved people from the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries.

Mainland Latin settlements on the Peloponnesian Peninsula mirrored the political divisions in the southern Italic Peninsula, some recognizing the Angevin kings of Naples, others the Aragonese kings of Sicily. But these Latin settlements were gravely weakened. Their feudatories were independent and ungovernable. Their disparate allegiances to the Angevins and the Aragonese exacerbated regional conflict. In the south, the Byzantines at Mistra were expanding the area under their control. And as the threat to the region from Turkic emirates slowly grew, the absentee Angevins—Robert, then another Philip of Taranto, then Queen Joanna of Naples herself—could do little to help their subjects, who were increasingly isolated and anarchic.

To the north, after ravaging West Asia and turning against various patrons in quick succession, the Catalan Company, a military band, had seized control of the duchy of Athens in 1311 after the Battle of Halmyros, and sought and accepted overlordship from Federico III, the Aragonese king of Sicily, who appointed his younger son Manfred as Duke of Athens. Under a series of able vicar-generals and fueled primarily by income from the trade in enslaved captives, Athens and Thebes were divided among, and run by, members of the Company in spite of the disapproval of much of Europe and Byzantium, vigorous string pulling by the Brienne family they had ousted, and even the preaching of crusades against them. Manfred's line held the dukedom until the 1350s, when it passed directly to the crown of Sicily.

There was room for these Latin settlements to exist due to broader yet subtle changes in the eastern Mediterranean's political arrangements. The Byzantine Empire, which had seemed poised to thrive once the threat of Charles of Anjou evaporated, in fact, entered a period of decline. The costs of the Palaiologoi ascendancy had to be borne, and the provinces, which were the tax base for the empire, were thus unhappy and gradually pulled away from Constantinople. Meanwhile, in Anatolia, the dissolution of the Sultanate of Rum made way for various small Turkish emirates—one led by the founders of the Ottoman dynasty—to emerge in the region, slowly but surely eating away at the empire's eastern borders. Discontent led to civil war (1341–7), during which both sides made alliances with external Latin and Turkic powers who, perhaps predictably,

pursued their own interests above all else and often kept for themselves the lands they had supposedly retaken for Byzantium.

With the benefit of hindsight, the period from 1300 to 1370 demonstrates the early maneuvers of the Ottomans, who steadily expanded their domains through diplomacy, alliances, and accommodation of local populations, as well as military tactics. They repeatedly allied with Byzantium in the mid-fourteenth century—even if they quietly kept territory gained fighting on their behalf—and during the disastrous civil war, Sultan Orhan had married the Byzantine emperor's daughter, Theodora. When an earthquake weakened Byzantium in 1354, Orhan's son, Suleiman Pasha, took Gallipoli, enabling continued westward expansion.

Crusades in the Eastern Mediterranean

Crusading thrived on disasters and it was typical that with the news of the Mamluk conquest of Acre in 1291, there was a revival of fervor. In 1300, a rumor swept Europe that the Mongols had conquered the Holy Land and handed it over to Latin Christians. Pope Boniface VIII sent "the great and joyful news" to Edward I of England and probably to Philip IV of France as well. He encouraged the faithful to go at once to Jerusalem and he ordered the exiled Latin bishops to return to their sees. Men hurriedly took the cross all over Europe and several noblewomen in Genoa sold their jewelry to help pay for a crusading fleet, although in the end the project was dropped.

After the dispersal of this rumor, the papal curia next wanted to achieve three things: provide aid to Cilician Armenia, which was still holding out against the Mamluks; organize support for Latin settlements in the Peloponnese; and above all to enforce an economic blockade of the Mamluk Sultanate. Most people at the time agreed that such a blockade was a necessary prelude to a crusade to take the Holy Land. From Boniface VIII's pontificate onward popes regularly promulgated decrees relating to the blockade. Clement V authorized the Hospitallers on Rhodes to capture the vessels of Latin merchants trading with the Mamluks and confiscate their cargoes. Strict embargoes were imposed from the early 1320s, when it was laid down that Latin merchants who infringed them were to be excommunicated. These measures were accompanied by direct approaches to Latin trading communities, which were often persuaded to legislate for their merchants in the way the popes wanted.

The effectiveness of the blockade has been debated. Ports such as Ayas, which could act as intermediaries between merchants despite the embargo, grew in importance, but direct trading with Muslim-ruled trade centers continued, if on a reduced scale. When the trade routes across Asia came to be temporarily disrupted by plague and opportunistic challenges to Mongol rule in the 1340s, badly affecting Black Sea traffic, Italians insisted that trade relations with the Mamluks be reopened. From 1344 the Holy See, which was beginning to abandon hope for the recovery of the Holy Land, granted licences for such commerce. More important, however, recent scholarship has emphasized that the main goal of papal embargoes was to reinforce the centrality of the papacy in Latin Christendom, and to influence, rather than completely control, Mediterranean trade.[2]

The Latin Empire of Constantinople had disintegrated and ultimately been conquered by the Byzantine Palaiologos dynasty in 1261, but dreams of reviving it survived into the fourteenth century. After the death of Pope Boniface VIII in 1303, growing French influence on the curia manifested itself in support for Charles of Valois, Philip IV's brother. In 1301, Charles of Valois had married Catherine of Courtenay, the recognized heiress of the failed Latin Empire, and they wanted to defeat the Palaiologoi and reestablish it. In 1306 the collection of crusade tenths in France, Sicily, and Naples was authorized in favor of retaking the Latin Empire and in 1307 crusade preaching was ordered in the Italic Peninsula. Ultimately, Charles delayed so long that the coalition of powers against the Byzantine Empire on which he was relying collapsed.

In the meantime, Pope Clement V had been considering the preaching of a large-scale crusade with the purpose of recovering the Latin settlements in West Asia. The attitude of the French, and the Templar scandal, meant that this could only be a long-term goal. So he turned to the organization of a smaller crusade of 5,000 troops, which was to remain in the eastern Mediterranean for five years under the command of the Hospitaller master in order to defend Cyprus and Cilicia and prevent Latin merchants engaging in illicit trading. However, King Jaume II of Aragon's crusade against Granada, planned at the same time and discussed more herein, was siphoning off potential recruits.

That said, it is indicative of the general enthusiasm for crusades in the eastern Mediterranean that large numbers of rural and urban poor in England, Flanders, northern France, and the German states took the cross and gathered in disorderly groups in the spring and summer of 1309. It was said that 30,000–40,000 of them arrived at Avignon demanding a general passage. Ultimately, the expedition that sailed from Brindisi early in 1310 did little more than help consolidate the Hospitaller occupation of Rhodes. In the years after 1310, the papacy was still concerned about the future of Latin settlements in the Peloponnese. The papal see granted Philip of Taranto—husband of Catherine of Valois, the daughter of Charles of Valois and Catherine of Courtenay and rightful heir to the Latin Empire—crusade tenths and indulgences. In addition, crusades in favor of the Brienne pretenders to the dukedom of Athens against the Catalan Company were approved, one as late as 1330.

But with the accession of Pope John XXII in 1316, and driven by crusade enthusiasm growing in France, crusading to West Asia again came to the forefront of curial planning. Philip IV of France had already agreed to prepare a crusade at the council of Vienne in 1312 and a six-year tenth had been levied on the whole Latin Church, of which the French contribution, increased for a seventh year, had been conceded directly to the king. At Whitsun 1313, at a great assembly held in Paris to witness the knighting of his sons, Philip himself, his sons and his son-in-law King Edward II of England had all taken the cross.

By the 1320s, crusade enthusiasm was widespread in France. In 1320, there was another popular movement of "shepherd" crusaders. Philip IV had died, but his son Philip V was committed to the project of a crusade to West Asia. To assist him, Pope John not only confirmed a new four-year tenth to be levied on the French Church, but also made a four-year grant of *annates*. This was followed in 1318 by another two-year

tenth. The French crown had been given eleven years of tenths and four years of *annates* since 1312 and the tenths alone would have raised 2,750,000 pounds *tournois*.

Rebellion in Flanders held back Philip V of France and, with Cilicia again under threat, the various parties began to think of another smaller crusade to be led by Louis I, Duke of Bourbon and a trusted royal advisor. But in 1319, John XXII diverted the naval vanguard of this crusade to crusades against imperial adversaries. Philip V, who was a committed crusader, left 100,000 pounds in his will to a future crusade and might well have gone on crusade if he had not fallen mortally sick in 1321. Over the winter of 1319–20, he held a number of assemblies, to some of which he summoned many old warhorses from the provinces to advise him.

In January 1323, the new king of France, Charles IV, formulated another detailed proposal, this time for a three-part crusade: a "first passage" (*primum passagium)*, to sail at once to the aid of Cilicia; a "preliminary passage" (*passagium particulare)* in the following year or soon afterward; and, in the very long term, a "general passage" (*passagium generale)* to reconquer Jerusalem. Planning ground to a halt over finance, since it was certain that the bulk of the costs would have to be borne by the French Church, which was in no state to take on such a commitment, and it was not until 1328 that King Philip VI, who was another enthusiast, revived the project. In 1331, the pope gave his consent to the preaching of an expedition to leave before March 1334. Philip's plan, which at first took the pope by surprise, was a very ambitious one, involving, again, a three-stage crusade, for which the main French contribution would be to a *passagium generale*. This would leave in August 1336 under the command of the king himself as captain-general of the church. On October 1, 1333, in another great Parisian ceremony held in the meadows near St. Germain-des-Près, Philip and many of his nobles took the cross.

The first of the two preliminary *passagia* was launched in 1334. It constituted a significant development, because the result was a naval league designed to deal with the Turkic emirates of Menteshe and Aydin. This was the first example of a "crusade league." It was built on an agreement drawn up on Rhodes in September 1332 between Venice, the Hospitallers, and the Byzantine emperor Andronikos III to maintain a force of twenty galleys in the region for five years. In the autumn and winter of 1333–4, Philip VI of France, Hugh IV of Cyprus, and the papacy agreed to supply more galleys, bringing the total, at least on paper, to forty. This fleet inflicted a heavy defeat on Turkic forces in the Gulf of Edremit.

The league was also going to be involved in a second *passagium*, a force of 800 men-at-arms under Louis I, Duke of Bourbon, which was to invade West Asia in 1335. Nearly 400 men were to be sent by France and the papacy, 200 by the Hospitallers, and 100 each by Cyprus and the Byzantine Empire, while Venice and Naples would contribute additional shipping. But Pope John XXII died at the end of 1334 and France was edging toward war with England. Under John's successor, Pope Benedict XII, the plans for the second *passagium* were shelved. An attempt was made to revive the naval league, it seems unsuccessfully, although at one point the papacy, the Byzantine Empire, and France were preparing ships. In 1336, the papacy recognized that political

conditions in Europe were so unfavorable that the general passage would have to be canceled as well, although he sent some limited aid to Cilicia. This led to bitter reproaches and disillusionment.

In May 1342, Pope Benedict XII was succeeded by Clement VI, who had been a leader of the French delegation that had negotiated on behalf of Philip VI in the early 1330s. Clement made no plans for a *passagium generale*, the organizing of which would now have been quite impossible, given that France and England were at war and Europe was suffering from a general economic depression. But in its place a new strategy, based on the successes of 1334, was hammered out. Responding to appeals from Venice, Cyprus, and Rhodes, Clement sent a legate to Venice to reconstruct a new naval league against the Turkic emirates, now at their most aggressive. The papacy and Cyprus would each provide four galleys, the Hospitallers and the Venetians six each. The pope paid for his galleys by levying a three-year tenth, later supplemented by another two-year one, on certain provinces of the Latin Church and by crusade preaching to raise money through the administration of indulgences. In the spring of 1344, twenty-four galleys assembled off Euboea. They defeated the Turks at sea and on October 28 took the port of Smyrna, the emirate of Aydin's principal harbor.

The capture of Smyrna led to yet another outburst of crusading enthusiasm in Europe. In response to a setback early in 1345, when the leaders of the crusade were killed in an engagement with the Turks, the dauphin of Viennois, Humbert II, volunteered to defend the beach-head and led an expedition that sailed from Venice in the middle of November. Humbert returned to Europe in 1347 and the league broke up in 1351, by which time Venice was at war with Genoa, which had been granted indulgences to defend its Black Sea station of Feodosiya against the Kipchak Khanate in 1345.

Officially, the crusade league was still in being and jointly responsible for the defense of Smyrna. However, in a Europe coping with the Black Death and against the background of the Hundred Years' War, Pope Innocent VI spent most of his ten-year pontificate trying to revive it. It was not until 1359 that the league was put on a more active footing. Crusade preaching was authorized and a tenth was levied. Peter Thomas, a Carmelite preacher and diplomatist, was appointed legate and with Venetian and Hospitaller ships he won a victory that autumn at Lapseki in the Dardanelles.

Ultimately, though, the idea of a *passagium generale* to Jerusalem was revived in the 1360s by King Peter I of Cyprus. In 1359, the year he succeeded to the throne, Peter used Cypriot ships abstracted from the league to occupy Corycus in Cilicia and in 1361 he captured Antalya. On June 15, 1362, he addressed a circular letter to Europe announcing his intention of leading a crusade to liberate Jerusalem. In October, he set off to raise money in Europe and he met the new pope, Urban V, at the end of March 1363. A *passagium generale* was planned for March 1365. King John II of France was a fervent supporter and took the cross, together with several of his nobles. He was granted a six-year tenth and other revenues and was appointed captain-general, but the Hundred Years' War forestalled him. He died on April 8, 1364, a prisoner of the English, to whom he had surrendered himself when one of the hostages for his ransom after his capture in the Battle of Poitiers had broken his parole.

The dream of a *passagium generale* was clearly unrealistic, given the economic conditions in France. Nonetheless, Peter I of Cyprus, leading what was originally envisaged as a *passagium particulare* in advance of the main crusade, sailed from Venice on June 27, 1365, with the crusaders he had recruited. With an army of *c.* 10,000 men and 1,400 horses he adopted the old expedient of attacking Alexandria, perhaps, it has been suggested, with the aim of at least strengthening the standing of the Cypriot ports by destroying a major rival. Taking advantage of the Nile floods, which would have hindered the Mamluks bringing up reinforcements, he sailed into one of the two harbors on October 9 and landed on a strip of beach near the city wall on the following morning. At the same time a Hospitaller contingent of one hundred brothers in four galleys under the Order's admiral landed on the shore of the other harbor so as to be able to attack the city's defenders from the rear. The crusaders broke into the city but Peter could not hold his prize and his expedition, laden with plunder, withdrew to Cyprus six days later. In the following year, Count Amadeus of Savoy left Venice with another fragment of the crusade, an army of 3,000–4,000 men. After retaking Gallipoli from the Turks in August, he campaigned on the Black Sea coast against the Bulgarians, who had been holding up the return overland of the Byzantine emperor John V from Buda (Budapest): the towns of Nesebur and Sozopol were restored to the empire. Peter of Cyprus went on to lead a raid on Cilicia and Greater Syria in 1367, but after his assassination in 1369 the liberation of Jerusalem became a secondary goal, as Latin Christendom began to worry about the Ottomans.

Suleiman Pasha's occupation of Gallipoli in 1354 had made it impossible to view the Ottomans as anything other than a potential threat, despite the relative lack of drama associated with their rise. Byzantine Emperor Ioannes V—whose mother had been Anna of Savoy and whose son-in-law was Suleiman Pasha's father—eventually, reluctantly, appealed to Latin Christendom for assistance. Writings of his contemporaries make clear that, for some Byzantines at least, the Latins were seen as a less immediate threat than the Ottomans, and in this context, the 1204 Latin conquest of Constantinople and all the subsequent plans to reestablish a Latin Empire seemed insignificant. In 1366 Ioannes' cousin, the count of Savoy, retook Gallipoli and convinced Ioannes to appeal to Rome. In 1369, Ioannes went to Rome and made a personal submission to the pope, who then began urging Latin Christians to fight the Ottomans. These appeals were largely unheeded—crusading energies were engaged elsewhere—and when Ioannes returned to Constantinople, he may have felt virtually forced to accept an offer of patronage from the Ottoman sultan Murad I. In 1372, Ioannes became Murad's vassal, paying tribute and providing military service when requested.

Crusading against Papal Adversaries

From the point of view of the papacy, the same conflicts of interest in Latin Christendom prevailed as in the thirteenth century, and threats from political opponents to the papacy were at times believed to pose the greatest danger to the Latin Church. Crusades in

support of the Angevin rulers of the Kingdom of Naples had ended in 1302. After that date most other crusades were directed against the Ghibelline supporters of Western imperial claims, which had been revived in the northern and central Italic Peninsula.

At the risk of oversimplification, the central issue was whether papal crowning—and thus, papal approval—was necessary for true imperial status, or whether individuals assumed the title of Western emperor after election as king of the German states. Henry VII of Luxembourg was elected king in 1308 and was confirmed Western emperor by Pope Clement V in 1309, with a coronation in Rome planned for 1312. But as Henry made his way toward Rome, relations with Clement deteriorated, and the pope rescinded the planned coronation. After negotiating and fighting his way through the northern Italic Peninsula, Henry was crowned emperor in Rome by Ghibelline bishops who were loyal to his imperial cause. Henry's death in 1313 at the age of forty further destabilized the political situation within the German and Italian states, and the conflict between Guelphs and Ghibellines was at the heart of intra-Christian crusades in the fourteenth century.

That said, the first significant crusade of the new period was preached in 1309 against Venice, not a Ghibelline city at all, after a dispute with the papacy over the succession to Ferrara, a place of strategic importance to both sides. Venice submitted in 1310, but Ferrara, which from 1317 was under a regime hostile to the papacy, was also involved in the next crusade, which was proclaimed in December 1321 against its Estensi rulers, together with Matthew Visconti of Milan and Frederick of Montefeltro, and Frederick's brothers and supporters in the march of Ancona and the duchy of Spoleto. Frederick of Montefeltro was defeated and the Visconti regime in Milan went under, but the continuing resistance of the Ghibellines meant that papal authority was not restored in the region.

In 1324 the crusade was extended to cover Mantua as well, but the campaigns, although enormously costly, only achieved a precarious balance of forces, which was broken in 1327 by King Louis IV Wittelsbach of Germany's descent on the Italic Peninsula. Louis' initial success, including his deposition of the pope and appointment of an anti-pope and his occupation of Rome, led to a crusade being declared against him in 1328. Ultimately, lack of money and supplies forced Louis to leave the peninsula. The Ghibelline coalition collapsed and many of its leaders, including Azzo Visconti and the Estensi, changed sides.

The papacy's next move would result in the creation of another crusade league, this one against Rome. Pope John XXII lent his support to a plan to establish a kingdom in Lombardy for John of Bohemia, the son of the former Western emperor Henry VII of Luxembourg and a committed crusader, which John would hold as a papal fief. In September 1332, the League of Ferrara was formed to oppose this and the pope's desire to dominate the northern and central Italic Peninsula was thwarted. The papacy tried again in 1353, when Pope Innocent VI sent Cardinal Gil Albornoz, who as archbishop of Toledo had celebrated mass before the Battle of Salado, to regain control of the Papal State. Gil Albornoz was successful in the Western provinces, but he could not overcome the Romagna. In October 1354, leading members of the resistance to the papacy were

declared to be heretics and, in the winter of 1355–6, a crusade was proclaimed against them. Gil Albornoz completed the reconquest of the Romagna in 1357 at a huge cost. In 1360, however, the church went to war with the Visconti of Milan and in 1363 declared Bernabò Visconti to be a heretic. The crusade was renewed and although peace was concluded in 1364 it was again revived in 1368 when preaching was organized in the Italic and German states, and Bohemia.

A feature of these crusades of the 1350s and 1360s was the use by both sides of mercenary companies. Crusades were in turn preached against the mercenary companies when they got out of hand. For almost the whole of the pontificate of Gregory XI (1371–8), the Latin Church was at war in Lombardy and Tuscany. However, Gregory, who commuted vows, resorted to crusade terminology, and transferred certain crusade taxes, does not seem to have launched fully privileged crusades there, preferring to grant limited indulgences that were applicable only in the case of death.

This endemic crusading was given impetus by the exile of the popes in Avignon from 1309 to 1378. Under strong pressure to return to Rome, yet reluctant to do so until order had been restored to the Papal State, fearful of the Western emperors, particularly in the light of Louis IV's invasion, the Avignon popes pressed on when they could. They could not avoid criticism for this, particularly in France, which was swept by crusading fever in the 1320s and did not accept that a crusade to the Holy Land should be postponed for the sake of crusading in the Italic Peninsula. For example, in 1319, Pope John XXII diverted to his crusades a Franco-papal fleet of ten ships intended to crusade in the eastern Mediterranean. King Philip V of France responded by taking the Visconti and the Ghibelline league under his protection.

Nor could the popes avoid having to pay for these enormously expensive wars: nearly two-thirds of John XXII's revenue was spent on them. It is remarkable that they managed to meet the bills and remain solvent. To do so, they drew on their experiences in the thirteenth century and elaborated a system of extraordinary taxes, especially caritative subsidies ("voluntary" donations), *annates* (taxes on the first year's income of the new holder of a benefice) and intercalary fruits (income from benefices during vacancies), to supplement the income taxes they were levying on the clergy. This led to a system of clerical taxation that prevailed to the end of the Middle Ages.

Fourteenth-century popes tended to associate Ghibellinism with heresy, or at least with schism, and this featured alongside traditional references to the defense of the rights of Christendom's Mother Church in their justification of the anti-Ghibelline crusades. By the 1320s, charges of heresy were being leveled forcefully and elaborately at the Ghibellines, backed by references to their denial of papal authority and their association with known heretics such as the Franciscan Spirituals. In this respect, these crusades were large-scale versions of a type of crusading already seen in previous centuries: crusading against purported heretics. In the fourteenth century, this type included a savage little expedition against the followers of Fra Dolcino in Piedmont in 1306–7, the proclamation of a crusade against the Cathars in Hungary in 1327—canceled when it was realized that it encroached on the authority of the Inquisition—and a minor campaign against heretics in Bohemia in 1340.

Iberia and North Africa

Crusading in the western Mediterranean from 1300 to 1370 can be roughly divided into two periods, the first of relative activity until 1350, and the second of lesser activity thereafter. Many phenomena outlined in the previous chapter will be visible here, too: intra-Christian fighting and competition for the various crowns of Latin kingdoms in the peninsula; swiftly changing alliances between assorted Latin and Muslim rulers; the endurance of the Emirate of Granada; and ambitious crusade plans that only sometimes met with success. One significant change is that from roughly 1340 onward, the presence of non-Iberians in peninsular crusades appears to have slightly increased, and furthermore, the dynamics of Iberian crusading were also discussed in the context of crusading elsewhere. In other words, at least at the highest political levels, crusading was still seen as an effort that spanned different regions. Overall, general hopes for Latin expansion via the expansion of particular states drove most crusading efforts in Iberia at this time.

The first crusade efforts of the new century were singularly unsuccessful. In 1308, Jaume II of Aragon, Ferdinando IV of Castile, and the Marinid Sultan Abu Sa'id 'Uthman II came to an agreement against Granada. Jaume and Ferdinando would attack Almeria and Algeciras, while Abu Sa'id 'Uthman would try to retake Ceuta. Pope Clement V declared this joint campaign a crusade and authorized taxation on the clergy in Aragon and Castile. Ceuta was retaken by the Marinids and Castile took Gibraltar (held only until 1333), but Algeciras and Almeria remained unconquered, and the conquest of Gibraltar hastened a renewed alliance between Granada and the Marinids. This lackluster outcome made both Latin monarchs and popes more cautious about peninsular crusading. Instead, Jaume II of Aragon secured tribute from Tlemcen, Bougie, and Tunis on the African coast and attempted to become king of Cyprus by contracting marriage with Marie de Lusignan in 1315, a marriage that never came to pass.

Then in 1312, Alfonso XI, who was to prove to be the best military leader in the peninsula since Ferdinand III of Castile, inherited the throne of Castile at the age of one year and twenty days. His throne was fiercely safeguarded by his mother, Maria de Molina, and her allies until he reached his majority in 1325. He was able to unite his nobles behind crusade efforts, and from 1328 a series of papal grants relating to crusade preaching and the collection of tenths and *tercias* evidenced a revival of activity on the frontier with Granada. This attracted significant interest from across the Pyrenees and in 1326–7 and 1331 King Philip VI of France, in 1328–9 King John of Bohemia and King Philip of Navarre, and in 1330 Count William of Jülich were enthusiastic enough to plan to bring parties of crusaders. The period was one in which crusading fervor was at a high level in Europe. Non-Iberians had not shown so much interest in Iberian crusading for a century. Muhammad IV of Granada appealed to the Marinids, who responded positively and retook Gibraltar in 1333. More crusade preaching and taxes were granted by the papacy, but ultimately a truce was made between Castile and Granada in 1334.

This truce expired in 1339 and hostilities swiftly resumed. In 1340, the Marinid Sultan Abu al-Hasan began to move troops northward across the straits and an army of *c.* 67,000

men besieged Tarifa. Aragon sent ships to provide naval support and the papacy granted crusade preaching and taxes. Alfonso XI of Castile then risked direct engagement in much the same way as his ancestor had gambled at Las Navas de Tolosa. On October 30, he won a major victory on the banks of the little River Salado, returning to Seville with so much booty that in Paris the price of gold and silver fell. In August 1342, he laid siege to Algeciras with soldiers from all over Europe, including Genoese and nobles from France, the German states, and England, among them King Philip of Navarre, Gaston of Béarn, Roger Bernal of Castielbon and the earls of Derby and Salisbury. The city fell in March 1344, the Straits of Gibraltar were won; the Marinid invasion had failed.

In 1350, however, Alfonso XI died of plague while besieging Gibraltar and thereafter Castilian crusading success flagged, although requests for crusade privileges from the papacy did not. In 1354, Alfonso's successor, Pedro I, asked the papacy to authorize a crusade in support of the emir of Montesclaros, who claimed to want to convert to Christianity; Arabic sources testify rather to Pedro's interest in expanding Castilian power in North Africa.[3] This had been foreshadowed by the plans of Luis de la Cerda—great-grandson of Alfonso X of Castile—for a crusade to the Canary Islands ten years before, plans that had been approved by the papacy but ultimately come to naught. But Pedro was not nearly as popular as his father had been and he was overthrown by his illegitimate brother, Henry of Trastamara, who made use of French mercenaries to achieve the crown. These mercenaries were encouraged to see their efforts as a crusading enterprise by the papacy, and their leader was promised the crown of Granada by Henry in 1366. It was believed that after defeating and killing his brother, Henry would lead renewed warfare against Muslim opponents.

North Europe

Crusades in northern Europe from 1300 to 1370 can be loosely divided into two categories: crusades against the 'Rus, led primarily by the monarchs of Sweden; and crusades against Lithuania, led primarily by the Teutonic Knights, who—as discussed earlier in the chapter—were facing serious allegations of corruption. In both cases, the crusades in the north affected, and were affected by, crusading in other places; they were part of, rather than completely separate from, Latin Christendom. And, in both cases, the dynamics of crusading in the Baltics were always complicated.

In the far north, the frontier between Latin and Byzantine Christianity, and thus between Latin and non-Latin political powers, was unstable, and in the early fourteenth century, both Christian sects were seeking expansion through territorial colonization, political aggrandizement, and missionary-driven conversion. In the 1320s, when enthusiasm for crusading was general in Latin Christendom, a movement got under way in Sweden and Norway—then unified, at least in theory, through the rule of the infant Magnus and his regent-mother, Ingeborg—to protect Latin Christians from the Byzantine "schismatics." Diplomatic relations were affirmed with the Teutonic Knights and permission was requested to use tithes collected for papal crusading efforts. In 1323,

Map 12 The Baltic Sea and Environs, *c.* 1300.

Pope John XXII had a crusade proclaimed in Norway. Although war with Novgorod was replaced by treaties in the mid-1330s, money from papal tax-collecting for crusades continued to make its way north.

Crusading was revived in the 1340s by King Magnus II of Sweden and VII of Norway, now in his majority and under the influence of his cousin St. Birgitta, a crusade enthusiast. He led a crusade to what is now Finland in 1348 that achieved very little and was then halted by the Black Death. He campaigned again in 1350 and another crusade was preached on papal authority in the following year, with additional permission to tap into crusading tithes. Clement V directed the Teutonic Knights to support Magnus' efforts and crusade preaching was supposed to be widespread. But although the clergy supported these crusade plans and advanced them with the usual effective rhetoric, it appears no one else did. The expedition never materialized, Clement V died in 1352, and in 1356 there began internal political convulsions that put paid to Magnus' ambitions.

Further south crusading was primarily in response to the increasing dominance of the powerful state of Lithuania. Lithuania had emerged in the first half of the thirteenth century under the rule of a grand-prince, Mindaugas, who by the time of his death in 1263 had unified his people, a peasantry under the domination of a warrior-mounted class, into a strong and prosperous nation. His successors further expanded Lithuania, creating a tributary network channeling wealth back to the leadership and further strengthening Lithuania's military capabilities, thus enabling even further expansion.

Lithuanian grand princes used diplomacy and foreign allies strategically, and thus to its neighbors, Lithuania appeared both an economic opportunity and a military threat. Although Mindaugas had accepted baptism and for a short time had professed Latin Christianity, even receiving a crown from Pope Innocent IV, this diplomatic maneuver had been fairly swiftly abandoned and Lithuania remained a pagan society.

By the end of the thirteenth century and the beginning of the fourteenth, Lithuania and the Teutonic Knights were direct competitors for expansion and exploitation of regional peoples. Lithuania was no longer a remote but rather a present threat to the Order. This was virtually the same moment when the most serious allegations were being made against the Teutonic Knights. In this context, crusading against Lithuania served both to defend the Order's territories and to rehabilitate its reputation in Latin Christendom.

It will be remembered that in 1226 the master of the Teutonic Order had been confirmed in his possession of a march in Prussia and had received from the Western emperor the title of imperial prince. After the fall of Acre, the Teutonic Order had moved their headquarters to Venice, roughly halfway between the eastern Mediterranean and the Baltic. But, in September 1309, mindful of the arrest of the Templars and apprehensive of what might come from the allegations against the Order, the grand master Siegfried of Feuchtwangen took up residence in the castle of Marienburg in western Prussia, which henceforth was to be his Order's central convent. Prussia was now fully an order-state, like Rhodes, and as a result, ensuring its survival in the region was imperative.

The Teutonic Knights had withdrawn into their Baltic shell and now sought to extend and reinforce their authority over their semi-sovereign state, while vigorously prosecuting their perpetual crusade and attracting to their wars as many crusaders from other parts of Latin Christendom as they could. The transference of the headquarters to Marienburg was preceded by the conquest in 1308–9 of eastern Pomerania and Gdańsk by ruthless methods. In Livonia, where Latin Christian authority was shared with three bishops, and in Estonia, where there was a powerful knightly class, the Teutonic Knights established a semi-independent regime; later, after 1438, the Livonian brothers would effectively choose their own master. In the order-state of Prussia, on the other hand, the Teutonic Knights dominated the Latin Church and they built up an efficient economy based on the management of their demesne lands and the encouragement of Latin peasant migration and settlement in a region in which many of the former great estates had been destroyed. Their approaches to castle-building, horse-breeding, armor, and tactics were innovatory.

The popes remained suspicious of their motives, but having the right to wage a perpetual crusade, the Teutonic Knights did not have to seek papal authorization every time they granted indulgences. They could, therefore, recruit lay knights for periods of short service with them, attracted by the prospect of warfare against pagan Lithuania. Throughout the fourteenth century, a stream of crusaders from all over Europe came to fight with them in campaigns, known as *Reysen*, which took the form of raids into the areas of Lithuanian control: for example, Bohemians in 1323, Alsatians in 1324, Englishmen and Walloons in 1329, Austrians and Frenchmen in 1336. Monarchs,

princes, and knights from across Europe made repeat trips back to crusade in the region over several decades.

There were two main campaign seasons for *reysen* each year, one in winter and one in summer. The *Winter-Reysa* was a mounted raid of between 200 and 2,000 men with the simple aim of devastating a given area as quickly as possible. There were usually two of these a year, one in December, the other in January or February, with a gap between for the Christmas feast. The *Sommer-Reysa* was usually organized on a larger scale with the intention of gaining territory by destroying an enemy strongpoint or building a Latin Christian one, although plundering was a feature too. These *reysen* were not unlike sports and were subject to the weather conditions in much the same way as horse-racing is today. Those who took part had the right to leave shields painted with their coats-of-arms hanging in Marienburg, Königsberg, or other fortresses. Sometimes before, sometimes after, a *reysa* a solemn feast would be held at Marienburg, with a Table of Honor for the ten or twelve most distinguished knights present. In 1375, Grand Master Winrich of Kniprode, under whom this chivalric theater became most magnificent, presented each of the twelve knights at the Table of Honor with a shoulder badge on which was written in gold letters *Honneur vainc tout* (Honor conquers all). The Order of the Tiercelet, a Poitevin order of knights, had a special augmentation of its insignia, the claws of its emblem of a falcon gilded, for a member who had been on a *reysa*.

Thus, notwithstanding the brutality, hardships, and expenses involved, one is tempted to write off the *reysen* as packaged crusading, and their popularity demonstrated how desirable this package could be when wrapped in the trappings of knightly endeavor and logistically well-managed. The Teutonic Knights brilliantly exploited their situation in the north to create a type of crusading that was attractive to the nobility and gained them public recognition while at the same time they minimized interference from the Holy See. At the same time, volunteers from lower social classes in Latin Christendom were also accommodated, and their presence affirms that crusading in the north was not simply chivalric theater. Crusading as a form of penance continued to attract many for whom northern Europe was the nearest theater of war. The Teutonic Knights placed non-knightly crusaders into units under the command of their own brothers, ensuring that their abilities were used most appropriately and that any military shortcomings did not hinder the *reysa*.

All this enabled the Teutonic Knights to hold on but did not lead to victory over Lithuania. Lithuania, after all, held the upper hand in many ways, which goes a long way to explain why the Teutonic Knights had had to develop a form of crusading that would attract free military labor from far afield. The period from roughly 1300 to 1370 witnessed a number of military assays from both directions, periodically interrupted by diplomatic efforts and a rare truce, the capture, removal, and/or enslavement of prisoners of war on both sides, and presumably opportunistic small-scale rebellions against Latin rule. The full crusade apparatus was put in play, with a 1325 papal bull offering full crusade indulgences reinforcing the "perpetual crusade," authorization for conquest given by the Western emperor in the early 1340s, and steady recruitment efforts in other

parts of Latin Christendom. These efforts helped maintain the status quo and prevented further Lithuanian expansion.

Ideas and Cultures of Crusading through 1370

How was crusading understood by those who undertook it and those who urged others to do so? Did the same ideas and themes continue to be popular centuries after 1095, or had different ideas and themes emerged? Perhaps predictably, the answer is that some of the same ideas and themes continued to be popular and actively propagated, while at the same time, new inflections and conceptualizations also emerged, above all an explicit emphasis on the expansion of Latin Christendom. Compared to work on the late eleventh and twelfth centuries, significantly less work has been done on the ideologies of later crusading, and so this is one of many areas in which further research is needed.

At the heart of crusade enthusiasm in the fourteenth century remained a desire for salvation and the spiritual benefits offered by penitential violence on behalf of God. This violence was thought necessary to eliminate internal and external threats to Christendom and to purify it, and God's representatives were believed rightly able to authorize it. The "holy lands" conquered by crusaders were represented as rightly theirs because they were rightly God's. Crusading continued to be buttressed by devotional elements such as pilgrimage, the veneration of relics, and the liturgical year. Indeed, the way that devotional practices intertwined with crusading warfare in many different locations in the fourteenth century is particularly notable. In the Iberian Peninsula, chroniclers surrounded crusade battles with the kind of Christian military religious practices known for centuries: prayers; invocations to God, Mary and the saints; open-air masses; a profusion of banners, standards, and pennons; veneration of relics; and blessings of arms and armor. Whether these religious practices actually occurred or not, writers clearly thought they should have.[4]

One of the most radical developments in the relationship between regular Latin devotional practices and the crusades was instituted by Pope Clement V, as Cecilia Gaposchkin has argued. In the early fourteenth century, Clement brought the crusades into the celebration of Mass. The Collect was now to include the prayer "take care for the Christian armies such that the pagan people . . . may be vanquished," the Secret was now to entreat God to "release [His] defenders from all the evils of the pagans" and included in the Postcommunion was the appeal "Look upon [us] O God, our protector, and defend Your defenders from the dangers of pagans."[5] As Gaposchkin has eloquently summarized,

> The central ritual of the Christian faith, the ritual that defined God's community theologically and that expressed that community through ritual action, was being used to define the enemy both ideologically and militarily. . . . Crusading had moved right to the very heart of the central ritual of the community, making

Figure 10.1 Typanum, Chapel of Saint Anne, church of St. Elizabeth, Malbork, fourteenth century © Alamy Stock Photos.
This tympanum stands above the southern portal to the Chapel of St. Anne in the church of St. Elizabeth (of Hungary) in Marburg. The church was built by the Teutonic Knights in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The tympanum recounts the narrative of the relic of the True Cross, starting with its discovery by St. Helena. The Teutonic Knights, like other military orders, revered their relic collections, particularly those of the Passion, and by the fifteenth century, the Teutonic Knights held at least four pieces of the True Cross, including two that were held at Marburg. (Tomasz Borowski and Christopher Gerrard, "Constructing Identity in the Middle Ages: Relics, Religiosity, and the Military Orders," *Speculum* 92, no. 4 (2017): 1056–100 at 1072–3.)

> crusading synonymous with being Christian, and in turn defining Christianity itself in relation to its military fights against pagans.[6]

These were not simply clerical ideas imposed onto temporal actors. Jaume I of Aragon himself, in his *Book of Deeds*, outlined an ideology founded on James 2:14-16: "faith without works is dead."[7] In Prussia, crusaders venerated relics, established new pilgrimage sites and networks, and also engaged in standard military religious practices, pushing back against any suggestion that the northern crusades were less religious.[8] Meanwhile, the *Chronicle of Prussia* drew upon ideas of pilgrimage and "the language and imagery of German mystics" to emphasize crusading as a literal and spiritual journey motivated by intimate love for God.[9] Whether we look at northern Europe, Iberia, or Cyprus, if relics or pilgrimage sites did not already exist, then they were "discovered" and established, reminding us of the "discovery" of relics like the Holy Lance during the First Crusade. Land was found to be sacred if not already understood to be so.

Indeed, by the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, historical and literary traditions were firmly entangled with crusading. While in historical hindsight, crusades appear

to have been newly expansionary, from the perspective of those engaged in these wars, their efforts seemed to be echoes of deeds done before, paving the way toward a future that resembled an imagined past. Figures such as Arthur, Charlemagne, and Sts. Barbara, George, and Helena served to inspire and justify. The crusade as *imitatio Christi* ("imitation of Christ"), now even more strongly supported by explicit devotion to the Passion, was accompanied by the desire to imitate also the First Crusaders, and indeed all those who had crusaded before. Crusaders could now be not only *militia Christi*, the knights of Christ, but also *Marienritter*, the knights of Mary. Prester John, the imaginary Christian ruler rumored from the twelfth century to be "out there" waiting to assist crusaders with his wealth and armies, was, by the fourteenth century, located in Africa, but still believed to be ready to help unify and expand Christendom. Crusader targets were described with the languages of both the *chansons de geste* and courtly love, eliding warfare and the literary genre of romance.

Many of these ideological strands related primarily to the nobility, particularly through the cultural pathways of chivalry, courtly love, and family traditions. Certainly, these themes were used by the rulers of states and military orders to motivate. Peter I of Cyprus accentuated Cyprus' historical relationship with the Kingdom of Jerusalem to motivate his vassals,[10] while as we have seen, the Teutonic Order masterfully framed *reysa* as a stage on which one's chivalry could be performed. While at some moments there seem to be clear distinctions between such chivalric crusade ideals and those focused on devotion, at other moments, that distinction breaks down. Indeed, we now have a great deal of evidence demonstrating that for many nobles, these two ideological strands—chivalric violence and piety—were intertwined.

For monarchs, the ideas that supported crusading also, increasingly, supported their own claims to rule and expand their states on behalf of Christendom. For example, in the early fourteenth century, Portuguese monarchs "consciously adapted the crusade idea to the historical and political circumstances of the kingdom," connecting their realm with the relic of the True Cross and founding a new, royal, military order, the Order of Christ.[11] For Norman Housley, France under Philip IV—as noted, a committed crusader—provides an early case study of the emergence of sanctified patriotism in Europe. In his words, "warfare, national feeling, and religious conviction were linked . . . by ties so close that the search for a precise causal relationship is futile."[12] Furthermore, monarchs and other individuals imagined themselves in the eschatological role of the Last Emperor, positioning themselves as messianic figures whose missionary endeavors and holy wars would achieve goals pivotal for Christendom and Christian salvation.[13]

The fact that appeals to sanctified patriotism, and indeed to crusading, were politically effective underscores their ideological potency. Crusading was not simply a phenomenon for the powerful. It remained a symbol of normative Christian unity—across social classes, between rulers and their nobles, and between monarchs and popes—and even united those who went on crusade with those who supported it "at home" through their money, devotions, and prayers. While crusading had always involved a call for Christian unity in defense of Christendom, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries that call became more explicitly focused on not only defense but also expansion. And

while crusading had always involved ideas about conversion as well as conquest—ideas that were sometimes ambiguous and often apparently conflicting—in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, these ideas were resolutely joined. In the words of Felicitas Schmieder, "crusading for world conversion on the one hand, and on the other hand, embarking on a mission to gain baptized allies for a crusade, were two means to reach the same end."[14] We see this not only in cultural materials but also in the energetic involvement of the mendicant orders in missions alongside crusades.

Box 10.2 The Mendicant Orders

Mendicant, that is, "begging," orders are Latin Christian (now Catholic) religious orders whose members take vows of individual poverty. The two dominant mendicant orders in later medieval Europe were the Dominicans and the Franciscans, both established in the early thirteenth century and named after their respective founders, St. Dominic and St. Francis of Assisi. Members of mendicant orders were active preachers and thus played roles in efforts to combat heresy, including leading inquisitions. They also played a key role in efforts to convert those outside Christendom, including sometimes participating in crusades or following after them as missionaries. Dominicans and Franciscans rapidly became dominant members of the universities springing up around Europe in the thirteenth century. While individual members upheld their vows of poverty, both orders accrued collective wealth and wielded considerable influence. A range of other mendicant orders came into being in the later Middle Ages.

But how could crusades and missions be undertaken successfully, particularly in the eastern Mediterranean, where the setbacks had been overwhelming? In the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, a wide range of thinkers wrote a large number of crusade treatises designed to answer this question. These authors had to face up to the fact that a major effort would now be required, since it was no longer the case of reinforcing existing settlements in West Asia but of organizing a full-scale invasion of a dominant power.

Some of the ideas floated were not, in fact, new. For example, the old Iberian argument that crusades in Iberia would lead to a liberation of Jerusalem by armies marching overland through North Africa was deployed, and some writers continued to be attracted by the idea of an alliance with one of the powers in West Asia, particularly the Ilkhanate. This latter idea introduced a train of thought relating to the outflanking of the Islamicate world that was to lead to the struggle—as much to do with trade as with Christian strategy—between the Portuguese and Mamluk fleets in the Indian Ocean and to the search for a Western route to the Indies.

Four proposals appear over and over again in crusade treatises. The first was the suggestion that the military orders should be united and that out of them a new

super-order should be created. The second proposal, which was related to the first, concerned the government of a future Kingdom of Jerusalem. A group of theoreticians put forward the idea of a warrior king, a *Bellator Rex*, the master of a military order that would wage the crusade and then rule the Christian Holy Land; one theoretician, Peter Dubois, argued that this post should always be held by a son of the king of France. It is not hard to see how this idea was compatible with the prophecies of a Last Emperor. The third proposal rested on the conviction that the Mamluks' ability to resist invasion could be impaired if their economy was damaged by means of the imposition of an embargo on trade with the Mamluk Sultanate, governed from Cairo. The fourth proposal distinguished two kinds of crusade, the *passagium generale*, a great international expedition, and the *passagium particulare*, a preliminary strike on a smaller scale to gain some specific advantage.

It is remarkable how far these ideas were put into practice. The union of the military orders was partially achieved when the Templars were suppressed and most of their properties were granted to the Hospitallers. Order-states came into existence in Prussia and on Rhodes, ruled by the masters of the Teutonic Knights and the Hospitallers of St. John. There were attempts to embargo trade with the Mamluks. And as we have seen, there were planned *passagia generalia* as well as many *passagia particularia*, often conducted by new "crusade leagues." These leagues were alliances of particular Latin polities whose rulers were most enthusiastic or who felt themselves to be most threatened. Although not supranational, these leagues' campaigns were authorized by the popes and their armies were granted crusade privileges.

The theorists' dream climaxed in the vision of the Cypriot chancellor and tutor to Charles VI of France, Philip of Mézières, of a new order, the *Nova Religio Passionis Jhesu Christi*, the members of which would take vows of obedience and poverty, but of conjugal fidelity rather than celibacy, because they would be responsible not only for ruling and defending the Holy Land but also for colonizing it with their children. His ideas were not considered outlandish. Between 1390 and 1395 Philip, who worked tirelessly for peace between England and France as a prelude to a crusade, recruited the support of over eighty nobles, especially in England and France, but also in Scotland, the German states, Iberia, and Lombardy. They included Louis II of Clermont and John Boucicaut.

In addition to these common points, insights particular to specific treatises are worth highlighting. As Felicitas Schmieder has explained, the anonymous author of the *Directorium ad passagium faciendam* (1332) was focused on the eventual Latin Christianization of the world. This author, who seems to have had direct experience in the eastern Mediterranean, saw reliable allies as essential if this goal was to be achieved, and—like many in Latin Christendom—saw a direct correlation between two aspects of "faith": religious identity and trustworthiness. Thus, conversion to Latin Christianity could produce reliable allies, but Christians from other sects in the eastern Mediterranean were considered nonetheless unreliable due to characteristics of their ancestry. The solution for the author of the treatise was conversion via baptism followed by a rigorous program of interventions designed to change these "other" Christians' ancestral traits. This treatise gives us an early glimpse of how ideas about

religious and racial identity were connected in the early fourteenth century and integral to the crusading movement.[15]

Another author with experience as a crusader and diplomat in the eastern Mediterranean, Roger of Stanegrave, wrote a treatise encouraging King Edward III of England to crusade in the 1320s or early 1330s: *Li Charboclois d'armes du conquest precious de la Terre saint de promission*. Alongside discussions of topography, climate, resources, arms, and tactics, *Li Charboclois* emphasized the ideals of Arthurian chivalry, with three chapters on the topics of prowess, strength, and justice. Like the author of the *Directorium*, Roger's ultimate goal was the (Latin) Christianization of the world, but in his case, Zrinka Stahuljak has argued, it was chivalric Christianity in particular that mattered, and he used allegory and invoked purported prophecies to persuade his readers. Thus, Roger conflated Arthur's liberation of "Graunt Bretaigne" with Edward III's future liberation of the Holy Land.[16]

Planning for more perfect crusades was not limited to crusading in the eastern Mediterranean. Ramon Llull, fourteenth-century Catalan polymath and mystic, is more usually known for his zeal for missionary work and the conversion of Jews within Latin Christendom, but he also advocated for crusading. Early works, like the *Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles* and *Quomodo Terra Sancta recuperari potest*, eventually took more formal shape in the *Liber de fine* (1305) and *Liber de acquisitione Terrae Sanctae* (1309). Crusading for Llull, as for so many already discussed, was a means to the ultimate end: conversion of the world to Latin Christianity. Gabriel Ensenyat has argued that, faced with the irrefutable evidence provided by so many failed crusades that Muslims could not be eliminated, Llull embraced crusading as a way to force Muslims to listen to preaching that he believed would, ultimately, convert them.[17]

Meanwhile, in northern Europe, St. Birgitta of Sweden, noblewoman and cousin of King Magnus II of Sweden/VII of Norway, had made a pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela in the Iberian Peninsula while still married and before her career as a Christian mystic truly began.[18] Her *Revelations* of her visions—compiled after her death—contain directions for how her cousin, Magnus, should pursue crusading. In her visions, these directions were conveyed through Christ and his mother, Mary. Like so many in the previous centuries, Birgitta saw crusading as a way to unify and reform the nobility, directing Christian warfare against non-Christians and using royal taxation to support a godly enterprise. Clerics should be involved to ensure the true conversion of those conquered, and crusading forces should be deliberately small and efficient, and without mercenaries, who lacked the proper motivation. Two banners should fly: the Passion, for peace, and the Sword of Justice, for war. Pagans should be offered the opportunity for peace through conversion first, with warfare only if the pagans proved intractable. If war ensued, then it was acceptable to offer the defeated a choice of baptism or death, for the sake of their own souls.[19]

It is hard to decide upon the exact degree of influence Birgitta wielded at the court of her cousin Magnus. While there are signs that Magnus' crusades correlated with Birgitta's ideas, his crusades were ultimately unsuccessful and Birgitta unimpressed. She departed

Figure 10.2 Birgitta of Sweden (second from right), fourteenth century.
© Wikimedia Commons (public domain).
In the 1360s, artist Andrea di Bonaiuto decorated the Spanish Chapel of the Santa Maria Novella church in Florence, Italy. Santa Maria Novella was built by the Dominican Order and remains Florence's primary Dominican church, and the Spanish Chapel served the Dominican convent. The lavish allegorical fresco from which this detail is taken is known by various names, including *The Church Militant and Triumphant* and *The Way of Salvation.* In simplest terms, the fresco depicts members of the Dominican Order and other notably pious figures preaching and leading others to salvation. There are many contemporaries depicted in the fresco, including here (from left to right) Queen Joanna of Naples, Catherine of Sweden, her mother Birgitta of Sweden, and Lapa Acciaiuoli Buondelmonte. (Names of figures from Julia Bolton Holloway, *Julian Among the Books: Julian of Norwich's Theological Library* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016), 183 and fig. 19 at 106.) In the fresco, these women stand looking up and to their right toward Pope Urban V and Emperor Charles IV of Bohemia, who sit side by side on an elevated platform.

Sweden for Rome in 1349 and in later revelations, she expressed her disappointment and anger, calling for Magnus' deposition. She was not the only one to do so and in 1364 he was deposed. Birgitta's influence was not confined to the Baltic crusades. Eventually, a highly popular saint in England, she proceeded from direct correspondence with multiple popes to living in Rome itself. Her primary focus was moral reform. For Birgitta, as for so many over the centuries, crusading was desirable not for its own sake but as a means to an end: a spiritually reformed and implicitly Latin Christendom.

CHAPTER 11
RECONFIGURED, 1370–1520

It used to be believed by scholars that crusading, like the European Middle Ages as a whole, had entered a period of decline or decay in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. According to this model, crusading in the long fifteenth century was both ineffective and largely unappealing. The last several decades of research by a host of scholars have shown this understanding to be incomplete and the model of decline or decay fundamentally incorrect. What we do see in the long fifteenth century is "reconfiguration."[1] This reconfiguration was enacted in the swiftly growing dominance of early nation-states vis-à-vis crusading efforts and the refinement and promotion of related royal and national ideologies; the identification and rhetorical interpretation of a new primary target of crusades, the Ottoman Turks; and the deployment of crusades in European imperialism and expansion in the Atlantic world, West Africa, and South Asia.

At the same time, striking continuities with prior centuries are also visible in the long fifteenth century. The papacy continued to claim primacy and control of crusading, and continued to do so to little avail, although temporal rulers continued to look to the papacy for legitimation. Crusade efforts continued to sometimes attract widespread interest and participation from varied social classes, and at other times fell flat due to a lack of interest. Crusades continued to target both internal and external "enemies of Christ" and liturgical "weapons" were reinvigorated in light of Ottoman successes. And crusades continued to be ideologically represented in terms of both defense and proactive expansion, and to be expressed in relation to other cultural themes such as chivalry and moral reform.

North Europe

In northern Europe, the crusade apparatus established by the Teutonic Order in Prussia continued to prove popular at the end of the fourteenth century. We have particular knowledge of its appeal among the nobility and royalty of Latin Christendom. King John of Bohemia made three trips north, as did John Boucicaut and Count William IV of Holland. Henry of Lancaster went in 1352. Henry of Derby, the future King Henry IV of England, went in 1390 and 1392. In 1377 Duke Albert of Austria came with 2,000 knights for his "*Tanz mit den Heiden*" (Dance with the Heathen). In the following year the duke of Lorraine joined the *Winter-Reysa* with seventy knights. Shortly after this Albert of Austria turned up again with the count of Cleves and they had a special *reysa*

laid on for them so that they could fulfill their vows before Christmas. Count William I of Guelderland went seven times between 1383 and 1400.

But northern crusades led by the Teutonic Order depended on the existence of a frontier with a non-Latin Christian enemy that could be portrayed as perpetually aggressive. These crusades' raison d'être vanished in 1386 when the Lithuanian grand duke Jagiello, who accepted Latin Christian baptism, married the Polish queen Jadwiga in Kraków and took the name of King Vladislav II of Poland. Christianity in fact made slow progress in Lithuania after this dynastic union, but the fact remained that the Lithuanians were now subject to Latin Christian government and allied with Latin-ruled Poland.

This Polish-Lithuanian alliance swiftly deployed against the Teutonic Knights. At Tannenberg (Grunwald) on July 15, 1410, the Teutonic Order's forces were destroyed by a Polish and Lithuanian army that also contained Czech, Moravian, Vlach, and Crim Mongol mercenaries. The grand master, the chief officials, and *c.* 400 brother knights lay dead on the field. Marienburg held out and the First Peace of Thorn (Toruń) of February 1, 1411, enabled the Order to keep most of its territory, but it was never again to be as great a force. The last time non-German crusaders came to Prussia seems to have been for the *Reysa* of 1413. The Order's crusading role was debated, and defended, at the Council of Constance in 1415–18, when the Teutonic Knights appealed to the assembled prelates against Poland.

The Teutonic Knights faced not only combined Polish-Lithuanian might, but also simmering discontent among their subjects, Germans, Prussians, and Poles, who were losing their separate identities and evolving into a self-consciously Prussian society. The gentry and townspeople formed themselves into a Union to protect their interests in the face of the Order's ruthless attempts to restore control. In the 1450s this Union rejected the Order's overlordship and turned to Poland. Prussia, which had been ravaged by invading armies in 1414, 1422, and 1431–3, was partitioned in the Second Peace of Thorn of October 19, 1466, thus ending the Thirteen Years' War with Poland. The Order lost Marienburg and was left only with eastern Prussia, which it held as a Polish fief. Its headquarters moved to Königsberg (Kaliningrad).

There remained, of course, the apparent threat posed by non-Latin Christianity among the Rus'. Several papal attempts, such as those in 1378 and 1496, to have new crusades preached against the Rus' came to nothing. But the Teutonic Order lacked the resources to wage war against the Rus' while engaged in its struggle with Poland and Lithuania, and against its own subjects. Furthermore, looking for recruits from outside Prussia became less and less feasible, as energy was directed toward the Ottomans, and as the Prussians themselves internalized the idea of crusade, connecting it with Prussian identity in particular, and therefore viewing crusaders from elsewhere as "Outlanders."

In Livonia crusaders from elsewhere in Christendom were more frequent and welcomed, and a certain number of knights still took part in *reysen* in the region, who were described rhetorically as "the new Turks." Meanwhile, others were contending for superiority. Grand-Prince Ivan III of Moscow rose to power in the fifteenth century and reduced to dependency a range of different Russian principalities, including Novgorod

by 1489. Ivan himself represented his efforts as a Christian holy war to defend his people against the impious Latin Christians. Walter von Plettenberg, the Livonian master, organized a heroic defense against a Muscovite invasion in 1501–2. But it is significant that although his proctor in Rome begged for a crusade letter he never got one. Pope Alexander VI was hoping that the Russians would ally themselves with the Latins against the Ottomans. In the end, Ivan and Walter made a grudging peace.

Although the Teutonic Order would survive until 1525 in Prussia and until 1562 in Livonia, crusading along the Baltic was moving out of the hands of independent military orders like the Teutonic Knights and into the hands of monarchs, nation-states, and royal military orders. The "bulwark of Christendom" against the Ottomans in northern Europe was now Poland, which had to confront the Ottomans from the fifteenth century onward. And what had been seen as warfare driven by sectarian conflict between Latin and Byzantine Christianity gradually transformed into a conflict that was both confessional and national between Poland, Sweden, and Russia, and also between Sweden and Denmark. The recent work of Janus Møller Jensen on crusading in Denmark from 1400 to 1650 emphatically underscores that crusading did not become unimportant, let alone disappear, in the later Middle Ages and early modern period. Rather, it was interwoven with royal ideologies of power and national ambitions in Denmark, as it was in other parts of Europe. Furthermore, ideas of crusade were woven into Danish society, present in buildings and literature, sermons and processions, and regular everyday life.[2]

Iberia, Africa, and the Atlantic

As we move into the fifteenth century, Portugal requires more attention. Originally the county of Portugal, owing fealty to Alfonso VI of Léon and Castile, Count Afonso Henriques had proclaimed himself the prince—not count—of Portugal in 1129, with the status of Portugal as a state in its own right confirmed by the papacy in 1179. Holy warfare and crusading against Muslims had been a significant component of Portuguese identity, especially the identity of its monarchs, and as Luis Adão da Fonseca has demonstrated, from the fourteenth century onward crusading ideology was integrated fully within the ideology of Portuguese monarchy and in particular Portuguese overseas ambitions that would eventually yield a global empire.[3] Arguably the centerpiece of this royal crusading ideology was the Order of Christ, founded by King Denis in 1319, who incorporated both former Knights Templar and Templar assets into this new military order headed by the Portuguese crown and eventually empowered to assign overseas benefices in conquered lands.

As Portuguese warfare moved from the land to the sea, maritime crusades began to play the role that land-based crusading had in earlier centuries. By 1411 Portugal and Castile had settled a treaty which closed the door for further expansionist warfare on land. Given preexisting interests in crusading in Africa and the movement to maritime warfare, Portuguese royal crusading interests turned to North Africa, in particular the port of Ceuta, which occupied a strategic position across the Straits of Gibraltar. In

Map 13 Iberia and Northwest Africa, *c.* 1492.

1415 King João I led a crusade to Ceuta, proclaimed in many plans as a staging post for an eventual eastward push to take Jerusalem. In this crusade João's son, Henry the Navigator, earned some mild acclaim for his actions in the battle.[4] Notwithstanding the clear royal ambition behind the crusade, Vitor Manuel Inácio Pinto has demonstrated that Portuguese nobility and merchant classes also supported it because it seemed to offer these groups, respectively, opportunities for influence and commercial advantage. Ironically, then, the conquest of Ceuta and its defense and maintenance by the Portuguese via new taxes and infrastructure—such as the *10 Reais de Ceuta*, the *Casa de Ceuta*, and the *Carreira de Ceuta*—were a staggering financial drain over the centuries to come.[5]

The crusading conquest of Ceuta arguably marked the beginning of Portuguese colonies in Africa and the beginning of Portuguese expansion overseas in the Mediterranean, Africa, and India. As Portuguese maritime expansion rolled forward in the fifteenth century, the majority of such voyages were undertaken by members of the Order of Christ, of which Henry the Navigator was the first governor, and ideas and practices of crusading played a central role and ultimately informed Portuguese imperial ideology, as discussed later in the chapter. But with careful attention, even earlier signs are present. The conquest of the Canary Islands, which began in 1403, was launched by two Norman knights on the grounds that the conquest would facilitate the islanders' Christianization. The earliest accounts of the conquest—which took decades and faced serious indigenous resistance—presented warfare against the islanders as crusading, with papal bulls and banners of the Cross and the Virgin in hand.

In addition, Portuguese activity in West Africa was connected to that in North Africa by the leadership of Henry the Navigator, the underlying ideology of Christian expansion of the Portuguese monarchy, and the voices of those who chronicled and thus shaped the memory of Portuguese efforts. Gomes Eanes de Zurara, official royal chronicler and eventual leader of three commanderies of the Order of Christ, authored an account of the conquest of Ceuta as well as the better-known *Chronica do Descobrimento e Conquista da Guiné* (Chronicle of the Discovery and Conquest of Guinea). Both texts framed Portuguese actions as part of a "global conflict led by Christians against Infidels for the propagation of the faith"[6] even while, as Herman Bennett has so clearly shown, the political realities of fifteenth-century Portuguese diplomacy in West Africa were much more nuanced,[7] and diplomats from Ethiopia were esteemed visitors at European courts.[8]

Box 11.1 Medieval Ethiopia

Ethiopia was one of many prosperous states in Africa in the classical and medieval periods. The Solomonic Kingdom of Ethiopia succeeded to the Zagwe dynasty in the thirteenth century. The region—as the Kingdom of Aksum (*c.* 100–960 CE)—had already converted to Christianity in the fourth century. In the later Middle Ages, as Verena Krebs has made clear, Solomonic Ethiopia was a de facto empire,

ruling diverse populations, dominating subject states (including some ruled by Muslims), and asserting itself as the protector of Christians living under Mamluk rule to the north. Wealthy and ambitious, the rulers of Solomonic Ethiopia took the lead in diplomatic outreach to European rulers in the fifteenth century, whom they saw as a source of sacred objects.

It is crucial to recognize that Africa was not an unknown entity to Europeans, as later Western myths of a "dark continent" have suggested. Africa was, rather, a location of political powers, some known and appealed to or alternately feared, and others only imagined. It was a wealthy region that played a pivotal role in various hemispheric trade routes and thus a region of economic possibility. Furthermore, it was yet another arena for the perceived conflict between Christianity and Islam, with Christians, Muslims, and "pagans" who belonged to neither faith all known to inhabit the continent.

Recognizing these points should help us as we strive to reconcile the different attitudes that European Christians had toward Africa and Africans—terms that are themselves almost hopelessly broad. First, diplomatic engagement had been underway with Solomonic Ethiopia since at least the early fourteenth century and was pursued in West Africa by the Portuguese in the fifteenth century. Second, clearly, military engagements in West Africa were also understood as related to broader efforts to crusade and expand Christendom. At the same time, the arrival in Latin markets of enslaved people from the Canaries and West Africa in the fifteenth century serves also as a harbinger of the trans-Atlantic trade in the enslaved yet to come. In 1441 the first captured and enslaved person from West Africa was taken back to Portugal, with the first large group of enslaved people from West Africa arriving in Portugal in 1444. By 1448 enslavement of Africans by force of arms was abandoned for organized trade, with the first permanent trading post set up off the coast of Mauritania. Between 1450 and 1500, approximately 17,500 enslaved people from Africa would be shipped to the northern Atlantic islands such as Madeira.

This enslavement and subsequent trade in persons was, as we have seen, represented by chroniclers like Gomes de Zurara as part of the crusading effort and the expansion of Christendom, and was justified by papal bulls and in some cases granted plenary indulgences. *Dum diversas* (1452) granted the Portuguese crown the authority in fighting against enemies of Christ and the faith to "reduce their persons to perpetual servitude" and issued "full and complete remission [of sins]" to all who either fought themselves or provided material support "in the sincerity of faith."[9] *Romanus pontifex* (reissued 1455) permitted perpetual enslavement in order to "bring the sheep entrusted to [the pope] by God into the single divine fold," while *Inter caetera* (1456) gave Portugal spiritual jurisdiction over conquered lands.[10] In contrast, Castile's enslavement of indigenous Canarians later in the century was forbidden by the papacy—it was done nonetheless, even after the Canarians themselves converted to Christianity—and *In sacra Petri sede* (1514) granted a plenary indulgence and some privileges to any who fought and died in Africa or India without mention of enslavement.[11] An implicit connection between

slavery and crusading existed from earlier centuries, as discussed in previous chapters. These later bulls have been studied primarily in relation with European expansion in the early modern period, perhaps most notably by James Muldoon, and more research on their relation to the crusading movement, to which the points and language of the bulls clearly connects, and the development of the early modern slave trade is needed.

Obviously, then, Portugal's political and economic expansion was supported by papal bulls and papal diplomatic efforts. It was not in conflict with papal priorities in the fifteenth century, as Benjamin Weber has recently underscored. Rather, for the papacy, too, crusading—holy war for Christ and Christendom—theoretically extended well beyond the Mediterranean and immediate conflict with Muslim opponents, as we have already seen in crusading in northern Europe and against heretical and papal adversaries.[12] At the same time, endeavors that might at first glance appear firmly divorced from the crusades were in fact seen by many contemporaries as simply new ways to reach old goals. For example, expansion westward and around the horn of Africa did not only serve to expand European political and economic interests, it also theoretically offered a way to get behind the Ottomans and the Mamluks to conquer Jerusalem, as well as a means to convert "pagan" peoples to Christianity before they could be turned to Islam. Enslavement was repeatedly represented as care for the eternal souls of those enslaved and as a means toward the triumphant expansion of Christendom. And it was hoped that the wealth to come from the trade in enslaved people, and from voyages like that of Christopher Columbus and conquests like those of Henry the Navigator, would fund another *passagium generale* to conquer Jerusalem and usher in the End of Days.

Intrinsic to plans to outflank the Muslim states in the eastern Mediterranean were diplomatic relations with the Solomonic Kingdom of Ethiopia, which were pursued energetically by the Portuguese crown and the papacy in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. The idea of an Iberian-Ethiopian alliance against the Mamluks had circulated first in the early fourteenth century, but approximately the first century of efforts among Latin Christians to recruit Ethiopian monarchs to crusade were unsuccessful, as Verena Krebs has discussed. Portuguese appeals for alliance were reissued to Ethiopia's ruler Eleni in the early fifteenth century, fueled by the enthusiasm of Henry the Navigator. The first monarch in generations to respond positively to such an appeal, Eleni sent to Portugal by way of India an ambassador and personal written response to Manuel I of Portugal and the papacy in 1509. She sent a cross made from a relic of the True Cross and offered a cross-dynastic marriage as well as substantial supplies and military resources for war against the Mamluk Sultanate at the north of Ethiopia's own borders.[13] Krebs argues we should read Eleni's response in the context of changes in the political status quo, both on the borders of Ethiopia and in the broader Red Sea and Indian Ocean regions, as well as suspicions that the End of Days might be approaching.[14] The alliance ultimately came to no military action. The two royal courts mutually exchanged embassies and gifts, but the process took more than a decade and was complicated by various diplomatic missteps, by which time Eleni was no longer the ruler.

Portugal was not the only Latin-ruled Iberian state that led crusades at this time. In the later fifteenth century, active Castilian warfare against the Kingdom of Granada,

warfare which had been dormant for over a century, was renewed. Following a demanding international struggle for dominance in the western Mediterranean, the death of Alfonso XI while besieging Granada, and a civil war, since 1350 the Kingdom of Castile had prioritized a "cold" war with the Nasrid dynasty. Instead of seeking active military engagement, the Castilians instead sought to profit from treaties that damaged Granadan interests and brought tribute payments to the Castilian crown.[15] In 1475 Pope Sixtus had gone as far as appropriating for the wars against the Ottomans half of the *tercias reales*, which had long since ceased to be used for conquest. But with the union of the states of Aragon and Castile in the persons of Ferdinand and Isabella in 1479 and the resurgence of crusading ideas that followed the loss of Constantinople in 1453, the now-united Spanish court, with Isabella taking the lead, began to seethe with fervor, nationalistic as well as religious. The paraphernalia of crusading—papal letters, indulgences, and crusade privileges—were in evidence. Huge sums of money were spent and large armies raised and the war against Granada was pursued with a remarkable single-mindedness at the expense of almost all the country's other interests.

Ferdinand and Isabella were helped by the fact that Granada, which by seizing the town of Zahara provided a casus belli, was torn by dissension set off by the rebellion of the king's son in 1482. Alhama fell to the Spanish in that year and the western half of the kingdom, comprising Zahara, Alora, Setenil, Benameji, and Ronda, was occupied between 1483 and 1486. Malaga was taken in 1487 and Baza, Almeria, and Guadix in 1488–9. Ferdinand and Isabella laid siege to Granada itself in April 1490 and when their camp was destroyed they replaced it with a town, Santa Fe, the building of which demoralized the city's defenders.

Granada surrendered on January 2, 1492, and the Spanish king and queen entered it on the sixth. On February 4, the Vatican and Castel Sant'Angelo in Rome were illuminated with torches and bonfires. On the next day a solemn procession of thanksgiving was held and the first bullfights in Rome were organized by Cardinal Rodrigo Borgia. It was said somewhat grandiloquently that the taking of Granada offset the loss of Constantinople and it was assumed that this would be a prelude to the "liberation" of North Africa.

Despite this aggressive stance, the initial treaty of surrender was generous to Granada, and served to create a "functioning Islamic principality . . . under Christian rule."[16] This was deliberate and advantageous for the Spanish crown, since it kept intact Granada's immense productivity. However, the terms of the treaty were upheld for no more than eight years. More severe ecclesiastical decrees steadily applied pressure on Muslims and Arabic culture and divided the Christian and Muslim inhabitants of the city. When these decrees sparked rebellion in 1499, the rebellion was used in turn to justify even harsher steps, leading to mass migrations, mass baptisms and the reconsecration of the city's mosques as churches. Although Isabella and Ferdinand tried to reassure Jewish and Muslim subjects in Aragon and Castile, their promises were not believed, and there followed several notable mass conversions of Muslim communities to Christianity as a strategy for self-preservation.

Post-Granada invasions of Africa resumed in 1497 with the occupation of Melilla and this was followed by a notable series of conquests, authorized by the popes and

justified by the ancient idea of reaching the Holy Land by way of the African coast as well as by the traditional authorization of conquests that supported missionary efforts: Mers el-Kebir in 1505; Oran in 1509; and the Rock of Algiers, Bejaïa, Tunis, Tlemcen, and Tripoli in 1510. Traditional historiography has presented these conquests as a new development, a sign of Europe finally desiring knowledge of a continent they had somehow overlooked. In fact, as this book has shown, Africa occupied a central place in Afro-Eurasia, a reflection of the fact that Africa—more specifically, the three international points of connection provided by the regions of West Africa, East Africa, and North Africa—had been part of Latin Christian worldviews for centuries. Not only a place for the imaginary and fantastical, Latin Christians recognized Africa's states, rulers and wealth, and strategic value. Crusading in Africa in the fifteenth century represents a time of intensified and more aggressive efforts, not forays into something entirely unknown.

To some degree, the same can be said of Latin Christian expansion in the Atlantic. This expansion was not driven solely by Iberian states. Janus Møller Jensen has discussed how both the Danish and Portuguese believed that India, and Prester John, could be reached by sailing west, toward Greenland. The Danes sought legitimation of westward expansion and conquest as crusades, seeking papal indulgences for expeditions westward—first to Greenland, and thence to the other side of the world—in 1514 and 1519. Such crusade plans came closest to fruition in 1520–1, at the same time as new legends were created of a Danish hero, Ogier the Dane, who purportedly crusaded in India and founded the kingdom that would eventually become the realm of Prester John.[17]

Crusading against Christians

The Great Schism and Crusading

During the Great Schism (Western Schism) there were first two and later three lines of popes, housed variously in Rome and Avignon. Latin Christendom was split between those adhering to one line or the other—even the Hospitallers on Rhodes were divided among themselves—and there came to be internal crusades generated by the Schism itself. Attempted crusades against Naples in 1382 and 1411–12 and France in 1388, and in Italy in 1397 and Aragon in 1413, came to nothing, but in the early 1380s two expeditions were planned in England, which backed Urban VI in Rome. One crusade under Henry Despenser, the bishop of Norwich, was to be launched against the "Clementists," the supporters of Clement VII in Avignon, wherever they might be found. The other crusade under John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster, was to invade Castile. Despenser's crusade was a lost cause. It left for Flanders, which was subject to the Clementist French, on May 16, 1383, with massive demonstrations of popular support and, after taking several seaside towns, laid siege to Ypres. But in early August the approach of a French army caused the siege to be abandoned and the English withdrew. John of Gaunt's crusade, heralded by a ceremony in which his nephew King Richard II recognized him as king of Castile, began

on July 9, 1386, when he sailed from England. A year later he had withdrawn to Gascony, having received a rich indemnity in return for his renunciation of the Castilian crown.

Unified Latin Christian crusading should have been out of the question given the Schism, but two major ventures in this period demonstrated that the crusading movement was strong enough to rise above the Schism, even while the Schism generated its own crusades. In 1390 continuing crusade interest manifested itself in a scheme, proposed by the Genoese, who supported Pope Boniface IX, to King Charles VI of France, who supported Pope Clement VII. They advocated a crusade to the port city of Mahdia in the Hafsid kingdom of Tunisia, which was a center for privateering against Genoese shipping. The Genoese, Sicilians, and Pisans had already been involved in a major military engagement aimed at the Hafsids, and had occupied the island of Jerba in 1388.

Pope Clement VII authorized the crusade to Mahdia, for which there was great enthusiasm in France, even though the king stipulated that knights must equip themselves at their own expense and that the number of *gentilshommes* (noblemen) in the army must not exceed 1,500. Genoa contributed 1,000 crossbowmen and 2,000 men-at-arms in addition to 4,000 sailors. Crusaders also came from England, Iberia, and the Low Countries. The fact that this venture was seen to transcend divisions in Christendom was demonstrated by an order from the high command that no one should refer to the Schism, but that in a spirit of fraternity all should unite to defend the Latin faith. Louis II of Bourbon and Clermont, an experienced soldier and grandson of crusade enthusiast Louis I, was appointed leader. In July 1390 the French and Genoese fleets made for the island of "Consigliera," possibly Kuriate, where they halted for nine days. They landed on the mainland late in the month, but the Hafsids had had time to organize resistance and after nine or ten weeks besieging Mahdia both sides were exhausted. The Genoese secretly negotiated a renewal of an earlier treaty they had had with the Hafsids and Louis returned to Europe in October with nothing achieved. Perhaps for precisely this reason, those who wrote of the crusade to Mahdia emphasized parallels with the 1270 crusade to Tunis and French writers in particular claimed to have been acting to avenge the crucifixion and punish the lack of piety among the Muslims.[18] Soon, the attention of many Latin Christians would pivot to the growing Ottoman Sultanate.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the Ottoman Sultanate had risen to prominence in the first half of the fourteenth century out of a number of small emirates in West Asia that emerged after the Mongol conquest of Baghdad in 1240. The Ottomans' positive trajectory was due to a confluence of factors: good governance, including that of conquered peoples; military effectiveness; and strategic diplomacy. By the second half of the fourteenth century, their empire was expanding at a fast clip. Edirne was taken in 1361, Plovdiv in 1363, and victory at Maritsa in 1371 gave Sultan Murad I most of Bulgaria and Serbian Macedonia. The Ottomans achieved dominance of the Balkans after the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, on the morning of which Murad was assassinated, leaving his elder son, Bayezid I, sultan.

The Ottoman Sultanate was not the only Muslim-ruled state in the eastern Mediterranean and West Asia in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The Mamluk Sultanate, for example, still held Jerusalem and was still a factor in the Mediterranean,

while Timur's extraordinary conquests in West and Central Asia ensured that first he and then various successor states, especially the Aq Qoyunlu under Uzun Hasan, played a role in Mediterranean affairs and as potential allies to Latin Christians. The Ottomans were also not the Muslim-ruled state with the most severe policies toward Latin Christians; Kate Fleet has shown that in the case of resident Latin merchants, the Mamluk Sultanate seems to have adopted a noticeably harsher stance than the Ottomans.[19] But the Ottomans clearly sought expansion in regions under Latin Christian rule and were remarkably successful in their efforts, and thus they commanded attention.

It had been under Pope Gregory XI (1370–8) that the power of the Ottomans became for the first time a dominant factor in curial thinking. Gregory, who came from a family with crusading traditions, saw the Ottomans as the primary external threat to Christendom and had in mind the preaching of a *passagium generale* to the Balkans to defeat the Ottoman forces. The Hundred Years War made this impossible and the pope therefore tried to unite those European states that were directly threatened by the Ottomans and to encourage them to help themselves. In his efforts, Gregory was supported and at times kept on track by a group of crusading enthusiasts including the mystic Catherine of Siena, who focused on a letter-writing campaign to key crusade participants such as Joanna of Naples, Elizabeth of Hungary, Louis of Anjou, John Hawkwood, and Bernabò Visconti, Lord of Milan.

The envisioned crusade meant, in practice, the creation of a crusade league, and plans for a new one had been hatched in 1369. They were revived in 1373 and 1374, but the proposals foundered on the refusal of the powers involved—Venice, Genoa, Naples, Hungary, and Cyprus—to unite. Gregory's attempt to organize a Genoese crusade in 1376 came to nothing and another forced on him by the Hospitallers in 1378 ended disastrously at Epirus.

Perhaps because it had been a demonstration of Christian unity, perhaps because France and England were once again inspired by crusading zeal, the 1390 crusade to Mahdia fired widespread interest and Gregory XI's project for a *passagium generale* against the Ottomans in the Balkans was revived in the early 1390s. The governments of France and England were actively discussing plans for a crusade either to Eastern Europe or to Prussia from 1392 onward and early in 1393 a small Anglo-French force was sent to Hungary, to be followed in 1394 by ambassadors from England, Burgundy, and France. It surely helped crusade appeals that the Ottomans had continued their expansion: Sultan Bayezid I took what was left of Bulgaria in 1393 and invaded the Peloponnese in 1394.

It was in response to the small crusade forces and ambassadors sent by France and England that King Sigismund of Hungary sent embassies to Western Europe to appeal for help. The reaction in France, particularly in Burgundy, was strong and many leading nobles were recruited, including the counts of Nevers, La Marche and Eu, and Henry and Philip of Bar, all cousins of the king. Large numbers also took the cross in Germany. Charles VI of France wrote to Richard II of England suggesting that they both enroll and it seems that the crusade was envisaged as a *passagium particulare*, in advance of a *passagium generale* that was to be led in person by the kings of France and England.

The pope in Rome, Boniface IX, proclaimed the crusade in 1394 and he was joined by the pope in Avignon, Benedict XIII, who granted indulgences to the French crusaders.

An army of *c.* 10,000 men mustered around Sigismund at Buda in the late summer of 1396, before advancing to Orşova and crossing the Danube at the Iron Gate (Portile de Fier). In the second week of September they came before the city of Nicopolis (Nikopol), where they were joined by Venetian and Genoese ships and by a Hospitaller squadron under the master, Philibert of Naillac, which had sailed up the Danube. Bayezid was besieging Constantinople when the news of the crusaders' advance reached him. He marched at once to relieve Nicopolis, which he approached on September 24. On the following day, in one of those futile acts of stupid bravery typical of knightly culture in the period of its decline, the French, in spite of their inexperience of the enemy or the conditions, insisted on being placed in the front line. They then charged up a hill straight for the Turkish position which was fortified by stakes and, slowed down by these obstacles, they were exhausted by the time they came face to face with the main Ottoman forces. In the confusion the crusaders began to recoil and their withdrawal degenerated into a rout during which John of Nevers and many of the leaders were taken prisoner.

Ottoman expansion was temporarily halted not by crusading warfare, but rather, by the invasion of Anatolia by Timur, the ambitious ruler of the Chagatai Khanate. In the wake of Timur's conquest and with the temporary eclipse of Ottoman power there was a revival of crusading activity. John Boucicaut, who had been appointed governor of Genoa, arrived at Rhodes with a Genoese fleet of ten galleys and six large transports in June 1403, with the intention of enforcing Genoese claims in Cyprus but also raiding the coastline. He ravaged the port area of Alanya and then, unable to reach Alexandria because of contrary winds, he and the Hospitallers attacked Tripoli and Latakia, pillaged Batroun and sacked Beirut, although most of the loot seems to have been Venetian merchandise. After an unsuccessful descent on Sidon he returned to Genoa, fighting a sea-battle with the Venetians on the way. In 1407 he was planning a new attack on the Mamluks. In the meantime, the Byzantine Empire was tenuously holding on, continuing to appeal to Latin Christendom for military support while also playing a complicated diplomatic game with different Ottoman claimants to the position last held by Bayezid.

The rejuvenation of Ottoman power after 1413 and the ending of the Great Schism also meant a revival of crusading plans. In 1420 Pope Martin V tried without much success to organize a crusade in aid of the Latins in the Peloponnese and in 1422, when Constantinople was being besieged by the Ottomans, he wanted to arrange a league of Hospitallers, Venetians, Genoese, and Milanese to go to its assistance. But these dreams came to naught, as Latin Christendom was caught up in the Hussite crusades, the last great series of crusades against heretics before Martin Luther.

Hussite Crusades

Jan Hus, who had criticized the granting of crusade indulgences by Pope John XXIII to those who waged war on King Ladislas of Naples, had been burned for heresy in 1415 on the judgment of the Council of Constance. Nevertheless, Hussite strength in

Bohemia continued growing. The Hussite demands—communion in both kinds; the public suppression of sin, particularly among the clergy, with the threat of non-clerical jurisdiction in the field of morals; freedom to preach; and a review of the church's temporal possessions—were sharpened by their association with Czech nationalism at a time when the Western emperor-elect, Sigismund of Hungary, was laying claim to the throne of Bohemia. In 1418 Pope Martin V charged one of his cardinals with the preparation of a crusade against heresy. In March 1420 Sigismund held an imperial diet at Breslau (Wrocław) during which the papal legate publicly read the pope's proclamation of a crusade against Wyclifites, Hussites, and their supporters. Early in May Sigismund led an army of *c.* 20,000 men into Bohemia, but many of them deserted and he suffered a series of defeats at the hands of the Hussites under their able leader Jan Žižka.

A feature of these crusades, however, was the energy and persistence with which they were organized. By the time Sigismund was pulling out in March 1421 another crusade was being prepared. Two armies entered Bohemia, although they had withdrawn before Sigismund re-entered Hussite territory in the following October, only to be comprehensively defeated and forced out in January 1422. In the next autumn two more armies marched. They withdrew within months. A fourth crusade invaded Bohemia in July 1427, but it dissolved in panic after an engagement near Tachov and suffered huge losses, after which the Hussites themselves advanced into German territory. A plan to raise an English crusade in 1428–9 under Cardinal Henry Beaufort, who had been legate on the crusade of 1427, ended with Henry's army, financed with crusade taxes, being put at the disposal of the duke of Bedford in France and being swallowed up by the Hundred Years War.

Against this background of failure a great imperial diet took place at Nuremberg in February and March 1431 and planned yet another crusade. In the summer three crusade armies mobilized against the Hussites. One concentrated on retaking those German territories that had been lost. The second, under Albert of Austria, raided Moravia. Then the third, under Frederick of Brandenburg, was annihilated by the Hussites on 14 August.

The five Hussite crusades, which included in their ranks participants from many parts of Europe, were almost the most futile of the whole movement. Crusading, of its nature episodic, was, we have already seen, an uncertain instrument with which to confront heresy. The Hussite crusades primarily served to reinforce the links between heresy and Czech nationalism, and the Hussites' military victories only served to affirm their belief in the holiness of their own cause. In the end the Hussites were only brought under some measure of control by the Bohemian nobles themselves, although heresy was still worrying the papacy in the 1460s. At the same time, the Hussite crusades also demonstrate how completely everything could still be subordinated to a drive for uniformity within Christendom. Sigismund had been the king of Hungary who had instigated the crusade of Nicopolis. If anyone had first-hand knowledge of the Ottoman threat it was him, and yet he was prepared to divert energy and resources into an internal struggle. Furthermore, as discussed later herein, the Hussites' own

ideas of holy warfare showed the persistence and adaptability of ideas of Christian holy war.

Crusades against the Ottomans

As Ottoman power resurged under the leadership of Sultan Murad II, Byzantine emperor John VIII Paleologos made yet another appeal to Latin Christendom, this time holding out an offer of union between the Churches of Constantinople and Rome. This union, the Union of Florence, was agreed in 1439; the primacy of the papacy was recognized by the Byzantines, who also agreed to accept the *Filioque* clause. While some leaders of the Greek church strongly supported the effort to secure Latin military assistance in the form of a crusade, the union was criticized and opposed by others. Irregardless it led to renewed crusade efforts.

On January 1, 1443, Pope Eugenius IV issued a new crusade letter, calling on all the faithful to defend Christendom against the Ottomans. The response came from Poland, Wallachia, Burgundy, and Hungary, where John Hunyadi, the ruler of Transylvania, had been engaged in resistance. He and King Ladislas of Hungary planned a great expedition for the summer of 1443. They routed the Ottomans at Niš and entered Sofia, after which they withdrew. The Balkans were now up in arms and, although the king of Hungary may have been induced to pledge himself to a ten-year truce with the Ottomans in June 1444, he had already sworn to renew the war against them. A crusade army of *c.* 20,000 men advanced through Bulgaria and besieged the coastal town of Varna. At the same time a new naval crusade league—twenty-four galleys provided by the pope, Duke Philip of Burgundy, Venice, Dubrovnik, and the Byzantine Empire—sailed for the Dardanelles. Sultan Murad hurried to Varna's relief with a much larger army, some of it transported, it was rumored, in Genoese ships, and on November 10 thoroughly defeated the crusaders in a battle in which Ladislas of Hungary and the papal legate were killed.

Varna paved the way for the final onslaught on the Byzantine Empire, in part because, despite Murad's eventual victory, it had highlighted Ottoman vulnerability in the Balkans, and in part because it appeared to some Byzantines to be a sign that the Union of Florence had been a mistake. The Ottomans' second direct assault of Constantinople, that of Mehmed II in 1453, was ultimately successful, due primarily to the size of the Ottoman fleet blockading the city's harbor and the large number of cannon capable of damaging the city's walls.

The Ottoman conquest of Constantinople was the formal end of the Byzantine Empire. Nonetheless, there were points of continuity. Ivan III of Moscow, who had married the Byzantine princess Zoe in 1472, adopted the Palaiologos family emblem, and his successors proclaimed themselves "tsars" (i.e., caesars) and represented Moscow as a new, and third, Rome. And in 1484, the patriarch of Constantinople formally repealed the Union of Florence, ensuring the survival of a branch of Christianity originally Byzantine.

The news of the fall of Constantinople in May 1453 was a sensation. Thereafter followed seventy years of intense activity and propaganda on the part of the papal curia, in

which the defense of Christian Europe predominated and the recovery of Constantinople became an ideal similar to the liberation of Jerusalem in earlier periods. The news had reached Rome in early July 1453. Cardinal Isidore of Kiev sent urgent entreaties on behalf of the Greek church to a wide range of Latin Christian authorities, both ecclesiastical and temporal, and on September 30 Pope Nicholas V issued a new general crusade letter and sent appeals to the courts of Western Europe. For the first time printing presses in Germany were used to advertise the crusade and print indulgences and propaganda. A series of crusade assemblies in Germany, marked by intrigue and divisions of opinion, concluded in 1455 by postponing the crusade for a year after the news of Nicholas' death had reached the participants. In the meantime, the remaining Latin Christian settlements in the Aegean had been thrown into a state of panic and in November 1455 the pope was persuaded to grant plenary indulgences to the defenders of Genoese Chios.

The next pope, Calixtus III, was even more committed to crusading to take Constantinople than his predecessor had been and was reported to be "always talking, always thinking about the expedition." On May 15, 1455, he confirmed Nicholas' general letter and he set March 1, 1456, as the date for the crusade's departure. Legates and preachers, especially recruited from among the Franciscans, were sent throughout Europe and a commission of cardinals under John Bessarion, who was Greek, oversaw planning. On February 14, 1456, the charismatic preacher John of Capistrano took the cross at Buda and was empowered to proclaim the crusade: he was said to have recruited 27,000 men in Hungary alone.

A major Ottoman threat was developing against Belgrade, and John of Capistrano himself led a force of 2,500 men to the town, where he was joined by other Hungarian crusaders under John Hunyadi. They broke the Ottomans' blockade and in an engagement reminiscent of those on the First Crusade—and remarked as such by contemporaries—a huge Ottoman army was repulsed by inferior crusade forces on July 22. The Ottomans abandoned their equipment in their disorderly flight and John of Capistrano went so far as to claim that the time had now come to recover Jerusalem and the Holy Land. In the following summer a papal fleet of sixteen galleys captured more than twenty-five Ottoman ships at Mitilíni and occupied Samothráki, Thásos, and Limnos (Lemnos), for the defense of which Pope Pius II was later to found a new military order, of Our Lady of Bethlehem.

It is notable that John of Capistrano had recruited and led to Belgrade an army of the poor. This was a people's crusade that was successful and was characterized by piety, discipline, and good internal organization. Hungarian peasants had been accustomed to bear arms in popular levies, but the Belgrade Crusade was not the only example in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries of the recruitment of the poor. A "crusade revolt," the Dósza uprising in Hungary in 1514, involved a huge peasant crusade totaling *c.* 50,000 men recruited by Franciscan Observants which turned on the nobles, who were condemned as *infideles.* And certainly in the Hussite crusades, many fought on both sides who were not among the social elite. The resurgence of the poor in crusades reminds us that the idea of crusading was appealing across social class lines, and it was presumably encouraged by the fact that not all crusades were fought at sea, and many were fought on European ground.

Map 14 The Ottoman Empire, *c.* 1566.

The stand at Belgrade was not enough to stop the Ottomans, of course. The European powers were not prepared to sink their differences and give full-hearted backing to a crusade, as the experiences of Calixtus' successor Pius II show. Pius had been a fervent supporter of the movement from the start. Almost his first act as pope was to summon a crusade congress to Mantua, which was intended to be fully representative of Christendom. It achieved little because, as Norman Housley has noted, it was inherently unworkable. The envoys were not empowered to commit their masters, who anyway had other pressing concerns, as fully as the pope had hoped. The crusade congress dragged on for eight months, largely because the envoys of Germany and France arrived so late. By Christmas 1,459 a total of 80,000 men had been promised and on January 14, 1460, a three-year crusade against the Ottomans was proclaimed, but by March 1462 Pius was very nearly in despair. In fact, apart from a declaration of war on the Ottomans by Venice, the results of all the planning and diplomatic activity were insignificant.

Pius, however, was determined that there should be a crusade and, like Gregory X two centuries before, he wanted to lead it himself, doing battle as a priest "with the power of speech, not the sword." He took the cross on June 18, 1464, in St. Peter's and left Rome on the same day for Ancona, where he expected to be joined by a Venetian fleet. Companies of Spanish, German, and French crusaders arrived—more men than is usually supposed—and so did the fleet, but plague broke out and Pius died on August 15.

With Ottoman conquest of the island of Euboea, Venice's chief naval station after Crete, the newly elected Pope Sixtus IV published a general letter on December 31, 1471, and hurriedly went into league with Venice and Naples, spending more than 144,000 florins on a papal squadron under Cardinal Oliviero Carafa. The league's fleet, a truly large one that comprised some eighty-seven galleys and fifteen transports, assembled off Rhodes in the late summer of 1472 and attacked Antalya and Smyrna, burning the latter town to the ground. Pieces of the chain from the entrance to Antalya's harbor were brought back in triumph and until recently could be seen hanging over a door in the basilica of St. Peter in Rome.

When it came, the response of the Ottomans was startling and a display of the power now at their disposal. In 1480 they besieged Rhodes and at the same time their forces landed in Italy itself, near Otranto, which fell to them on August 11. They had established a beach-head in Western Europe and Sixtus, who even contemplated flight to Avignon, at once appealed for aid. He followed this by issuing another general crusade letter on April 8, 1481, but on May 3 Sultan Mehmed II died and on September 10 Otranto surrendered to Latin forces.

A combined drive for moral reform and crusade remained a feature of the papacy as the fifteenth century closed. Capitulations agreed by the cardinals before proceeding to the election of Pope Innocent VIII on August 29, 1484, included the pledge to summon a general council to reform the church and initiate a new crusade. As soon as Innocent had been elected the curia began to make plans, but it was not until 1490 that the political situation in Western Europe began to seem favorable. A congress to discuss a crusade was opened in Rome in March and was attended by representatives of all the major powers except Venice. It put forward very detailed proposals for two

Figure 11.1 Gentile Bellini, the Sultan Mehmet II, 1480.
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In 1479, the same year that Venice and the Ottoman Empire signed a peace treaty, Sultan Mehmed II—known for his cultural curiosity and patronage—requested the services of a Venetian portrait artist. In response, the Venetian senate sent Gentile Bellini, the talented artist who had painted portraits of Venetian doges. Bellini was in Istanbul for more than a year, serving as a cultural ambassador as well as an artist. His portrait of the sultan was completed in 1480, the same year that an Ottoman army invaded Otranto. The portrait features a slightly turned profile, a visual technique that helps create a sense of depth. The richly begemmed and embroidered cloth reminds us of Mehmed's wealth, while the six golden crowns clearly indicate his status as one of, if not the most, powerful rulers alive in Afro-Eurasia at the time. The Latin inscription on the parapet, *imperator orbis* ("emperor of the world"), makes the point explicit. Mehmed seems to have been happy with the portrait, and subsequently honored Bellini with court titles.

land armies, one comprising German, Hungarian, Bohemian, and Polish crusaders, the other French, Spanish, Portuguese, Navarrese, Scottish, and English, together with a fleet which was to be provided by the Holy See and the Italian states. The whole campaign was to be under the general command of the Western emperor Frederick III or his son Maximilian, the king of the Romans. One army was to attack the Turks on

the Hungarian frontier while the other would land in Albania. The fleet would operate in the Aegean. The Ottoman prince Çem Sultan, who had contested the rule of his elder half-brother Bayezid II and, after betrayal by the Hospitallers, had been the hostage of a range of Latin Christian powers including Innocent VIII, was to accompany the crusade: everyone seems to have been convinced that his presence would be a political bonus.

No crusade resulted from these ambitious proposals—although plenary indulgences were given to those who went to the defense of Hungary in 1493—and they were overtaken by the French invasion of Italy in 1494. But crusading remained so much in the air that King Charles VIII of France, who was asserting his claims to the throne of Naples, seems to have been genuinely absorbed in the dream that his conquest of southern Italy would be a prelude to an invasion of Greece in the company of Çem Sultan, whom he collected in Rome. Çem Sultan died; the crusade plans faded away and, although Charles entered Naples in triumph on February 22, 1495, and was crowned king on May 12, the hostility of Venice and Milan made it impossible for him to stay. He withdrew to France in November.

In 1499 news of extensive Ottoman preparations reached Italy. It was feared that an attack on Rhodes was imminent, but in fact the assault was focused on the Venetian possessions in the Peloponnese. Lepanto fell in August and Methóni, Pylos, and Koróni a year later. Pope Alexander VI commissioned preparatory studies for a crusade and Europe seemed to be again aroused, with Henry VII of England expressing real concern. The pope tried to assemble another congress and on June 1, 1500, he issued a new general letter. Substantial sums were raised from a three-year crusade tenth and in the spring of 1502 a papal squadron of thirteen galleys sailed to supplement the Venetian fleet. But France and Spain were at each other's throats over the Kingdom of Naples and the next few years were taken up with much talk and little action. Popes Julius II and Leo X were indefatigable planners and propagandists, but the constant warring in Italy, the French invasions, and the League of Cambrai against Venice nullified their efforts.

Henry VII of England, Manuel of Portugal, and James of Scotland pressed for a new crusade, while at one time or another Ferdinand of Spain and Louis XII of France were prepared to commit themselves to the enterprise. Crusading was discussed at the first, sixth, eighth, tenth, and twelfth sessions of the Fifth Lateran Council between 1512 and 1517, with an emphasis on its old association with reform. Leo X issued another letter for eastern Europeans in 1513 and a crusade army was certainly being raised in the following year. Leo pressed the political powers on the need to resolve their differences and in 1516 he even summoned the French to a crusade under their king, Francis I, whom he had persuaded to take personal leadership.

Then came the Ottoman conquests of West Asia and the Nile Delta in 1516 and 1517. Public opinion was aroused, and the papal curia responded with a further burst of activity. On November 11, 1517, a special crusade indulgence was issued and the pope established a commission of eight cardinals. This commission—after stressing the need for a general armistice in Europe, to be guaranteed by solemn oaths taken by all the princes in a sworn alliance titled the *Fraternitas Sanctae Cruciatae*—proposed the

raising of an army of 60,000 infantry, 4,000 knights, and 12,000 light cavalry, together with a fleet. One force would land at Durazzo while the other advanced on Thrace from the north. The pope himself would accompany the crusade. Copies of this memorandum were sent to European monarchs.

The responses of King Francis and the Western emperor Maximilian underlined their conviction that peace in Latin Christendom was a prerequisite and on March 6, 1518, the pope declared a five-year truce in Europe and sent prominent cardinals as legates to secure the adherence of all the powers. So concerned were people at this time that it really looked as though the crusade would proceed as planned. France, the Western empire, and Venice agreed to the five-year truce and in October France and England made the Treaty of London, establishing a defensive union which other powers could join. The pope ratified it on December 31 and King Charles of Spain a fortnight later. The Field of the Cloth of Gold in June 1520, an extravagant demonstration of the friendship of Francis I of France and Henry VIII of England, was a theatrical expression of this new alliance. Plans for raising money and military forces went ahead, but with the news of Sultan Selim's death in 1520 the preparations faltered and the crusade passed out of the limelight. The Christian princes turned their minds to their political interests nearer home, the rival claims of Charles of Spain and Francis of France for the empire and Naples, and the Lutheran revolt in Germany.

A strong reality check was delivered by the Ottoman conquest of Rhodes in 1522. This conquest was hardly a surprise to anyone concerned, but rather, the culmination of long-term trends in the eastern Mediterranean. At the start of the fifteenth century, there were two major Latin-ruled island-states in the eastern Mediterranean: the kingdom of Cyprus and the order-state of Rhodes. In addition to these polities, there were smaller Latin-ruled principalities in the Peloponnese. Over the course of the fifteenth century, internecine infighting and ineffective leadership, as well as assaults from Byzantines, Mamluks, and Ottomans, gradually eroded these holdings, leaving only Cyprus and Rhodes still under Latin rule at the start of the sixteenth century.

Cyprus had suffered a succession of disasters after crusade enthusiast King Peter I was assassinated in 1369. Its economy had been geared to the commercial needs of the Italians since the thirteenth century, but this made it peculiarly sensitive to the tensions that existed between Venice and Genoa. It had been turning toward Venice, but in 1372 war broke out with Genoa and a squadron of Genoese galleys burned Limassol, took Paphos, and besieged and took Famagusta, capturing King Peter II and later his uncle James as well. In October 1374 Cyprus was forced to agree to pay annual tribute and an enormous indemnity against the return of Famagusta. An attempt to retake Famagusta by force in 1378 failed and the city, with a zone of two leagues around, was transferred to Genoa in return for the release of James, who had now inherited the throne. Intermittent hostilities continued on and off for decades, punctuated by Genoese victories after which more indemnities were extracted.

Then in 1425 the Mamluk Sultanate, responding to Cypriot privateering and raids on its coasts, launched a large-scale attack on the island during which the shoreline between Larnaca and Limassol was pillaged and many Cypriots taken and enslaved.

With the island's weakness revealed, a powerful Mamluk invasion force, probably with the connivance of the Genoese, landed on the southern coast on July 1, 1426. On July 7, in the Battle of Khirokitia, the Cypriot army was routed, Nicosia was sacked, and King Janus was taken. He was ransomed for 200,000 ducats, an annual tribute of 5,000 and the acknowledgment of the Mamluk Sultanate's suzerainty. In 1448 Corycus, the last Cypriot property on the Cilician mainland, was lost. In 1489 Cyprus was taken over by Venice. Thereafter, Cyprus' Venetian rulers focused considerable attention on defense against the Mamluk Sultanate and the Ottoman Empire.

By the early fifteenth century, Rhodes had become one of the most heavily fortified places in the world and this made it attractive to merchant shipping. It had also become a major port of call for pilgrims traveling to the Holy Land. Hospitallers also held the other islands of the Dodecanese, of which the most important was Cos, and on the mainland by 1308 they built a large castle at Bodrum to replace the one they had lost at Smyrna (Izmir). Rhodes was usually seen by the Mamluks, Ottomans, and independent emirates as a threat to their interests and was thus attacked by the Mamluks in 1440 and 1444.

Lay knights came to Rhodes to campaign with the Order, in much the same way as to Prussia although in fewer numbers, and, as in Marienburg and Königsberg, they hung their coats-of-arms in *maisons d'honneur* in the city of Rhodes. The most striking demonstration of the Hospitallers' reputation throughout Christendom can be seen today on the face of the English Tower at Bodrum at the southeastern corner of the *enceinte*: a line of twenty-six English coats-of-arms sculpted in stone, at the center of which are the royal arms of Henry IV and six other members of his family. Fourteen of the individuals represented here were Knights of the Garter. It is likely that the shields record contributions to the building of the tower.

Clearly, while the Hospitallers continued to profess a defensive stance, in practice, they remained highly aggressive, and the *corso*—privateering against Muslim ships—remained a signature tactic. The galleys, the maintenance of which was a heavy expense, were supplemented from the late fifteenth century by a carrack, later a galleon. Regulated by a special tribunal on Rhodes and later on Malta, the *corso* was financed by the Hospitallers and others, with 10 percent of the spoil going to the master of the Order. In 1519 the *corso* was providing the order with 47,000 ducats a year. It also benefited the Rhodian economy, although the prisoners taken by it and held on the island or sold on as slaves enraged the Ottoman government and contributed to its decision to invade in 1522.

The invasion was hardly a surprise. By the late 1470s the Hospitallers expected to have to meet an invasion sooner or later and made the best preparations they could for it. From May 23 to late August 1480 the Ottomans laid siege to the city of Rhodes with a large force before withdrawing exhausted. The successful defense did wonders for the Hospitallers' prestige. *Te Deums*, processions, and the ringing of church bells were decreed in France, and an account of the siege in English was in print within two years. It was a mark of the respect with which the Hospitallers were regarded that the Ottoman pretender Çem Sultan had fled to Rhodes, in mistaken hopes that the Order would back his claim.

But the Ottoman Sultanate under great conquerors like Selim I and Suleiman I was not going to permit Rhodes, insignificant in comparison with the territories it had subdued, to exist indefinitely. An armada under the command of Suleiman himself began to disembark troops on the island in July 1522. The invasion was well planned and was on a very large scale. By July 28, 1522, Ottoman batteries were pounding the city. After months of bombardment, mining, and assaults, the walls were no longer tenable, the stock of munitions was low, and the indigenous inhabitants supported surrender. On December 18 the grand master Philip of l'Isle Adam surrendered and, allowed to leave with honor, sailed from Rhodes on January 1, 1523. This was not the end of Mediterranean crusading, Latin Christian presence on Rhodes, or the Hospitaller order-state, which reestablished itself on Malta, but it was the end of Latin rule of Rhodes.

Ideas and Practices of Crusading

Ideas of crusading in the long fifteenth century were vigorous, often conventional, and capable of mobilizing Latin Christians of different social classes to wage war. At the same time, new circumstances and new ways of thinking encouraged new additions to ideas of crusading, perhaps most importantly the humanists' concept of the Ottoman Empire as a barbaric adversary to Christian Europe. In this reformulation, Christendom and Europe became virtually synonymous even while individual nations and principalities laid claim to ideas of crusade in support of nationalism. Meanwhile, there continued to be those Latin Christians who criticized crusading, including both those who supported their own ideas of Christian holy war against the Latin Church as well as a rare few who unequivocally condemned violence as a means for conversion.

In many ways the response to crusade appeals already described in this chapter attests to the vigor of ideas of crusading, but in addition, we see in the fifteenth century another massive output of crusade treatises. Especially after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453, and not unlike the treatises produced in the fourteenth century, this corpus includes the work of Christian mystics alongside many humanists. Diplomatic correspondences and letters form another large body of sources for ideas of crusading in the fifteenth century, as do many different vernacular works of literature and art, and extravagant events like the Feast of the Pheasant in Burgundy in 1454.

Traditional ideas of crusading remained present and popular in the fifteenth century. Crusade as a means of salvation performed by soldiers of Christ on pilgrimage was still referenced, with biblical, classical, and earlier medieval heroes and rulers set forth as role models. Crusade failures continued to be represented as divine chastisement.[20] Ideologically, moral reform within Christendom was linked to crusading efforts in at least two ways. It was asserted that moral reform would lead to the unification for necessary crusade efforts, and at the same time, crusades were used as a tool to enforce and ensure homogenous moral reform. Jerusalem functioned as both a rhetorical and literal goal, and even after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453, crusades

in regions far afield from the eastern Mediterranean were discussed as the first step on the way to retake Jerusalem. This was not least because eschatological and messianic thinking, and thus an imminent End of Days, continued to be a major motivating factor for some prominent individuals.

But new circumstances also had an effect on ideas of crusading. The Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453 led many to refocus crusade efforts on the reconquest of Constantinople rather than Jerusalem, although the two goals were seen as at least theoretically linked. The Ottoman conquest of Constantinople led to a spate of recovery treatises not unlike those of the fourteenth century. However, as Nancy Bisaha has demonstrated, in these treatises and other works there was an intense collective effort by Renaissance intellectuals to harmonize the crusading movement with humanist thinking, especially by reworking the idea of crusade and the history of crusading in relation to the classical past.[21]

In particular, humanists reimagined conflict between Latin Christians and Muslims as conflict between a "civilized" Europe and a "barbaric" Ottoman Empire. In so doing, they substantially affirmed the idea that "Christendom" and "Europe" were largely synonymous. Most recently, Cecilia Gaposchkin has identified the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as the time when the liturgies of the crusades were "superseded by the waging of war in order to protect the people of *Christianitas*. . . . Taking the cross meant fighting to save Europe."[22] The practices of crusading were also considered by humanists, who employed advanced propaganda technique, including humanist oratory and printing, and sought to justify the use of professional soldiery and raising finance through the issuing of indulgences in return for donations. In response to the revisionary researches of Bisaha and Norman Housley the term "Renaissance crusading" is now used to describe these developments.

Military orders came in for renewed criticism after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople and this encouraged the process already underway of nationalizing many orders and proposing the creation of new, hopefully superior, orders. The Hospitallers and Teutonic Knights were criticized again in the early fifteenth century, and in their attempts to justify their existence both returned to their original raisons d'être, above all the defense and expansion of Christendom. This strategy was successful for the Hospitallers and much less so for the Teutonic Knights.[23] Other less well-known orders, like the Order of St. Lazarus, gradually refashioned themselves in line with the directives of emerging national governments from the early sixteenth century onward.[24]

Meanwhile, new military orders had continued to be created. While some of these orders were theoretically transnational, many were explicitly national from the start, and in practice, all such new orders were connected to one or another national government, such as the Order of the Passion with France and the Order of Christ with Portugal. Other new religious orders, like the Society of Jesus of Ignatius Loyola, did not prioritize crusading but nonetheless conceived of crusading as necessary for the well-being of Christendom and a tool for further conversion. Loyola incorporated the language of militant Christianity—rooted in monastic rhetoric from so many centuries before—in

the society's foundational documents, referring to members of the order as those who "wish to fight for God under the banner of the Cross."[25]

Similarly, chivalry was further refined and, in the process, further distinguished from crusading in the eyes of many. Many historians have seen the period from the late fourteenth through the early sixteenth century as one in which the Christian function of knighthood became detached from crusading. Irina Savinetskaya has concluded that while crusading as an individual endeavor provided a certain kind of group consciousness for those French knights who were able to undertake it, crusading was not an essential aspect of French chivalric identity. Phillippe Josserand has demonstrated how the heroic figure of Pelayo Pérez Correa went through a process of transformation in vernacular literature, gradually shedding crusading rhetoric to emerge an ideal Christian knight by roughly the turn of the fifteenth century.[26] A similar discarding of crusade imagery in the work of artist Vittore Carpaccio has been shown by Bernard Doumerc.[27] In other words, knights performed Christian violence as pious knights, not just or primarily as crusaders.

This shift was subtle and often meant that elements traditionally associated with crusading were now associated much more definitively with chivalry and temporal knighthood. Indeed the line between "military order" and "chivalric order" became ever more difficult to discern. In promoting his Order of the Passion, Phillippe de Mézières wrote to Duke Philip the Bold of Burgundy in 1397, just after Nicopolis, that the Virgin Mary (a "pitying queen") would say to Jesus "by your grace this chivalric movement has taken the name, the life, and the arms of your holy passion in order to avenge the shame which is continually visited upon you in your holy city of Jerusalem, and in order to repair the Catholic faith which is now grievously wounded in Hungary."[28] Mézières seamlessly wove together the imagery of temporal monarchs and chivalry with older ideological themes of the *imitatio Christi*, vengeance for Christ, and the defeat of heresy. In 1430, Duke Philip the Good of Burgundy founded the chivalric Order of the Golden Fleece on the occasion of his marriage to Isabella of Portugal. The Order's purpose was to glorify and advance the "true faith" and the Church of Rome, and its first chancellor was the theologian and crusade enthusiast Jean Germain.

Thus the situation was not one in which the church and its military orders were being replaced by secular knighthood but rather one in which all concerned were more seamlessly fusing core elements of crusading with chivalry, now seen as a major source of momentum for crusading efforts and for the power of emerging nation-states and their monarchs. This is demonstrated effectively by the Order of the Dragon, founded by Sigismund King of Hungary in 1408 and endowed by the papacy with a perpetual crusading indulgence in 1433. Because members of the order vowed to fight "Turks, schismatics and heretics and also infidels" and to aim for their "extermination and confusion," they were to have "full remission of sins and penalties, in the same way as crusaders, confessed and penitent, [have] in the passage for the acquisition of the Holy Land."[29] Emperor Maximilian later secured similar privileges for his own Order of St. George. The goals and "perpetual crusade" privileges at play are very similar to those of military orders like the Teutonic Order in prior centuries, and they were likewise granted

by the papacy. The difference is that in this later period, such chivalric orders like the Order of the Dragon were fundamentally tied to existing state borders and state rulers.

This broad point stands even when we look at those Europeans who fought against crusaders. As Pavel Soukup has explored at length, when the Hussites faced down crusades, they developed their own ideas of Christian holy war and chivalry. Even while they fiercely criticized key elements of crusading, such as papal leadership, the indulgence, and the cross as a military symbol, the Hussites embraced other elements, such as the idea of fighting the enemies of Christ and the true faith.[30] They furthermore adhered to their own chivalric model, which strikingly was open to all social classes because it emphasized religion above all else.[31] And these ideas were, in the Hussites' minds, connected with their Czech identity.

Even while crusading was adapted, the historicization of the First Crusade that began in the twelfth century became even more emphatic in the fifteenth. This was especially true after 1453, when it seems that many hoped Latin Christendom would be forced to reflect on its actions or lack thereof.[32] Histories of the First Crusade, some thought, could inspire present and future crusaders to a similar triumph and offer heroic role models in the persons of Godfrey of Bouillon and other leaders of the second wave. The long fifteenth century saw histories in Latin and the vernaculars published, as well as historical allusions in papal proclamations, diplomatic letters, and a range of other source materials. On the one hand, these evocations drew a rhetorical connection between the past and the present, while on the other, their near-mythological power was due in large part to the great sense of historical distance and nostalgia so many felt. The meaning of the events of the First Crusade and the identities of the first crusaders were open to the claims of many different groups within Latin Christendom. Meanwhile other texts, such as the defense of Louis IX's reputation written by Louis and Etienne Le Blanc, show that the popularity but also the criticism associated with some other crusaders remained present.[33] At the same time humanists revived the much simpler East/West binary of Roman antiquity, positioning Europe as the preeminent force for Christianity and "civilization."

Though it may seem paradoxical, even while Christendom was more than ever seen as synonymous with Europe, individual nations and particular royal dynasties continued to lay claim to crusading in support of national identity and power. On the one hand, this was a continuation of the long-standing trend to connect crusades and national identity, which had led to the establishment of crusade leagues, as described in the previous chapter. In this vein, Portuguese and Spanish monarchs developed and disseminated royal ideologies that integrated crusading into their nascent national crowns, while symbols that used to be clearly interpreted as crusading—such as the Banner of St. Eric, in northern crusading—became linked also to national identity. Dramatic events such as the Feast of the Pheasant in Burgundy in 1454 managed to convey through their internal narratives and rich iconography the ways in which particular states—in the case of the Feast, the duchy of Burgundy—played particular leadership roles in crusading on behalf of Christendom. Even the Hussites, who were targeted by crusades, nonetheless connected their own religious identity and ideas of Christian holy warfare with Czech nationalism. Norman Housley has concluded that "by the mid-sixteenth century there

Figure 11.2 Battle of Domazlice (1431), sixteenth century.
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The *Jena Codex* is an early-sixteenth-century manuscript from Czech lands. The text consists of theological treatises that argue in Czech for the authenticity and biblical verisimilitude of Hussite Christianity and against the Catholic Church. The codex is also richly illustrated. This illumination depicts the 1431 Battle of Domazlice from the perspective of its victors, the Hussites (left). The Hussites are distinguished by their banner bearing a chalice, while the crusaders' banners are white with red crosses. There are no clergy present among the Hussites, as they thought proper, but there are monks depicted among the crusaders, emphasizing the engagement of the Catholic Church in war, which the Hussites criticized. The crusaders' cruelty and savagery is further signaled by the killing of infants. (Soukup, "Hussite Views of Crusading," 257.)

was scarcely a national, ethnic or civic community in Europe which had not been saluted as a Chosen People, its territory deemed to be sacred soil, and its capital city hailed as the New Jerusalem."[34]

On the other hand, the circumstances of crusading in the fifteenth century also encouraged the development of new ideological emphases, most especially that of the "bulwark of Christendom." The concept of the *antemurale* ("bulwark") was deployed by nations most directly threatened by the Ottoman Empire to assist with recruitment and the procurement of resources. These nations—including Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Rhodes, and Romania—argued that their individual states stood between the Ottomans and the rest of Europe; their national wars of defense were thus simultaneously crusades that defended all Christendom.[35]

In discussing the establishment of "sanctified patriotism" in Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Norman Housley has outlined three major conclusions that help us understand the entangled relationship between crusading and nationalism in the fifteenth century. First, the sanctification of the nation relied on the assumption that God would intervene in just wars *pro deo et patria* (for God and the fatherland) on behalf of his "chosen people." Second, the soldiers who fought in such wars were a consistent ideological focal point, with their roles elevated well beyond simple military service and seen as deserving and ultimately receiving a heavenly reward. Third, the relationship between crusading and nationalism varied; at times, it was most intimate, as in 1588 when Hapsburg Spain tried to invade England via a formal crusade, while at other moments, the links seem more tenuous. But it is undeniable that the ideas of a nation as a "chosen people" and of soldiers as "soldiers of Christ" would have inevitably evoked the crusades for contemporaries.[36]

Neither the humanists' conflation of "Christendom" and "Europe" nor the growth of sanctified patriotism within individual nations led to a narrower worldview but rather, seem to have inspired many to seek to expand Christendom/Europe on a truly global scale. Some sought this expansion as a goal in its own right, while others saw it as the means to acquire the resources necessary to retake Jerusalem from the Mamluks. These were ongoing and continuing trends, rather than brand new developments, and as in earlier centuries the idea of expansion often went hand in hand with the rhetoric of defense. For example, the same poems that repeatedly called upon Charles V to defend Christendom against the Ottomans also extolled expansion: "Unfolding the banner of the Holy Cross, crying aloud to Jesus, carry the standard of Christ . . . destroy the enemy even to death and open the doors to all the lands."[37] Furthermore, the circumstances of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries also drove expansion, in particular the maritime conquests of Europe.

As already noted, Portuguese voyages of expansion and "discovery" were undertaken largely by members of the Order of Christ, and the imagery and ideas of crusading were pervasive. Legendary traditions—whether older traditions, like that of Prester John, or newer ones, like that of Manuel I of Portugal as the Last World Emperor—contributed to the perception that European expansion and colonization of lands previously unknown were positive steps toward the Christianization of the world. This was also the goal of

theorists like Phillippe de Mézières and formed part of the worldview of the papacy in the fifteenth century.[38] And at the same time, others, like Columbus, believed that the wealth generated by their voyages and the conquest and exploitation of those they encountered, would pave the way for "the restitution of the Holy Sepulchre to the Holy Church militant" that was necessary for the End of Days.[39] It was also thought possible that finding new routes to Southeast Asia could economically damage the Mamluk Sultanate and thus enable the conquest of Jerusalem. As new lands were conquered by European Christians, the papacy continued its prior practice of authorizing these conquests and confirming the rights of the conquerors to rule, even though it no longer claimed papal supremacy over said rulers and the rulers themselves were gradually relying less and less on papal legitimation.[40] Meanwhile, sacred figures of Christian devotion such as the Virgin Mary made their way to the "New World" alongside the conquerors to assist with both conquest and conversion, as Amy Remensnyder has discussed in *La Conquistadora*.[41]

This thrusting outward expansion of Christendom/Europe was accompanied by inward "purification" of Christian societies in Europe. Not only heretics and schismatics but also Jews and Muslims were at times targeted as enemies of Christ and Christendom, and ultimately expelled or forced to convert by most Latin Christian-ruled states. This, too, was not a new development but rather an escalation and intensification of trends seen centuries before. Yet when assessing the history of the crusades in relationship to the history of persecution and expulsion of non-Latin Christians in Europe, the broad trend—correlation between crusading and persecution/elimination—is undeniable, even while any number of factors make that correlation complicated. Historians face two substantial challenges, then. The first is to account for the broader trends without disregarding the more specific histories of persecution and expulsion and the complexity of factors and agency involved on a local scale. The second is to attempt to understand the connection between crusades and Latin Christian treatment of non-Latin Christians. And within the context of this book, the question is how to do this on an appropriate scale.

To begin with a broad chronological overview, we have seen in earlier chapters how crusading efforts often connected to instances of anti-Latin Christian stereotypes, persecution, and violence, including violence as part of a crusade. The identities of heretics, Jews, Muslims, and pagans were often conflated or represented in a generalized way as "enemies of Christ" even while particularly derogatory stereotypes and stories, such as the blood libel, were developed and circulated about the Jews in particular, and both canonical and temporal legislation targeted Jewish communities. Various Latin Christian rulers, at various times and under various circumstances, isolated and/or expelled their Jewish subjects in the thirteenth century, even while at other moments they provided royal protection for some Jewish families and communities. Meanwhile philosophers like Ramon Llull affirmed that any Jews who refused conversion should be expelled.

Violent persecution of Jews increased in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In France and Aragon, the "Shepherds' Crusade" of 1320 killed hundreds of Jews, in part as a revolt against the Latin Christian monarchs who were ostensibly their protectors,

while the pogroms of 1391 in Seville, Castile, Aragon, and Valencia led to not only mass murder but mass forced conversions. Ferdinand and Isabella's Alhambra Decree (1492), calling for the expulsion of Jews from all their territories, is often seen as the culminating moment in these expulsions, although in reality expulsions of Jews continued onward through the early modern period. Historian Robert Chazan has suggested that in analyzing the deteriorating condition of Jews living in European Christendom, we should acknowledge three different elements—the "Church, the populace at large, and the ruling authorities"—whose interactions drove the deterioration.[42]

Meanwhile, a similar, although not identical, history was true for free Muslims living under Latin Christian rule. The Muslim colony at Lucera had diversified and even briefly became a military reserve for the Angevins before being dismantled by Charles II in 1300. Colonists' possessions were seized by the Crown of Naples and the majority of them were enslaved and sold. While Muslim communities in Iberia continued to thrive in the fourteenth century, the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries can nonetheless be identified as a period of decline in terms of their role and treatment within Latin Christian Iberian states. *Mudejáres* were alternately required or chose to live in segregated communities and laws in some places required Muslims to visually distinguish themselves.

Although it is unclear to what degree these laws were enforced or had a noticeable effect, historian Brian Catlos has urged us to recognize a complicated range of factors in the fifteenth century—economic, social, political, and religious—that "undermined the stability of Christian-Muslim relations . . . stoking the perception of Muslims as disloyal, generically distinct foreigners."[43] In 1455 Christians in Valencia attacked the city's *mudejáres* and called for their death or conversion. The royal decree ordering the conversion or departure of all remaining Muslims in Aragon-Castile was issued and executed in 1502. Something similar had already occurred in Portugal in 1496–7, while Muslim communities in Aragon were spared until 1526.

A correlation between crusading and the persecutions and expulsions so briefly described is clear but determining causal relationships is more complicated. On the one hand, it seems indisputable that ideologies encouraging violence would have had an effect, but at the same time, it also seems quite clear that the dynamics of interfaith relations were complicated and often nuanced. It may be helpful to identify points of convergence between the history of the persecution of non-Latin Christians and the history of the crusades, rather than attempting a sweeping and oversimplified explanation. One such point of convergence was particular ruling authorities, temporal or ecclesiastical. Ruling authorities clearly played a major role in determining the fates of their subjects, whether positive or negative, and we have seen repeatedly how ideologies of crusading became integrated, often enthusiastically, into ideologies of emerging national monarchies.

A second point of convergence is the many different literary, legendary, and artistic traditions that explicitly connected crusading with harmful stereotypes and the glorification of violence. It is worth underscoring, as so many scholars have, that the stereotypes, rhetoric, and imagery of persecution and expulsion took on lives of their own once created, which helped ensure that Jews and Muslims remained demonized

even after they were expelled from Latin Christendom. A third and related point of convergence is the shared refrain of the obligation of Christians to defend and/or avenge Christ and the church, and the way that obligation was linked to devotional trends, such as a focus on Christ's suffering and those who were believed to cause it.

Lastly, especially for the period of the long fifteenth century, a final point of convergence is the emerging theme of individual Christian nations as the defenders of universal Christendom/Europe, and a corresponding link between national and religious identity and unity. This allowed for the interpretation of religious non-conformity as treason and wars against those with heterodox religious views as both a national and a Christian good.[44] If we add to that the concept of blood purity that emerged in Iberia in the fifteenth century—which affirmed that the "body itself . . . passed on group, rather than exclusively familial, identity"—we see the presence of the idea that one's nationality and religion were becoming literally embodied, and thus potentially unalterable.[45]

As Rachel Burk has explained, blood purity laws—the *limpieza de sangre* in Spain and the *limpeza de sangue* in Portugal—were local statutes that began in Spain in the mid-1400s and in Portugal in the fifteenth century; the sixteenth century was the time of their greatest propagation. The laws

> prohibited recent converts to Christianity and eventually their descendants from holding select offices in government, the Church, guilds, schools, and universities. To qualify for these positions, proof of lineage free from Muslim and Jewish relatives even in generations past was required. With these entrance demands developed an inquisitional process for accessing and certifying a supposedly physical verity that ended in a set of documents called blood purity proofs, as well as a generalized social preoccupation with lineage.[46]

This concept of blood purity was not without ideological precedent. Jewish bodies had been described as biologically different for centuries, and as the last chapter discussed, at least one fourteenth-century crusading treatise believed that non-Latin Christians were unreliable due to their ancestry, even after they converted to Latin Christianity. The twin devotional foci of purity and blood within medieval Latin Christendom should also be familiar at this point. So, while new, the blood purity laws emerged from context. They were not always enforced, but their "significance is as a new idea in the larger history of exclusion, as an early instance of the institutionalization of biopolitics, and an ideological inheritance left to the Spanish and Portuguese colonies, but there transformed."[47]

The emergence of the concept of and laws related to blood purity in Iberia is just one of several indicators that in the fifteenth century we can discern the ever firmer coalescing of ideas of race and racialized identity that resemble those of modernity. The First Crusade launched what Robert Bartlett has called the "ethnicization" of Christianity, by means of which "the Christian people" or "the Christian race" became ways to refer to crusaders and their cause.[48] In the influential polemics of Bernard of Clairvaux, those fought by crusaders became explicitly non-human, but rather, agents of evil. We have seen how the Mediterranean trade in enslaved people accompanied all

warfare, including crusading. Lastly, we can acknowledge the whitening of the Latin Christian body in the thirteenth century, and the emergence of thinking about religious identity as rooted in the body and in one's culture of birth in relation to Jews but also non-Latin Christians.[49]

In the fifteenth century, the trade in enslaved people increased. Identity continued to be affirmed as, indeed, rooted in the body; thus Greek Christians were still routinely captured and some enslaved by Latin privateers such as the Hospitallers. For centuries, skin color had determined the price of an enslaved person in both Christian and Islamic markets, with lighter skin correlating with a higher price.[50] As Africa became the primary source of enslaved people in Iberia in the fifteenth century—through a process entangled with crusading, as already discussed—darker skin became ever more correlated with enslavement; in the words of James Sweet, "where blackness always had implied slavery in Castile, slavery now implied blackness."[51] And at the same time, the fear that some Christians—those whose families had converted more recently and/or under duress—were not "true" Christians would continue to drive persecution, execution, and expulsion as Europe *qua* Christendom continued to seek purification alongside expansion.

In the long fifteenth century, there were vocal critics of crusading, too. Some, among the most prominent crusade enthusiasts, criticized "modern" crusades because they failed to live up to the standards of piety, penitence, and military effectiveness believed to have been set by the First Crusade. This strand of criticism echoed many centuries of similar complaints. Other critics, like the Hussites, formulated their own ideas of holy war, thus rejecting traditional crusading even while borrowing some of the same ideas and biblical source texts.

In addition, a few rare individuals criticized crusading in new ways even while they supported the expansion and defense of Christendom. Juan de Segovia, Castilian archdeacon and professor of theology, was a humanist and ardent conciliarist who played a major role in the events leading up to the end of the Great Schism. As Ann Marie Wolf has demonstrated, his later career was dedicated to opposing crusades against the Ottomans and, simultaneously, writing against Islam and urging the conversion of Muslims through peaceful means; in his words, *via pacis et doctrine*, "the way of peace and teaching." Segovia rejected crusading for several reasons, including its long history of ineffectiveness, Christ's direction to preach, which Segovia held as incompatible with warfare, and his belief that God wanted all humans to come together as Christians. Segovia did use military imagery, however, even while arguing passionately against actual violence.[52]

Simultaneously more radical and more conventional was the position of Nicholas of Cusa, fifteenth-century humanist, theologian, and papal legate who sought reconciliation between the papacy and the German states. In his text written after the 1453 conquest of Constantinople, *De pace fidei* (Concerning the peace of faith), Nicholas imagined representatives of different nations meeting in heaven and speaking about a variety of religions and sects. These representatives ultimately agree that the "there is only one religion but many rites."[53] However, the meaning of this phrase is not quite as utopic

as it might seem; for Nicholas, the "one religion" was Latin Christianity. As a result, Christians were practicing the most accurate faith and peace among the faiths would occur only when other religions recognized this and converted. *De pace fidei* further referenced the standard Antisemitic trope that Jews would always resist the "truth" of Christianity, which corresponded with legal restrictions on Jewish attire and behavior that Nicholas himself enacted as bishop. Furthermore, Nicholas on other occasions did advocate crusading. His utopian dreams were premised on the superiority and anticipated global triumph of Latin Christianity and ultimately did not stop him from pursuing traditional courses of action.

CHAPTER 12
PERSISTENT, 1520–1750

Earlier editions of this book have argued for either an end or a serious decline in crusading from 1500 onward, even though there were lingering signs of crusade through the early modern period. However, ongoing research is rapidly unveiling crusades and crusading well into the seventeenth century, suggesting that connections between the medieval Mediterranean and the early modern Atlantic worlds were, indeed, well established. Nonetheless a complete picture of crusading through 1750 is not yet fully visible. The work of synthesizing fields, national histories, and time periods considered distinct by most historians, and thus rarely brought together in professional historical training, is incomplete. This chapter, then, more than any other in the book so far, serves to highlight where additional research and synthetic analysis is needed. It showcases both points of continuity and major changes, but it also acknowledges the work that has yet to be done and the need for collaboration across traditional geographic, chronological, and topical boundaries. It is hoped that this will help students understand the historiographical process and inspire future generations of scholars to do work that is clearly needed.

It can be stated with confidence that crusading did not simply stop with the fifteenth century nor did it become moribund at a consistent rate throughout Latin Christendom in the early modern period. The list of continuities is substantial and, notably, includes not only ideas of crusading but practices and institutions. The list of changes, however, is also significant, and includes an apparent decline in the utility of crusading as wars of European Christian nationalism and imperialism gradually took center stage.

Reformation and the "Wars of Religion"

After the seventy years of intense effort, pressure for crusading relaxed in the third decade of the sixteenth century. The papal curia was distracted by the French and imperial invasions of the Italic Peninsula and by anxiety about the activities of the newest reformers as the Lutheran revolt gained momentum. Pope Adrian VI's reaction to the news of the Ottomans' conquest of Belgrade in 1521 and of Rhodes in 1522 had been to declare a three-year truce in Europe to allow the mustering of forces to fight them. Francis I of France was reminded by the Sacred College that the glory of his house rested not on wars with its neighbors but on the part it had played in crusades, but the project collapsed in the face of yet another French assault on the Italic Peninsula. Francis and the emperor Charles V expressed their desire for a "general crusade" to be summoned by the pope in their Treaty of Madrid in 1526, and for his part, Adrian's successor, Clement VII, wanted to form a

pan-European league against the Ottomans. On August 26 of that year a Hungarian army under King Louis II of Hungary was defeated by the Ottomans in the Battle of Mohács and Louis was killed. It is not surprising that the pope continued to press for the formation of a crusade league in spite of the growing imperialist threat to the Italic Peninsula and within the curia itself, which was to lead to the imperialist occupation of Rome in 1527.

Charles V's agents demanded of Clement the summoning of a general council to reform the church and extirpate Lutheranism and linked this to the preparation of "the most desired expedition against the infidels." The association of reform with crusading was proposed again in the abortive plans for a council at Mantua in 1537 and yet again in the summons to the Council of Trent in 1544, which was convoked to resolve those matters "which relate to the removal of religious discord, the reform of Christian behaviour and the launching of an expedition against the infidel under the most sacred sign of the cross," an agenda that differed from those of the councils of the thirteenth century only in its reference to Protestantism and in the ascendant role of Charles and other national rulers in relation to the papacy.

Many Catholics continued to believe that heretics—in this case early Protestants—were as dangerous as the Ottomans, if not more so. For example, King Philip II of Spain's spokesman declared in 1566 that the Turks were less of a menace than the "internal evil" of heretics and rebels, and in his writings, the sixteenth-century French humanist Blaise de Vigenère repeatedly used the history and rhetoric of crusading to advocate for the punishment of heresy.[1] This was not a new trend; we have seen it as early as the twelfth century in the sentiments of Peter the Venerable discussed many chapters ago. But arguably the spreading popularity of new Christian sects made this "internal evil" a more tangible presence.

It was not just a question of rhetoric and ideology; crusades in the fullest sense were part of the wars of religion. In February 1524 Clement VII was expressing anxiety about both the Ottoman threat to Hungary and the activities of Martin Luther, and the proposal for a general crusade incorporated in the Treaty of Madrid two years later stated the twin aims of "the repelling and ruin . . . of the infidels and the extirpation of the errors of the Lutheran sect." Although for political reasons the Hapsburgs avoided introducing crusade ideas into the Schmalkaldic War (1546), the English rebels against King Henry VIII in the Pilgrimage of Grace (1536–7) adopted badges depicting Christ's Five Wounds that had been worn earlier by crusaders in North Africa. The exiled Cardinal Reginald Pole called for a crusade against England and this was eventually realized in the Spanish Armada of 1588, which was indulgenced and partly financed by crusade taxation. In 1551 Pope Julius III threatened King Henry II of France with a crusade for aiding the Protestants as well as the Turks. Crusade confraternities were much in evidence in the first three outbreaks of civil war in France in the 1560s—at one point the Catholics in Toulouse, besieged by the Protestant Huguenots, all assumed the wearing of white crosses—and crusading elements were to surface in the Thirty Years' War (1618–48). We have seen over and over again that internal threats were almost invariably treated more seriously by the popes, and indeed by most adherents to the Church of Rome, than external ones.

Protestant doctrines spread and evolved rapidly and by the end of the century a significant minority of European Christians no longer counted themselves as members of the Church of Rome, who for their part now called themselves "Catholics." While without exception early Protestants rejected the right of the papacy to lead a holy war, many of the reformers were committed to the idea of holy war and framed their own violence and warfare in terms that would be familiar to any student of Christian violence and the crusades. Indeed, David Trim has suggested, the Reformed Protestantism that emerged later in the sixteenth century from the fusion of Calvinism and Zwinglian reform was more emphatically "made for war" than Lutheranism or Catholicism, due to its possession of a number of key ideological and logistical factors, including predestination, a powerful collective identity and internal structure, and an apocalyptic perspective.[2]

A shared embrace of holy war caused Catholics and Protestants to fight together against common enemies, such as the Ottomans or, in the case of the English, Hapsburg Spain. While Martin Luther himself had rejected expressions of papal majesty and examples of salvation through works—and indeed, in a sort of negative echo, portrayed the "bishop of Rome" as worse than the Ottomans—his approach when preaching the right of Christians to take up arms in defense of their lands and families against the Muslims "resembled (Norman Housley has pointed out) the Catholic crusade in a number of key respects, notably its emphasis on repentance and prayer," and this "enabled Lutheran communities to work alongside their confessional foes in times of crisis." The Lutheran princes and estates voted to grant the Western emperor supplies to fight the Ottomans and in Protestant England a Form of Thanksgiving was said thrice weekly in the churches for six weeks after the successful defense of Malta in 1565. The Huguenot captain, Francis of La Noue, spent his time in prison in the early 1580s writing a *Discours politiques et militaires* which contained a project for a modified *passagium generale*, without an indulgence, to recover Constantinople. He hoped that this would unite Christendom and end the religious wars. In the following centuries Protestants were still occasionally to be found serving with the Hospitallers on Malta.

Perhaps most interestingly, both Catholics and Protestants involved in France's wars of religion made use of key moments in crusade history to justify and motivate their own efforts in the sixteenth century, as Luc Racaut has demonstrated. Catholic polemicists referenced the Albigensian Crusade as an example of the long-standing threat posed by heretics in France and what should be done to fight them. This is perhaps unsurprising, but French Protestants also embraced the Albigensian Crusade as an example of ongoing persecution of the true faith and of the inevitable need to resist persecution with violence. The fact that many thirteenth-century nobles in the Languedoc lost their lands in the course of the Albigensian Crusade was used to prod Protestant nobles into action three centuries later. These polemics were deployed in histories as well as popular tracts and ultimately, in Racaut's words, "the example of the Albigensian Crusade was used continuously as a statement against religious toleration throughout the French Wars of Religion."[3]

Indeed, both David Trim and Norman Housley have emphasized the role of religion as the most important ideological factor in European warfare from the medieval into the early modern period, whether one considers crusades, other Christian holy wars, or national warfare. Of course, the lines between those three categories could be quite hard to distinguish. As Housley explains quite clearly, on the one hand, this demonstrates the clear problems with periodization, which insists on hard and fast lines between eras and phenomena. On the other hand, this is not a simple history of static continuity. None of the forms of warfare just mentioned were precisely the same in the sixteenth century as they had been in the twelfth, even if "the conviction that human armies could literally fight God's war" had proved remarkably persistent.[4]

Crusading against the Ottomans and Their Allies

Chapter 10 began by noting that some knights in the fourteenth century were able to crusade in different times and places through their lives. It is possible to say the same now about individuals in the seventeenth century like Phillippe de Lonvilliers de Poincy (1583–1660), the French Hospitaller knight-commander who on behalf of his order fought Ottomans in the Mediterranean, Huguenots in the Atlantic, and a range of different adversaries in the Caribbean. Such "career crusaders" may be fewer on the ground in the seventeenth century than in the fourteenth; more research is needed on this as on other aspects of early modern crusading. But the point remains that there was more continuity in the long history of crusading that might at first be imagined. There was even continuity through conquests that seem to be definitive ruptures. Molly Greene has made a similar point about the Ottoman conquest of Venetian-ruled Crete in the seventeenth century, arguing that there was an "essential continuity" between Venetian and Ottoman Crete that is too readily obscured by a preoccupation with the idea of Christian versus Muslim conflict. The real newcomers in the Mediterranean Sea, she asserts, were the intruding northern powers of France, England, Holland, and, eventually, Russia.[5]

In the sixteenth century the advance of the Ottomans, however potent and terrifying they appeared to be, was becoming spasmodic, at least on the eastern land frontier, where rapid moves were followed by periods of relative peace. By 1541 the Ottoman frontier had been established in Central Europe with its capital at Buda. Vienna was besieged in 1529 and again in 1683. We shall see that a serious contest was fought in North Africa where local Muslim rulers recognized Ottoman overlordship and received Ottoman support in their contests with the Spaniards. In the Mediterranean itself the Ottomans were mopping up the islands and the remaining mainland holdings of the Latin Christians. Návplion and Monemvasia were surrendered in 1540; Chios fell in 1566 and Cyprus in 1570–1. Although Malta fought them off in 1565, Crete was conquered in 1669.

Diplomacy continued to go hand in hand with military endeavors. Venice and the empire, which were bearing the heaviest losses, were prepared to make truces with Constantinople and the Venetians went as far as to congratulate Suleiman on his capture of Rhodes and his victory at Mohács. France made alliance with the Ottomans in 1536

as part of a strategy to defend against the power of Charles V; this alliance, reinforced by Selim II's capitulations of 1569, positioned the French navy as protector of Catholic merchants and pilgrims traveling in the Ottoman Empire and this was also beneficial. More surprising was the attitude of Pope Paul IV (1555–9), whose obsession with heresy left him with little time for crusades, although he threatened Charles V and Philip II, whom he feared and hated, with one. He even considered an alliance with the Ottomans against the Habsburgs and this was among the charges for which his nephew Cardinal Carlo Carafa, who, incidentally, had been a Hospitaller, was later sentenced to death.

Crusading against the Ottomans and their allies was now confined to three zones. One of these was North Africa, where Spanish and Portuguese beachheads had been established along the northern coast as centers of conversion and as bases for the mastering of the shoreline. Meanwhile the myth of Prester John in Africa faded in the sixteenth century and crusading in West Africa had also given way to more purely commercial activity as the trade in enslaved Africans continued to intensify and become trans-Atlantic. Yet although the vast conquests in the Americas absorbed much of the energy of Castilian and Portuguese society, the efforts and resources put into the struggle for North Africa were striking. Furthermore, as a national enterprise under royal control, the Spanish crusading movement was self-reliant enough to be less affected by events elsewhere in Europe. Nonetheless they faced resistance.

An early leader of resistance to the Spaniards was a man called Aruj Barbarossa, a native of Lesbos and possibly ethnically and, at least originally, religiously Greek, who took control of Miliana, Médéa, Ténès, and Tlemcen. He was killed in 1518, but his younger brother Khayr al-Din Barbarossa took over, subjected the territories he ruled to the Ottomans and with their help took Collo, 'Annaba, Constantine, Cherchell, and, in 1529, the Rock of Algiers, which became his base. He soon built a reputation as one of the most feared privateering captains in the western Mediterranean, leading large fleets on raids as far as the Italic Peninsula. He was such a threat that in 1533 the imperial envoys treating with the Ottoman government on the exchange of Koróni, which had been retaken for Hungary in 1532, wanted the Ottomans to include in the bargain the surrender of the Rock of Algiers to the Spaniards.

In August 1534 Khayr al-Din occupied Tunis, providing himself with a base of operations uncomfortably close to southern Italy. Charles V's response was to organize an expedition to take it. A crusade was preached and indulgences were offered. The emperor himself took command "under the Crucified Saviour," with a standard of the Crucifixion, and like many crusaders before him made a preliminary pilgrimage, in his case to Montserrat to invoke the aid of the Blessed Virgin Mary. Pope Paul III sent money and six galleys. The Hospitallers sent four and the Portuguese provided galleons and caravels. On June 16, 1535, a fleet of 74 galleys and 330 other ships disembarked an army under the emperor's command not far from the spot where Louis IX of France had landed in 1270. In a great crusading victory, which Charles claimed liberated 20,000 Christian captives, the fortress of La Goulette was taken on July 14. Most of the opposing fleet was captured, Khayr al-Din's troops were defeated, Khayr al-Din withdrew, and on July 21 Tunis was sacked. The lock and bolts of its gate were sent to St. Peter's in Rome

Figure 12.1 Unknown artist, map of Algiers, sixteenth century.
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Literature for armchair travelers—including guidebooks and world maps—has been popular for thousands of years. While many Latin Christian world maps in the medieval period were largely cosmological, other approaches were developed and employed around the medieval Mediterranean. For example, cartographer Muhammad al-Idrisi (d. 1165) famously created an intricately detailed world (i.e., Afro-Eurasian) map, the *Tabula Rogeriana*, for Roger II of Sicily in 1154. The *Tabula Rogeriana* consisted of seventy double-page spreads. In the sixteenth century, Europeans used a similar approach as al-Idrisi and began publishing what they would call "atlases": world maps published in a user-friendly book format. The *Civitates orbis terrarum* ("Cities of the World") was one such atlas published in six volumes between 1572 and 1617. It features more than 500 depictions of cities and because it includes city plans, it offers a uniquely detailed look into a wide range of sixteenth-century cities. The depiction of the city of Algiers may have been created by Antonio Salamanca or by an unknown artist following Salamanca's work. It shows the Peñón of Algiers, a small island just off the coast that had been fortified and connected to the mainland. Many locations in the city are labeled with tiny numbers that correspond with descriptions at the bottom. The caption in the lower right corner tells the reader that this is a picture of "the strongly fortified city of the Algerian Saracens in Numidia, a province of Africa, near the Balearic Sea and across the Mediterranean from Spain, [and] subject to the imperial power of the Ottomans."

where Charles enjoyed an imperial triumph. While some depicted the conquest as a "new Punic war," other contemporary writers celebrated Charles' crusade by comparing Charles to the Old Testament figure of Gideon, whose conquests brought peace to the Israelites, and to the Roman emperor Titus, who in popular legendary traditions had taken Jerusalem from the rebelling Jews. Others noted in messianic tones that Charles' dominions now stretched on both sides of the Mediterranean, with some suggesting that the conquest of Tunis was the first step toward the liberation of Jerusalem.[6]

In October 1541 Charles led the forces of his empire on an assault on Algiers, which was unsuccessful because a gale scattered his fleet and convinced him that he could not supply the army he had landed. Among those with him who tried to persuade him to persist with the enterprise was Hernando Cortes, the conqueror of Mexico. Then in June 1550 Charles sent a fleet to besiege Mahdia which had been the goal of Louis of Clermont's crusade in 1390. It had recently become the base of Khayr al-Din's successor as the leading North African privateer, a native of West Asia called Turghud Ali (Dragut). The Spanish took the town on September 8, although Turghud Ali slipped away. The sultan appointed him governor of Tripoli, which had been given to the Hospitallers in 1530 but was lost to the Ottomans on August 14, 1551.

The Hospitallers, whose reputation had not been enhanced by their lackluster defense of the place—200 of them had surrendered—pressed King Philip II of Spain to reoccupy Tripoli. Pope Paul IV granted crusade indulgences, which were renewed by Pope Pius IV, and in February 1560 a fleet of at least forty-seven galleys provided by Spain, Genoa, Florence, Naples, Sicily, the papacy, and the Hospitallers, together with forty-three other ships, carried an army of 11,000–12,000 men of various nationalities to the island of Djerba at the southern entrance of the Gulf of Gabès, a key strategic position in the Mediterranean. Djerba had been the object of many military expeditions from Latin Christendom, especially the kingdom of Sicily, starting in the twelfth century, but now it was finally conquered.[7] The crusaders took possession of its fortress on March 13 as a first step toward the recapture of Tripoli. They knew that there would be an Ottoman counter-stroke and they worked hard to improve the fortifications, although many of them were being struck down with typhus. In May the bulk of the crusade army began to re-embark, planning to leave behind a garrison of 2,200 Spaniards, Italians, and Germans, but there was no time to complete an orderly embarkation before an Ottoman armada was upon it. On May 11 the Christian fleet was destroyed with the loss of twenty-seven galleys. The garrison of Djerba had very little water because the two cisterns in the castle were almost dry, but it managed to produce about thirty barrels a day through distillation. By July 27 it had run out of the wood needed to heat the stills and many men were dying of thirst and scurvy. The siege was over by July 31.

Box 12.1 John Parisot of la Valette (1494–1568)

Born into a family long associated with the Hospitallers, John de la Valette entered the Order at the age of twenty and was present at the siege of Rhodes in 1522. Fluent

in several languages, including Arabic and Turkish, he combined propensities to both violence and piety in a way typical of so many crusaders. In 1538 he was imprisoned for four months for nearly beating a layman to death. He was appointed to the highly exposed and dangerous governorship of Tripoli for two years, but in 1541 he was captured by privateers and used by them as a galley slave until his release was negotiated. Held to be one of the finest sea-captains of the age, he was chosen to be captain-general of the Order's galleys in 1554. In 1557, the Order, mindful of the attack that was sure to come, elected him grand master. After the Ottoman besiegers had been driven from Malta in 1565—a triumph for which he was rightly given the credit—he commissioned the building of the new city of Valletta on the peninsula where there had been the fiercest fighting, laying the first stone himself.

Clearly Spain and Portugal were more concerned about North Africa than the eastern Mediterranean and the papacy understood this. In the period leading up to the Battle of Lepanto in 1571 Spain was persuaded to subordinate its interests in favor of naval campaigns eastward, but this did not alter the fact that Tunis, which Charles V had restored to a dependent Muslim ruler in 1535, posed a constant threat to the Spanish outpost at La Goulette. In 1569 Tunis was occupied by Uluç-Ali Reis, another Algerian privateer and Ottoman admiral who was to be the loser at Lepanto, and this convinced the Spaniards that something had to be done. With the collapse of the Holy League, which will be described below, Don John of Austria took Tunis with hardly a fight on October 11, 1573, and went on to capture Bizerte. The Ottoman response was immediate. On May 13, 1574, an enormous fleet of 240 galleys left Constantinople for the North African coast. After a month's siege they took La Goulette on August 25 and recaptured Tunis on September 13.

The Iberians had now been pushed into the far west of North Africa. The Ottomans and their allies strengthened their grip on the coast, helping their own candidate for the sharifate, 'Abd al-Malik, to take Fez in 1576. The Spanish government began to look secretly for peace with them, but King Sebastian of Portugal launched himself into what may have been the last *passagium generale*—as opposed to a crusade league—against Muslims, fortified with indulgences and accompanied by papal legates. He landed at Asilah, in command of an army of 15,000 foot and 1,500 horse—Portuguese, Spaniards, Germans, Netherlanders, and a papal force originally destined for Ireland under the command of the Englishman Sir Thomas Stukeley—together with several thousand non-combatants. By August 3, 1578, he had reached Ksar el-Kebir (Alcácer-Quivir), but he was now out of touch with his fleet and short of provisions. On August 4 he was faced by a greatly superior North African army and in the ensuing battle of "the Three Kings," Sebastian, 'Abd al-Malik, and his predecessor, to whom Sebastian was allied, all succumbed. This defeat was a disaster for Portugal.

The two other theaters of crusading warfare against the Ottomans and their allies, Hungary and the eastern Mediterranean, were linked strategically and so can be treated together. In the autumn of 1529 Sultan Suleiman laid siege to Vienna for three weeks and

anxiety about his advance impelled Charles V and Clement VII into an alliance. Francis I of France, who had been at war with Charles, was forced to make peace with him. As far as the pope was concerned, a threat to the heart of Europe had brought into existence the general peace for which he had been striving; as so many theorists and crusaders had hoped over the centuries, waging holy war against an external enemy produced peace, however temporary, in Christendom. On February 2, 1530, three weeks before Charles was to be crowned Western emperor by Clement in Bologna, the representatives of a dozen states, mostly Italian but also including the empire and Hungary, were asked by the pope to secure the necessary authority to commit their masters to a "general expedition against the infidels." Clement authorized crusade preaching in the empire and for the next two years worked hard to get an expedition going, but his efforts were nullified by hostility between France and the empire and by the Lutheran problem.

Charles' triumph at Tunis in 1535 had revived the hopes for a crusade eastward. In January 1536 Pope Paul III assured King Sigismund I of Poland that he was working for the recovery of Constantinople and in the middle of September 1537 a Veneto-papal crusade league was formed and a commission of cardinals was appointed to plan a campaign. However, this coincided with an alliance between France and the Ottomans to attack Italy, which in the event was a failure because their moves were not synchronized. In February 1538 Charles joined the league. If it was successful he was to become emperor in Constantinople and the Hospitallers were to get back Rhodes. He was to pay half the expenses, the Venetians a third and the papacy one-sixth. The pope managed to persuade France and the empire to sign a ten-year truce, but in September the league's fleet was defeated off Préveza at the entrance to the Gulf of Arta by a navy under Khayr al-Din's command. The pope, who intended, he said, to go on crusade himself, encouraged Charles to take up arms again in the following spring, but the league faded away and in 1540 the Venetians made peace with the Ottomans, paying an indemnity of 300,000 ducats and ceding to them Návplion and Monemvasia, their last fortresses in the Peloponnese. They were not to recover any important holdings in continental Greece until 1685.

The disaster at Préveza put paid to crusading in the eastern Mediterranean for some time. In the late 1550s Pope Paul IV was not interested and although his successor Pope Pius IV was more conventional—he said he would like to accompany the expedition of another league, for there was no more glorious way to die than on a crusade—the imperial government was anxious for peace on its eastern frontier. Truces—interspersed with outbreaks of war—were arranged with the Ottomans in 1545, 1547, 1554, 1562, 1565, and 1568. By the late 1560s, however, it was clear that the Ottomans were preparing to seize Venetian Cyprus. On March 25, 1570, their demands for its surrender reached Venice. The Republic, which had sought to avoid committing itself to an alliance with Spain since that would involve it in the defense of the Spanish possessions in North Africa, now turned in desperation to King Philip II. A large fleet of papal, Genoese, Venetian, Sicilian, and Neapolitan ships was hurriedly assembled, but after reaching Rhodes it withdrew to Crete on hearing of the fall of Nicosia. The Turks had landed on Cyprus on July 1, taken Nicosia on September 9, and received the surrender of Famagusta after a sustained defense on August 5, 1571.

On the previous May 25 a Holy League of the papacy, Spain and Venice had been formed after intense diplomatic efforts. As in 1538 Spain would pay half the costs, Venice a third and Pius V one-sixth. The Venetians would assist in the defense of Spanish North Africa. This was to be a perpetual alliance, committed to annual campaigns in the eastern Mediterranean, and Don John of Austria, Charles V's illegitimate son and so Philip of Spain's half-brother, was to be its first commander-in-chief. John reached Naples on August 9, 1571, and was ceremoniously presented with the standard which was to fly over his ship: an enormous embroidery of the Crucifixion, embellished with the arms of the three allies. His command, the largest fleet assembled by crusaders in the sixteenth century, supplemented by vessels provided by Savoy, Genoa, and the Hospitallers, consisted of 209 galleys, 6 galleasses, 27 large ships, and many smaller ones. It carried 30,000 men, 28,000 of whom were professional infantry. It set sail on September 16 from Messina with the aim of engaging an Ottoman armada of 275 vessels that had been cruising in the southern Aegean and the Adriatic.

Battle was joined on October 7 at the point near Lepanto where the Gulfs of Corinth and Patras meet. John had more heavy cannon and his gunners were better trained. The Ottomans were overwhelmed by the European gunfire. Their losses were immense and were said to include 30,000 men killed or captured, 117 galleys taken, and 80 vessels destroyed. Lepanto is not regarded nowadays as the watershed it once was, but the effect on European morale can scarcely be exaggerated and in a sermon that was printed and widely circulated the French humanist Mark-Anthony Muret declared that the Europeans must now push on to Judaea and liberate the Holy Sepulchre. The anniversary is still celebrated in the Catholic Church as the Feast of Our Lady of the Rosary.

The Holy League was reaffirmed on February 10, 1572. Pope Pius made great efforts to extend its membership and on March 12 he issued a long brief addressed to all the faithful, in which he renewed the crusade in terms that would have been familiar to Innocent III nearly four centuries before:

> We admonish, require and exhort every individual to decide to aid this most holy war either in person or with material support. . . . To those who do not go personally but send suitable men at their expense according to their means and station in life . . . and to those similarly who go personally but at another's expense and put up with the labours and peril of war . . . we grant most full and complete pardon, remission and absolution of all their sins, of which they have made oral confession with contrite hearts, the same indulgence which the Roman pontiffs, our predecessors, were accustomed to concede to crusaders going to the aid of the Holy Land. We receive the goods of those going to war . . . under the protection of St Peter and ourselves.

A large advance fleet engaged the Ottomans in early August. The encounters were inconclusive, although they again demonstrated the superiority of European gunnery.

Joined by John of Austria and with the number of vessels swelled to 195 galleys, 8 galleasses, 25 galiots, and 25 other ships, the Europeans then tried to take Methóni and Pilos in the Peloponnese. They failed and in spite of the efforts of the papacy the Holy League dissolved in 1573 with the Venetians making peace with the Ottomans and the Spaniards turning their attention back to North Africa. Pope Gregory XIII spent the rest of his pontificate trying unsuccessfully to form another league.

The early seventeenth century saw the election of popes committed to reform and, at least in the case of Paul V, actively committed to crusading as part of the reform project. But the papacy switched tactics starting in the early 1620s under Gregory XV, instead prioritizing communication between Catholic Christendom and Christian communities under Ottoman rule, as well as more purely missionary efforts in both the Americas and West Asia.[8]

But when the Ottomans invaded Venetian Crete in 1645 indulgences were granted to the defenders. In nearly twenty-four years of war, until Iráklion surrendered on September 26, 1669, the Venetian fleet, supplemented by galleys and other ships provided by the popes and the Hospitallers, undertook a series of aggressive operations in the Aegean, with the aim of blocking the Dardanelles. In 1656 the islands of Bozcaada (Tenedos) and Limnos near the mouth of the Dardanelles were taken and were held for a year. These wars were described by the papacy as a *res Christiana* (Christian matter) but indulgences were only granted once, in 1645.

The Venetians and Hospitallers were not the only forces fighting the Ottomans, however. As Phil McCluskey has conclusively demonstrated, the 1660s were a decade of French warfare against the Ottomans at Crete, as well as in Hungary and North Africa. The French nobility, some of them members of orders such as the Ordre du Saint-Sepulchre and the Ordre du Saint-Esprit, were "eager to perform an active form of piety" even though they denigrated the Ottomans much more as cultural "barbarians" than as Muslims. Louis XIV's government capitalized on the mood of the nobles with the rhetoric and imagery of Christian holy war "against the enemies of the Christian name," particularly in relation to campaigns in the Mediterranean. A group of Capuchin and Oratorian clerics exhorted the French volunteers at the sortie at Candia in 1668 to die for their faith, while the French galleys had been ordered to fly standards bearing a crucifix. McCluskey argues that these were examples of the "crusading theme" in play but not "true religious-inspired enthusiasm," and certainly Louis XIV's government abandoned the tactic after the 1660s, when it became clear that it was no longer effective. Furthermore, McCluskey highlights, the emphasis on crusading was noticeably more intense in the campaigns in North Africa than in Hungary. He suggests this may have been due to the presence of the Knights of Malta at the North African campaigns.[9]

Meanwhile, in 1666, the London Gazette reported inaccurately but excitedly that a military alliance had formed between united Jewish tribes and "Arabs" in West Asia, conquered Mecca and Medina, destroyed Muhammad's tomb, and was marching toward Jerusalem. As Adam Knobler has explained, this rumor—which seems to have been taken seriously—built upon a number of different factors, including a long-established mythology of the "lost 10 tribes of Israel" as well as heightened eschatological and

millennial expectations among Catholics and Protestants in England in the seventeenth century. And in some minds, at least, there may have been the memory of David ha-Reuveni, who in the early sixteenth century traveled in Europe seeking support for a Jewish-Christian military campaign against the Ottomans; he was eventually discredited but at first taken seriously, with the papacy recommending him to Joao III of Portugal. In any event, as Knobler underscores, the fact that news of a Jewish army advancing toward Jerusalem was seen as praiseworthy and exciting in the mid-seventeenth century vividly demonstrates the degree to which European Christians had accepted the Renaissance crusading idea that Christian Europe represented civilization first and foremost, rather than simply the religion of Christianity; this acceptance opened the door for the possibility of "civilized" allies who were not themselves Christian.[10]

Not all European Christians were supporters of war and crusades in particular, it must be said. Many plans for peace in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries centered on a desire for peace in Christendom, with just and/or holy wars waged elsewhere only when necessary and ultimately leading to universal peace upon the creation of a universal Christendom. It goes without saying that such plans ignored the preexisting centuries of warfare within Christendom, let alone the wars of religion from the sixteenth century onward. But they represented an ongoing belief in, or at the least a hope for, both the inevitable expansion and triumph of Christianity and a peace that would accompany such triumph.

There were some voices arguing against war without qualification, although not as many as might be thought. Albrecht Classen has drawn our attention to sixteenth-century German poets such as Hans Sachs and Hans Wilhelm Kirchhof, who used their art to draw attention to the unmitigated horrors of war for non-combatants and to argue against any form of war.[11]

Some sought to straddle the line, not willing to commit to complete opposition to warfare but perceiving even just war in defense of Christendom at best as "a medicine which stood a fair chance of killing the patient," in the words of Norman Housley.[12] Erasmus is sometimes seen as inconsistent in his views on holy war, but Housley argues that in fact Erasmus' thought reflected an essential paradox with which he wrestled throughout his career. On the one hand, Erasmus firmly rejected crusading. On the other, he acknowledged the Ottomans were a serious threat, and unless one were willing to surrender to them, the question of when and how war against them should be waged had to be considered. Erasmus' views on war against the Ottomans evolved over time and certainly he expressed them in different ways to different audiences. But at the heart was an unsolvable paradox and Erasmus' final verdict on war against the Ottomans reflected this: when absolutely necessary war could and should be waged, but at the same time, even such a necessary war would undermine the reform of Christian society and the conversion of the Ottomans, outcomes for which Erasmus sorely hoped.

Critics of crusading and warfare against the Ottomans were unable to gain traction primarily because the Ottomans remained a present threat. Norman Housley has argued that this geopolitical reality played an important role in ensuring the ongoing sanctification of warfare in the early modern period. It served not only to reinforce earlier themes and

trends, such as eschatological beliefs and familiar rhetoric of "liberation" from "idolators" and "savage beasts," as letters of the Patriarch of Constantinople to European leaders emphasized in the early seventeenth century,[13] but also to create the opportunity for the development of "new vocabulary and images for use in conceptualizing Christendom's internal fault lines."[14] As already discussed, Christendom required moral reform and struggle against the "internal Turk" if war against the Ottomans was to be effective, and for both reasons—reform and victory in war—crusading was at least useful if not essential.

In March 1684, a new Holy League involving the papacy, Poland, the empire, and Venice was formed by Pope Innocent XI following the second unsuccessful Ottoman siege of Vienna. The League was supported by preaching, crusade tenths, enthusiastic recruitment, and prayers of intercession at home, reminiscent of earlier centuries. It embarked on a war that lasted until 1699 and impoverished the papal curia. Buda was taken in 1686, Belgrade was held from 1688 to 1690, and there was a consolidation of Christian gains in Hungary and Transylvania. Between 1685 and 1687 the Venetians occupied almost the whole of the Peloponnese and they held Athens from October 1687 to April 1688, blowing up the Parthenon in the process of taking it. They seized the island of Levkás in 1684 and they held Chios for five months in 1694–5. Thousands of "volunteers" fought in Crete and in the armies of the Holy League of 1684, which was a good deal more successful than the leagues of the sixteenth century. In 1715 the Ottomans again advanced in the Peloponnese; in 1716, the empire and Venice allied to fight the Ottomans, and the battles of what are known as the Ottoman-Venetian War were populated, again, with European "volunteers." Were these late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century "volunteers" crusaders? No researcher has yet examined these conflicts in terms of crusading, but it seems that we are justified at least in supposing that they may have considered themselves as such. This is perhaps especially true in the late seventeenth century, when the full apparatus of early modern crusading—league, preaching, taxation, prayers, recruitment, and participation from many nations—remained present, and when, as we shall see, crusading was very much alive in other ways.

Crusading in the Caribbean and Americas

Fifteen years after the publication of Carol Delaney's pivotal article "Columbus's Ultimate Goal: Jerusalem," the topic of crusading in the Caribbean and Americas has been addressed by more scholars but remains in sore need of attention from historians equally expert in the study of the crusades and the early modern Atlantic world. Simply becoming such a historian is no small feat, since the two fields of study are usually divided on lines of periodization in undergraduate and graduate programs alike. Nonetheless, it is hoped this section will help spur that work on by showing that the questions of to what extent and in what ways crusading was part of the history of that early modern Atlantic world are valid and important ones.

As the previous chapter discussed, Iberian and Danish conquests in the Atlantic started in the early fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, respectively. Portuguese and Spanish conquests in the Americas also began in the fifteenth century, with boundaries between their respective imperial holdings in the western hemisphere formally set by the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494. Dutch and English conquests and colonization in the Americas came later, in the seventeenth century. The previous chapter discussed the relationship of crusading with conquest and colonization in the fifteenth century. What, now, if anything, connects the history of the crusades with European conquest and colonization in the sixteenth century and beyond?

We can start by acknowledging the role of Christianity—and specifically elements of the history of Christianity that also relate to the history of crusading—in European conquest and colonization. James Muldoon, who dedicated so much of his career to researching points of continuity between medieval and early modern European thought and practices related to Spanish empire, argued in *Popes, Lawyers and Infidels* (1979) that Christianity was the single most important element shaping Spanish and indigenous relations in the Americas. This can be seen both among those who criticized Spanish empire and those who sought to justify it, as Muldoon outlined in *The Americas in the Spanish World Order* (1994). For example, both Bartolome de Las Casas, a passionate critic of Spanish treatment of indigenous peoples, and Juan de Solorzano Pereira, who sought to provide a moral and legal framework for Spanish empire, made use of the canon law tradition on the relationships between Latin Christians and non-Christians that stretched back to the thirteenth century at least. Furthermore, Muldoon argued in *The Spiritual Conversion of the Americas* (2004) that in the broader context of the wars of religion, Catholics and Protestants alike saw a "spiritual opportunity" in the Americas as they tried to outdo each other in terms of converts and the resources needed to support their efforts against each other.

Of course the history of Christianity and the history of the crusades are not identical. At this point, the evidence for more concrete connections between crusading and European conquest and colonization is limited by scholars' work more than anything else, because what evidence we do have is indicative. First, the "most remarkable instance of the survival of medieval crusading privileges" can be found in the Spanish and Portuguese conquests—not only in Africa (as discussed in the last chapter) but in the Americas.[15] *Conquistadores* wore crosses; they were recruited using preaching tactics developed for the crusades, they were justified—as both James Brundage and Muldoon have demonstrated—in terms of canon law traditions developed in the context of crusading in earlier centuries, and they were granted legal privileges previously given to crusaders. Specific devotional themes and literary-historical narratives also accompanied the *conquistadores*, as discussed more further.

Second, there are tantalizingly glimpses of how the conquering Europeans themselves saw their actions as crusades. We saw in the last chapter that the cross, emblem of the military Order of Christ, appeared on the sails of Portugal's ships as they embarked on expeditions led by members of the Order. Now, Matthew Voss has shown how virtually identical symbology can be seen in a map intended for the highest levels of the Portuguese

Figure 12.2 The Jorge Reinel Chart of the Atlantic, *c.* 1540.
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court and government in the mid-sixteenth century (Figure 12.2). The map depicts Europe, Africa, and the Americas, with the Atlantic squarely in the center. On the map, two different symbols are used: the Portuguese royal standard, indicating areas firmly under Portuguese control, and the Cross of the Order of Christ, designating regions Portugal had claimed but not in fact settled or where they faced armed resistance. Voss concludes, "By marking them with the Cross of the Order of Christ, [the map] associated struggling and problematic areas of empire with the ideology of crusade, the basis of its ecclesiastical authority and right of conquest."[16] In other words, the map demonstrates the importance of crusading to Portuguese self-justification.

Third, the Hospitallers (now known also as the Knights of Malta) were quite literally present in the Caribbean and the Americas, both as individual actors and as an order. This is hardly surprising when we consider the entanglement of military orders and the "frontiers" of Latin Christendom from the twelfth century onward, and the brother knights clearly saw their activities in North Africa and the Peloponnese in the period in similar terms. What is perhaps less recognized and studied is the degree to which that transferred into the western hemisphere in the early modern period. As David Allen has summarized, we particularly see the involvement of French brother knights in relation to French colonization. Some examples include efforts to create a priory in Acadia (1635); the founding of a convent, chapel, and hospital near Quebec with funds from the Troyes commandery (1637); and participation in the Mississippi venture (1717–20).[17]

Map 15 The Seventeenth-Century Caribbean.

The most work so far has been done on the career of Philippe de Lonvilliers de Poincy, who as we have already seen was a committed member of the Order. Louis XIII of France appointed him lieutenant-general of French holdings in the Caribbean and he departed thence in 1639. He had previously fought Huguenots in France in the 1620s and subsequently commanded Fort La Hève in 1632 under then lieutenant-general Isaac de Razilly, who was also a Knight of Malta and lord of Port Royal. As David Allen has explained, de Razilly seems to have seen in the Americas an opportunity for the Order of Malta to advance its efforts to expand Christendom through conversion, going so far as to offer the revenues of Port Royal to the Grand Master if a priory might be established.

Under de Poincy's leadership, properties on St. Christopher were further developed—both fortifications and sugar plantations were added—and some nearby islands were conquered, including St Croix. De Poincy ordered significant building projects on St Croix, including a fortified palace complex with sugar refinery, stables, church, separate residences for servants and enslaved laborers, surgeon's house and pharmacy, furnaces, workshops for carpenters and stonemasons, prisons, and more. As Zammit concludes, it was clearly meant to be self-sufficient if necessary.[18]

The Order was convinced to purchase the relevant group of islands in 1653, at which point de Poincy became the islands' governor on behalf of the Order. In this role he seems to have prioritized pragmatism, dealing diplomatically with Protestant neighbors in the short term and, in contrast to Mediterranean conventions, refusing to free children born to enslaved parents. The papacy was kept apprised of all these efforts, indicating that de Poincy believed that his undertakings on behalf of the Order would be considered important in Rome. But the eagerness of de Racilly and de Poincy was not matched by most in the Order—who felt their efforts detracted from work in the Mediterranean—and de Poincy died in 1660. In 1665 the Order sold the islands back to the French crown for a very small sum, which seems to have irritated the Spanish. While the net sum of all the efforts of the Knights of Malta in the Caribbean and the Americas seems small in hindsight, and while certainly the majority of the brother knights prioritized efforts in Afro-Eurasia, it seems that the Order did not necessarily distinguish between the expansion and defense of Christendom in the two hemispheres, and that some felt their duties as Knights of Malta extended into and across the Atlantic.

Practices of Crusading

We have seen in prior chapters the growing trend toward the fusion of crusading and nationalism. This fusion took varied forms: crusade leagues formed between nation-states; military orders that were based or recruited within particular nationalities; royal foundation and leadership of military orders; order-states such as Prussia and Malta. If we cast a wider net, then the increasing dominance of "sanctified patriotism" in Europe may also appear related to this fusion, although it is important to note that sanctified patriotism did not emerge solely from crusading.

From the sixteenth century onward, we see many of the same trends. The last crusade league was in 1684; military orders based within particular nationalities or with leadership from a particular crown continued beyond the chronological boundaries of this chapter into the modern period; and the order-state of Malta persisted and arguably thrived. Sanctified patriotism—Christian nationalism, in other words—was fully ascendant and expressed in global empires. This was not least because, in the words of Norman Housley, existing eschatological traditions linked to crusading "furnished a varied menu of prophetic insights within which such events as Columbus's Atlantic crossing, and the overseas discoveries of the Spanish and Portuguese, could be interpreted providentially, to balance out such forbidding elements as the Ottoman advance and to instill a feeling of hope."[19] At the same time, there were changes. Some of these changes consisted of the formalization of trends already in play while others were more dramatic.

Military Orders

In sixteenth-century Iberia, de facto royal control of various military orders gave way to rulers' assumption of government over them de jure by means of papal grants. To view this change as a profound form of "secularization" would be inaccurate, because elements from their religious past were retained and also because their missions continued to be conceptualized in explicitly sacral and universalizing terms. Their knights continued to serve in North Africa, Mediterranean galley fleets, and overseas empires—the management of Portugal's was entrusted to the Order of Christ—and their membership continued to entail public, as opposed to private, obligations that related to the defense of Christendom or the faith. For example, in the early sixteenth century both clerics and armsbearers joined military orders in Portugal and were equally expected to fulfill a number of spiritual obligations that marked the orders as religious orders. The armsbearers ("knights" or "brother knights") also vowed to fight to defend the Christian faith.[20] And the papacy did not fully relinquish its prerogatives. Pope Pius V (1566–72) ordered the Portuguese military orders to take up position on the North African frontier and even decreed that no brother could be professed until he had served for three years there; he wanted to establish a seminary in Africa for the training of young brother knights. From 1552 Santiago maintained three or four galleys, which were incorporated into the Spanish Mediterranean fleet.

The Iberian orders continued to influence a number of new creations that mirrored their nature. They included the Tuscan Order of St. Stephen (1562), which ran an effective navy for nearly two centuries; the Savoyard Order of St. Maurice and St. Lazarus (1572) and the French Order of Our Lady of Mount Carmel and St Lazarus (1609), both of which incorporated the last independent elements of the Order of St. Lazarus; and the Parmese Constantinian Order of St. George (1697). This trend continued into the modern period.

In the meantime, the oldest international military orders—the Teutonic Knights and the Hospitallers—enjoyed very different fates in the early modern period. In 1525 the grand master of the Teutonic Order, Albert of Brandenburg, adopted Lutheranism and was enfeoffed by the king of Poland as hereditary duke of Prussia. In 1562 the last master

of Livonia, Gotthard Kettler, also became a Lutheran duke. The commandery of Utrecht adopted Calvinism and still exists as the charitable body in the Netherlands to which reference has just been made. The rest of the Order survived as a Catholic institution only in southern Germany, where from its headquarters at Mergentheim its grand master ruled over a little court. It continued to play a part in the Habsburg wars against Ottomans and Protestants, maintaining from 1696 a regiment in the Habsburg army. It was now relatively small—in 1699 it comprised only ninety-four knights and fifty-eight priests—but it remained a functioning military order.

Although the Hospital of St. John survived, and indeed flourished, as we shall see, it lost its northern provinces. The north German brothers, who had already carved out for themselves a separate province in 1382, adopted Lutheranism and formed a Protestant bailiwick which eventually bought itself freedom from the grand magistry on Malta and survives today as the Bailiwick of Brandenburg. In Denmark the Order also lived on for a time as a Lutheran establishment, but then gradually ceased to function. In England, Norway, and Sweden it was dissolved and its property was confiscated, although it was briefly revived in England under Queen Mary. In Scotland the last Hospitaller commander, James Sandilands, converted to Calvinism and was granted the Order's lands as a secular barony in 1564.

But the Order continued to thrive as an order-state, playing major roles in international politics and European expansion through the seventeenth century, as we have already glimpsed. Within a year of their evacuation of Rhodes the Hospitallers of St John had been negotiating for a new base. On March 23, 1530, the emperor Charles V granted them the islands of Malta and Gozo and the North African city of Tripoli. By putting them in the front line of the defense of the Spanish African holdings, he made use of them just as his predecessors, the monarchs of Castile, had employed Iberian military orders for centuries. For their part, the Hospitallers employed traditional crusade ideas of liberation and reconquest of "Christian lands" in marshaling support for the defense of Tripoli. They even went so far as to imagine transferring their convent from Malta to Tripoli, seeing in Tripoli the potential for an African order-state under their rule that would resemble the crusader states of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.[21] Eighteen months after receiving Tripoli, the Hospitallers tried to demonstrate their worth to the general cause of Christendom by sacking Methóni in the Peloponnese. The pope was not impressed and said that it would have been better for them to have occupied the place instead of looting it, but this raid probably led to the suggestion in 1533 that they be given charge of Koróni, which had recently been recaptured.

The Hospitallers' plans for a new crusader state in North Africa came to naught with their surrender of Tripoli in 1551, but any loss of prestige was more than compensated for by their defense of Malta in 1565 against an enormous and well-equipped Ottoman army, sent to clear Constantinople's line of communication with North Africa. On May 19 the invasion force of between 25,000 and 30,000 men began to land. To resist them the grand master, John of la Valette, had less than 10,000, including *c.* 500 brother knights and some brother sergeants-at-arms. The assault lasted until September 8 when,

having sustained very heavy losses, the Ottomans withdrew in the face of a relief force of between 8,500 and 10,000 Spaniards and Italians. They left a scene of ruin and desolation on the shore of the Grand Harbour, in the midst of which stood only a few of the original defenders still capable of bearing arms. Of the 500 brother knights at the start of the siege, 300 were dead and most of the rest were wounded.

The Hospitallers had not been enthusiastic about Malta at first, a small and infertile island of ninety-five square miles with its fortifications in poor repair. Memories of the past were kept alive by the way the churches built by them—of St. John, St. Catherine, Our Lady of Victory—were given the same patrons as their churches on Rhodes. Nor were they prepared to embark on an ambitious building program at first: they satisfied themselves with a few simple conventual buildings and the construction of two forts. After 1565, with their reputation enhanced and with so much energy expended and blood spilt, their attitude changed. A new city, designed by Francesco Laparelli, decorated by Girolamo Cassar and named after John of la Valette, was built on the peninsula overlooking the Grand Harbour which had been the scene of some of the fiercest fighting. A feature of it was the incorporation of the conventual buildings into the town rather than in a separate compound, so that the whole city became as it were a monastic enclosure. It was massively fortified and the Hospitallers continued to improve the fortifications around the Grand Harbour in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Alain Blondy has described the Order's cultural emphases in the later sixteenth century as a combination of "noble and military engagement on behalf of the faith."[22] The new priority on Malta can be seen in the new names of the Order and its brother knights—the Order and Knights of Malta—and its relevance can be seen in the ongoing contest between Spain and France to exert influence on and benefit from the Order.

It used to be thought that the history of the Order of Malta in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries was one of decline or anachronism; that is now recognized to be inaccurate. It is true that the brothers' vows were being fulfilled in a more flexible manner, that many European commanders were absentee, that others lived the solitary lives of affluent country gentlemen on the Order's estates and that the Order's government was increasingly autocratic and gerontocratic, since seniority was everything. Although between 1526 and 1612 chapters-general met on average every six years, none was summoned between 1631 and 1776, when financial concerns forced one on a grand master who was anyway inclined to reform. For most of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, therefore, the Order's management depended solely on the master, whose title had been elevated to that of grand master in the Rhodian period.

But the Order was still thriving. In 1700 it had 560 commanderies throughout Catholic Europe. It benefited substantially from Counter-Reformation enthusiasm in seventeenth-century Europe and the Vatican itself, as well as from France's ascendancy in the Mediterranean. There was the serious pursuit of pious, charitable, and missionary goals, often in collaboration with the Jesuits, alongside the traditional concerns for the care of the sick poor and the defense of Christendom. The atmosphere in the convent on Malta was devotional, if rather puritanical. The Order still attracted recruits and between 1635 and 1740 the number of brothers, predominantly knights, in fact rose from 1,715 to

2,240, of whom *c.* 600 were resident on the island. Anthony Luttrell has pointed out that although it was a noble corporation the Hospital attracted "entrants with a remarkable and vigorous range of thoroughly up-to-date military, diplomatic, scientific and artistic interests and talents." The Order's magnificent library in Valletta still testifies to the cultured interests of many brothers, who included men like Louis de Boisgelin and Déodat de Dolomieu. A corollary, of course, was the arrival of Enlightenment ideas, and even Freemasonry, among them.

The Knights of Malta remained a foreign elite on the island of Malta, a closed oligarchic caste which refused to admit into its higher ranks even the Maltese nobles, whose sons could only enter as chaplains, although families did sometimes arrange for children to be born in Sicily in the hope of qualifying them for admission. The grand masters ruled their order-state as benevolent, if rather unimaginative, despots. They built hospitals, encouraged works of art, and founded a famous school of anatomy in 1676 to supplement their hospital. They ran a health service for the population, which rose from *c.* 20,000 in 1530 to over 90,000 in 1788, mainly in response to the employment provided by the dockyards and arsenals. After 1566, when the decision to found Valletta was taken, the building campaign attracted laborers from the countryside and about 8,000 workers from Sicily, and the urban complex around the Grand Harbour grew rapidly. By 1590 there were 7,750 residents in Valletta and "The Three Cities," by 1614 *c.* 11,200 and by 1632 *c.* 18,600. Like Rhodes, Malta became an important commercial center, handling a growing volume of shipping and acting as the entrepôt for goods on their way even to the Americas.

Malta was not legally autonomous. It was a fief of the kingdom of Sicily and there was a political crisis in 1753–5 when King Charles VII of Naples wanted to exercise his rights as sovereign. Stage by stage, however, the grand masters had been assuming the attributes of sovereignty. They had begun to mint their own coinage as soon as they had conquered Rhodes and from that island they had sent ambassadors to the courts of Europe, whose function was often to defend their estates and privileges from predators. Their ambassadors from Malta were officially received in Rome, France, Spain, and Austria. The grand master was made a prince of the empire in 1607, nearly 400 years after the grand master of the Teutonic Knights, but it was Grand Master Manoel Pinto (1741–73) who completed the process by adopting a closed crown, the signifier of full sovereignty.

The Hospitallers continued to fulfill their military role. They played a part in nearly all the leagues and major campaigns against the Ottomans, including the defense of Crete, to which they made a major contribution. To this day the keys of the fortresses of Passava, Lepanto, and Patras in Greece and Hammamet in Tunisia, which were stormed between 1601 and 1603, hang in the chapel of Our Lady of Philermos in their conventual church in Valletta. In 1664 they attacked Algiers and in 1707 they helped the Spaniards hold Oran. Their ships were regularly at sea, cruising along the North African coast and throughout an area bordered by Sicily and Sardinia in the west and Crete and the Peloponnese in the east, with the aim of clearing the Mediterranean of Muslim pirates. As we have seen, they had a fleet of seven or eight war galleys.

After 1705 they gradually replaced these with a squadron of four or five ships of the line, mounting fifty or sixty guns each. Although the maintenance of this force was a very great expense—in the seventeenth century an average of 45 percent of the headquarters' revenues were spent on it—the Hospitallers kept up an aggressive and quite damaging onslaught on Mediterranean shipping. The Turkish attack on Tripoli in 1551 was partly in retaliation for a series of assaults by them on neighboring Muslim ports.

Privateering—in their own term, the *corso*—was in fact one of the Order's two main sources of income through the seventeenth century, the other being their estates. Their fleets did not only attack Muslim shipping. In *Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants*, Molly Greene has described Malta as "the capital par excellence of Catholic piracy" and explained that the ships of not only Muslims, but also those of Jews and Greek Orthodox Christians, were their targets. This did not mean that all targets were treated equally; Greek Orthodox Christians were less likely to be enslaved and had the option of arguing the unfairness of their treatment in the *Tribunale degli Armamenti* (Armaments Tribunal) on Malta. The Knights continued to see themselves as corsairs, fighting for control of the eastern Mediterranean. The early modern Mediterranean, Greene has persuasively argued, was not a place where clear religious boundaries gave way to clear national boundaries, but rather a space of "ambiguity, confusion, and contradictory thinking in terms of how the [sea] was and should be organized."[23]

In this ambiguous space, the Knights of Malta continued to pursue their own mission and goals, often in terms remarkably unaltered by time even while methods and other actors changed. In 1619, at a time when the Knights' privateering activity had intensified, *The Glorious Triumph of the Holy Religious Order of Noble, Valorous and Unconquered Knights of St. John of Jerusalem* was published in Italian and Spanish. As Fabrizio D'Avenia has explored, the text showcases a number of key propaganda themes of the Order in the early seventeenth century: the role of saints and martyrs; providentialism; stereotyping of "the enemy of the faith" and a repudiation of internal divisions within Christendom; and the need to reconquer holy lands once ruled by Christians.[24] The effects of the last several centuries are visible, for example in the emphasis on "barbarous Turks" rather than "infidel Muslims," but it is nonetheless interesting how consistent the major themes had remained.

The Order was appreciated for more than its religious function and its support of Catholic shipping and fleets. The naval training they gave their knights was much admired, and in fact, Alain Blondy has called the Order "une école navale européenne" ("a European naval school"). Membership was open to young nobles from European nations, and its genealogical requirements ensured that training took place only among the "true" nobility. Joining the Order in one's youth gradually became the norm, in part to benefit from as many years of naval and military training as possible, and brother knights were greatly in demand in national navies and government roles as a result of their experience. When the empress Catherine the Great of Russia wanted a galley fleet in the Baltic she asked for the assistance of a knight of St John. Famous French sailors who were brother knights included the Chevaliers Tourville and d'Hocquincourt and

the marquis of Valbette in the seventeenth century and the Bailiff de Suffren in the eighteenth. We have already seen the involvement of brother knights in the Caribbean and Americas.

Indulgences

How many crusaders were there in the sixteenth century? Since the indulgence was being granted to all who fought the Ottomans, whether they had formally taken the cross or not, and the vast majority of the men employed by crusade leagues were professional soldiers and sailors, it is not entirely clear how many crusaders, that is to say volunteers who had taken a vow or given alms and received an indulgence, were to be found by the 1570s. Indeed, the purported devaluation and abandonment of the indulgence as an outdated, anachronistic, and, in the eyes of many, immoral institution is seen as a standard for the decline and impracticality of crusading in the early modern period. Even Norman Housley, in concluding his discussion of crusading through 1580, stated that "crusading lost its practicality in the face of adverse developments in Europe's political, military, and financial structures."[25] In other words, while ideas, rhetoric, and themes of crusading lived on, the institutional forms that had supported it in prior centuries did not continue. This conclusion still seems to hold true for some nations. Møller Jensen's recent work on the crusades in early modern Denmark, a Protestant state, supports this position, although he notes that "there is no evidence that the crusade or genuine crusade indulgences were unpopular" before the Reformation in Denmark erased the practice of indulgences.[26] Yet we have already seen in the case of military orders that the practices of crusading had longer lives than has been thought and that they continued to evolve and adapt through the early modern period. In several recent articles Patrick O'Banion has argued that in the case of Spain and its crusade indulgence, the *bula de cruzada*, a similar trend is discernible in relation to the crusade indulgence.[27]

Expanding on the precedents of the thirteenth century onward, from the late fifteenth century crusade indulgences were overwhelmingly preached to non-combatants whose alms paid for professional armies. While highly practical, and while possible to defend in terms of making spiritual benefits available to all (who could pay), this shift was seen as controversial and became a focal point of Protestant attacks on Catholicism. Sixteenth-century popes like Pius IV, for their part, were also reluctant to simply grant the *bula de cruzada* to Spanish monarchs on request. But for the Catholic rulers of Spain, the funds raised by the indulgence enabled conquest and expansion that they perceived as God's work on earth.

In sixteenth-century Spain, the whole matter came to a head during the reign of Philip II (1556–98). Philip saw himself as the defender of Christendom—not too unrealistically, given the extent of his empire—and as he sought to restore the Order of the Holy Sepulchre of Jerusalem he was determined that the *bula de cruzada* be reissued by Rome. But Pius IV strongly opposed reissuing the indulgence as Philip wanted it, not least because it was a matter under consideration at the three meetings of the Council of

Trent (1545–1563), which sought to morally reform Catholic Christendom and counter Protestantisms, and also because of objections from the Order of Malta.

When diplomatic efforts to gain the *bula de cruzada* failed, Philip asked twelve Spanish theologians to weigh in on the question in May 1567. Unsurprisingly they affirmed the morality of the *bula de cruzada* and pointed immediately to the Ottoman threat in the Mediterranean as a primary reason for its need. But they also justified it in three other ways, as O'Banion has outlined: financial need in order to resist the Ottomans; traditional legitimations related to the protection of the church and Christians; and the need to respond to contemporary challenges, which, they argued, Philip was uniquely positioned to do. Most interestingly, they drew upon the work of Francisco de Vitoria. Vitoria questioned Spanish claims in the Americas and the treatment of indigenous peoples, and was uncomfortable with crusading, all of which would seem to make his work unsuitable for those buttressing Philip's request for the *bula de cruzada*. But Vitoria also outlined an argument for just war for the "common good" and in any event, he classed Muslims as enemies with whom no approach other than warfare would work. Philip's team of thinkers used these particular elements of Vitoria's thinking to support Philip's position.

In 1569 Pius IV granted Philip the *bula de cruzada* but not in the hoped-for form. Pius limited the privileges attached to it and moreover explicitly favored any who would take the cross themselves; he thus attempted to reform the *bula de cruzada* in the very act of issuing it. It took two more years, but ultimately Philip was victorious. In 1571 Pius V granted the indulgence as Philip had wanted it, his hand forced by growing Ottoman forces.

The most interesting point, as O'Banion highlights, is that from this point onward the papacy would renew the *bula de cruzada* into the eighteenth century. Spanish nobles who would in prior centuries have taken the cross instead helped lead the national army. It has been conventional to see the development of the modern bureaucratic nation-state as part of a simultaneous decline of crusading. But O'Banion argues that crusading in Spain continued to evolve and be adapted in the sixteenth century precisely in order to serve the early modern nation-state; "rather than declining with the rise of the state, crusading experienced an early modern revival rooted in the royal appropriation of papally sanctioned holy war and tied to a powerful royal 'messianic vision.'"[28] Do these points only hold true for Spain, or are they applicable more broadly? Going even further, do the trends in crusade liturgies outlined by Cecilia Gaposchkin in relation to the Hussites and Ottoman Turks also apply in relation to expanding European empires in the sixteenth century? Additional scholarly investigation is needed to answer these questions.

Christian Nations

The relationship between crusading and nationalism has been discussed through the book, especially in the prior chapter. So hopefully the point is well established that this relationship did not suddenly spring into being in either the fifteenth or sixteenth

century. And, as just discussed, while in some states, such as Denmark, ideas of crusading persisted while the apparatus fell away, in other states, most clearly Hapsburg Spain, crusading practices evolved and were adapted by the crown—not anachronisms clinging on to an otherwise developing nation-state but rather part of the process of early modernization.

It has been argued, perhaps most notably by Christopher Tyerman, that the sixteenth century marked the secularization of the crusades as they came under national control across Europe.[29] Certainly it was a century of greatly diminished papal prerogative. But the sixteenth century witnessed heights of Christian nationalism in Portugal, Spain, Russia, and Denmark—to name just a few of the states most recently surveyed by scholars of the crusades—precisely because of the influence of ideas of crusading and of sanctified patriotism. Influence flowed in the other direction, too, as the Order of Malta became a de facto sovereign state. Messianism and apocalypticism infused the thought and personal convictions of monarchs and emperors, many of whom, even the rulers of Protestant states like Denmark or Orthodox states like Russia, seem to have genuinely believed themselves to each be the defender of Christendom, with a duty to not just defend but ultimately promote the global triumph of Christendom. And when the propaganda of their courts was effective in generating popular support, as it often but not always was, we have to conclude that it was still resonant. While there are moments of clearly opportunistic use and discard of crusading ideology—such as that of Louis XIV's government in the 1660s, though the sentiments of his nobles seem to have been sincere enough—such do not seem to have been the norm.

Thus the sixteenth century was the century of the secularization of the crusades only insofar as holy warfare fused with the wars of Christian nations and the defense and expansion of Christendom merged with the defense and expansion of the state. Notwithstanding the Counter-Reformation resurgence of the seventeenth century, states not popes controlled Christian holy war. This undoubtedly marks a major change, although the struggle between rulers and popes for control of the crusades dates to the twelfth century, so it is possible to see this as the outcome of a long-standing contest. And certainly the papacy did not simply acquiesce to this change. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries reveal any number of militant popes and their involvement in crusading, especially in the granting of spiritual privileges, clearly continued to be valued, at least by some, through 1684.

One of the more interesting manifestations of early modern Christian nationalism and the crusades is the development of national historiographies of the crusades. This point has already been well established by scholars in relation to Spain, France, and Portugal, in particular, but holds true for other nations as well. Møller Jensen has argued that it was only in the seventeenth century that Danish historians sought to distance the nation's past from the history of the crusades; before then, the history of the crusades was used to bolster national histories.[30] Anti Selart has demonstrated how successive waves of historians, beginning with Germans in the sixteenth century, used the history of the crusades to support not only Livonia's national history but the social position of their ethnic groups within Livonia.[31] And fascinatingly, as Alan Murray has laid

bare, the sixteenth-century German historian Froben Christoph, count of Zimmern, actually invented a fictional First Crusader—Walther, Duke of Teck—and inserted him in crusade narratives to bolster national interests.[32] It was not enough to bring the nation and Christian holy war together in the present; the past also needed to reflect this synchrony.

Ideas of Crusade

The recognition by historians that crusade ideas were still alive in the sixteenth century was originally due to the work of Kenneth Setton, who uncovered enormous quantities of material to support his case. Setton's work continues to be affirmed and extended by the ongoing work of scholars. It is now widely accepted that ideas of crusading were active in the sixteenth century, and investigation is rightly moving into the seventeenth century and beyond. What is still debated is the extent of these ideas and their precise valuation within early modern European society. Much like this chapter's earlier section on crusading in the Caribbean and the Americas, it is hoped that this section will encourage more research on ideas of crusading in the early modern period, especially beyond the sixteenth century into the Counter-Reformation of the seventeenth century.

Indeed another point of contention is if and when the crusades, a living phenomenon, gave way decisively to historical and cultural memory; if and when crusading became only of the past and not the present. A host of scholars around the world are currently working on memories and representations of the crusades in the eighteenth through twenty-first centuries, and it is hoped their work will yield greater clarity. But at the same time, the field is unlikely to reach a simple, singular point of change, not least because crusading, its historiography, and its memorialization coexisted from the beginning. In other words, from the First Crusade onward, Latin Christians crusaded at the same time as they wrote histories and memorialized the crusades in cultural terms. Thus there is an essential artificiality in the very question of when crusading stopped and its historiography began. After all, in terms of chronology, we have in the course of this chapter circled back to the historiographical discussion with which the book began. The processes of historicization and memorialization often occupy the same chronological space as events themselves, and the history of the crusades in the seventeenth century demonstrates this point admirably.

In the seventeenth century, building on public interest generated in part by Richard Knolles (*The Generall Historie of the Turks*, 1603) and for personal motivations that are still unclear, English historian Thomas Fuller published *The Historie of the Holy Warre* in 1639. Fuller's primary concerns, as outlined by Bernard Hamilton, were the relationship between the English church and the medieval Church of Rome, the status of Islam, and the question of whether the crusades were holy wars and thus justified. He concluded that there was continuity between the medieval Church of Rome and his own Anglican church, and that God had used Muslims to chastise Christian society, an opinion he shared with many earlier generations of Latin historians. On the question of whether the crusades had been true holy wars, Fuller was, in Hamilton's words, "ambiguous"; he did not mock or

disparage the religious devotion that inspired them but certainly called into question the motivations of the papacy. He primarily located crusading in the eastern Mediterranean and was most interested in the crusader states, but he also discussed the Albigensian Crusade, warfare against Muslims in Iberia, and crusades in northern Europe and the Order of the Teutonic Knights.[33] He could not ignore the warfare between Europeans and Turks that was raging in the Mediterranean and that was represented as crusading as he wrote. He further recognized that the Knights Hospitaller in their order-state of Malta were actively engaged in this warfare; indeed they were to join a crusade league that was formed to defend Crete within six years of the publication of his book. In fact, Fuller did not entirely dismiss the possibility that crusades would be fought in the future and he even conceived of the launching of a new one to recover Jerusalem, although he considered that it would be totally impractical. In contrast with Fuller, Louis Maimbourg (*Histoire des Croisades*, 1675) asserted that the theater of crusading war had shifted decisively to Europe itself.

There were those in the seventeenth century who published crusade treatises and appeals, though in nothing like the numbers nor with the effect of such texts in previous centuries. In 1622, polymath Francis Bacon began writing (and never finished) *An Advertissement Touching a Holy Warre*. Bacon constructed a dialogue on the question of a new crusade between six individuals: a moderate Catholic, a zealous Protestant, a zealous Catholic, a soldier, a politician/diplomat, and a courtier. While it seems unlikely that Bacon identified with those in the dialogue most enthusiastic for a new crusade, it is impossible to fully discern Bacon's own stance on the topic of a new crusade from the dialogue itself, partly because it is incomplete—suggesting the work was not his top priority—and partly because he gave full voice to each participant's perspective. It is suggestive that he dedicated the text to the Bishop of Winchester and in his preface explained that he saw the text as an "oblation" to the Church of England, explaining "For who can tell whether there may not be some 'one arising' [*exoriere aliquis*]? Great matters, especially if they be religious, have many times small beginnings, and the platform may draw on the building."[34] The fragmentary quote is from Dido's curse in Book 4 of the Aeneid: "rise, some unknown avenger, from our bones" (*exoriere aliquis nostris ex ossibus ultor*),[35] suggesting that Bacon saw the crusades as dead but perhaps capable of resurrection, and that he did not necessarily think such a resurrection undesirable.

In 1631, Francisco Quaresmius published in Latin a version of a sermon delivered to Philip IV of Spain five years before: *Jerusalem Afflicted*. A theologian, scholar, and administrator who held posts at both ends of the Mediterranean, in this text Quaresmius urged Philip IV to meet his obligations as the official sovereign of Jerusalem by reconquering the holy city and "freeing it from the tyranny of the Turks" (*ut libertatem ex Turcarum tyrannide assequatur*). Drawing upon but also adapting traditionally gendered Christian metaphors, Quaresmius personified Jerusalem as Philip's royal and articulate wife, now enslaved by the Ottomans and arguing against her husband's quiescence.[36]

Later in the century, in 1671–2 the German polymath Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, sent to the French government a crusade proposal: France should conquer Egypt, thus upsetting growing Dutch power, confounding the Ottomans, and ensuring French

dominance in the Mediterranean. Such a crusade would also allow colonization in West Asia comparable to that ongoing in the Americas, Africa, and South Asia. While suggesting seventeenth-century advantages to such a crusade, Leibniz also capitalized fully on the history of the crusades and especially French involvement in the crusades focused on North Africa in the thirteenth century.[37]

None of these treatises led to new general crusades, but they testify to the ongoing adaptation of the history and ideas of crusading to seventeenth-century environments. Furthermore the number of such texts identified and discussed by scholars thus far remains very small, particularly in comparison with prior centuries. It is hard to know with certainty whether this number reflects the waning interest of seventeenth-century contemporaries or simply scholarly ignorance. For example, Quaresmius' sermon was found, studied, and translated in just the last ten years by Chad Leahy and Ken Tully, while Bacon's text has yet to be subjected to rigorous analysis, and it is not unusual for summary accounts of the careers of Bacon and Leibniz to leave their crusade-related texts out altogether. Although it seems unlikely that there were crusade treatises present on any scale comparable with the fourteenth or even fifteenth centuries, these points raise the question of how many other seventeenth-century texts simply have not been considered relevant and thus have been left unstudied and unknown to most historians.

We also see the crusades persisting in literary and dramatic works of the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries. Assessing *Orlando Innamarato* and *Orlando Furioso*, Jo Ann Cavallo concludes that although the poems diverge in their treatment of the crusades—with the crusades denigrated in the first and affirmed in the latter—the crusades are alluded to in both through a shared Egyptian setting.[38] In analyzing two late sixteenth-century English crusading romances more traditionally seen as Catholic oddities, Lee Manion concludes that they speak to a developing discourse focused on "pan-Christian identity" and "defined by a shared interest in religious violence and conversion."[39] It almost goes without saying that Torquato Tasso's immensely popular *Gerusalemme Liberata*, an account of the First Crusade that was widely successful in large part because it appeared quintessentially historical to its audiences, was first published in the late sixteenth century. In the seventeenth century, Racine wrote a pair of fascinating plays, *Esther* and *Athalie*, for a school for noble girls run by Madame de Maintenon. Both plays "show not just that God protects his Chosen People, be this by means of wars and massacres, but that even the bloodiest events may be viewed as forming part of a providentialist design from which the Christian Redeemer will come."[40] And Louis IX of France continued to feature in French plays throughout and indeed beyond the period in question, as William Chester Jordan has demonstrated, continually functioning as a mirror for contemporary concerns. Thus, in seventeenth-century dramas, Louis was portrayed as saintly albeit troubled by dynastic issues, while by the later eighteenth century, he was used in polemics related to the role of the monarchy.[41]

A perhaps more unexpected example of the role of crusading in early modern culture comes in the form of cultural transference in the colonized Americas. Earlier chapters have discussed the role of the narrative of Vespasian and Titus' destruction of Jerusalem—in both Latin and many vernaculars—as extremely popular crusade literature from the

twelfth century forward. The historical suppression of the Jewish rebellion by the two (pagan) Roman emperors was reimagined as the "vengeance of Our Lord"; the emperors became new converts who fulfilled Christ's prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem as revenge on the Jews for his death. As Louise Burkhart has explained, the early-sixteenth-century Castilian narrative "La destruycion de Jerusalem" of Juan de Molina—itself a translation from an earlier and anonymous Catalan text—was adapted into a Nahuatl play, probably in the eighteenth century, and then performed by Nahuas for at least two centuries thereafter. This is not as surprising as it might seem when one recognizes that it was one of Molina's own publishers who exported the first printing press to New Spain and that one of Cortés' companions referenced the narrative in his memoir in relation to the conquest of Tenochtitlan. Additionally, after the Truce of Nice was concluded in 1538 between Francis I of France and Charles V, Nahuas and others staged two mock battles to celebrate the occasion: the conquest of Rhodes, performed in Mexico City, and the conquest of Jerusalem, performed in Tlaxcala, as part of Corpus Christi events. It seems the Nahuas themselves, after colonization and Christianization, saw a clear parallel between the fall of both cities, though they adapted the narrative was adapted in key ways to fit their own historical consciousness and to critique specific colonial abuses.[42]

Many ideas of crusading in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries continued to resemble ideas from prior centuries even while they were adapted. The connection forged between crusading and the moral reform of Christendom by Innocent III in the thirteenth century—and arguably implicitly present from the First Crusade onward—was notably persistent, as we have already seen in the 1619 text drumming up support for the Order of Malta, *The Glorious Triumph of the Holy Religious Order of Noble, Valorous and Unconquered Knights of St. John of Jerusalem*. More recent additions to ideas of crusading, such as the fourteenth- and fifteenth-century humanists' reimagining of conflict between Latin Christians and Muslims as conflict between a "civilized" Europe and a "barbaric" Ottoman Empire, were also particularly enduring.

Perhaps above all, the intensified connection between nationalism and a host of related Christian themes—crusading, Christian nationalism, apocalypticism, Christian universalism, national messianism, and the need perceived by many different Christian sects to purify and unite the "true" faith, to name just a few—correlated with hardening and stratification of categories of identity. These social categories and accompanying hierarchies were increasingly perceived as fundamentally immutable. In short, the history of the crusades is entangled with the long history of race. The connection between crusading and race is a subject in need of more widespread attention; it is hoped that this too-brief discussion will serve not as an authoritative summary but rather a prompt to further engagement.

By the sixteenth century, a focus on blood purity had evolved into official intolerance, and by the end of the seventeenth century, "a tiered system of social classification based on European, indigenous, and African ancestry had grown up."[43] This system was overlaid on top of an evaluation of human worth that, as had been seen in Mediterranean slave markets for centuries, concluded those with lighter skin were literally worth more than those with darker skin. As Sweet concluded, "the classification of human beings

based on pseudoscientific claims during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries gave greater legitimacy to racism, but the science of race merely reinforced notions of biology that had been evolving for centuries."[44]

As we have seen, early modern European nations and empires also inherited the ideas propagated centuries earlier in the context of crusading, especially the belief that conquest, domination, and enslavement could serve to defeat the enemies of the faith, expand Christendom, civilize (i.e., Christianize) the barbarous, and save souls. Concepts of race facilitated this work both by demarcating those to be dominated and by providing a pious reason to profit from that domination. Whether we examine the letters and diaries of Columbus, the *corso* of the Hospitallers, or the efforts of those like Philippe de Lonvilliers de Poincy, it seems clear that the wealth generated through the acquisition of land and resources and the sale or labor of enslaved people was seen by enthusiasts as a key tool. Resources were needed to fund crusades; war was costly in every sense.

War was also essential. Arguably one of Geraldine Heng's most important arguments for the study of the crusades is the connection between warfare and the process of racial formation. She has argued that the process of racialization was and is "a product of instrumentalizations that occur in war . . . and in support of war."[45] In this context, the various wars of nation, empire, and crusade in the early modern period appear not coincidental but fundamental to the process of early modern racialization. This provides helpful context for recent scholarship identifying a point of origin for modern racist ideas in the writings of Gomes Eanes de Zurara, royal chronicler of Portuguese crusades and conquests and leader within the Order of Christ, and his peers.[46] Certainly by 1500, "most inhabitants of Europe's three most powerful nation-based states, England, France, and Spain, believed that their rulers' wars were sanctioned and supported by God."[47] The drive to purify Christendom connected to crusading had simultaneously shrunk to the scale of a nation and expanded to encompass world empires, serving as both a "homogenizing" and "fractionalizing" force.[48]

Critically, however, Heng persuasively argues against the common understanding of racialization as an inherently linear and modern process. She urges us to direct our attention to the work Latin Christians in Europe undertook starting in the late eleventh and twelfth centuries to racially identify themselves as "the Christian people."[49] If we adopt this perspective, then it is indeed insufficient to discuss race in the context of the later crusades, as has been done in this book. Rather, racial formation and the connection between religion and race become a central topic in the long history of the crusading movement.

Indeed, early modern contemporaries made explicit the connection between the hardening and stratification of identity and the long history of the crusades. In preaching to the Spanish Armada in 1588, Jesuit priest Pedro de Ribadeneyra confirmed that "it will be no less of an honour for Spain to chase the demon out of England than to have driven it out of the Indies."[50] He also argued that this would repay the citizens of other Catholic nations who had fought in Iberian holy wars in earlier centuries, making the link with the crusading past equally explicit.

CHAPTER 13
LEGACIES, 1750 TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

We have come full circle chronologically, returning to the very points in time that were focused on in Chapter 1. As stated before, the processes of historicization and memorialization are often cotemporaneous with the phenomenon in question, making it hard indeed to determine between phenomena and corresponding discussions and to fix firm starting and ending points. It is thus unfortunate that the question of "when the crusades ended" is perhaps that most frequently asked of any scholar of the crusades. It is nearly impossible to answer. As this book has shown, the crusading movement was ambiguous, complex, entangled with other trends and phenomena, and, at times, self-contradictory from the very start. Furthermore, it routinely changed over time. Even with a relatively clear and detailed definition in hand, such as the one outlined in Chapter 1, the answer to the question of when the crusades ended will always depend upon whose perspectives are prioritized and which elements of the definition are considered essential and which disposable. To add to the challenges of fixing an end date is the fact that scholarship is currently being published at an incredible pace on the crusades in culture and politics—crusader medievalisms—from the eighteenth century forward. Arguably this is the fastest growing area of research, with new publications emerging in a swift stream; to give just one example, the exceptional new book series *Engaging the Crusades* has published six titles since 2018.

This chapter does not attempt to summarize this new and still emerging work, although it is hoped that by the time of the next edition of this book, it will be possible to responsibly summarize the wealth of knowledge on the crusades in the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries being researched, written, and published at this very moment. And this chapter does not answer the question of when the crusades ended. What the chapter does show is that the course of the crusades continued to flow into modernity, even if slowed to a trickle and directed in different channels in a changed landscape. In providing transparent discussion instead of forced closure, this chapter builds on the historiographical changes over time evident in the first three editions of this book, and supports the current edition's overall emphasis on complexity, ambiguity, and the value of the historical process.

Military Orders in the Eighteenth Century

It is simplest to discuss the continuity of crusading in modernity in reference to military orders. The Teutonic Order remained a diminished yet functioning military order,

playing a part in the Habsburg wars—the Order was led by members of the Habsburg family starting in 1804—and moving its headquarters to Vienna after 1809. It is still in existence, although it was reconfigured in the early twentieth century as a purely religious order without a military role. Other military orders as well as chivalric orders such as the Order of the Golden Fleece have likewise survived to the present, albeit not without alteration. For example, the Order of Christ still exists but has been secularized.

The most successful and notorious military order in the eighteenth century was, of course, that of the Order of Malta (the Hospitallers). It was still thriving in the second half of the eighteenth century, with a still-growing population and a new university founded in Malta in 1768. Malta remained an important commercial center, handling a growing volume of shipping and acting as the entrepôt for goods on their way even to the Americas; the United States established a consulate there as early as 1783. The quarantine service was internationally regarded as the most efficient in the Mediterranean. And the Knights of Malta continued to engage in activity across the Atlantic, with some brother knights making plans for a colony of the Order in Guiana (1761–5) and others fighting in the American Revolution and subsequently joining the new Order of Cincinnati to help buttress the new nation-state.[1] In 1794, the Order of Malta unsuccessfully pursued a treaty with the nascent United States in the terms of any state at the time, offering protection for Mediterranean commerce in exchange for land in America:

> The Island of Malta, placed in the centre of the Mediterranean, between Africa and Sicily, offers by its position to all navigators, an asylum, provisions and succour of every kind. Of what importance would it not be for the American commerce to find upon this stormy sea, fine ports, provisions, and even protection against the Algerine pirates. In exchange for the succours and protection, by means whereof the American vessels might navigate the Mediterranean freely and without inquietude, would the United States consent to grant, in full right, to the Order of Malta some lands in America, in such quantity as might be agreed on between the two governments, placing such lands under the immediate protection and safeguard of the American loyalty?[2]

As students of American history know, this came to naught, and the United States instead built diplomatic relationships with many Mediterranean powers, appointing its first consul to Malta in 1796 and signing a series of peace treaties with North African city-states in the late 1780s and 1790s.

Malta's commercial relations with France were particularly close and half the shipping that called at Malta in the eighteenth century was French. It was from this that Napoleon's ambitions partly sprang. They were achievable due to the decline of the Knights' military capabilities in the later eighteenth century. By the middle of the eighteenth century, the war with the Ottomans was dying away and the military role of the Knights of Malta was rapidly declining, too. By 1740 there were only between ten and twenty corsairs operating from Malta and thereafter they dwindled almost to nothing. Their fleet was still actively engaged in 1798, the year Malta fell, and the proposed treaty with the United

States testifies to their own self-perception and ambitions. But their Order, which was, after all, one of the classic expressions of the ancien régime, was devastated by the French Revolution and the revolutionary wars. In 1792 all its property in France was seized and by 1797 it had lost all its estates west of the Rhine, in Switzerland, and in northern Italy. Its revenues fell by two-thirds.

A new grand master, Ferdinand of Hompesch, made approaches to Austria and Russia that alarmed the French and in June 1798 Napoleon, who had his eye on Malta for commercial and strategic reasons, brought his fleet into Maltese waters on his way to Egypt and demanded admission to the Grand Harbour. When the knights tried to stand on their rights as a neutral state he attacked and the Order was in no state to resist him. Of the 500 knights on the island 50 were too old or ill for military service, 220 were Frenchmen who did not want to fight their compatriots, and the rest were divided as to what to do. Command was in the hands of brothers chosen for seniority and not merit: the bailiffs in charge of the defense of the east and west of Malta were both in their seventies. The guns were ancient and the powder was found to be rotten and the shot defective. The urban militia was inexperienced and undisciplined. It is hard to say who were the more frightened: the militia of the French, or the Order, which had recently faced a popular uprising, of the militia. Obsolete defensive plans were put into operation. In two days and with hardly any bloodshed, the garrison, which was scattered throughout the island rather than concentrated in Valletta, had been overcome. Hompesch and his brother knights were ignominiously expelled.

There is real irony in the events surrounding the fall of Malta on June 13, 1798. Just over 700 years after Pope Urban II had called for the service of Christian knights, here these knights still were, still obsessive about their status, as the armigerous mosaic memorials carpeting the floor of their conventual church in Valletta, the cenotaph of chivalry, testify. The order-state of these brothers, heirs of those extolled by Bernard of Clairvaux, many of them descendants of twelfth-century crusaders, was the type of crusading polity proposed by the theoreticians of the fourteenth century. It collapsed before the fleet of a French general bound for Egypt of all places. Napoleon was, of course, not a crusader, but he was more successful in Egypt than Louis IX had been. And the story has a final twist to it. Napoleon confiscated the precious stones and metals that adorned the Hospitallers' relics, many of which they had carried with them all the way from West Asia to Malta, by way of Cyprus and Rhodes. Much of this treasure still lies at the bottom of Aboukir Bay, to which it was sent when Nelson attacked the French fleet, but Napoleon disposed of some of it in the markets of Alexandria and Cairo to pay for his troops. So precious metal acquired in West Asia by representatives of the crusading movement returned six centuries later.

Napoleon's conquest of Malta in 1798 did not mark the end of the Order of Malta, which still exists, nor does it mark the end of military orders. A spate of new military orders were created in the nineteenth century, including the papal Equestrian Order of the Holy Sepulchre of Jerusalem (1847) and five Protestant orders, which claimed to have inherited in one case the traditions of the Teutonic Order and in four others those of the Hospital of St. John: the Bailiwick of Utrecht of the Teutonic Order (1815); and

the Bailiwick of Brandenburg (1852) in Germany, the Most Venerable Order of St. John (1888) in the British Commonwealth, the Order of St. John (1920) in Sweden and the Order of St. John (1946) in the Netherlands. Understanding the renewed vitality of ideas of crusading in the nineteenth century is our next task.

Imperialism, Romanticism, and History in the Nineteenth Century

Napoleon's judgment on the defense of Malta by the Knights Hospitaller was: "If the fortifications, the material means of resistance, were immense, the moral resources nullified them." Any remaining case for Christian holy warfare should have been undermined further by the grisly spectacle of Cardinal Ruffo's undisciplined Army of the Holy Faith rampaging through southern Italy in 1799, in support of the exiled Bourbon king of Naples. But at a time when Napoleon's invasion of Egypt had revived interest in the eastern Mediterranean and there was a growing appreciation of the Middle Ages, interest in and a romantic attachment to the history of the crusades was already becoming evident, the skepticism of many eighteenth-century historians notwithstanding.

As any survey of European historiography will note, the nineteenth century witnessed three interrelated trends: the "professionalization" of the discipline of history through the work of scholars like Leopold van Ranke; the deployment of history and historians in national and imperial enterprises; and both scholarly and popular romantic nostalgia for the past, specifically, the imagined origins of present nations. Scholars' search for national origins fueled and in turn fed on romanticism and popular enthusiasm, leading to a particular fascination with the Middle Ages, seen as the time when nations first began coalescing and also a time of romantic glamour and noble ideals. As a result, both the field of medieval studies and common tropes still resonant in twenty-first-century popular culture can be traced to the nineteenth century.

The crusades were identified as a particular locus for scholarly work and cultural nostalgia alike in the nineteenth century and attention to crusading merged with attention to another reimagined past, that of medieval chivalry. Medieval knights were believed to have adhered to a code of ethics, intimately associated with crusading, the features of which were courage, piety, loyalty, prowess, courtesy, honor, munificence, and a sense of "fair play." A movement began to manifest itself in a society for which armed knighthood and the crusades in particular had retained their glamour but lost their primary functions.

Crusading in particular lived on as a resonant idea and, for some, a devoutly hoped-for ideal, even while warfare had become almost fully nationalized. Adam Knobler has seen three related phenomena that sparked the idealization of chivalry and crusading in the UK in particular: "the feminization of British religion, the rise of public, patriotic rhetoric, and, gradually, the changing nature of British warfare and the realities of war."[3] What emerged can be known as "muscular Christianity" or "Christian militarism"; whatever term is used, the new national hero was represented as patriotic, Christian, masculine, and "noble," a "true" knight and crusader who fought selflessly for cross and

country out of pious devotion and selfless duty. Christian militarism in the UK could be found in textbooks, literature, art, theater, and, from the 1840s, within the British Army. Knobler concludes that "by the 1860s, the association of religion and femininity had largely been obliterated" by new, militaristic hymns like "Onwards Christian Soldiers," originally written for schoolchildren.[4]

This movement was in part a reaction to the political, economic, and social changes brought about by the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution. As the old patterns of existence were being swept away, a sentimental attachment to perceived features of the lives of nobles and landed gentry in the past came to be characteristic of those classes that felt themselves to be threatened. This attitude of mind, sympathetically portrayed in the novels of Anthony Trollope, was also echoed in the tastes of the classes that were in the process of supplanting the old ones and in a general attachment to so-called medieval values. The movement also played critical roles in validating and historicizing modern European nation-states and, by extension, their imperial endeavors.

In Europe, attachment to "the medieval" was expressed in the buildings and decorative work of men like Augustus Pugin and Eugène Viollet-le-Duc. In the United States, the movement also found expression in architecture, art, literature, and social and political spheres, although it is worth emphasizing that research on the phenomenon in the United States is badly needed. This attachment simultaneously drove the massive endeavors of nineteenth-century historians to collect, edit, and analyze the medieval past in nationalistic terms. Substantial collections of medieval primary sources were gathered, edited, and published by scholars; these multivolume collections remain an indispensable part of scholarly work now. The organizing principles used to make the collections are revealing. Many collections were either based around the concept of a modern nation-state, such as the *Monumenta Germaniae Historiae*, begun 1826 with the motto "*Sanctus amor patriae dat animum*" (holy love of the fatherland gives courage), while the crusades also served as the basis for the multiple series of volumes *Recueil des historiens des croisades* (1844–1906).

The non-scholarly products of these interrelated movements, such as works of architecture and literature, are known as "medievalisms" and there is a subfield of scholars dedicated to the study of medievalisms in a wide range of contexts and in relation to a wide range of themes. "Crusader medievalisms" in particular are now being intensely investigated for reasons that will become clear below. It is worth reemphasizing that the emergence of the field of medieval studies and intense scholarly study of medieval Europe coincided with the popular blossoming of medievalisms; scholarly and popular preoccupations stood in relation to each other.

This nineteenth-century romantic movement and the widespread social invocation of medievalisms of all kinds contributed to a number of projects related to or invoking the crusades. Many of these projects were key elements of European and American imperialism. Analyzing these projects poses a number of challenges to historians and there are two extreme positions in particular of which to be cautious. On the one hand, it does not seem supportable to dismiss the nineteenth-century evidence as completely unrelated to the medieval crusades; that is, to deny any connection between nineteenth-

century medievalisms and the medieval crusades. On the other hand, it would also seem to be a mistake to accept nineteenth-century claims to an unbroken tradition of crusading without contextual analysis.

In an effort to find a way forward between these two problematic positions, in the third edition of this book Jonathan Riley-Smith proposed two analytical categories for nineteenth-century evidence: "para-crusading" and "pseudo-crusading." He wrote then:

> Para-crusading had within it some authentic elements, although chosen selectively and distorted. Pseudo-crusading had no correspondence to the old reality, but borrowed its rhetoric and imagery to describe ventures that had nothing at all to do with it, particularly Imperialist ones, as nations already expressing pride in their crusading past became involved in the scramble for empire.[5]

The desire for an analytical distinction when assessing the nineteenth century is both understandable and admirable, and there certainly does seem to be a qualitative difference between, say, a newspaper cartoon that references the crusades and the creation of a new military order. Quantitatively, too, it seems that the number of people who desired to engage in crusading in Europe was limited when compared to the fourteenth, fifteenth, and even sixteenth centuries. Riley-Smith's categories of para- and pseudo-crusading sought to acknowledge both change and continuity, which remains a central goal of this edition of the book.

At the same time, Riley-Smith's two categories create difficulties. What were or are "authentic elements" and how can we discern them? Furthermore, if we recognize that there was not a hard and fast line between "the Middle Ages" and "modernity"—not only in regard to crusading, but in general—then we cannot simply distinguish between "medieval" crusades and "modern" crusader medievalisms. And there certainly was not a hard and fast line between crusading in the medieval and modern periods, as earlier chapters in this book have shown. In addition, from the start we have seen in the history of the crusades ambiguity, complexity, differences, and sometimes extraordinarily far-fetched applications of rhetoric. We have also seen groups and nations using the crusades and the history of the crusades in expansionary efforts in the medieval period, not just the modern. In facing these questions and studying crusader medievalisms in twentieth-century Britain, Mike Horswell has chosen to focus on "explicit claims of crusading" and a "deeper engagement with crusading," by which he means cases in which "a developed perception of crusading has framed the behavior and self-understanding of a person or group, and motivated a response." Horswell distinguishes this "deeper engagement" from the "broad diffusion of crusading rhetoric."[6]

In this edition of the book, the terms para- and pseudo-crusading will not be used and, following Horswell, we will focus primarily on "deeper engagement with crusading" rather than "the broad diffusion of crusading rhetoric." That said, readers should be aware that the diffusion of crusader rhetoric was broad indeed. Furthermore, we will divide our discussion of crusader medievalisms by the two themes Adam Knobler has suggested in his pivotal study: national symbolic inheritance and the creation of crusading heroes

in Europe (and presumably the United States, although that work remains yet to be done); and the backlash against both these trends among Muslims and in the Islamicate world. This approach allows for Riley-Smith's desire to distinguish between types of engagement with the crusades in the nineteenth century to be respected and discussed, with an ongoing emphasis on both continuity and change. It should allow students to acquire a sense of the range and longevity of engagement with crusading, not only in popular culture but also in the realms of politics and war. It is hoped that this sense in turn will help students contextualize references to crusading currently on the rise in the twenty-first century and equip them to pose and discuss pertinent questions about the history and memory of the crusades in the present moment.

Western Engagement with the Crusades

The crusades manifested in Western culture in an extraordinary number of ways, as scholars continue to reveal and discuss. Elizabeth Siberry's work on the crusades in England alone highlights the crusades in various literary genres, theater, music, art, and children's books, and we can add to that list statuary, architecture, and poetry, including some of William Wordsworth's ecclesiastical sonnets. Perhaps the most recognizable and influential representation of the crusades in nineteenth-century European culture was in the novels of Sir Walter Scott. As Siberry explains, Scott was "the pre-eminent historical novelist" of his day. His readers took his work as historical truth and influenced contemporary historians.[7] His works were international bestsellers and inspired theatrical and operatic productions and works of art; even costume balls featured his crusading characters.

Scott's works echoed the idea of eighteenth-century historians that the crusades took place only in West Asia in the distant past. Four of Scott's novels involved crusades and crusaders. *Count Robert of Paris* (1831) was set in Constantinople at the time of the First Crusade. The other three novels had crusading in the 1190s as their background. *Ivanhoe* (1819) and *The Betrothed* (1825) focused on events on the home front, but the plot of *The Talisman* (1825) was set in West Asia and centered on the friendship between a Scottish knight and Salah al-Din (Saladin for Scott), who appeared in a bewildering array of disguises, including that of a skilled physician who cured King Richard I of England.

Scott's novels painted a picture of crusaders who were brave and glamorous, but also vainglorious, avaricious, childish, and boorish. Only a few were moved by religion or idealism; most had taken the cross out of pride, greed, or ambition. The worst of them were the brothers of the military orders, who appear in the novels as courageous and disciplined yet also arrogant, privileged, corrupt, and unprincipled. An additional theme, the cultural superiority of the Muslims under Salah al-Din, which was only hinted at in the other novels, pervaded *The Talisman*. In his introduction to later editions of it, Scott wrote:

> the warlike character of Richard I (of England), wild and generous, a pattern of chivalry, with all its extravagant virtues and its no less absurd errors, was opposed

> to that of Saladin, in which the Christian and English monarch showed all the cruelty and violence of an Eastern Sultan; and Saladin, on the other hand displayed the deep policy and prudence of a European sovereign.

Scott, influenced by William Robertson's earlier emphasis on the superiority of medieval Islamic culture, painted the crusaders as romantic yet unenlightened warriors crudely assailing more civilized and sophisticated Muslims. Scott's Saladin, in contrast, was arguably a modern liberal European gentleman, beside whom medieval Europeans made a poor showing. The past again served to acclaim the present.

The Talisman was Scott's most popular crusade novel after *Ivanhoe*. It was dramatized on many occasions and translated into many European languages. It inspired painters in Britain, France, and Italy, and its Saladin influenced generations of writers and politicians. William Ewart Gladstone, enraged in 1876 by atrocities attributed to the Ottomans in Bulgaria, compared them unfavorably to "the chivalrous Saladins of Syria." Saladin's ruinous tomb in Damascus began to feature on European sight-seeing tours—the Prince of Wales visited it in 1862—which signaled that in the context of European imperialism, some in Europe hoped attention to Saladin's virtues might be of use at the very same time they aspired to be "crusaders" themselves.

Indeed, in both the construction of national identities in Europe and the justification of both national and imperial endeavors, the crusades proved to be "an apt and readily portable symbol of the political landscape," in the words of Adam Knobler.[8] Enthusiasm in France found expression in the *Salles des Croisades* in the Château of Versailles. These formed part of King Louis Philippe's scheme of decoration for the palace, which was to become a museum dedicated to the glories of France. The five rooms were hung with over 120 paintings illustrating scenes from crusading history and were decorated with the coats-of-arms of families whose ancestors had been crusaders; Louis IX featured in four works. Most of the paintings of the crusades were commissioned from 1838 to 1842, aligned with the opening years of the French conquest of Algeria. There was fierce competition among French nobles to be included and for years after the rooms opened in 1843 those who had not originally been represented continued to bombard the authorities with demands for inclusion, producing in support of their case documents, many of them forged, attesting to their crusading ancestry. Napoleon made use of the crusades too, explicitly invoking their history as he deployed troops to Lebanon in 1860.

In Spain "crusading came to be an almost constant theme in Spanish traditionalist polemic" in the nineteenth century.[9] From this perspective, Napoleon was equivalent to Muslim adversaries in the past, and the defense of Spain against the French emperor was an inheritance of the *Reconquista*. Spanish clergy and monks played a key role in the deployment of such ideas. When Napoleonic forces were defeated, the new monarchy of Ferdinand VII and royalist clergy would again call upon the crusading past—even as far afield as in Mexico—when faced with opposition from the independence movement. Ferdinand's brother, Don Carlo, and his heirs would continue to promote a connection to the crusades through loyal nobles and clerics alike. In 1870, the claimant Carlos, Duke of Madrid, was presented with a replica of the Cross of Victory, explicitly recalling the

Figure 13.1 Prosper Lafaye, Louis Phillipe visits the Salle des Croisades, July 1844. © Wikimedia Commons (public domain).

deeds of James I of Aragon. And crusading was invoked substantially again by politicians, journalists, and literary writers with Spain's attempted invasion of Morocco of 1859–60. When Spain lost most of its remaining colonies in North America in 1898, traditionalists explained the disaster as divine punishment for repudiating Spain's formerly religious past and made a concerted effort to revise school textbooks in order to correct the country's moral error.

Not only countries with a demonstrated Catholic past claimed crusading in the nineteenth century. Some Russian and Bulgarian monarchs and Greek nationalists alike called for holy war against the Ottomans, the reconquest of Constantinople, and the founding of a new Byzantine Empire. Some of these appeals were couched in the terms of the medieval crusades, although others were more closely linked to ideas of holy war inherited from Byzantium.[10] Furthermore Emperor Tewodros II of Ethiopia also repeatedly claimed the goal of retaking Jerusalem for Christendom and assumed as a matter of course that in such action, he would have the Christian nations of Europe (especially Britain) as allies.[11]

European elites explicitly claimed crusading as a precedent for nineteenth-century imperialism. The French occupation of Algeria in 1830 was compared to Louis IX's descent on Tunis in 1270 and in an abridged edition of the *Histoire des croisades* of Joseph François Michaud, his collaborator Jean-Joseph Poujoulat averred that "the conquest of Algiers in 1830 and our recent expeditions in Africa are nothing other than

crusades." On seeing Horace Vernet's painting of the French assault on Constantine in 1837 a contemporary exclaimed:

> We find there again, after an interval of five hundred years, the French nation fertilizing with its blood the burning plains studded with the tents of Islam. These men are the heirs of Charles Martel, Godfrey of Bouillon, Robert Guiscard and Philip Augustus, resuming the unfinished labours of their ancestors. Missionaries and warriors, they every day extend the boundaries of Christendom.

What is most interesting about this example is the failure to reference early modern empire-building, which as we have seen, so clearly made use of the crusades and informed the ideas present in the nineteenth century. Not recent crusades but rather those of the more distant past were pressed into service in the nineteenth-century present.

Many European countries also developed their own traditions of national crusading history, believing that the crusaders' achievements were now being replicated and that "uncivilized" Muslim societies were going to benefit from Christian rule. The newly created state of Belgium adopted Godfrey of Bouillon. Norwegian nationalists looked to King Sigurd. Germany claimed eight crusading rulers, above all Frederick Barbarossa. Spain mined the history of medieval Iberia, with heroes like Ferdinand III of Castile. England applauded Richard Coeur de Lion. Statues were erected in prominent locations, ensuring that these traditions were publicly recognized and incorporated into the visual culture of modern nation-states. Military heroes within the British Empire were lauded as new crusaders who fought and if necessary died "for the honour of the Cross and for the honour of England."[12]

The crusades were referenced in particular when the international status quo appeared threatened, reminding us that the historical context in the Mediterranean had decisively altered. Cecil Rhodes' second will called for the establishment of "a secret society dedicated to, among other things, encouraging British occupation of the Holy Land."[13] After the so-called "Oriental Crisis of 1840," an episode in the Egyptian-Ottoman War, Sir William Hillary, diplomat, soldier, philanthropist, and a knight of the English Order of St John, published a pamphlet calling for "Christian occupation of the Holy Land." He argued that a Christian state should be established in West Asia to counterbalance Egypt and Turkey, and that it should be ruled by the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, now to be returned to full sovereignty. His plans were utopian, encompassing tolerance of Jews, Muslims, and all sects of Christianity:

> The restoration of the order of St John to its former state and dignity—of once more becoming the protector and defender of Palestine, appears to be the great connecting link in that chain, through which alone, perhaps, could the contending and conflicting interests of so many great and powerful nations be brought cordially to adopt any one measure as common to all. . . . [and thus] the affairs of the East and the balance of power in Europe be permanently and honorably adjusted, and secured on the principles calculated to endure, and long to avert the calamities of war from so many nations.[14]

Renewing the crusades, then, was presented as a means to achieve distinctly modern and Eurocentric goals of international accord, good government, and religious tolerance. This flavor of positive British imperialism was particularly apparent in Sir Claude Conder's history *The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem* (1897).

> The Crusades were no wild raids on Palestine resulting only in misery and destruction. The kingdom of Jerusalem was the model of just and moderate rule, such as we boast to have given to India, under somewhat similar conditions.

And Conder's publisher, the Palestine Exploration Fund, advertised his book by recalling:

> The condition of the Orientals (is) almost the same as that when Europe intervened in the Eastern question in the days of Godfrey of Bouillon and of King Richard Lionheart.

Similar ideas were presented to children, too, albeit in a distinctly saccharine way, as in *Little Henry's Holiday at the Great Expedition*, a guidebook to the 1851 London World's Fair:

> P: Do you remember, what old TIME said of the first gathering of nations—of the Crusades?
> Rose: I do, Papa.
> P: Now, when men write the history of Europe, and speak of the Crusades, they show that out of evil came good, that nations gained new ideas, they learned much of each other, and much *from* each other. Thus, they became more "civilized."[15]

The idea of the late medieval humanists that crusading pitted civilized Europeans against barbarous Ottomans had transformed into the idea that the crusades had in fact advanced "civilization" for all involved.

Non-Western Engagement with the Crusades

The legacies of crusading not only continued to feature in the history and culture of Europe and the United States but also in places affected by European imperialism, such as Jerusalem, and within some Muslim communities. As has hopefully been clear from earlier chapters, Islamic and Arab-writing historians addressed the crusades from the twelfth century forward. The persistent and pervasive belief among generations of scholars that somehow the crusades had been forgotten by Muslims and Muslim-ruled states and only returned to Muslim consciousness thanks to the words and deeds of Europeans has been conclusively shown to be inaccurate as well as noticeably Eurocentric by Diana Abouali and other scholars building on her work.[16] In addition, "the crusades" did not necessarily figure as a single, central topic for Muslim and Arab-writing historians, one deserving of

its own separate historiography, nor did they necessarily emphasize the same Muslims in the history of the crusades. Thus while Salah al-Din certainly was remembered and written about, Baybars was also a prominent historical figure—who also featured as the hero in popular epic narratives in the modern period—and furthermore, much more recent events related to crusades against the Ottomans often took precedence.

A scholarly synthesis of Islamic and Arabic historiography of the crusades in English is badly needed, and this chapter cannot attempt to fill that gap. However, the recent work of Paul Cobb and Jonathan Phillips at least allows us to sketch a rough trajectory here.[17] Three points will be emphasized. First, stand-alone histories of the crusades in Arabic and/or authored by Muslims in the modern period date from the sixteenth century. Second, European imperialism in the Mediterranean coincided with revived memories and historical attention to the history of the crusades among invaded communities. Third, and admittedly most conjecturally, it appears that the experiences of imperialism and the emergence of nationalism correlated with increased attention to the crusades in both scholarship and popular culture among Europeans and those they colonized alike. Indeed, the most popular works were translated and thus moved around the Mediterranean.

The first stand-alone modern history of the crusades in Arabic was *Information and Explanation Concerning the Raids of the Franks on the Lands of the Muslims* by Ahmad ibn ʿAli al-Hariri in 1519. Al-Maqqari mourned the losses in Iberia in a 1632 text, while the seventeenth-century Ottoman travel writer Evliya Çelebi showed ongoing awareness of crusading in his ten-volume work on his travels. The early-eighteenth-century Ottoman historian Naʿima offered the instructional examples of the Ayyubids and Mamluks to his readers. And in 1701, elite inhabitants of Jerusalem asked the Ottoman sultan to prohibit a visit to their city from the French consul due to anxieties about French motivations vis-à-vis Jerusalem.

In this context, European imperialism served to increase anxieties and collective attention to the history of the crusades, starting with Napoleon's 1798 invasion of Egypt. Certainly the number of sources demonstrating preoccupation with the crusades among both Muslims and Middle Eastern Christians grows through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. At the end of the nineteenth century, in a time of political crisis for the Ottoman Empire in the 1890s, the first Muslim-authored history of "the crusades," the *Splendid Accounts in the Wars of the Cross*, was written by Sayyid ʿAli al-Hariri. And at the same time, the Ottoman state was itself identifying European imperialism with the crusades; hardly surprising, given the enthusiasm with which European powers proclaimed themselves to be following in the footsteps of their crusading ancestors. In his introduction al-Hariri explained that he wished to write a comprehensive and accessible history of the "wars of the cross" for readers of Arabic, and further noted that Abdulhamid II had "said that Europe is now waging a crusading war on us, in a political form."[18]

This entanglement was reinforced and arguably exacerbated by the behavior on a visit to Damascus in November 1898 of Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, who laid a satin flag and a wreath, with an inscription dedicated to "the Hero Sultan Saladin," on Salah

al-Din dilapidated tomb. He was to pay for the restoration of the mausoleum and the construction of a very un-Islamic marble tomb-chest, on which rested another wreath, this time bronze gilt and inscribed "From one great emperor to another." At a banquet afterward the kaiser expressed his delight at treading the same soil as Salah al-Din, "one of the most chivalrous rulers in history," who, he added, had been "a knight without fear or blame, who often had to teach his adversaries the true nature of chivalry." However, as Carole Hillenbrand has very recently demonstrated, the wreath was in fact a statement of colonial superiority and dominance masked as praise: "it pretends to be one thing—a tribute to Saladin—but in reality it is quite another, namely a piece of imperial self-aggrandisement."[19] The past was to be colonized alongside the present.

Thus we see the entanglement of historical and international political interests in European states, colonized lands, and the Ottoman Empire in the last years of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, we see attention to figures and themes from the crusades in popular culture around the Mediterranean. Sir Walter Scott was not the only writer engaging the public on a massive scale. Jurji Zaydan, a Greek Orthodox Christian born in Beirut, wrote both works of history and twenty-two historical novels. The latter were popular and some featured figures from the history of the crusades, such as Salah al-Din. Widely performed theatrical works focused on Salah al-Din were also popular in the eastern Mediterranean at the turn of the twentieth century. At that time nationalism gave further impetus to many around the Mediterranean to identify histories that could be of use in binding a nation-state together. For different reasons yet at the same time, the crusades offered appealing narratives of the past to many different societies, even while the professionalization of the academic discipline of history both gained strength from and encouraged ongoing use of the crusades by contemporary actors.

It seems quite clear that in the nineteenth century, ideas and even some frameworks of crusading (such as the concept of order-states) continued to be used and, given their repetition and effectiveness, presumably were received well by at least a portion of their intended audiences. It is also notable that at the same time, so many foundational histories and collections of sources for the study of the crusades were written and compiled, not only in Europe but around the Mediterranean. All that said, the fact that a range of international actors used the history of the crusades in pursuing their own contemporary goals, while important in its own right, does not mean simply that "the crusades" continued. Ideas, rhetoric, and imagery very often postdate a particular phenomenon, sometimes quite dramatically and within vastly different historical contexts. It is important, then, that there is evidence for actual crusading in familiar forms in the nineteenth century.

Crusading in Familiar Forms

In the 1820s the Knights of Malta recruited English enthusiasts to help them recover the island of Rhodes. This involved funding and manning a navy that was to sail to the Aegean to assist the Greek revolt against the Turks. The expedition never left England, but it entailed Protestants being admitted to a Catholic religious order to carry war to

the Ottomans and led in the end to the establishment of a major charitable enterprise throughout the British Empire, an Order of St. John committed to first aid and ambulance services. In the 1860s, devout Catholic recruits from France, Spain, Britain, and the United States. fought against the forces of the Risorgimento in defense of the Papal State in the 1860s. When in the same period the government of Napoleon III decided to intervene in Lebanon on behalf of the Maronites, there was talk of actually proclaiming a crusade. Though that did not occur, Napoleon told the departing French troops:

> You are leaving for Syria. . . . On that distant soil, rich in great memories . . . you will show yourselves to be the worthy descendants of those heroes who carried the banner of Christ gloriously in that land.

Feelings were running so high in 1876 over allegations that the Ottomans were ill-treating the Bulgarians that the author of a pamphlet written for English Catholics had to explain why a crusade could not be launched against the Ottomans. And in the midst of European imperialism in Africa emerged what Jonathan Riley-Smith has called "the only authentic crusade venture of the nineteenth century."

Charles-Martial Allemand-Lavigerie, who founded the missionary orders of the White Fathers and the White Sisters in 1868 and 1869, was one of the most influential figures in the European missionary field. His life shows how the ideas of crusading and imperialism could inspire people from the most unlikely backgrounds. He was born in 1825 into a secular bourgeois household, with traditions of Freemasonry and support for the French Revolution; his father refused to fund his seminary education. Nevertheless, his career was spectacular. He was a professor at the Sorbonne at the age of twenty-eight, bishop of Nancy at thirty-eight, and archbishop of Algiers at forty-two. He was to be a cardinal from 1882 until his death ten years later.

At the age of twenty-two he had been appointed director of the *Oeuvre des Ecoles d'Orient*, an agency responsible for raising money to support the activities of French religious communities in West Asia when the Catholics there, particularly the Maronites in Lebanon, were coming under severe pressure. He visited the region in 1860 and so fired with enthusiasm did he become that he unsuccessfully applied to become Latin patriarch of Jerusalem in 1872. Five years later he acquired for his missionaries the beautiful twelfth-century crusader church of St. Anne in Jerusalem, which had been bought and restored by the French government at a time when French crusade scholarship was in its golden age, as we have seen.

Lavigerie's espousal of crusade ideas began to reveal themselves in the 1880s. He was obsessed with the evils of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, concerned for the safety of his missionaries, committed to the French cause in the "Scramble for Africa," and anxious about competition from "Protestants and Freethinkers," who, he believed, were literally gaining ground in Africa in the wake of the Belgian advance up the River Congo. Eventually he became convinced that a Catholic kingdom should be established in eastern central Africa as a haven for those who escaped slavery, a center of evangelization, and a block to any expansion eastward by Belgium.

In May 1883 he was wondering whether within the White Fathers:

> One could have two orders of brothers, of which one would bear arms like the old Knights of Malta, and the other would follow the actual rule of the [White Fathers]; but both would make perpetual vows.

He was worried, however, by the prospect of the Superior of the White Fathers becoming a military commander-in-chief. He pointed out that the old military orders had been run by their brother knights, not by their priests, and his mind turned to the possibility of using the Order of Malta itself. The Order had been gradually reviving since the abandonment of its island state and in 1879 Pope Leo XIII had restored the right, which it had lost in 1805, to have an elected grand master. The pope had referred to its "surpassing merits in the Church, distinguished by the glory of its history and the victory won against the common enemy." It was now refocusing its efforts on the care of the sick, but Lavigerie saw this as an opportunity to revive its ancient military traditions. In a note addressed to Holy See in June 1884, he suggested the establishment of a Catholic state west of Lake Tanganyika, which would be a bulwark against Protestant advance, and he thought that the reconstituted Order of Malta could be employed to make this a reality.

In effect, he was proposing the establishment of a new order-state along the lines of Prussia, Rhodes, and Malta. He reported that Pope Leo "was personally enthusiastic (the word enthusiastic is not too strong)," but a meeting he had with Grand Master Ceschi of the Order of Malta was a disappointment. The grand master, who presided over an Order that had abandoned a military role and must have been worried by the prospect of inter-confessional conflict in Africa, replied that he did not have the resources for such a task. Lavigerie later wrote that he regretted he could not "galvanize those paralytics."

On the basis of "verbal instructions" from the pope that were not formally recorded but in which Leo apparently "summoned the Christian world to a crusade to end such great horrors (as the commerce in slaves)," Lavigerie called in 1888 for an *Association militaire et religieuse*, such as had been created in the past to defend Christians against the Turks. It was generally thought that he had in mind the Order of Malta, which, it was assumed, the pope was reorganizing so that it could involve itself in the work of the redemption of enslaved people in Africa. After all, Leo had restored the rank of cardinal to the grand master and had again written in praise of the Order's crusading history, celebrating its ancient origins, the virtue and nobility of the brother knights, their glorious service on behalf of Christianity and the Catholic Faith, and the victories won by them against the enemy of the Christian name.

But Lavigerie had abandoned the idea of the Order of Malta, which was now, he wrote, "only a shadow of its former self." A year later his mind turned to the establishment of fortified asylums, placed on great communication routes in the Sahara and having the additional purpose of "advancing commerce and civilization." These, he wrote in March 1889, could be founded by an association "somewhat like the Order of Malta," the members of which would be "volunteers of civilization and peace." In 1890 he began to plan this new order, to be called *L'Institut Religieux et Militaire des Frères Armés du Sahara*. He had bought

an agricultural property at Biskra on the edge of the Algerian desert with money provided by the French anti-slavery society and had built there a residence for fifty persons. This was to be the Order's mother house. According to the Rule he composed, the armed brothers were to operate throughout the African sahel. The brothers would receive those who escaped from slavery, offer hospitality to travelers, work the soil, and befriend the locals. Lavigerie described exactly how their settlements were to be established. In each of them there was to be a commandant, two lieutenants—one in charge of agriculture the other of military exercises—two almoners and a hospital to care for the sick from local communities.

As penitents and professed religious, subject to the pope through the vicar apostolic, the armed brothers had to adhere more strictly than others to the practice of apostolic poverty. Minutely detailed instructions determined their way of life, with the aim of corresponding it as closely as possible to that of the people among whom they would reside. They were to live, sleep, and eat in the manner of the region and they had to learn Arabic and indigenous languages. Their days were to be divided between prayer and spiritual reading, agricultural work in their settlements, and military exercises. They were to promise to be obedient to their superiors, to be poor, to be chaste, "and to fight to death, if it should be necessary, for the defense and protection of those, principally the victims of slavery, who will put themselves under this Institute's protection." They had to carry arms and know how to use them, and in each settlement they had to build a fortification and keep an arsenal of weapons.

Hundreds of men from all social classes applied to join the new Order and ninety-five were accepted, although the community at Biskra never had more than thirty members. On April 5, 1891, the first brothers received their habits of white emblazoned with a red cross. A daughter community of six brothers was founded at Ouargla, further south, at the end of 1891 and Lavigerie wanted other settlements established even deeper into the interior, but the newspapers, even the Catholic ones, were indifferent or hostile and the French government became concerned. The Order was anyway not developing as had been hoped and the entrants were not of the caliber to provide experienced leaders. Lavigerie, who was gravely ill—he was to die a week later—took the decision to wind the *frères armés* up and sent one of the missionaries to Biskra to break the news on November 19, 1892. The community at that time consisted of twenty-three members. Nine joined the White Fathers; one entered the Trappists; two became colonists; the others returned home.

The *Institut des Frères Armés* was a reflection not only of the crusading dream but of a reactionary streak in the French Church, which was reeling under assault from anti-clerical forces and trying to rediscover its roots in its medieval past. The Order of Malta showed itself to be more pragmatic than Lavigerie. The achievements of its government from 1834 onward in preserving its claims to sovereignty and persuading its members to renounce the role they had followed for seven centuries—thus readopting the care of the sick as its principle activity and rebuilding its provincial structure on a new basis—demonstrate how adaptable it was and explain why it was so reluctant to get involved in the creation of an African order-state. By the nineteenth century, the same Order that had dreamed of an order-state based around Tripoli in the sixteenth century wanted nothing to do with an African order-state.

Figure 13.2 The Frères Armés du Sahara.
© The Archive of the Society of the Missionaries of Africa.
This photograph shows us the community in the mother house at Biskra, Algeria, in 1891. Note the crosses worn on the brothers' chests and the guns they carry.

Lavigerie played a major part in the process of reconciling the Catholic Church in France to the Republic and in its defense against anti-clerical onslaught. He was close to the popes and, as we have seen, founded two very successful missionary orders. At least one prominent newspaper believed that he would have made a great pope. His crusade plans attracted support from many people, including Pope Leo XIII, who on hearing of his death was said to have exclaimed: "I loved him as a brother, as Peter loved Andrew." In his interests and political influence Lavigerie reminds one, although obviously on a lesser scale, of the twelfth-century Cistercian abbot Bernard of Clairvaux. His *frères armés*, professed fighting religious wearing crosses, engaged in holy and penitential combat and subject to the papacy, conformed to the old criteria for crusading. The one major difference—that they would fight in defense of those who escaped slavery—looked forward to the secular humanitarian warfare that was to be in vogue a century later.

Crusader Medievalisms into the Twenty-First Century

In the third edition of this book, Jonathan Riley-Smith concluded that in the first half of the twentieth century, crusading was "consigned to oblivion" as a phenomenon of the distant past.

> An intellectual consensus confined it to the Middle Ages. The word "crusade" remains in use, but in a debased form, implying for most people nothing more

> than some heartfelt campaign for a political or religious cause. And Western culture has found a replacement for holy war in secular forms of ideological violence, employed on behalf of religious or cultural or even pseudo-scientific ideals—Nationalism, Marxism, Fascism and Humanitarianism—that were, or are, considered by their adherents to be of universal importance.[20]

This conclusion was reasonable at the time and remains current among some crusade scholars, but, in yet another reminder of the incredible pace and coverage of scholarship on the crusades, it is no longer fully sufficient. If one is only concerned with "real" or "authentic" crusades—however defined—then this statement makes more sense. Certainly in the twentieth century crusade indulgences were no longer issued by the papacy nor were officially sanctioned military orders still being created from scratch. Long-standing military orders such as the Order of Christ (among others) remain to this day, with symbolism and imagery visibly indebted to their crusading past, but have been otherwise secularized and nationalized. There are many people around the world for whom Riley-Smith's words still ring true.

But at the same time, if one is concerned also with crusader medievalisms, then the picture becomes more complicated. We have seen the entanglement of crusading and crusader medievalisms in the nineteenth century in both Western and non-Western contexts. Crusader medievalisms remained prominent into the twentieth century and are now positively surging in the twenty-first century. Even as many have agreed that crusading is firmly confined to the past, other thinkers and actors have invoked the crusades in support of their own agendas and actions. Comparative syntheses of work on modern crusader medievalisms are sorely needed and the work that could inform such books continues to be published at an incredible pace by scholars in a range of disciplines including history, politics, international relations, and media studies. This section, then, serves only to sketch the main outlines in general terms, with hopes that future editions will be able to feature a fuller discussion.

The first point to make is that crusading continued to figure prominently in both Western and non-Western cultural memories in the twentieth century. Mike Horswell has demonstrated that "significant authors for a century after Scott included crusading novels in their oeuvre" in order to "inculcate and perpetuate the cultural system" of a chivalric, Christian, and imperialist Britain.[21] Elizabeth Siberry's extensive studies of crusader medievalisms have shown likewise that nineteenth-century crusader medievalisms in literature extended well beyond Scott; she notes that "at a family, local, regional, and national level, the crusades provided the necessary elements of a good story."[22] In addition, the crusades surfaced in theater, opera, stained glass, and a wide range of artworks. In Arabic literature, too, as well as in theater, textbooks, and other cultural institutions in the Islamic Mediterranean, the crusades continued to serve "as a potent memory to invoke and to weave around contemporary events."[23] Studying sometimes-overlooked cultural artifacts, such as postage stamps in twentieth-century France, also demonstrates "a positive acceptance of the crusades as an element of a nation's identity," as Rachael Pymm has shown.[24] Meanwhile, as the many contributors

to *Playing the Crusades* discuss, the crusades—distorted in a range of ways—continue to feature prominently in twenty-first-century video games and as a result, have profoundly influenced public perceptions of the past.[25]

One striking example of the presence and impact of crusader medievalisms in the first half of the twentieth century is the Most Noble Order of Crusaders, established in 1921 in London and brought to historians' attention by Mike Horswell. The men who founded the order remembered the First World War as the "Ninth Crusade" and sought to help reform English society by reviving ideals they linked to chivalry, a task which they referred to as the "Tenth Crusade."[26] At its peak more than 5,000 men had joined the London order, although there were also at least four regional conclaves.[27] These men were from a range of social classes, with a predominance of ex-servicemen and including a few MPs; their initial London ceremony was held in nothing less than Westminster Abbey. By 1928 there were fifty-two conclaves in the UK, as well as a Canadian branch.

The order was dominated by medieval or pseudo-medieval elements, including the motto *Sic Deus Vult*, the leadership of a Grand Master, and a range of traditional imagery and ceremonial expectations. Public reception of the Order was mixed, with some praising it, others condemning it as a British KKK, and still others mocking members' perceived pretensions. It is clear that members of the Order saw their goals as intrinsically Christian—one publication referred to Christ as "the greatest crusader the world has ever known"—but also British and patriotic, "removed from the theological debates that demarked denominations and . . . tied to loyalty to King and country."[28] Ultimately the Order did not survive beyond the 1930s.

The second point is that, as already suggested, these cultural memories were frequently connected to nationalism and the political needs and agendas of nation-states on an international stage. The idea of the crusade as a forerunner of nineteenth-century imperialism gained momentum after a British Army had invaded Ottoman-ruled Palestine during the First World War and Britain and France had occupied Palestine and Syria and Lebanon under mandate from the League of Nations. Although the British commander, General Allenby, who entered Jerusalem on December 11, 1917, never made the remark "today the wars of the crusaders are ended" attributed to him—indeed steps were taken to avoid giving offence, particularly as Muslims were serving with the British forces—the magazine *Punch* published a cartoon titled "The Last Crusade," which had Richard Coeur de Lion gazing at Jerusalem from a distance with the caption: "At last my dream come true." On arriving in Damascus in 1920 the first French military governor of Syria, General Henri Gouraud, was heard to say, "Behold, Saladin, we have returned." The French Mandate in Syria generated a wave of French historical literature, one theme of which was that the achievements of the crusaders provided the first chapter in a history that had culminated in modern imperialism.

In the meantime, similar rhetoric had also been employed in the service of the combatants in the First World War, particularly the British. An extreme example of this was provided by an Anglican priest who, serving as an army chaplain, described the Dardanelles campaign as

> the latest of the crusades. Should Constantinople fall it will be the greatest Christian victory that has occurred for hundreds of years. . . . A vision arises before the mind of Byzantium once again a Christian city; St Sophia once again the home of Christian worship, and who knows, once again the Holy Land rescued from the defiling grip of the infidel.

During the First World War, Germany had promoted the conflict as a holy war, even while not explicitly marking it as a crusade, as Felix Hinz has shown.[29] It was also to surface in the 1930s in the Spanish Civil War, during which some Iberian bishops were prepared to uphold General Francisco Franco's conviction that he had embarked on a crusade to save Catholic Spain from Communism and Freemasonry. And it surfaced in the United States, too. While work on the crusades and crusader medievalisms in the context of US history is badly needed, we at least know that the crusades were invoked in the early-twentieth-century Ku Klux Klan, whose goal was the "purification" and "restoration" of white, Protestant America, as Kelly J. Baker has demonstrated. In 1926, in the published article "Our Crusading Army," Imperial Wizard H. W. Evans described crusaders as those who tried to "rescue the Tomb of our Lord from the power of Saracens" before arguing that in seeking to cleanse and reform US society, Klansmen were modern crusaders fulfilling a "divinely appointed task."[30]

In Britain before the Second World War the crusades functioned to communicate self-perception of a triumphant and chivalric British Empire. There were attempts to employ crusader medievalism "in the context of Britain's involvement in the second World War," such as scholar, cleric, author, and one-time royal chaplain Cyril Alington's pro-war pamphlet *The Last Crusade*. Alington was not simply applying the label of crusading to drum up recruits; he made an explicit and nuanced argument for the war against Nazi Germany as a crusade. Horswell has described Alington's work as representing "an attempt (perhaps the last) to appeal to the country to engage in a conflict on the ground that it *really was* a crusade."[31]

Meanwhile in Arabic-speaking regions, the crusades also continued to resonate in the context of Western imperialism as a symbol of European aggression against those living in West Asia. Two ideological movements in the Arabic-speaking world in the twentieth century made particular use of the crusades: nationalism and pan-Islamism. Both emerged in the aftermath of the Ottoman Empire and in the context of settlements made by European empires after the First World War that affected the political dynamics of the eastern Mediterranean. To the nationalists, their struggle for independence was a predominantly Arab or Turkish riposte to a crusade which was still being waged against them.

From the mid-twentieth century onward, however, nationalists were increasingly challenged by a renewed and militant pan-Islamism, the adherents of which, believing Islam to be an indivisible entity, a community dedicated to the worship of the one God embracing all races, anathematized nationalism because it was often secular and was, of its nature, divisive. This did not prevent them from adopting a nationalist interpretation of crusade history that they then globalized. Whereas a nationalist vision of a crusading past and present underwrote a particular nation's struggle for freedom from colonial

oppression, to the pan-Islamists Western aggression and penetration into any part of the *dar al-Islam* justified the waging of military *jihad* on a world scale. Inspired by the arguments of their leading ideologue, Sayyid Qutb, they maintained that "crusading" was a term that applied to any offensive against Islam, including a drive for economic or political hegemony, by those who called themselves Christian or had inherited the Christian tradition and to any aggressive action by those perceived as surrogates, like Zionists or Marxists. Indeed "international Zionism" and "international Communism" were presented as ideologies employed by Western imperialists to mask its "Crusaderism," which was a force, more ancient than its surrogates, enshrining an enduring Christian ambition to subvert Islam and destroy believers.

This state of affairs called for not only externally focused warfare but internal purification of Islamic society. The militant wing of pan-Islamism, the so-called Salafist jihadis, was also inspired by the writings of a charismatic figure from the Middle Ages, the theoretician Ibn Taymiyya, whose commitment to religious uniformity as a prelude to success in holy warfare had been not unlike that of many of his Christian opponents. For him the priority of the military *jihad* had been not to wage war beyond the frontiers but to purge Sunni Islam of alien elements, such as heretics and unbelievers. The military *jihad* was to turn inward and create by force a united and purified society dedicated to God, which could then focus its attention on the world beyond. The jihadis were, therefore, particularly emotional about infidel penetration, which they believe corrupted Islam. This version of neo-imperialist crusade history took root in several Muslim societies before it suddenly and spectacularly forced itself on the world outside. It is clear that it owes much to the widespread utilization of the crusades by nineteenth-century Western imperialists.

But it also owes much to the continued utilization of the crusades by twentieth-century Western governments. This is an area that needs more research, although the work of Andrew Elliott has been particularly helpful. While it is conventional to perceive George W. Bush's infamous statement that the war against terror was a crusade as a singular misstep, Elliott asks us to recognize a broader trend in Western political rhetoric that should be read as context. To begin, the response of the Bush administration served to transform "relatively minor quirks and missteps into serious policy initiatives to drive an ideological wedge between East and West."[32] After 9/11, Prime Minister Tony Blair continued to call for crusades in casual terms, and Elliott concludes that "even after drawing criticism across the globe, the ideas which underpinned Bush's crusade comments were in ample evidence long after the furore faded away."[33] These ideas continued to support the War on Terror and the literal wars through which it was enacted; "the logic of crusade was thus pitched as a liberation doctrine—if 'they' are uniformly medieval, 'our' role is to modernize them."[34]

In the twenty-first century, in addition to nation-state usage of the crusades, various non-state actors—easily if perhaps unhelpfully classifiable as "extremists"—also continue to make use of the crusades to recruit, motivate, and justify acts of violence in the digital and super-connected twenty-first century. Whether one looks at the statements of Osama bin Laden, the criminal organization of *Los Caballeros Templarios de Michoacán*, the

social media posts of the Islamic State and the English Defense League, the manifestos of individuals like Anders Behring Breivik and Seung-Hui Cho, the revival of the rhetoric of *Reconquista* in far-right movements in the Iberian Peninsula, or the slogans and symbolism prominent at white supremacist political gatherings in a range of different countries,[35] one sees far-right movements determined to engage in violence characterized as either crusading or counter-crusading and linked to a rejection of a range of modern ideas and a desired return to "traditional" social and political formations. As Akil Awan and Andrew Elliott have both emphasized, the sharing of crusader medievalisms in the current age of mass media is potentially revelatory. Awan has persuasively argued that the ideas of "crusade" and "crusader" are used as rhetorical tools for dehumanization, leading to a veritable feedback loop of antagonism and mistrust.[36] In Elliott's words, "it becomes clear that we are dealing not with a means of moderating, mistreating or misrepresenting the past, but most emphatically the issue is with the present and its use of the past."[37] The critical historical question, then, is not "when the crusades ended" but "what factors account for the crusades' still unfolding legacies in the present." Of course, the critical ethical questions raised by these legacies are in fact significantly more pressing.

AFTERWORD

Susanna A. Throop

It is conventional for Western historians and their students to maintain distance from the past that they study, or at least, to imagine that such distance is both possible and desirable. This, of course, is a legacy of historical empiricism and its profound influence on the professionalization of Western history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Even though the approach of sentient empathy described in Chapter 1 applies pressure to the distinction between past and present, nonetheless that distinction remains an *a priori* assumption for Western scholars of the crusades. In other words, it is assumed that when we study the crusades and crusaders, we are studying the past, which stands apart from the present. It is also conventional for Western historians and their students to imagine a distinction between their academic study of the past and the diverse understandings of the past that inhabit modern popular cultures and political rhetoric. From this perspective, the "real" history of the Western university stands in contrast to the appropriated, misunderstood, or misrepresented histories of everyone else.

The history of the crusades, as surveyed in this book, calls into question both premises. We cannot identify a single point in time when the crusades ended. We can study and discuss continuity and change readily, but simplistic ideas of "beginnings" and "endings" do not hold up to scrutiny. Similarly, as Kristin Skottki has demonstrated, "While in theory it may sound plausible to differentiate between . . . historical culture and . . . academic historiography, this division is, in reality, a fallacy." In other words, historians' works are entangled in their own contexts, and the crusader medievalisms that so many scholars at the moment argue against, in fact "derive their origin from the very heart of crusade historiography." Indeed, Skottki concludes, historians' own blindness to the connections between their work and popular conceptions of the crusades "may be identified as one of the major causes for the fierce struggle over the meaning and nature of the crusades today."[1] The last several chapters have demonstrated this quite clearly; the work of historians of the crusades in the early modern and modern periods was clearly cotemporaneous with the simultaneous waging of and resistance against crusading violence. It would be a mistake to imagine that historians' work in the twenty-first century differs in that regard; that we, unlike all historians before us, have finally managed to separate that which we study from the world in which we live and the subjectivities we inhabit.

Because scholars cannot assume a comfortable distance from the history of the crusades nor from the representations of the crusades in the world around us, and because so many in the current moment are currently using the crusades to motivate and justify violence, studying the crusades engages directly with the question of historical ethics. While any study of the past involves ethical considerations, in the case of the history of the crusades, the knowledge that we put forward into the world can and

presumably will be used by many different actors to further their own agendas. To give just one example, to discuss whether the crusades ended or not is to engage in a political as well as a historical discussion, even if one has absolutely no wish to make a political claim of any kind. As Geraldine Heng has so succinctly put it, "our work can be made to assume other burdens than what we had designed."[2]

The result, as I have argued elsewhere, is that acknowledging the contexts in which scholars of the crusades work should be followed by reflection and a renewed commitment to intentional ethical action, because

> We have choices to make that will affect not only our field but our societies and our world, and given the current uses of the crusades in modern discourse, those choices will almost certainly echo broadly beyond academia, whether or not we have considered their ethical dimensions in advance.[3]

This requires all of us to be self-aware, engage in reflection, and act as best we can upon the ethical dimensions of our work as historians. Indeed, Gabrielle Spiegel has argued that the question of the ethical response to the use of the past in the present is the most pressing issue facing all historians at this moment.[4] The challenge, of course, is that such ethical considerations were largely dismissed from the profession of history in the formative nineteenth century. To put it another way, the ethics of historical work were considered to reside in historicism and the principles of source criticism, that is, in the relationship between the historian and their sources, without reference to the broader context in which the historians' work would rest.

However, there have been historians in the last half-century attempting to engage a broader question of historical ethics. In his discussion of popular representations of the history of slavery in the United States in the late twentieth century, Michel-Rolph Trouillot argued that the problem was one of the authenticity of the past in the particular present moment.

> It is from within this present that survivors, actors, and fellow narrators are asking us: what for? The meaning of history is also in its purpose. Empirical exactitude as defined and verified in specific context is necessary to historical production. But empirical exactitude alone is not enough. Historical representations—be they books, commercial exhibits or public commemorations—cannot be conceived only as vehicles for the transmission of knowledge. They must establish some relation to that knowledge. Further, not any relation will do. Authenticity is required, lest the representation becomes a fake, a morally repugnant spectacle.[5]

Authenticity for Trouillot involves agency as well as historical narration. In other words, in the example he discussed, resolution could not be found in a simple articulation of historical facts nor a simple denunciation of a past phenomenon, but rather, in acknowledgment of ongoing dynamics of power and inequity in the present that provide an unavoidable context for the past.

To apply the point, it is perhaps easy to denounce the crusades and religious violence in general and to proclaim such violence morally egregious. It is particularly easy if we imagine such violence safely contained within the past, apart from our present moment. But the unfolding legacies of the crusades—the ways in which the crusades continue to be invoked to motivate and justify violence from a wide range of political perspectives, and the fact that the crusades continue to be powerfully resonant *in the present*—is in fact the primary issue that needs to be addressed. In Trouillot's words, the ethical question lies not in historians' relation to the past but to "the meanings of the past in the present." Because the history of the crusades matters immensely in the current world, scholars of the crusades should—arguably, must—undertake research with broader awareness and ethical commitment.

I have made this argument in relation to the profession as a whole elsewhere; here, I focus on changes in approach and methodology most badly needed. My hope is to suggest possibilities and raise questions as a springboard for students' and instructors' discussions. But I must acknowledge that this hope is balanced by a keen awareness of the structural and personnel crises facing higher education in the United States and the United Kingdom at the present moment, crises perhaps most visible in academic strikes for better working conditions in the United Kingdom and the deprioritization and sometimes dissolution of history departments in the United States. The degree to which meaningful change in any field can be enacted in the face of resource shortages and devaluation of work should also be part of student and instructor discussions, and it is certainly in my mind even as I suggest future change.

First, let us reconceptualize the field of study. The idea that the crusades were and have been the only form of Christian holy war and only manifestation of organized Christian violence is untenable. If we position the crusades within the longer and broader history of Christian holy war and sacred violence—as Phillippe Buc above all has done—then the questions we ask may become both more nuanced and informative. In other words, instead of forcing a historical decision on the question of continuity or change, we can acknowledge both continuity and change within the broader framework of Christian holy war and sacred violence. We can, as I suggested in my first monograph, "now attempt the reconstruction of the discourse of Christian violence by an examination of the perpetrators . . . and to attempt to do so on the macro rather than the micro level." Philippe Buc's magisterial *Holy War, Martyrdom and Terror* (2015) has already launched this work, but there remains more to be done. Furthermore, we would all benefit from more willingness to see "Christian violence" as both a historical and ongoing reality rather than an oxymoron or anachronism.

Second, we can recognize the massive problem of periodization and do our best to work around it. Crusading is equated by scholars and the public alike with the Middle Ages. It is commonplace to find references to the "age of the crusades" or "the crusading period," for example, as though the crusades were an era of time, and many other textbooks of the crusades either explicitly or tacitly affirm this. The academic study of the crusades is virtually always housed within the medieval period and led by scholars who identify as medievalists, and thus the training of each new generation of scholars

is based upon and perpetuates the idea that the crusades were medieval. Meanwhile scholars focused on other periods, such as the early modern era, may be given little reason to doubt the identification of crusading with the Middle Ages and they thus bring that assumption into their own work. All of this leads to truly formidable logistical problems; even if an individual scholar seeks to move beyond these assumptions, the structures of academia and scholarly training will stand in their way.

It will take deliberate effort by scholars of the crusades to move the chronological boundaries of the field, but such effort is now clearly needed, not least because confining the crusades to the medieval period serves quite a number of different psychological and political purposes. Part of the appeal of locating Christian violence within, and only within, the crusades is that it seems to confine such violence to a single historical period, and one that is comfortably in the past. Such confinement allows for modernity to be a time of "progression" away from religious violence, perhaps in particular for those who identify as Christians or are citizens of a country, like the United States, that places great ideological emphasis on a break from the medieval past. At the same time, for any who yearn for a return to what they view as the "golden age" of the medieval Mediterranean, confining the crusades to the Middle Ages allows for a narrative of loss and salvation. That is, that past "golden age" with its "correct" social, political, and religious hierarchies and conflicts has been lost but it can be reconstructed. Both those who prefer a historical narrative of "progress" and those who wish for a "return to a better time" may find satisfying the idea of the crusades as medieval. Of course, dispelling the idea that the crusades were only of a particular period of time also has political impact. Yet at this point, it seems quite clear that it is no longer feasible to suggest that crusading was only medieval. Scholars cannot put the crusades back into the Middle Ages and seal the box, so we must do our best to produce accurate knowledge over a longer timeframe.

This will almost certainly require not only changes in the training of doctoral students but proactive scholarly collaboration across traditional boundaries of geography, chronology, and language. It is impossible for any one or even two scholars to possess the expertise and both historical and modern languages necessary to write the history of the crusades across time and space. So let us abandon the outdated and fundamentally misleading idea of the individual scholar toiling alone, and also the more recent model of national or regional collectivities of scholars, and embrace truly international and trans-periodic collaboration. The Global Middle Ages Project provides just one example of how such work can be done.[6] Expanded collaboration would help enable new scholarship that is now badly needed on topics such as the crusades in the context of the early modern and modern Atlantic world, crusades and crusader medievalisms in the historical and present-day United States, and engagement with the histories of race and slavery in relation to the crusades over the *longue durée*. Expanded collaboration may also help scholars of the crusades trained more traditionally gain exposure to different theoretical perspectives that may prove helpful.

Third, our field badly needs more synthetic and integrative publications, both so that in-depth scholarly work may be better contextualized and so that the best teaching materials possible can be formulated. We have an overabundance of scholarly articles,

which are too often inaccessible behind paywalls, and traditional scholarly monographs, which may be too narrowly focused for rapid learning by non-specialists. We need more synthetic works at a level between the laser-focused and meticulous analysis of primary sources and the sweeping scope of a textbook; we need more translations of scholarly work in a range of languages; and we need more synthetic works that center non-Western perspectives, such as Paul Cobb's *The Race for Paradise* (2014). Academia does not always reward the writing of such things and scholars are sometimes critical of those who attempt them. Nonetheless, that is what is needed, if we seriously want to shift public conversations about the crusades. It does little good to change the conversation within a group of a few dozen scholarly peers if thousands of students are still being taught the same old narratives. Vastly diverse international views on the crusades inhabit textbooks as well as popular cultures around the world, as Felix Hinz and Johannes Meyer-Hamme have so clearly demonstrated in their comparative study of historical cultures.[7] "Trickle down" historical revision appears ineffective, so a more direct approach is needed. The most well-established scholars should be willing to lead the way or partner with early career scholars on this work, since they have the least to lose by doing something unconventional and their voices matter when it comes to changing assumptions about what work matters the most in the field. In this regard, it is worth calling out for praise the partnership of Mike Horswell and Jonathan Phillips in launching and sustaining the *Engaging the Crusades* book series.

The fourth and final point to consider is the limit of historicism. In their relation to current events and to violence suffered by too many now, the crusades are emphatically not dead or gone. There is a tendency for historians, faced by such a situation, to attempt to use historical knowledge in place of or alongside moral rebuttal. But we can, and I suggest should, assert that violence against others on the basis of their religion, race, or ethnicity is horrific now, in the present, regardless of the past. And we can and should acknowledge that the histories of violence we engage in teaching and learning about the crusades are traumatic histories, and that trauma may be felt in the present moment by our students and ourselves.[8] By all means let us do our best to promote the most accurate historical knowledge we can, and to acknowledge when that knowledge of the past undercuts modern political polemics. But doing those things is not necessary to address present wrongs and to question present violence, and is insufficient when facing trauma-informed distress in our classrooms.

Furthermore, there are risks in centering conversations about present violence on historical questions, and in centering them on questions of historical violence. María Inés Mudrovcic has noted that when facing an ethical crisis in the present, most historians' instinctive reaction is to provide a narrative of how that ethical crisis came about. Such a narrative, however, may create the sense that the present is inevitable, stable, and unavoidable. Thus a historical mindset has the potential to legitimize continuity over time as a foundation for ethical action.[9] And continuity over time is no such thing. Similarly, the history of violence and war is not the only history available to us, and as Suleiman Mourad and Niall Christie have urged, there are alternate lenses with which to view medieval interfaith relations—alternate lenses that arguably should be prioritized.[10]

Ultimately, the fact that there has long been one or another discourse of violence does not legitimize it, nor does it mean that it is inevitable or unavoidable. In an important way, our ethical obligations in the present and the path toward a more ethical future stand apart from the past.

The questions of what exactly constitutes a "more ethical future" and what means should be used to attain it rest at the heart of the study of the crusades. In my first monograph, I urged the field to "grapple with [the] apparent conundrum" at the heart of the crusade appeal: "that a desire for moral purpose and an interest in promoting justice coexisted with regular, repeated violence and the rhetoric of religious hatred."[11] This conundrum, like the rhetoric and imagery of the crusades, is still with us. And its ongoing presence requires us to value complexity, ambiguity, and self-awareness, in our work as historians and in our lives as people in the twenty-first-century world.

CHRONOLOGY

March 1095	The Council of Piacenza
July–September 1096	Pope Urban II's preaching journey
November 27	Proclamation of the crusade at the Council of Clermont
December–July 1096	Persecution of Jews in France, Germany and Bohemia
1096–1102	**The three main waves of the First Crusade**
July 15, 1099	Crusaders conquer Jerusalem
1103	Planned crusade of Emperor Henry IV
1107–8	Crusade of Bohemond of Antioch-Taranto
1108–9	Crusade of Bertrand of St Gilles
1114	Catalan Expedition to the Balearic Islands
December 19, 1118	Alfonso I of Aragon's crusade conquers Saragossa
1119–20	Foundation of the Knights Templar
June 27, 1119	Battle of the Field of Blood
1120–6	Crusade of Pope Calixtus II in the eastern Mediterranean and Iberia
1126	First evidence for the militarization of the Hospital of St John
1128–9	Crusade of King Baldwin II of Jerusalem
May 1135	The Council of Pisa offers the crusade remission of sins to those taking up arms against papal enemies
1139–40	Crusade to the eastern Mediterranean
December 24, 1144	Zangi conquers Edessa
December 1, 1145	Pope Eugenius III's crusade bull *Quantum praedecessores*
1146	Persecution of Jews in the Rhineland
1146–7	St Bernard preaches the crusade
April 13, 1147	Papal authorization of crusading in Iberia and northern Europe
1147–9	**Crusading in eastern Mediterranean, Iberia, and northern Europe ("Second Crusade")**
October 24, 1147	Crusaders and Alfonso I of Portugal conquer Lisbon
1153	Crusading in Iberia
1157–84	Several papal calls to crusade, answered by some small- and medium-sized expeditions
1157–8	Crusading in Iberia
1158–76	Foundation of the first Iberian military orders
1163–9	Expeditions to Nile Delta of Amalric I of Jerusalem
March 23, 1169	Fatimids submit to Nur al-Din
October 28, 1174	Salah al-Din assumes power in Damascus
1177	Crusade of Philip of Flanders
November 25	Battle of Mont Gisard

July 4, 1187	Battle of Hattin
October 2	Salah al-Din conquers Jerusalem
October 29	Pope Gregory VIII's crusade bull *Audita tremendi*
January 1188	Imposition of the Saladin Tithe in England
1189–92	Crusade against Salah al-Din ("**Third Crusade**")
1190	Persecution of Jews in England
June 1191	Richard I of England occupies Cyprus
July 12	Crusaders re-conquer Acre
September 2, 1192	Treaty of Jaffa
1193–1230	Crusading in Livonia
1193	Crusading in Iberia
1197–8	Crusade of Henry VI Hohenstaufen
1198	Foundation of the Teutonic Order
August	Pope Innocent III's crusade bull *Post miserabile*
November 24, 1199	Pope Innocent III proclaims a crusade against Markward of Anweiler
December	Institution of the taxation of the Church of Rome for crusaders
1202–4	Crusading in the eastern Mediterranean ("**Fourth Crusade**")
1202	Foundation of the Order of Sword-Brothers
1204	Pope Innocent III allows regular recruitment for northern crusading
April 12–15	Crusaders conquer Constantinople
May 9	Baldwin of Flanders elected Latin emperor of Constantinople
1206	Danish crusade to Saaremaa
January 14, 1208	Assassination of Peter of Castelnau, papal legate in Languedoc
	Pope Innocent III proclaims crusade in Languedoc
1209	Danish crusade
1209–29	Crusading in Languedoc (Albigensian Crusade)
1212	The Children's Crusade
	Crusade in Iberian Peninsula
July 17	Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa
April 1213	Pope Innocent III's crusade bull *Quia major*
September 12	Battle of Muret
November 1215	Fourth Lateran Council permits regular Church taxation for crusading and issues the crusade constitution *Ad liberandam*
October 28, 1216	King Henry III of England crusades against English rebels
1217–29	Crusade to Damietta and Nile Delta ("**Fifth Crusade**")
1219	Danish crusade to Estonia
1225	The Teutonic Order invited to Prussia
1227	Crusade against heretics in Bosnia authorized (renewed in 1234)
1228–9	Frederick II Hohenstaufen crusades in eastern Mediterranean
1229	The Teutonic Order begins the conquest of Prussia
February 18	Treaty of Al-Kamil and Frederick II Hohenstaufen
April 12	Peace of Paris

1229–53	Crusading in Iberia
1230–45	Popes Gregory IX and Innocent IV formalize the Teutonic Order's perpetual crusade in northern Europe
1231	Crusade of John of Brienne
1232–4	Crusade against the Stedinger heretics
1237	The Teutonic Order absorbs the Sword-Brothers
	Swedish Crusade to Finland
1239–40	Crusade in aid of the Latin Empire
1239–41	Crusade to eastern Mediterranean led by Thibaut of Champagne and Richard of Cornwall
1239	Proclamation of crusade against Frederick II Hohenstaufen (renewed 1240, 1244)
1240	Danish Crusade to Estonia
1241	Proclamation of a crusade against the Mongols (renewed 1243, 1249)
1242	First Prussian Revolt
April 5	Battle on Lake Peipus
July 11–Aug 23, 1244	Khwarazmians sack Jerusalem
October 17	Battle of Harbiyah
1248–54	Louis IX of France crusades to the Nile Delta ("**Seventh Crusade**")
1248	Crusade against Frederick II Hohenstaufen
1251	The First Crusade of the Shepherds
1254	Crusade to Prussia
1255	Crusades against the opponents of the papacy
1256–8	War of St Sabas in Acre
1259	Battle of Pelagonia
1260	Battle of Durbe
	Second Prussian Revolt
	Crusade to North Africa
September 3	Battle of 'Ayn Jalut
October 23	Baybars becomes Mamluk sultan in Cairo
July 25, 1261	Palaiologoi Dynasty re-establishes the Byzantine Empire
1265–6	Crusade of Charles of Anjou
February 26, 1266	Battle of Benevento
May 18, 1268	Mamluks conquer Antioch
August 23	Battle of Tagliacozzo
1269–72	Louis IX of France crusades to North Africa ("**Eighth Crusade**")
1269	Aragonese crusade to the eastern Mediterranean
1271–2	English crusade in eastern Mediterranean under the Lord Edward
May 18, 1274	The Second Council of Lyon issues the crusade decree *Constitutiones pro zelo fidei*
September 1277	Charles of Anjou's representative reaches Acre

March 30, 1282	The Sicilian Vespers
1283–1302	Crusades against the Sicilians and Aragonese
1287	Crusade to the eastern Mediterranean of Alice of Blois
1288	Crusade to the eastern Mediterranean of John of Grailly
April 26, 1289	Mamluks conquer Tripoli
1290	Crusades to the eastern Mediterranean of Odo of Grandson
May 18, 1291	Mamluks conquer Acre
1302	Mamluks take the island of Arwad from the Templars
1306–1522	Hospitaller rule over the island of Rhodes
1306–7	Crusade against the followers of Fra Dolcino in Piedmont
1307	Crusade proclaimed in support of Charles of Valois' claims to Constantinople
October 13	Arrest of all the Templars in France
1309	A Popular Crusade
	The Teutonic Knights move their headquarters to Prussia
	The Hospitallers move their headquarters to Rhodes
1309–10	Castilian and Aragonese crusades in Iberia
	Crusade against Venice
1310	Hospitaller crusade to Rhodes
March 15, 1311	Battle of Halmyros
April 3, 1312	The Order of the Knights Templar suppressed
May 2	Pope Clement V grants most Templar properties to the Hospitallers
1314	Crusade in Hungary against Mongols and Lithuanians (renewed 1325, 1332, 1335, 1352, 1354)
July 5, 1316	Battle of Manolada
1317	Foundation of the Order of Montesa
1319	Foundation of the Order of Christ
1320	The Second Crusade of the Shepherds
1321	Crusade against the opponents of the papacy (extended 1324)
1323	Crusade against the Rus'
1325	Crusade in Poland against Mongols and Lithuanians (renewed 1340, 1343, 1351, 1354, 1355, 1363, 1369)
1328	Crusade proclaimed against Louis IV Wittelsbach of Germany
	Crusade in Iberia
1331	Crusade to the eastern Mediterranean proclaimed
1332–4	First Crusade League to the eastern Mediterranean
1340	Crusade against heretics in Bohemia
October 30	Battle of Salado
1342–4	Crusaders besiege Algeçiras
1344	Crusade to the Canary Islands planned
October 28	Crusade League to the eastern Mediterranean occupies Smyrna
1345–7	Crusade to the eastern Mediterranean of Humbert, dauphin of Viennois
1345	Genoese crusade to defend Feodosiya against the Mongols

1348	Crusade of Magnus II/VII of Sweden/Norway to Finland (renewed 1350, 1351)
1349–50	Crusaders besiege Gibraltar
1353–7	Crusade to regain control of the Papal State
1359	Crusade League in the eastern Mediterranean
1360	Crusade against Milan (renewed 1363, 1368)
1365–7	Crusade of Peter I of Cyprus to Alexandria
1366	Crusade of Amadeus of Savoy to the Dardanelles and Bulgaria
1383	Crusade of the bishop of Norwich against the Clementists in Flanders
1386	Crusade of John of Gaunt in Castile Union of Poland and Lithuania.
1390	Crusade to Mahdia
1396	Crusade to Nicopolis
1398	Proclamation of a crusade to defend Constantinople (renewed 1399, 1400)
1399–1403	Crusade of John Boucicaut in the eastern Mediterranean
December 1402	Timur conquers Smyrna
July 15, 1410	Battle of Tannenberg
1420–31	The Hussite Crusades
July 7, 1426	Battle of Khirokitia
1444	Crusade of Varna
May 29, 1453	Ottomans conquer Constantinople
September 30	Proclamation of a new crusade to the eastern Mediterranean
1455	Genoese crusade in defense of Chios
1456	Crusade of John of Capistrano
1459–60	Congress of Mantua
January 14, 1460	Proclamation of the crusade of Pope Pius II
August 15, 1464	Pope Pius II dies while waiting for his crusade to muster at Ancona
December 31, 1471	Crusade to the eastern Mediterranean proclaimed
1472	Crusade League in the eastern Mediterranean
May–August 23, 1480	Ottomans lay siege unsuccessfully to Rhodes
August	Ottomans conquer Otranto
1481	Crusade recovers Otranto from the Ottomans
1482–92	Crusade in Iberia under Isabella and Ferdinand
January 2, 1492	Crusaders conquer Granada
1493	Crusade in Hungary against the Ottomans
1494	Treaty of Tordesillas
1499–1510	Crusaders establish multiple beachheads in North Africa
June 1, 1500	Proclamation of a crusade against the Ottomans
1513	Crusade proclaimed in eastern Europe against the Ottomans
November 11, 1517	Proclamation of a crusade against the Ottomans
June 1520	The Field of the Cloth of Gold
July–December 18, 1522	Ottoman siege of Rhodes, ending in surrender of Rhodes

1525	Teutonic Order in Prussia and Utrecht adopt Lutheranism
September 26–October 1529	First Ottoman siege of Vienna
1530–1798	Hospitaller rule over the Island of Malta and Tripoli
February 2, 1530	Proclamation of a crusade against the Ottomans
June–July 1535	Crusade of Emperor Charles V to Tunis
1536–7	Pilgrimage of Grace in England
l537–8	Crusade League in the eastern Mediterranean
October–November 1541	Crusade of Emperor Charles V to Algiers
June–September 1550	Crusade of Emperor Charles V to Mahdia
August 14, 1551	The Hospitallers surrender Tripoli to the Ottomans
Feb–July 31, 1560	Crusade of Philip II of Spain to Jerba and Tripoli
1562	Foundation of the Order of St Stephen
May 19–September 8, 1565	Unsuccessful siege of Malta by the Ottomans
1569	Pope Piux V grants the *bula de cruzada* to Philip II of Spain (thenceforth renewed into the eighteenth century)
1570–3	Holy (Crusade) League operating in the Mediterranean
1570–1	Ottomans conquer Cyprus
October 7, 1571	Battle of Lepanto
1572	Foundation of the Savoyard Order of St Maurice and St Lazarus
October 11, 1573	Tunis temporarily occupied by Don John of Austria
1578	Battle of Alcácer Quibir (Battle of the Three Kings)
1588	The Spanish Armada (a crusade against England)
1609	Foundation of the Order of Our Lady of Mount Carmel and St Lazarus
1645–69	Ottomans defeat crusade league to conquer Crete
1653	Hospitallers acquire Caribbean islands, governed by Philippe de Lonvillers de Poincy (sold to French crown in 1665)
1664	Hospitallers attack Algiers (among ongoing privateering)
July 14–September 12, 1683	Second Ottoman siege of Vienna
1684–97	Holy (Crusade) League begins the recovery of the Balkans
1697	Foundation of the Parmese Constantinian Order of St George
1699	Peace of Karlowitz
1791–5	Hospitallers plan for a colony in Guiana (unsuccessful)
1792	Hospitaller properties in France seized
June 13, 1798	Malta surrenders to Napoleon
	Napoleon invades the Nile Delta
1809	Teutonic Order (what remains) moves its headquarters to Vienna
1819–31	Crusading novels of Sir Walter Scott published
1820	Hospitallers recruit volunteers to help recover the island of Rhodes from the Ottomans (unsuccessful)
1843	The *Salles des Croisades* open in the Château of Versailles
1847	Foundation of the Equestrian Order of the Holy Sepulchre of Jerusalem
1890–2	The *Institut Religieux et Militaire des Frères Armés du Sahara* founded by Cardinal Lavigerie with the support of Pope Leo XIII

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Chapter 12

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Afterword

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FURTHER READING

UPDATED WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ANDREW D. BUCK

Given the sheer amount of scholarship on the crusades produced over the last century, no bibliography can claim to be authoritative. It is hoped that the scholarship noted here, as well as in the endnotes, will serve as a stepping-off point for further study. As a result of this book's primary target audience, the majority of the works included below are in English. However, a few references to works in non-Anglophone languages are also included. Sources in translation are listed in a separate section.

Works of Reference

Bibliographies

Any attempt to produce a bibliography of crusades scholarship is beset by issues of definition and language, and few attempts have been made to carry on the work of Hans E. Mayer in his *Bibliographie zur Geschichte der Kreuzzüge* (1960), which was supplemented, for works published during the years 1958–67, by "Literaturbericht über die Geschichte der Kreuzzüge," *Historische Zeitschrift* Sonderheft 3 (1969) and for the years 1967–82 by his "Select Bibliography of the Crusades," in collaboration with Joyce McLellan, in Kenneth M. Setton (editor-in-chief), *A History of the Crusades* 6 (1989). The lists of recent publications and works in progress in the *Bulletin of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East*, which is incorporated in the journal *Crusades*, are a useful guide to what is being brought out year by year, and a more up-to-date online repository has been compiled by Paul Halsall at https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/crusades-bibliography.pdf. For Islamic history, Jean Sauvaget's *Introduction to the History of the Muslim East*, recast by Claude Cahen (1965, repr. 1982) is still useful, but see also now the bibliographies found in the *New Cambridge History of Islam*, 6 vols (2010). Good modern bibliographies for the Latin West and crusading can also be found in the *New Cambridge Medieval History*, 7 vols (1995–2005).

Historiography

Two important introductions to the state of research on the crusades are Norman J. Housley's *Contesting the Crusades* (2006) and Christopher J. Tyerman's *The Debate on the Crusades, 1099–2010* (2011). Both are useful in their own ways, but much has been produced since their respective publications. Ronnie Ellenblum has important

things to say on the historiography behind castles and settler society in *Crusader Castles and Modern Histories* (2007). A more recent collaborative attempt to trace national historiographies and legacies of crusading is found in *Controversial Histories—Current Views on the Crusades: Engaging the Crusades, Volume Three*, ed. Felix Heinz and Johannes Meyer-Hamme (2022). There is a critique of Spanish historiography by Luís García-Guijarro Ramos in "Historiography and History: Medieval Studies on the Military Orders in Spain since 1975," *The Military Orders Volume 3. History and Heritage*, ed. Victor Mallia-Milanes (2008).

Encyclopedias

Two valuable recent publications are *The Crusades. An Encyclopedia*, ed. Alan V. Murray, 4 vols (2006) and *Prier et Combattre. Dictionnaire européen des ordres militaires au Moyen Âge*, ed. Nicole Bériou and Philippe Josserand (2009). They provide valuable up-to-date guides to many aspects of the histories of the crusades and the military orders.

General Histories

Popular or general histories of the crusades, often focused on the traditional period 1095–1291, continue to emerge. Any reader of Christopher J. Tyerman's *God's War. A New History of the Crusades* (2006), Thomas S. Asbridge's *The Crusades. The War for the Holy Land* (2010), or Andrew Jotischky's *Crusading and the Crusader States*, 2nd edn. (2017) will gain a great deal. For perspectives that seek to expand the parameters of crusading beyond 1291 and the eastern Mediterranean, see Norman J. Housley's *The Later Crusades, 1274–1580: From Lyons to Alcazar* (1992) and Susanna Throop's *The Crusades. An Epitome* (2018). *A History of the Crusades*, ed.-in-chief Kenneth M. Setton, 2nd edn, 6 vols (1969–89) is still useful, but is soon to be replaced by a two-volume set under the editorial leadership of Jonathan Phillips.

Themes

Definition

The debate on defining the crusades, which used to be quite powerful but is now rather less fearsome, is discussed in Norman J. Housley's *Contesting the Crusades* (2006) and Christopher J. Tyerman's *Debate on the Crusades, 1099–2010* (2011). Recently, debate has turned to whether the medieval crusades even existed as a discrete entity, particularly given the lack of secure terminology. See Benjamin Weber, "When and Where did the Word 'Crusade' Appear in the Middle Ages? And Why?," in *The Crusades: History and Memory*, ed. Kurt Villads Jensen and Torben Kjersgaard Nielsen (2021). In many ways, scholars are now more concerned with what participants and impacted communities *thought* about crusading, including into the modern era.

Crusade Ideas

Crusade ideology can be approached in two ways. One is through canon law. The standard works, each in need of updating, are James A. Brundage's *Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader* (1969), Frederick Russell's *The Just War in the Middle Ages* (1975), and Ernst-Dieter Hehl's *Kirche und Krieg im 12. Jahrhundert* (1980).

A second way is to look at crusading against a wider theological background. For the First Crusade, enduringly influential are Carl Erdmann's 1935 *The Origin of the Idea of the Crusade*, tr. Walter Goffart and Marshall W. Baldwin (1977) and Jean Flori's *Le guerre sainte: La formation de l'idée de croisade dans l'Occident chrétien* (2001). Jonathan Riley-Smith described, in "Crusading as an act of love," *History* 65 (1980), the way crusading was portrayed as a charitable exercise. Benjamin Z. Kedar has tackled, in *Crusade and Mission* (1984), the relationship between crusades and conversions, Norman Housley has studied, in *Religious Warfare in Europe 1400–1536* (2002), the borderline between crusades and other wars of religion, and Susanna Throop has demonstrated how crusading was represented as an act of vengeance in *Crusading as an Act of Vengeance, 1095-1216* (2011). The studies collected in *The Uses of the Bible in Crusader Sources* (2017), ed. Elizabeth Lapina and Nicholas Morton, also make a substantial contribution.

Most research has concentrated on the twelfth to early fourteenth centuries. Giles Constable's "The place of the crusader in medieval society," *Viator* 28 (1998) and H. E. John Cowdrey's "Christianity and the morality of warfare during the first century of crusading," in *The Experience of Crusading. 1: Western Approaches*, ed. Marcus Bull and Norman Housley (2003), are good entry points. More recent works include William Purkis, *Crusading Spirituality in the Holy Land and Iberia c.1095–c. 1187* (2008); Katherine Allen Smith, *War and the Making of Medieval Monastic Culture* (2011); Ane L. Bysted, *The Crusade Indulgence. Spiritual Rewards and the Theology of the Crusades, c. 1095–1216* (2015); Stephen J. Spencer, *Emotions in a Crusading Context, 1095–1291* (2019); and David Crispin, *Ihr Gott kämpft jeden Tag für sie Krieg, Gewalt und religiöse Vorstellungen in der Frühzeit der Kreuzzüge (1095–1187)* (2019). For the theoreticians of the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, see Sylvia Schein, *Fideles Crucis: The Papacy, the West, and the Recovery of the Holy Land 1274–1314* (1991), Antony Leopold, *How to Recover the Holy Land: The Crusade Proposals of the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries* (2000), and Pamela Beattie, "Ramon Llull's Crusade Treatises," in *A Companion to Ramon Llull and Llullism*, ed. Amy M. Austin and Mark D. Johnston (2019).

For the critics of crusading in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, see Elizabeth Siberry's *Criticism of Crusading 1095–1274* (1985) and Martin Aurell, "Is Political Theology an Oxymoron? Radical Criticism of the Crusades in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries," in *Political Theology in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Discourses, Rites, and Representations*, ed. Montserrat Herrrero, Jaume Aurell, and Angela C. Miceli Stout (2017).

Preaching

The ideas of the theoreticians, as transmitted through preaching, have been the subject of important recent study. Key starting points are Penny J. Cole's *The Preaching of the Crusades to the Holy Land, 1095–1270* (1991), Christoph Maier's *Preaching the Crusades: Mendicant Friars and the Cross in the Thirteenth Century* (1994) and *Crusade Propaganda and Ideology: Model Sermons for the Preaching of the Cross* (2000), and Miikka Tamminen, *Crusading Preaching and the Ideal Crusader* (2018). A sampling of works by scholars currently active in this aspect include Lydia M. Walker, "Living in the Penultimate Age: Apocalyptic Thought in James of Vitry's *ad status* Sermons," in *The Uses of the Bible in Crusade Sources*, ed. Elizabeth Lapina and Nicholas Morton (2017), and Jessalynn L. Bird, "Damietta the Whore, the Purification of the Virgin Mary, and the Crusade Movement," *Medieval Sermon Studies* 65 (2021).

Liturgy

The liturgy of the church was also used—through language and symbols—to instruct and inform the faithful. This, like preaching, is a relatively new topic in crusade studies. Most recently, there is M. Cecilia Gaposchkin's *Invisible Weapons. Liturgy and the Making of Crusade Ideology* (2017) and *Liturgy and Devotion in the Crusader States*, ed. Iris Shagrir and M. Cecilia Gaposchkin (2018). Cristina Dondi has examined the spread elsewhere of the rites in use at the church of the Holy Sepulchre in *The Liturgy of the Canons Regular of the Holy Sepulchre of Jerusalem* (2004), while Amnon Linder's *Raising Arms: Liturgy in the Struggle to Liberate Jerusalem in the Late Middle Ages* (2003) contains an exhaustive discussion of the various rites used by the church to publicize the needs of the Holy Land.

Crusade and Literature

In recent years, a methodological shift has seen the rise of literary-cultural approaches to Latin and vernacular texts, as well as a greater recognition of the interplay between the two. Many of the works already noted reflect this. In addition, for Latin texts, a good introduction is Marcus Bull, "Narratological Readings of Crusade Texts," in *The Crusader World*, ed. Adrian J. Boas (2015). More in-depth studies can be found in Bull's *Eyewitness and Crusade Narrative. Perception and Narration in Accounts of the Second, Third and Fourth Crusades* (2018), as well as Katherine Allen Smith's *The Bible and Crusade Narrative in the Twelfth Century* (2020) and Beth C. Spacey's *The Miraculous and the Writing of Crusade Narrative* (2020). Two useful edited volumes are *Writing the Early Crusades. Text, Transmission and Memory* (2014), ed. Marcus Bull and Damien Kempf, and *Literature of the Crusades*, ed. Simon Thomas Parsons and Linda Paterson (2018). For vernacular sources, that is the crusading *chansons* and lyrics, Michael Routledge's, "Songs" in *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades*, ed. Jonathan Riley-Smith (1995), remains a good starting point. However, much has been written since. For the Old French Crusade

Cycle, see the translations (with detailed introductions) by Susan Edgington and Carol Sweetenham of the *Chanson d'Antioche* (2011), the *Chanson des Chétifs* (2016), and the *Chanson des Jérusalem* (2016), as well as chapters by Sweetenham and Simon Thomas Parsons in *Jerusalem the Golden. The Origins and Impact of the First Crusade*, ed. Susan B. Edgington and Luis García-Guijarro (2014). For lyrics and poetry, see Linda Paterson, *Singing the Crusades. French and Occitan Lyric Responses to the Crusading Movements, 1137–1336* (2018), Stefan Vander Est, *The Knight, the Cross and the Song: Crusade Propaganda and Chivalric Literature, 1100-1400* (2017), and William Jackson, *Ardent Complaints and Equivocal Piety: The Portrayal of the Crusader in Medieval German Poetry* (2003).

Recruitment and Motivation

Two good books on recruitment in England are Simon Lloyd's *English Society and the Crusade* (1988), which is a detailed and very informative study of English crusading in the thirteenth century, and Christopher J. Tyerman's *England and the Crusades* (1988), which surveys the responses and experiences of the English from the first crusade to the late sixteenth century. Giles Constable's "Medieval charters as a source for the history of the crusades," in *Crusade and Settlement*, ed. Peter W. Edbury (1985) opened the way into the European charter collections as sources for motivation, though Jean Flori has sought to temper the charter-based approach somewhat in "Ideology and Motivations in the First Crusade," in *Palgrave Advances in The Crusades*, ed. Helen Nicholson (2005). The documents for fourteenth-century England are discussed in Timothy Guard, *Chivalry, Kingship and Crusade. The English Experience of the Fourteenth Century* (2013).

A number of historians are now engaged in researching the mindset of recruits. An important introduction is Marcus Bull's "Views of Muslims and of Jerusalem in miracle stories, c. 1000–c. 1200: reflections on the study of first crusaders' motivations," in *The Experience of Crusading. Volume One. Western Approaches*, ed. Marcus Bull and Norman J. Housley (2003). The following are examples of what might be described as an empathetic approach: Marcus Bull, *Knightly Piety and the Lay Response to the First Crusade. The Limousin and Gascony, c. 970–c. 1130* (1993); Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The First Crusaders 1095–1131* (1997); Caroline Smith, *Crusading in the Age of Joinville* (2006); Norman Housley, *Fighting for the Cross. Crusading to the Holy Land* (2008); and Nicholas Paul, *To Follow in their Footsteps. The Crusades and Family Memory in the High Middle Ages* (2012).

Gender

The intersection between crusading and medieval ideas of gender is a still burgeoning field. A pathbreaking start was made by *Gendering the Crusades, ed.* Susan B. Edgington and Sarah Lambert (2001), and Sabine Geldsetzer, *Frauen auf Kreuzzügen 1096–1291* (2003). More recently, important developments have been made through Natasha R. Hodgson's work, especially her *Women, Crusading and the Holy Land in Historical Narrative* (2007) and other studies, as well as *Crusading and Masculinities*, ed. Natasha

R. Hodgson, Katherine J. Lewis, and Matthew M. Mesley (2019). Other minor studies can also help to elucidate how dialogues around gender permeated crusading sources. See, for example, Andrew D. Buck, "William of Tyre, Femininity, and the Problem of the Antiochene Princesses," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 70:4 (2019); and Beth C. Spacey, "Visionary Masculinities: Emotion and the Experience of the Miraculous in Latin Narratives of the First Crusade," *Emotions: History, Culture, Society* 4:2 (2020).

Finance

The ability of crusaders to fund themselves, or for crusade leaders to subsidize their followers, is a crucial subject. Giles Constable's "The financing of the crusades in the twelfth century," in *Outremer*, ed. Benjamin Z. Kedar, Hans E. Mayer, and Raymond C. Smail (1982) is a starting point, but there is good material in Simon Lloyd's *English Society and the Crusade* (1988). Most recently, see Christopher J. Tyerman's *How to Plan a Crusade* (2016) and Daniel Edwards' *Finance and the Crusades. England, c.1213–1337* (2022).

Warfare by Land and Sea (Including Warfare in the Crusader States)

Raymond C. Smail's magisterial study of warfare in the twelfth-century Latin East, *Crusading Warfare (1097–1193)* (1956) has a sequel in Christopher Marshall's *Warfare in the Latin East*, *1192–1291* (1992). John France followed *Victory in the East. A Military History of the First Crusade* (1994) with a wider survey in *Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades*, *1000–1300* (1999). See also now Nicholas Morton, *The Crusader States and their Neighbours, 1098–1291* (2020).

Numbers and the death rate are estimated by Jonathan Riley-Smith in "Casualties and the number of knights on the First Crusade," *Crusades* 1 (2002) and James M. Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade*, *1213–1221* (1986). Siege warfare is treated in Randall Rogers' *Latin Siege Warfare in the Twelfth Century* (1992) and Michal Fulton's *Artillery in the Era of the Crusades. Siege Warfare and the Development of Trebuchet Technology* (2018). Sea-power and logistics are clarified by John Pryor in *Geography*, *Technology and War* (1988) and *Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades* (2006). For an interesting and novel approach which adopts the viewpoint of a sailor, see Dan Mirkin's *Sailing to the Holy land. Crusader Ships, Seamanship, Logistics, and Landing Operations* (2018). Armour and weapons are described in David C. Nicolle's *Arms and Armour of the Crusading Era 1050–1350*, 2nd edn, 2 vols (1999). The transfers of prisoners are considered in Yvonne Friedman's *Encounter between Enemies: Captivity and Ransom in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem* (2002), and Phillipe Goridis' *Gefangen im Heiligen Land* (2015).

There is not yet a definitive book specializing on the Order of St. John's navy in the Rhodian and Maltese periods, although Anne Brogini has important things to say in *Malte, frontière de chrétienté, 1530–1670* (2006). A good deal of work has been done on the innovative activities of the Teutonic Order in Prussia and Livonia. See Sven Ekdahl,

"Horses and crossbows. Two important warfare advantages of the Teutonic Order in Prussia," in *The Military Orders Volume Two. Welfare and Warfare*, ed. Helen Nicholson (1998) and the magnificent, but unfinished, treatment of the *Reysen* by Werner Paravicini, *Die Preussenreisen des Europäischen Adels*, 2 vols (1989–95).

Detailed treatment on Iberian warfare is to be found in works on the Iberian military orders by Carlos de Ayala Martínez, *Las órdenes militares hispánicas en la Edad Media (siglos XII–XV)* (2003) and Enrique Rodríguez-Picavea, *Los monjes guerreros en los reinos hispánicos: Las órdenes militares en la Península Ibérica durante la Edad Media* (2008).

For crusader castles, it would be best to start with Hugh Kennedy's *Crusader Castles* (1994). The most detailed treatment to date is Paul Deschamps' *Les châteaux des croisés en Terre Sainte*, 3 vols (1934–77) and there is a magnificent survey of Crac des Chevaliers in *Der Crac des Chevaliers. Die Baugeschichte einer Ordensburg der Kreuzfahrerzeit, ed.* Thomas Biller (2006). However, see also Robert W. Edwards, *The Fortifications of Armenian Cilicia* (1987); Denys Pringle, *Secular Buildings in the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem: An Archaeological Gazetteer* (1997); Kristian Molin, *Unknown Crusader Castles* (2001); *Burgen und Städte der Kreuzzugszeit*, ed. Matthias Piana (2008); and, for Prussia, Tomasz Torbus, *Die Konventsburgen im Deutschordensland Preußen* (1998).

On the fortifications of the city of Rhodes, see Albert Gabriel, *La cité de Rhodes, 1310–1522*, 2 vols (1921–3). See also Anthony T. Luttrell, "The later history of the Maussolleion and its utilization in the Hospitaller castle at Bodrum," *The Maussolleion at Halikarnassos* (1986) and "English contributions to the Hospitaller Castle at Bodrum in Turkey: 1407–1437," in *The Military Orders Volume 2. Welfare and Warfare*, ed. Helen Nicholson (1998). For the fortifications of Malta, see Stephen C. Spiteri, *The Art of Fortress Building in Hospitaller Malta, 1530–1798: A Study of Building Methods, Materials, and Techniques* (2008).

For the siege of Malta in 1565, see Anne Brogini, *1565. Malte dans la tourmente: le grand siège de l'île par les Turcs* (2011) and Stephen C. Spiteri, *The Great Siege: Knights vs Turks, mdlxv [1565]. Anatomy of a Hospitaller victory* (2005).

The Byzantine Greeks

Excellent starting points for Latin-Greek relations are Michael Angold, *The Byzantine Empire, 1025–1204*, 2nd edn (1997), Jonathan Harris, *Byzantium and the Crusades, 2*nd *edn* (2014), and Ralph-Johannes Lilie, *Byzantium and the Crusader States, 1096–1204*, tr. J. C. Morris and Jean E. Ridings (1993). For a recent study on Latin attitudes toward the Greeks, see Savvas Neocleous, *Heretics, Schismatics, or Catholics? Latin Attitudes to the Greeks in the Long Twelfth Century* (2019).

Jonathan Shepard has transformed our understanding of the attitude of Alexios I to the preaching of the First Crusade in "When Greek meets Greek: Alexius Comnenus and Bohemond in 1097–8," *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 12 (1988) and "Cross-purposes: Alexius Comnenus and the First Crusade," in *The First Crusade. Origins and Impact*, ed. Jonathan Phillips (1997).

For the centuries after 1204, see Michael Angold's *A Byzantine Government in Exile* (1975), John W. Barker, *Manuel II Palaeologus (1391–1425)* (1969), Angeliki E. Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins: The Foreign Policy of Andronicus II, 1282–1328* (1972), and Nikolaos Chrissis, *Crusading in Frankish Greece. A Study of Byzantine-Western Relations and Attitudes, 1204–1282* (2012).

The Jews

A great deal has been written about the persecutions of Jews by departing crusaders in 1095–6 and the Hebrew sources have now been properly edited by Eva Haverkamp for the Monumenta Germaniae Historica. The following works are strong entry points into the topic: Robert Chazan, *European Jewry and the First Crusade* (1987) and *God, Humanity and History. The Hebrew First Crusade Narratives* (2000), and Jeremy Cohen, *Sanctifying the Name of God. Jewish Martyrs and Jewish Memories of the First Crusade* (2004). For a more general perspective, see *Religious Violence between Christians and Jews, ed.* Anna Sapir Abulafia (2002).

The Muslims

As regards Muslim responses to the crusades and the crusading settlements, the starting point is Carole Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives* (1999), but see also Alex Mallett, *Popular Muslim Reactions to the Franks in the Levant, 1097–1291* (2013). More general works are Paul Cobb's *The Race for Paradise. An Islamic History of the Crusades* (2014) and Niall Christie's *Muslims and Crusaders. Christianity's Wars in the Middle East, 1095–1382*, 2nd edn (2020). For West Asia on the eve of the First Crusade, see Michael Brett's "The Near East on the eve of the Crusades," in *La Primera Cruzada Novecientos años Después*, ed. Luís García-Guijarro Ramos (1997) and "Abbasids, Fatimids and Seljuqs," in *New Cambridge Medieval History*, ed. David Luscombe and Jonathan Riley-Smith, vol. 2 (2004). For Islamic ideological responses, see Osman Latiff, *The Cutting Edge of the Poet's Sword: Muslim Poetic Responses to the Crusades* (2017) and Kenneth A. Goudie, *Reinventing Jihād. Jihād Ideology from the Conquest of Jerusalem to the end of the Ayyūbids (c. 492/1099–647/1249)* (2019). For the social background, see Shelomo D. Goitein's, *A Mediterranean Society*, 6 vols (1967–93), which focuses on the Jewish community in Egypt but provides a wealth of material on the Near East. Ronnie Ellenblum's *The Collapse of the Eastern Mediterranean. Climate Change and the Decline of the East, 950–1072* (2012) argues for the catastrophic effects of climate change on the Levant. Later economic history, such as papal embargoes, is covered in Eliyahu Ashtor's *Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages* (1983).

For the Ayyubids, see R. Stephen Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols: The Ayyubids of Damascus 1193–1260* (1977), and for the Mamluks, Robert Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The Early Mamluk Sultanate 1250–1382* (1986). Turkish history is covered by Songül Mecit, *The Rum Seljuqs. Evolution of a Dynasty* (2014);

Alexander Beihammer, *Byzantium and the Emergence of Muslim-Turkish Anatolia, ca. 1040–1130* (2017); and Stanford J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* 1 (1976). For the Nizaris, see Farhad Daftary, *The Isma'ilis: Their History and Doctrines*, 2nd edn (2007).

There are some good biographies of key Muslim rulers. See Taef el-Azhari, *Zengi and the Muslim Response to the Crusades. The Politics of Jihad* (2016), Nikita Elisséeff, *Nur ad-Din*, 3 vols (1967), Malcolm C. Lyons and David E. P. Jackson, *Saladin* (1982), Anne-Marie Eddé, *Saladin*, tr. Jane M. Todd (2011), Hans L. Gottschalk, *Al-Malik al-Kamil von Egypten und seine Zeit* (1958), and Peter Thorau, *The Lion of Egypt: Sultan Baybars I and the Near East in the Thirteenth Century*, tr. Peter M. Holt (1987).

For diplomatic relations, see Michael A. Köhler, *Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers in the Middle East, ed. and tr. Konrad Hirschler and Peter M. Holt (2013)*, and Peter M. Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy (1260–1290)* (1995). Western attitudes toward the Muslims are described, although in very different ways, by Norman Daniel in *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image* (1960; revised edn, 1993) and by John Tolan in *Saracens. Islam in the Medieval European Imagination* (2002). For a perspective that challenges the prevailing historiographical field, see Kristin Skottki, *Christen, Muslim und der Erste Kreuzzug* (2015).

The Mongols

The history of the Mongols and their dealings with Latin Christendom are covered in Peter Jackson, *The Mongols and the West, 1221–1410* (2005), David O. Morgan, *The Mongols* (1986), and Timothy May, *The Mongol Empire* (2016). For the first crusade against them, see Peter Jackson's "The crusade against the Mongols," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 43 (1991).

The Crusades to the Eastern Mediterranean

The numbered crusades have long dominated scholarship, and for ease it is worth listing specific works for each campaign below. However, as this book recognizes, the modern artificial numbering of crusades is both anachronistic and belies extensive crusading ventures carried out by smaller groups across the period. The *Independent Crusaders Project* is doing much to help reveal the history behind these expeditions and contains both useful primary information and bibliographies. See: https://independentcrusadersproject.ace.fordham.edu/.

The First Crusade

The topic has attracted almost as many books as there are general histories. The most straightforward is Thomas S. Asbridge, *The First Crusade. A New History* (2004). Several

retell the story from a particular viewpoint, such as Peter Frankopan's *The First Crusade. The Call from the East* (2012) or Jay Rubinstein's *Armies of Heaven. The First Crusade and the Quest for the Apocalypse* (2011).

For the eleventh-century background, Carl Erdmann's *The Origin of the Idea of the Crusade*, tr. W. Goffart and M. W. Baldwin (1977) is still very useful, as is H. E. John Cowdrey's *Pope Gregory VII, 1073–1085* (1998). For the efforts of the Byzantine emperor Alexios, see the works of Shepard listed earlier.

The best biography of Pope Urban II remains Alfons Becker's *Papst Urban II (1088–1099)*, 2 vols (1964–88). Robert Somerville's studies of councils—*Pope Urban II's Council of Piacenza* (2011), "The Council of Clermont (1095) and Latin Christian Society," *Archivum historiae pontificiae* 12 (1974), and "The Council of Clermont and the First Crusade," *Studia gratiana* 20 (1976)—are important. H. E. John Cowdrey's "Pope Urban II's preaching of the First Crusade," *History* 55 (1970) is still useful. For attempts to reinstate Peter the Hermit as the crusade's originator, see Ernest O. Blake and Colin Morris, "A Hermit goes to war: Peter and the origins of the First Crusade," *Studies in Church History* 22 (1984), and Jean Flori, *Pierre l'Ermite et la Première Croisade* (1999).

For the response to Pope Urban's appeal, see Marcus Bull's *Knightly Piety and the Lay Response to the First Crusade. The Limousin and Gascony, c. 970–c. 1130* (1993); Jonathan Riley-Smith's *The First Crusaders 1095–1131* (1997); and Lars Kjaer, "Conquests, Family Traditions and the First Crusade," *Journal of Medieval History* 45:5 (2019). For the military history of the crusade, see John France, *Victory in the East. A Military History of the First Crusade* (1994). For the development of crusade ideas on the march and in the immediate aftermath, see Jonathan Riley-Smith's *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading* (1986). A social history of the crusade is found in Conor Kostick's *The Social Structure of the First Crusade* (2008).

The 'Second' Crusade

Jonathan Phillips' *The Second Crusade. Extending the Frontiers of Christendom* (2007) is now the standard account. Giles Constable's "The Second Crusade as seen by contemporaries," *Traditio* 9 (1953) is still well worth reading. There are also three good edited volumes: *The Second Crusade and the Cistercians*, ed. Michael Gervers (1992); *The Second Crusade. Scope and Consequences*, ed. Jonathan Phillips and Martin Hoch (2001); and *The Second Crusade: Holy War on the Periphery of Latin Christendom*, ed. Jason Roche and Janus M. Jensen (2015).

The 'Third' Crusade

No authoritative account has been published, though extensive treatments of the venture's narrative can be found in Christopher J. Tyerman, *God's War. A New History of the Crusades* (2006) and Thomas S. Asbridge, *The Crusades. The War for the Holy Land* (2010). Scholars are for the most part reliant on works focused on singular figures, such as John B. Gillingham's *Richard I* (1999), Rudolf Hiestand, "'*Precipua tocius christianismi columpna*'. Barbrossa

und der Kreuzzug," in *Friedrich Barbarossa. Handlungsspielräume und Wirkungsweien des Staufischen Kaisers*, ed. Alfred Haverkamp (1992), Jim Bradbury, *Philip Augustus. King of France, 1180–1223* (1998), and Malcolm C. Lyons and David E. P. Jackson, *Saladin* (1982). A highly useful entry point into the historiography is Stephen J. Spencer, "The Third Crusade in Historiographical Perspective," *History Compass* 19:7 (2019).

The 'Fourth' Crusade

Several books are dedicated to this venture, but the most useful are Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden's *The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest of Constantinople*, 2nd edn (1997), Michael Angold's *The Fourth Crusade* (2003), and Jonathan Phillips' *The Fourth Crusade and the Sack of Constantinople* (2004). See also the essay collection *Urbs Capta. The Fourth Crusade and its Consequences, ed.* Angeliki Laiou (2005). Jean Longnon's *Les compagnons de Villehardouin* (1978), on the men who took part, is still of great interest.

The best treatment of Pope Innocent III's general crusading policies is in Helmut Roscher's *Papst Innocenz III und die Kreuzzüge* (1969). See also Christopher R. Cheney, *Pope Innocent III and England* (1976), and, for a wider perspective, *The Fourth Lateran Council and the Crusade Movement: The Impact of the Council of 1215 on Latin Christendom and the East*, ed. Jessalynn Bird and Damian Smith (2018).

The Children's Crusade

The standard work on this is Gary Dickson, *The Children's Crusade* (2008).

The 'Fifth' Crusade

The starting point remains James M. Powell's *Anatomy of a Crusade, 1213–1221* (1986). More recently, see *The Fifth Crusade in Context. The Crusading Movement in the Early Thirteenth Century*, ed. Elizabeth J. Mylod, Guy Perry, Thomas W. Smith, and Jan Vanderburie (2017) and Megan Cassidy-Welch, *War and Memory at the Time of the Fifth Crusade* (2019).

The Barons' Crusade

This is well treated in Michael Lower's *The Barons' Crusade. A Call to Arms and its Consequences* (2005).

The Crusades of Louis IX of France

The essential starting point is William C. Jordan's *Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade* (1979). The most recent treatment of these crusades in the context of Mediterranean history is Michael Lower's *The Tunis Crusade of 1270: A Mediterranean History* (2018). The best biography, from the point of view of crusading, is Jean Richard's *Saint Louis*, tr. Simon Lloyd (1992), but see also M. Cecilia Gaposchkin's *The Making of St Louis (IX) of France. Kingship, Sanctity and Crusade in the Later Middle Ages* (2008). Caroline Smith's

Crusading in the Age of Joinville (2006) is a good study of Louis' followers. Interesting material is found in Daniel Weiss, *Art and Crusade in the Age of Saint Louis* (1998) and *France and the Holy Land, ed.* Daniel Weiss and Lisa Mahoney (2004).

The Papacy and Crusading in the Thirteenth Century

Though Innocent III's career has long been the main point of study for thirteenth-century papal responses to crusading, recent work has expanded our knowledge of other popes and wider theaters of conflict. See, for example, Iben Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades 1147–1254* (2007); Rebecca Rist, *The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, 1198–1245* (2009); Pierre-Vincent Claverie, *Honorius III et l'Orient (1216–1227): Étude et publication de sources inédites des Archives vaticanes* (ASV) (2013); Philip B. Baldwin, *Pope Gregory X and the Crusades* (2014); and Thomas W. Smith, *Curia and Crusade. Pope Honorius III and the Recovery of the Holy Land, 1216–1227* (2017).

The Later Crusades, 1274 Onward

The best treatments are Norman J. Housley's *The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades*, *1305–1378* (1986) and *The Later Crusades*, *1274–1580: From Lyons to Alcazar* (1992). Other useful works include Malcolm Barber, "The pastoureaux of 1320," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 32 (1981); Timothy Guard, *Chivalry, Kingship and Crusade. The English Experience of the Fourteenth Century* (2013); Sophia Menache, *Clement V* (1998); Andrew C. Hess, "The Battle of Lepanto and its place in Mediterranean history," *Past and Present* 57 (1972); Sylvia Schein, *Fideles Crucis: The Papacy, the West, and the Recovery of the Holy Land, 1274-1314* (1991); and Mike Carr, *Merchant Crusaders in the Aegean, 1291–1352* (2015). Most recently, the ideas and activities of crusaders in the late fifteenth century have been of particular interest. See Nancy Bisaha, *Creating East and West* (2004); Norman J. Housley, *Religious Warfare in Europe 1400–1536* (2002); *Crusading and the Ottoman Threat 1453–1505* (2012) and his edited volume *The Crusade in the Fifteenth Century. Converging and Competing Cultures* (2017); and Liviu Pilat and Ovidiu Cristea, *The Ottoman Threat and Crusading on the Eastern Border of Christendom during the Fifteenth Century* (2018).

Crusading in Other Theaters of War

A valuable and recent collection of work on crusading across traditional boundaries of space and time is *Fighting for the Faith—The Many Crusades* (2020), ed. Carsten Selch Jensen, Janus Møller Jensen, and Kurt Villads Jensen.

Iberia

The most up-to-date general history is Simon Barton's *A History of Spain, 2nd edn* (2009). More specific is Richard A. Fletcher's "Reconquest and crusade in Spain c.

1050–1150," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th ser., 37 (1987), and Peter Linehan's "The Synod of Segovia (1166)," *Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law* NS 10 (1980), but more recent are William Purkis' *Crusading Spirituality in the Holy Land and Iberia c. 1095–c. 1187* (2008), and the comparative volume *Crusading on the Edge. Ideas and Practice of Crusading in Iberia and the Baltic Region, 1100–1500*, ed. Torben K. Nielsen and Iben Fonnesberg-Schmidt (2016). See also Robert I. Burns' *The Crusader Kingdom of Valencia*, 2 vols (1967), and *Muslims, Christians and Jews in the Crusader Kingdom of Valencia* (1984), as well as Richard A. Fletcher, *Saint James's Catapult: The Life and Times of Diego Gelmírez of Santiago de Compostela* (1984) and Hussein Fancy, *The Mercenary Mediterranean: Sovereignty, Religion, and Violence in the Medieval Crown of Aragon* (2016). For an alternative view, see Luis García-Guijarro, "Reconquest and the Second Crusade in Eastern Iberia: The Christian Expansion in the Lower Ebro Valley," in *The Second Crusade: Holy War on the Periphery of Latin Christendom*, ed. Jason Roche and Janus M. Jensen (2015).

Warfare in Iberia after 1274 is treated by Norman Housley in *The Avignon Papacy* and in *The Later Crusades.* Its extension into North Africa in the sixteenth century is described by Andrew C. Hess in *The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-century Ibero-African Frontier* (1978). Works on Iberian military orders are included in the section on the military orders.

The Baltic and Northern Crusades

Eris Christiansen's *The Northern Crusades* (1980) is still useful, but several important books have recently appeared: Iben Fonnesberg-Schmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusades 1147–1254* (2007); Janus M. Jensen, *Denmark and the Crusades, 1400–1650* (2007), *Jerusalem in the North. Denmark and the Baltic Crusades, 1100–1522, ed.* Ane L. Bysted, Carsten Selch Jensen, Kurt Villads Jensen, and John H. Lind (2012); and the aforementioned *Crusading on the Edge. Ideas and Practice of Crusading in Iberia and the Baltic Region, 1100–1500*, ed. Torben K. Nielsen and Iben Fonnesberg-Schmidt (2016). Norman Housley has interesting things to say in *The Avignon Papacy* and *The Later Crusades*.

Central to this subject is the history of the Teutonic Knights. Works on them are included in the section on the military orders.

Africa

Though much remains to be done regarding the intersection between crusading and Africa, good starting points are Bernard Hamilton's "The Lands of Prester John. Western Knowledge of Asia and Africa at the Time of the Crusades," *Haskins Society Journal* 15 (2004) and "The Crusades in North East Africa," in *Crusading and Warfare in the Middle Ages. Realities and Representations. Essays in Honour of John France*, ed. Simon John and Nicholas Morton (2014), and *Croisades en Afrique: Les expeditions occidentales*

à destination du continent africain, XIIIe–XVIe siècles, ed. Benjamin Weber (2019). See also Verena Krebs, *Medieval Ethiopian Kingship, Craft, and Diplomacy with Latin Europe* (2021); and Adam Simmons, *Nubia, Ethiopia, and the Crusading World, 1095–1402* (2022).

Crusades against Heretics and Opponents of the Church

A brief introduction to the Albigensian Crusade is found in Malcolm Barber's *Cathars* (2000). Papal Policy is explained in Rebecca Rist's *The Papacy and Crusading in Europe 1198–1245* (2009). Pavel Soukup has published a number of works on the Hussites, as cited in this book's notes. A good short description of the crusades against the Hussites is F. G. Heyman, "The Crusades against the Hussites," *A History of the Crusades* 3, ed. Kenneth M. Setton (1975). See also Mark Whelan, "Between Papacy and Empire: Cardinal Henry Beaufort, the House of Lancaster, and the Hussite Crusades," *English Historical Review* 133 (2018), and Thomas A. Fudge, *Jan Hus. Religious Reform and Social Revolution in Bohemia* (2010). There is interesting treatment by Norman Housley in his *The Later Crusades* (1992) and *Religious Warfare (2002)*.

The standard work on the political crusades in Italy is Norman Housley's *The Italian Crusades* (1982). He continues the story in his *The Avignon Papacy.* See also Simon Lloyd's "'Political Crusades' in England, c. 1215–17 and c. 1263–5," in Peter W. Edbury ed., *Crusade and Settlement* (1985).

The Nineteenth Century and Beyond

The historiography on crusading in the nineteenth century and beyond is ever growing. For important starting points, see Elizabeth Siberry, *The New Crusaders. Images of the Crusades in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries* (2000), Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Crusades, Christianity and Islam* (2008), and Mike Horswell, *The Rise and Fall of British Crusader Medievalism, c. 1825–1945* (2018). On the wider "medievalism" of the early twentieth century, see also Stefan Goebel, *The Great War and Medieval Memory. War, Remembrance and Medievalism in Britain and Germany, 1914–1940* (2007). Those interested in the continued influence of crusading in the modern era should consult the ongoing *Engaging the Crusades* series, edited by Mike Horswell and Jonathan Phillips.

Latin Settlements in the Eastern Mediterranean

For a general overview of the Latin settlements of West Asia in the so-called first period (1098–1187), see Malcolm Barber's *The Crusader States* (2012). No detailed survey exists for the thirteenth century, though some useful information is found in Jean Richard's *The Crusades, c.1071–c.1291* (1999). Recent discussions on the cultural "crusading" aspects of the crusader states can be found in Timo Kirschberger's *Erster Kreuzzug und Ethnogenese: In novam formam commutatus – Ethnogenetische Prozesse im Fürstentum*

Antiochia und im Königreich Jerusalem (2015) and Andrew D. Buck, "Settlement, Identity, and Memory in the Latin East: An Examination of the Term 'Crusader States,'" *English Historical Review* 135 (2020).

Edessa

Monique Amouroux-Mourad's *Le comté d'Edesse* (1988) should be supplemented by Christopher MacEvitt's *The Crusades and the Christian World of the East. Rough Tolerance* (2008) and Alan V. Murray's *Baldwin of Bourcq. Count of Edessa and King of Jerusalem (1100–1131)* (2021).

Cilician Armenia

An introduction in English is Thomas S. R. Boase ed., *The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia* (1978). It is also worth consulting Isabelle Augé, *Byzantins, Arméniens et Francs au temps de la croisade: politique religieuse et reconquête en Orient sous la dynastie des Comnènes (1081–1185)* (2007) and Marie-Anna Chevalier's *Les ordres religieux-militaires en Arménie cilicienne* (2009).

Antioch and Tripoli

The groundwork for the principality of Antioch was laid in Claude Cahen's *La Syrie du Nord à l'époque des croisades et la principauté franque d'Antioche* (1940). It has been carried further by Hans E. Mayer's *Varia Antiochena: Studien zum Kreuzfahrerfürstentum Antiochia im 12. und frühen 13. Jarhundert* (1993), Thomas S. Asbridge's *The Creation of the Principality of Antioch, 1098–1130* (2000) and several smaller studies, and Andrew D. Buck's *The Principality of Antioch and its Frontiers in the Twelfth Century* (2017) and other shorter studies, most especially "Women in the Principality of Antioch: Power, Status, and Social Agency," *Haskins Society Journal* 31 (2019). For Tripoli, the starting point was Jean Richard, *Le comté de Tripoli sous la dynastie toulousaine (1102–1187)* (1945), but see now Kevin James Lewis, *The Counts of Tripoli and Lebanon in the Twelfth Century. Sons of Saint-Gilles* (2017) and *Le Comté de Tripoli. État multicultural et multiconfessionel (1102–1289)* (2010), ed. Gérard Dédéyan and Karim Rizk. For the archaeological evidence, an excellent starting point is Balázs Major, *Medieval Rural Settlements in the Syrian Coastal Region (12th and 13th Centuries)* (2015).

Jerusalem

The best general introduction to the Kingdom of Jerusalem remains Jean Richard's *The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*, tr. Janet Shirley, 2 vols (1979), although it was first published in 1953. Joshua Prawer's *Crusader Institutions* (1980) is still also important. Alan V. Murray's *The Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem: A Dynastic History 1099–1125* (2000) is relevant to the early years of settlement. King Baldwin IV has been the subject

of Bernard Hamilton's *The Leper King and His Heirs. Baldwin IV and the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem* (2000) and Eric Bohme's *Die Außenbeziehungen des Königreiches Jerusalem im 12. Jahrhundert: Kontinuität Und Wandel Im Herrscherwechsel Zwischen König Amalrich Und Balduin IV* (2019). Jonathan Riley-Smith's *The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem*, *1174–1277* (1973) concentrates on the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries. There have also been several recent biographies of Jerusalemite rulers, including Simon John, *Godfrey of Bouillon. Duke of Lower Lotharingia, Ruler of Latin Jerusalem, c.1060–1100* (2019), Susan B. Edgington, *Baldwin I of Jerusalem, 1100–1118* (2019), Alan V. Murray, *Baldwin of Bourcq. Count of Edessa and King of Jerusalem (1100–1131)* (2021), and Helen J. Nicholson, *Sybil, Queen of Jerusalem, 1186–1190* (2022). For a more general study on royal diplomacy, see Jonathan Phillips, *Defenders of the Holy Land: Relations between the Latin East and the West*, *1119–1187* (1996).

Hans E. Mayer has led the way in the examination of individual lordships. His articles, many of which are in English, have been collected in *Kreuzzüge und lateinischer Osten* (1983), *Probleme des lateinischen Königreichs Jerusalem* (1983), and *Kings and Lords in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem* (1993). See also Steven Tibble, *Monarchy and Lordships in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*, *1099–1291* (1989). For an innovative approach that sets a crusader lordship in a much wider temporal setting, see Marcus Milwright, *The Fortress of the Raven. Karak in the Middle Islamic Period (1100–1650)* (2008).

On the legal and administrative history of the kingdom, see Benjamin Z. Kedar, "On the origins of the earliest laws of Frankish Jerusalem: The Canons of the Council of Nablus, 1120," *Speculum* 74 (1999), Jonathan Riley-Smith, "Further Thoughts on Baldwin II's établissement on the confiscation of fiefs," in *Crusade and Settlement*, ed. Peter W. Edbury (1985), Peter W. Edbury, *John of Ibelin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem* (1997), which is a preliminary study to his edition of the law-book of John of Jaffa: *John of Ibelin*, *Le Livre des Assises* (2003), and "Fiefs and Vassals in the Kingdom of Jerusalem: from the Twelfth Century to the Thirteenth," *Crusades* 1 (2003), and Marwan Nader, *Burgesses and Burgess Law in the Latin Kingdoms of Jerusalem and Cyprus (1099–1325)* (2006). Hans E. Mayer's *Die Kanzlei der lateinischen Könige von Jerusalem*, 2 vols (1996) is a masterful study of the chancery in advance of his four-volume edition of the royal charters, *Die Urkunden der lateinischen Könige von Jerusalem* (2010).

For settlement and relations with the indigenous, the best entry point is Ronnie Ellenblum, *Frankish Rural Settlement in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem* (1998). See also Cyril Aslanov, "Languages in contact in the Latin East: Acre and Cyprus," *Crusades* 1 (2002); Benjamin Z. Kedar, "The Subjected Muslims of the Frankish Levant," in *Muslims Under Latin Rule*, *1100–1300*, ed. James M. Powell (1990); Jonathan Riley-Smith, "Government and the indigenous in the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem," in *Medieval Frontiers: Concepts and Practices*, ed. David Abulafia and Nora Berend (2002); Iris Shagrir, *Naming Patterns in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem* (2003); and Adrian Boas, *Domestic Settings. Sources on Domestic Architecture and Day-to-Day Activities in the Crusader States* (2010).

Trade

The operations of European merchants are described in all the general works, but a wide-ranging survey is needed. The best introduction is Michel Balard's collected articles in *La Méditerranée médiévale. Espaces, itinéraires, comptoirs* (2006) and the same author's *Les Latins en Orient (Xe–XVe siècle)* (2006). See also David Abulafia, "Trade and crusade," in *Cross-cultural Convergencies in the Crusader Period*, ed. Michael Goodich, Sophia Menache, and Sylvia Schein (1995); Marie-Luise Favreau-Lilie, *Die Italiener im Heiligen Land vom ersten Kreuzzug bus zum Tode Heinrichs von Champagne (1098–1197)* (1989); Mike Carr, *Merchant Crusaders in the Aegean, 1291–1352* (2015); and *Crusading and Trading between East and West. Studies in Honour of David Jacoby*, ed. Sophia Menache, Benjamin Z. Kedar, and Michel Balard (2019). The context is brilliantly described in Shelomo Goitein's *A Mediterranean Society. The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza*, 6 vols (1967–99) and Jessica L. Goldberg's *Trade and Institutions in the Medieval Mediterranean: The Geniza Merchants and their Business World* (2016).

The Latin Church in the Crusader States

The best introduction in English is Bernard Hamilton's *The Latin Church in the Crusader States: The Secular Church* (1980). See also Andrew Jotischky, *The Perfection of Solitude: Hermits and Monks in the Crusader States* (1995), Hans E. Mayer, *Bistümer, Klöster und Stifte im Königreich Jerusalem* (1977), Jean Richard, *La papauté et les missions d'Orient au moyen âge (XIIIe–XVe siècles)* (1977), Miriam R. Tessera, *Orientalis ecclesia: Papato, Chiesa e regno latino di Gerusalemme (1099–1187)* (2010), and Bernard Hamilton and Andrew Jotischky, *Latin and Greek Monasticism in the Crusader States* (2020).

On schools, learning, and literary cultures, see Benjamin Z. Kedar, "Gerard of Nazareth: A neglected twelfth-century writer in the Latin East," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 37 (1983); Peter Edbury and John G. Rowe, *William of Tyre. Historian of the Latin East* (1988); Piers Mitchell, *Medicine in the Crusades. Warfare, Wounds and the Medieval Surgeon* (2004); Emilie Savage-Smith, "New evidence for the Frankish study of Arabic medical texts in the crusader period," *Crusades* 5 (2006); Charles Burnett, "Stephen, the disciple of philosophy, and the exchange of medical learning in Antioch," *Crusades* 5 (2006); and Julian Yolles, *Making the East Latin. The Latin Literature of the Levant in the Era of the Crusades* (2022).

Art and Architecture

Two of the most important publications on crusader art are Jaroslav Folda: *The Art of the Crusaders in the Holy Land 1098–1187* (1995) and *Crusader Art in the Holy Land from the Third Crusade to the Fall of Acre, 1187–1291* (2005). However, recent debates have re-considered the nature of the term "crusader art," for which see Lucy-Anne Hunt, "Art and Colonialism: The Mosaics of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem (1169) and the Problem of 'Crusader' Art," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 45 (1991) and Maria

Georgopoulou, "Orientalism and Crusader Art: Constructing a New Canon," *Medieval Encounters* 5 (1999). See also *The Crusades and Visual Culture*, ed. Elizabeth Lapina, April J. Morris, Laura J. Whatley, and Susanna A. Throop (2015).

For religious architecture, see Denys Pringle, *The Churches of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem: A Corpus*, 4 vols (1993–2009), which is the definitive survey of all the church buildings in the kingdom. Camille Enlart's *Les monuments des croisés dans le royaume de Jérusalem: Architecture religieuse et civile*, 2 vols (1925–8) is still useful for the county of Tripoli and the principality of Antioch.

For coins and seals, see D. Michael Metcalf, *Coinage of the Crusades and the Latin East*, 2nd edn (1995); Hans E. Mayer, *Das Siegelwesen in den Kreuzfahrerstaaten* (1978); and Gustave Schlumberger, Ferdinand Chalandon, and Adrien Blanchet, *Sigillographie de l'Orient latin* (1943).

Cyprus

The best study is Peter W. Edbury's *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades, 1191–1374* (1991). It can be supplemented by Jean Richard, *Chypre sous les Lusignans: Documents chypriotes des archives du Vatican (XIVe et XVe siècles)* (1962), Nicholas Coureas, *The Latin Church in Cyprus, 1195–1312* (1997) and *The Latin Church in Cyprus 1313–1378* (2010), Camille Enlart, *Gothic Art and the Renaissance in Cyprus*, tr. David Hunt (1987), and Thomas Devaney, "Spectacle, Community and Holy War in Fourteenth-Century Cyprus," *Medieval Encounters: Jewish, Christian and Muslim Culture in Confluence and Dialogue* 19:3 (2013).

Greece

The history of Latin Greece has had detailed, if rather unanalytical treatment, in *A History of the Crusades*, ed. Kenneth Setton, vols 2–3. See also Michel Balard, *La Romanie génoise (XIIe-début du XVe siècle)* (1978); Antoine Bon, *La Morée Franque: Recherches historiques, topographiques et archéologiques sur la principauté d'Achaïe (1205–1430)* (1969); Giorgio Fedalto, *La chiesa latina in Oriente*, 3 vols (1973–8); Peter Lock, *The Franks in the Aegean, 1204–1500* (1995); Teresa Shawcross, *The Chronicle of Morea* (2009); Nikolaos Chrissis, *Crusading in Frankish Greece. A Study of Byzantine-Western Relations and Attitudes, 1204–1282* (2012); and *Contact and Conflict in Frankish Greece and the Aegean, 1204–1453. Crusade, Religion and Trade between Latins, Greeks and Turks*, ed. Nikolaos Chrissis and Mike Carr (2014).

The Military Orders

For general introductions to the military orders, an encyclopedia now covers all the medieval orders: *Prier et Combattre. Dictionnaire européen des ordres militaires au*

Moyen Âge, ed. Nicole Bériou and Philippe Josserand (2009). It can be supplemented by *World Orders of Knighthood and Merit*, ed. Guy Stair Sainty and Rafal Heydel-Mankoo, 2 vols (2006), which extends to the present day. Good introductions are also found in the chapters by Alan J. Forey and Anthony T. Luttrell in *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades*, ed. Jonathan Riley-Smith (1995). See also Alain Demurger, *Chevaliers du Christ: Les ordres religieux-militaires au Moyen Âge* (2002), and Alan J. Forey, *The Military Orders* (1992). Recent works dealing with more than one order include Jochen Burgtorf, *The Central Convent of Hospitallers and Templars. History, Organization, and Personnel (1099/1120–1310)* (2008); Marie-Anna Chevalier, *Les ordres religieux-militaires en Arménie cilicienne* (2009); Adrian J. Boas, *Archaeology of the Military Orders: A Survey of the Urban Centres, Rural Settlement and Castles of the Military Orders in the Latin East (*c. *1120–1291)* (2006); Jonathan Riley-Smith, *Templars and Hospitallers as Professed Religious in the Holy Land* (2010); Myra Miranda Bom, *Women in the Military Orders of the Crusades* (2012); and *The Templars, the Hospitallers, and the Crusades. Essays in Homage to Alan J. Forey* (2020), ed. Helen Nicholson and Jochen Burgtorf. Likewise, the series *The Military Orders*, which includes the proceedings of a quadrennial conference on the military orders and is now into its seventh volume, contains much that is useful.

The Knights Templar

Reliable histories of the Templars are Malcolm Barber's *The New Knighthood: A History of the Order of the Temple* (1994), and Alain Demurger's *Les Templiers. Une chevalerie chrétienne au Moyen Âge* (2005). See also *The Templars. The Rise, Fall and Legacy of a Military Religious Order*, ed. Jochen Burgtorf, Shlomo Lotan, Enric Mallorquí-Ruscalleda (2021). For the Templars in the East, see Pierre-Vincent Claverie's *L'Ordre du Temple en Terre Sainte et à Chypre au XIIIe siècle*, 3 vols (2005).

The best book on their provincial structure remains Alan Forey's *The Templars in the Corona de Aragon* (1973). See also Evelyn Lord's *The Knights Templar in Britain* (2004). A new way of looking at the local relationship of the Templar commanderies with neighboring families is found in Damien Carraz's *L'ordre du Temple dans la basse vallée du Rhône (1124–1312): Ordres militaires, croisades et sociétés méridionales* (2005), and Jochen Schenk's *Templar Families. Landowning Families and the Order of the Temple in France, c. 1120–1307* (2012).

The orthodox view on the dissolution of the Order, one that stresses their innocence, can be found in Malcolm Barber, *The Trial of the Templars* (1978) and Alan Forey "Were the Templars guilty, even if they were not heretics or apostates?" *Viator* 42 (2011). For an alternative view, see the two essays by Jonathan Riley-Smith in Susan Ridyard ed., *The Medieval Crusade* (2004): "Were the Templars guilty?" and "The structures of the Orders of the Temple and the Hospital in c. 1291." See also now two important edited volumes: *The Debate on the Trial of the Templars (1307–1314)*, ed. Helen Nicholson, Paul F. Crawford, and Jochen Burgtorf (2010); *La fin de l'ordre du Temple*, ed. Marie-Anna Chavalier (2012).

The Knights Hospitaller of St. John

For the general history of the Hospitallers, see Helen Nicholson, *The Knights Hospitaller* (2001) and Jonathan Riley-Smith, *Hospitallers* (1999).

The most detailed examination of the Hospitallers in the eastern Mediterranean before the fourteenth century is Jonathan Riley-Smith's *The Knights Hospitaller in the Levant, c. 1070–1309* (2012), which replaces his *The Knights of St John in Jerusalem and Cyprus, c. 1050–1310* (1967).

For the Hospitaller sisters, see Anthony Luttrell and Helen Nicholson, *Hospitaller Women in the Middle Ages* (2006) and Myra Miranda Bom, *Women in the Military Orders of the Crusades* (2012).

On the Hospitallers' European estates, see Judith Bronstein's *The Hospitallers and the Holy Land. Financing the Latin East 1187–1274* (2005), Pierre Bonneaud's *Le prieuré de Catalogne, le couvent de Rhodes et la couronne d'Aragon 1415–1447* (2004), Michael Gervers' "*Pro defensione Terre Sancte*: The development and exploitation of the Hospitallers' landed estate in Essex," *The Military Orders*, ed. Malcolm Barber (1994), Gregory O'Malley's *The Knights Hospitaller of the English Langue 1460–1565* (2005), and Simon Phillips' *The Prior of the Knights Hospitaller in Late Medieval England* (2009).

The Hospitaller occupation of Rhodes and the Dodecanese is covered by Jürgen Sarnowsky's *Macht und Herrschaft im Johanniterorden des 15. Jahrhunderts* (2001), Nicolas Vatin's *L'Ordre de Saint-Jean-de-Jérusalem, l'Empire Ottoman et la Méditerranée orientale entre le deux sièges de Rhodes (1480–1522)* (1994), and in Anthony Luttrell's *The Town of Rhodes, 1306–1356* (2003), *The Countryside of Hospitaller Rhodes, 1306–1423. Original Texts and English Summaries* (2019), as well as his many articles, some of which have been collected in four volumes: *The Hospitallers in Cyprus, Rhodes, Greece and the West (1291–1440)* (1978); *Latin Greece, the Hospitallers and the Crusades, 1291–1400* (1982); *The Hospitallers of Rhodes and their Mediterranean World* (1992); and *The Hospitaller State on Rhodes and its Western Provinces, 1306–1462* (1999).

The Order's occupation of Malta is covered in Anne Brogini's *Malte, frontière de chrétienté, 1530–1670* (2006) and Alain Blondy's *L'Ordre de Malte au XVIIIe siècle: Des dernières splendeurs à la ruine* (2002). See also Emanuel Buttigieg, *Nobility, Faith and Masculinity: The Hospitaller Knights of Malta, c. 1580–c. 1700* (2011) and *Hospitaller Malta, 1530–1798: Studies on Early Modern Malta and the Order of St John of Jerusalem, ed.* Victor Mallia-Milanes (1993).

The Teutonic Order

The best general histories are Udo Arnold ed., *800 Jahre Deutscher Orden* (1990), Hartmut Boockmann, *Der Deutsche Orden: Zwölf Kapitel aus seiner Geschichte* (1981), and Klaus Militzer, *Die Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens* (2005). See also Nicholas Morton, *The Teutonic Knights in the Holy Land, 1190–1291* (2009).

For the thirteenth century, see Klaus Militzer's *Von Akkon zur Marienburg: Verfassung, Verwaltung und Sozialstruktur des Deutschen Ordens, 1190–1309* (1999).

For Prussia, English readers should consult Norman J. Housley's *The Avignon Papacy* (1986) and *The Later Crusades (1992)*, but also the ongoing work of Gregory Leighton, for example his "Did the Teutonic Order create a Sacred Space in Thirteenth-Century Prussia," *Journal of Medieval History* 44, no. 4 (2018). Axel Ehlers' *Die Ablasspraxis des Deutschen Ordens im Mittelalter* (2007) is a good study of the Teutonic Knights' use of indulgences. For their recruitment of European nobles, see Werner Paravicini's *Die Preussenreise des Europäischen Adels*, 2 vols (1989–95).

The Iberian Orders

The best general books on the subject are Carlos de Ayala Martínez's *Las órdenes militares hispánicas en la Edad Media, siglos XII–XV* (2003), Enrique Rodríguez-Picavea's *Los monjes guerreros en los reinos hispánicos: Las órdenes militares en la Península Ibérica durante la Edad Media* (2008) and Philippe Josserand's *Eglise et pouvoir dans la Péninsule Ibérique: Les ordres militaires dans le royaume de Castille, 1252–1369* (2004). A pathbreaking study on Portugal was Luís Adão da Fonseca's *O Condestável D. Pedro de Portugal, a Ordem Militar de Avis e a Península Ibérica do seu tempo (1429–1466)* (1982), with a good introduction in English found in "The Portuguese military orders and the oceanic navigations: From piracy to empire (fifteenth to early sixteenth centuries)," in *The Military Orders Volume 4. On Land and by Sea*, ed. Judith Upton-Ward (2008). English speakers might also consult Alan J. Forey, "The military orders and the Spanish reconquest in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries," *Traditio* 40 (1984), repr. in Alan J. Forey, *Military Orders and Crusades* (1994), Joseph F. O'Callaghan, *The Spanish Military Order of Calatrava and its Affiliates* (1975), and Philippe Josserand, "Frontier conflict, military cost and culture: The Master of Santiago and the Islamic border in mid-fourteenth century Spain," in *The Military Orders Volume 6:2. Culture and Conflict in Western and Northern Europe*, ed. Jochen Schenk and Mike Carr (2017), as well as other interesting chapters contained in volumes of *The Military Orders*.

Lesser Military Orders

For the Order of St. Lazarus, see David Marcombe, *Leper Knights* (2003). For the Order of the Sword-Brothers, see Friedrich Benninghoven, *Der Orden der Schwertbrüder* (1965). For the English Order of St. Thomas of Acre, see Alan J. Forey, "The military order of St Thomas of Acre," *English Historical Review* 92 (1977).

Sources in Translation

At least for the eleventh through thirteenth centuries, scholars of the crusades are now blessed by a proliferation of accessible English translations of major texts through the

Crusade Texts in Translation series. There are also several useful source collections or anthologies, including Louise and Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Crusades, Idea and Reality, 1095–1274* (1981), Norman J. Housley, *Documents on the Later Crusades, 1274–1580* (1996), Corliss Slack, *Crusade Charters, 1138–1270* (2001), S. J. Allen and Emilie Amt, *The Crusades. A Reader*, 2nd edn (2014), Jessalynn Bird, Edward Peters, and James M. Powell, *Crusade and Christendom. Annotated Documents in Translation from Innocent III to the Fall of Acre, 1187–1291* (2013). For Muslim perspectives, see Suleiman A. Mourad and James E. Lindsay, *Muslim Sources of the Crusade Period. An Anthology* (2021) and the collection of translated sources in Niall Christie's *Muslims and Crusaders: Christianity's Wars in the Middle East, 1095-1382, from the Islamic sources*, 2nd edn (2020). Recent essay collections edited by Alex Mallett also provide context and authorial details for key texts outside of the Latin Christian canon, *Medieval Muslim Historians and the Franks in the Levant* (2014) and *Franks and Crusades in Medieval Eastern Christian Historiography* (2021). There is a need for more sources in English translation that are either representative of historically marginalized perspectives or from beyond the traditional geographical and chronological boundaries of the crusades.

Sources from Latin Christendom

For each of the major "numbered" crusading expeditions, there survive several participant narratives that are central to understanding events. Similarly, particularly for the First Crusade, later texts were commissioned which are vital to our understanding of these events' later reception.

For the Latin participant narratives of the First Crusade, see: *Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum*, ed. and tr. Rosalind Hill (1962); Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia*, tr. John H. and Laurita L. Hill (1968); and Fulcher of Chartres, *A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem 1095–1127*, tr. Frances R. Ryan, ed. Harold S. Fink (1969). See also the translations found in Edward Peters, *First Crusade* (1998), especially for Raymond of Aguilers. For later texts, see especially Albert of Aachen, *Historia Iherosolimitana*, tr. Susan B. Edgington (2007); Baldric of Bourgueil, *History of the Jerusalemites*, tr. Susan B. Edgington with notes by Steven J. Biddlecombe (2020); Guibert of Nogent, *The Deeds of God through the Franks*, tr. Robert Levine (2011); and Robert the Monk, *Historia Iherosolimitana*, tr. Carol Sweetenham (2006).

Three of the main sources for the "Second" Crusade, one covering the fighting in Asia Minor, two other engagements in Portugal and Iberia, are Odo of Deuil, *De profectione Ludovici VII in orientem*, ed. and tr. Virginia G. Berry (1948), *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, ed. and tr. Charles W. David (1936, repr. with an introduction by Jonathan Phillips, 2001), and *The Conquest of Santarém and Goswin's Song of the Conquest of Alcácer do Sal: Editions and Translations of De expugnatione Scalabis and Gosuini de expugnatione Salaciae carmen*, tr. Jonathan Wilson (2021).

For the "Third" Crusade, see *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade. The Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, tr. Helen J. Nicholson (1997); *The Conquest of*

Jerusalem and the Third Crusade, tr. Peter W. Edbury (1996); Ambroise, *History of the Holy War*, tr. Marianne Ailes with notes by Malcolm Barber, 2 vols (2003); *The Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa. The History of the Expedition of Emperor Frederick Barbarossa and Related Texts*, tr. Graham Loud (2013); and *The Deeds of Philip Augustus. An English Translation of Rigord's Gesta Philippi Regis*, tr. Larry J. Field and ed. M. Cecilila Gaposchkin and Sean L. Field (2022).

For the "Fourth" Crusade, see Robert of Cléry (Clari), *The Conquest of Constantinople*, tr. Edgar H. McNeal (1936); *Capture of Constantinople: The Hystoria Constantinopolitana of Gunther of Pairis*, tr. Alfred J. Andrea (1997); Alfred J. Andrea, *Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade* (2000); and Geoffrey of Villehardouin, *The Conquest of Constantinople*, tr. Caroline Smith, *Joinville and Villehardouin* (2008).

For the "Fifth" Crusade, see Oliver of Paderborn, *The Capture of Damietta*, tr. John J. Gavigan (1948) and Edward Peters, *Christian Society and the Crusades*, *1198–1229* (1971).

For the first crusade of Louis IX of France, see John of Joinville, *The Life of Saint Louis*, tr. Caroline Smith, *Joinville and Villehardouin* (2008). See also Peter Jackson, *The Seventh Crusade, 1244–1254. Sources and Documents* (2007), which contains translated extracts from the narrative of Ibn Wasil, an important Arabic source still unavailable to readers.

For an example of the crusade memoranda around 1300, see Pierre Dubois, *De recuperatione Terre Sancte (The Recovery of the Holy Land)*, tr. Walther I. Brandt (1956).

For King Peter of Cyprus' attack on Alexandria, *Capture of Alexandria/Guillaume de Machaut*, tr. Janet Shirley, with intr. and notes by Peter W. Edbury (2001).

For the Albigensian Crusade, see *The History of the Albigensian Crusade. Peter of Les Vaux-de-Cernay's Historia Albigensis*, tr. W. A. and M. D. Sibly (1998); *The Chronicle of William of Puylaurens: The Albigensian Crusade and its Aftermath*, tr. W. A. and M. D. Sibly (2003); *The Song of the Cathar Wars: A History of the Albigensian Crusade/William of Tudela and an Anonymous Successor*, tr. Janet Shirley (1996); and Catherine Léglu, Rebecca Rist, and Claire Taylor, *The Cathars and the Albigensian Crusade. A Sourcebook* (2014).

For the Hussite Crusades, see *The Crusade Against the Heretics in Bohemia*, *1418–1437*, tr. Thomas A. Fudge (2002).

For the northern crusades of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, see Henry of Livonia, *The Chronicle*, tr. James A. Brundage (1961), *The Chronicle of Prussia by Nicolaus von Jeroschin: A History of the Teutonic Knights in Prussia, 1190–1331*, tr. Mary Fischer, and *The Chronicle of Arnold of Lübeck*, tr. Graham Loud (2020).

The Latin East: Antioch, Tripoli, Jerusalem

A collection of letters and documents has been translated in Malcolm Barber and Keith Bate, *Letters From the East. Crusaders, Pilgrims and Settlers in the 12th–13th Centuries* (2010). Much of the charter evidence for the Latin East is also now edited and translated through the *Revised Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani Database* project: www.crusades-regesta.com.

The early history of Antioch is described by Ralph of Caen, *Gesta Tancredi*, tr. Bernard S. and David S. Bachrach (2005), and Walter the Chancellor, *The Antiochene Wars*, tr. Thomas S. Asbridge and Susan B. Edgington (1999).

The early history of Jerusalem is best described in Albert of Aachen and Fulcher of Chartres (see above). The chief narrative for the twelfth century is William of Tyre, *A History of Deeds Done Beyond the Sea*, tr. Emily A. Babcock and August C. Krey, 2 vols (1943). For a Jerusalemite narrative of the city's loss to Saladin in 1187, see *The Conquest of the Holy Land by Salah al-Din. A Critical Edition and Translation of the Anonymous Libellus de Expugnatione Terrae Sanctae per Saladinum*, ed. and tr. Keagan Brewer and James H. Kane (2019). For those with French, see Jacques de Vitry, *Historia Orientalis*, tr. Jean Donnadieu (2008).

The thirteenth century is represented by Philip of Novara, *The Wars of Frederick II Against the Ibelins in Syria and Cyprus*, tr. John L. La Monte and Merton J. Hubert (1936); Philip of Novara, *Le Livre de Forme de Plait,* tr. Peter W. Edbury (2009); *Crusader Syria in the Thirteenth Century: The Rothelin Continuation of William of Tyre with Part of the Eracles or Acre Text*, tr. Janet Shirley (1999); and *The "Templar of Tyre" Part III of the Deeds of the Cypriots*, tr. Paul Crawford (2003).

Itineraries and pilgrimage descriptions of the Holy Land can be found in *Jerusalem Pilgrimage 1099–1185*, tr. John Wilkinson, Joyce Hill, and William F. Ryan (1988), and *Pilgrimage to Jerusalem and the Holy Land, 1187–1291*, tr. Denys Pringle (2012).

Cyprus and Greece

See *The Assizes of the Lusignan Kingdom of Cyprus*, tr. Nicholas Coureas (2002); Leontios Machairas, *Recital Concerning the Sweet Land of Cyprus*, ed. and tr. Richard M. Dawkins, 2 vols (1932); and *The Old French Chronicle of Morea. An Account of Frankish Greece after the Fourth Crusade*, tr. Anne van Arsdall and Helen Moody (2015).

The Military Orders

A good collection of documents is *The Templars. Selected Sources*, tr. Malcolm Barber and Keith Bate (2002). Their internal legislation is found in *The Rule of the Templars*, tr. Judith Upton-Ward (1992). Two important accounts of their dissolution are *The Fall of the Templars in the Crown of Aragon*, tr. Alan Forey (2001) and *The Proceedings Against the Templars in the British Isles*, tr. (in vol. 2) Helen Nicholson (2011).

For the Hospitallers we have much less. Their internal legislation up to the early fourteenth century is in *The Rule, Statutes and Customs of the Hospitallers, 1099–1310*, tr. Edwin J. King (1934). William Caoursin's account of the siege of Rhodes in 1480 was translated within two years as *The dylectable newesse and tythinges of the glorious victorye of the Rhodyans agaynst the Turks*, tr. Johan Kaye (1482). There is an edition by Henry W. Fincham in Order of St John of Jerusalem, Historical Pamphlets no. 2, 1926. The siege of Malta was described by Francisco Balbi de Corregio, *The Siege of Malta, 1565*, tr. Ernle Bradford (1965).

Eastern Christian Sources

For Byzantine historiography, see Anna Komnena, *The Alexiad*, tr. E. R. A. Sewter and Peter Frankopan (2009), John Kinnamos, *The Deeds and John and Manuel Comnenus*, tr. Charles M. Brand (1976), and Niketas Choniates, *O City of Byzantium. The Annals of Niketas Choniates*, tr. Harry. J. Magoulias (1984). The Armenian texts of Matthew of Edessa and Gregory the Priest can be found in *Armenia and the Crusades: Tenth to Twelfth Centuries*, tr. Ara E. Dostourian, 2nd edn. (2013), while there is a French translation of Sempad the Constable's thirteenth-century text in *La Chronique attribuée au Connétable Smbat*, tr. Gerard Dédéyan (1980). The major Syriac text of Michael the Syrian (Michael Rabo, or "the Great") is now in English translation in *The Chronicle of Michael the Great*, tr. Amir Harrak (2019), while the French translation of the so-called *1234 Chronicle*, found in volume two of *Anonymi auctoris Chronicon ad A. C. 1234 pertinens*, ed. and trans. A. Abouna, J.-M. Fiey, and J.-B. Chabot, 4 vols (1916–74), is valuable. A less well-known but deeply moving literary source useful for understanding the wide range of perspectives on crusading warfare is Suleiman of Asluh's *Lament on Tripoli*, discussed and translated by Floris Sepmeijer and Krisnie Ciggaar in "The Lament on Tripoli by Solomon of Asluh (Sulayman al-Asluhi): Its Historical and Cultural Character," *East and West in the Medieval Eastern Mediterranean III,* ed. Van Aalst and Ciggaar (2018), 9–36.

Arabic Sources

For certain Arabic chroniclers, historians are still reliant on the French translations found in the *Recueil des historiens des Croisades. Historiens Orientaux* (1872–96) and the *Revue de l'Orient Latin*. However, several now have modern translations. The most important of these is Ibn al-Athir, *The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athir for the Crusading Period from al-Kamil fi'l-ta'rikh*, tr. Donald S. Richards, 3 vols (2006–8). For the period to the middle of the twelfth century, see *The Book of the Jihad of'Ali ibn Tahir al-Sulami*, tr. Niall Christie (2015); Ibn al-Qalanisi, *Chronicle of Damascus*, tr. Hamilton A. R. Gibb (1932), with a fuller French translation in Roger le Tourneau, *Damas de 1075 à 1154: Traduction annotée d'un fragment de l'Histoire de Damas d'Ibn al-Qalansi* (1952); and Alex Mallett, "Al-'Aẓīmī's Ta'rīkh for the Crusading Period: The Years 489–508/1095–1115," *Crusades* 19 (2020). For Saladin, see Baha' al-Din ibn Shaddad, *The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin*, tr. Donald S. Richards (1997) and Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, *Conquête de la Syrie et de la Palestine par Saladin*, tr. Henri Massé (1972). For the thirteenth century, see Abu'l-Fida's *The Memoirs of a Syrian Prince*, tr. Peter M. Holt (1983); Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, *Sirat al-Malik al-Zahir*, part ed. and tr. Syedah F. Sadeque (1956); and *Chronicles of Qalawun and his son al-Ashraf Kalil*, tr. David Cook (2020), as well as Ibn al-Furat, *Ayyubids, Mamlukes and Crusaders*, part ed. and tr. Ursula and Malcolm C. Lyons, 2 vols (1971) and *Baybars' Successors. Ibn al-Furat on Qalawun and al-Ashraf*, tr. David Cook (2020).

For relations with the Christians and descriptions of the Latin East, see Ibn Jubayr, *Travels*, tr. R. J. C. Broadhurst (1952) and Usamah ibn Munqidh, *The Book of Contemplation: Islam and the Crusades*, tr. Paul Cobb (2008).

Treaties with the Mamluks are found in Peter M. Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy (1260–1290): Treaties of Baybars and Qalawun with Christian Rulers* (1995).

Hebrew Sources

For the Hebrew sources on the pogroms that marred the First and Second Crusades, see Shlomo Eidelberg, *The Jews and the Crusaders* (1977), but it should be noted that the dates of the Hebrew narratives and their relationship to one another have been recently revised. For a Hebrew perspective on the crusader states, see Benjamin of Tudela, *The Itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela*, ed. and tr. Marcus Adler (1907).

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